Page 3 of 8 FirstFirst 12345 ... LastLast
Results 41 to 60 of 148

Thread: Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

  1. #41
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Posts
    567

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Are you advocating that there should be a price to pay for cooperating with the Taliban?
    Doesn't there have to be? What's the alternative?
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  2. #42
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Your suggestion of such price is?

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Doesn't there have to be? What's the alternative?
    No, there does not have to be nor should there be. The Taliban can visit at any time, slice a throat or two, bash in a kid's head and leave. We, NATO and the Afghans are powerless to prevent that on several levels. Try to make people 'pay a price for cooperating with the Taliban' under those circumstances and all you'll do is create a whole lot more Taliban from the population that you are coercing -- because that's what you're suggesting, coercion.

    Not the American way nor the way of today's world.

    The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.

    You owe me answer on my solution to your case study. We need to talk about Case Studies...

  3. #43
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Posts
    567

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Now, question for you -- what's wrong with that solution to your case study?
    Nothing. That's pretty much what I'd do. Return with more troops, some artillery and a couple of tanks. (You guys are pretty good. I'm sure if the proper resources are sent, the troops will achieve their mission.) Build a fence around the city. But I think you must come back. You need to send the message that cooperation with the Taliban will not be tolerated. (or if you can't be trusted, you will be controlled, which is different from punished: fences not crucifixions.)

    But I think Wanat has now become strategic and you still need to be population centric. Trying to intercept the bad guys as they move back and forth from their sanctuary is the right short term tactical decisions, but a long term strategic mistake.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  4. #44
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Posts
    567

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The Taliban can visit at any time, slice a throat or two, bash in a kid's head and leave.
    My understanding of COIN 101 is that as long as that's allowed to continue, you lose. (I could of course be wrong, but that was one of the basics I thought I understood.)

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    You owe me answer on my solution to your case study. We need to talk about Case Studies...
    Patience my friend: just because I'm younger doesn't mean that I can out think or out type you.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The alternative is to convince the Taliban to stop doing those clandestine visits and committing random acts of terror to keep the population docile. That's the long hard way to do it -- but it's the only acceptable way.
    Actually, I'm pretty sure that we both agree - although every time I think that we agree you usually insist that I'm wrong - that the answer is to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan so we can kill them.
    Last edited by Rank amateur; 07-19-2008 at 01:57 AM.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  5. #45
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Close...

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Nothing. That's pretty much what I'd do. Return with more troops, some artillery and a couple of tanks. (You guys are pretty good. I'm sure if the proper resources are sent, the troops will achieve their mission.) Build a fence around the city. But I think you must come back. You need to send the message that cooperation with the Taliban will not be tolerated. (or if you can't be trusted, you will be controlled, which is different from punished: fences not crucifixions.)
    The significant problem with my solution is that it does not show any consideration what so ever for what other coalition elements may be doing -- it focuses only on one tiny village out of thousands in one Valley out of thousands. In short, you and I elevated a minor setback -- one of many over the last five years, with more to come -- into a strategic issue. It is not.
    But I think Wanat has now become strategic
    Only in the sense it's in the intrnational news and that will fade within days. In a month, most of the world will not be able to tell you what or where Wanat is.
    ...and you still need to be population centric.
    True but you don't need to penalize or punish them for reacting like sensible human beings to a threat that we cannot at this time eliminate.
    Trying to intercept the bad guys as they move back and forth from their sanctuary is the right short term tactical decisions, but a long term strategic mistake.
    Not necessarily a mistake, perhaps the best of several bad choices?

  6. #46
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    My understanding of COIN 101 is that as long as that's allowed to continue, you lose. (I could of course be wrong, but that was one of the basics I thought I understood.)
    There are many who agree with that. Unfortunately, most of them do not have the responsibility to actually do anything about the ability of insurgents worldwide to move among their own population pretty much at will, so yet again COIN 101 meets the reality of the world outside academe.
    Patience my friend: just because I'm younger doesn't mean that I can out think or out type you.
    Sorry, no intent to rush you; just to needle a teeny bit EVERYBODY can outthink and out type me, my two fingered approach inevitably mean fifty leven errors to correct...
    Actually, I'm pretty sure that we both agree - although every time I think that we agree you usually insist that I'm wrong - that the answer is to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan so we can kill them.
    We agree more often that not. Generally, my apparent disagreement is designed to get you to think past the desirable (rarely obtained in any war) or the book solution (only a guide and subject to wide variations). Frequently I let things slide -- like we have no Tanks in Afghanistan from above and attempt to rain on only that part of your parade that needs, IMO, a nudge -- that's the arrogance of the aged (or curmudgeon like attitude thereof...).

    Having said that, we do agree. We definitely need to take away their sanctuary in Pakistan; that's a key requirement. The question is how to get there without creating more problems than we solve -- and that is really one very knotty and difficult problem. Hopefully, Pakistan will get to work on it -- if they do not, we've been more than patient and we would be reluctant to take unilateral action but too many in the world fail to realize that the worst thing one can do is hack off the Americans; they tend to over react. My sensing is that we are starting to get annoyed...

  7. #47
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Posts
    567

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    but you don't need to penalize or punish them for reacting like sensible human beings to a threat that we cannot at this time eliminate.
    Again, I thought the entire strategy was control the population, and they will help you control the threat. Let the population support the insurgents, and you will never be able to control the threat.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  8. #48
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default In an ideal world...

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Again, I thought the entire strategy was control the population, and they will help you control the threat. Let the population support the insurgents, and you will never be able to control the threat.
    Regrettably, the one in which we live is far from ideal.

    Controlling the population iis one way to do it -- it is also quite difficult. The world learned a lot of really bad lessons from Malaya. In that insurgency, the final and effective solution was population control. However, there are many differences between Malaya and almost every other one in which we've been involved. To the subject at hand, Afghanistan, those differences are:

    The insurgents are not a distinct and minority ethnic group that the majority opposes; we cannot round up people an summarily move them into secure areas to preclude them having intercourse with the insurgents, the world won't stand for it (nor do we have the assets to do that; it would take a million troops to do it even part way); the US is not the government of the nation involved; the neighboring nations are not disposed to assist us and in fact one large neighboring nation is disposed to be decidedly unhelpful; there is no narrow, easily guarded peninsula border to secure, there are in fact 5,500 or so km of rugged, difficult to secure land border, 2,400+ with Pakistan. There's more, that's just a starter list -- but everyone of those factors makes this a whole lot different than Malaya or the 'British experience' (who I understand now privately admit they are learning from us and that they misapplied the Northern Ireland experience in Basra with poor results).

    Population contol's a theory, no more. Populations are extraordinarily difficult to control; people tend to object to having others tell them where to go or what to do. You can force them to do things -- if you have adequate force -- but all you'll do is build up resentment. What you can do is control the environment to cut down on the visits of unfriendly types in the wee hours and we are doing that with some success, it just takes a while.

  9. #49
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,169

    Default It's an objective not a theory

    Population contol's a theory, no more. Populations are extraordinarily difficult to control; people tend to object to having others tell them where to go or what to do. posted by Ken
    Controlling the population a task, not a theory. It is a task that must be achieved to obtain a victory in a COIN. Fail to control the population and you might as well pack your bags and go home. Forget Malaysia, rather focus on what control means, then adapt your measures to your unique situation.

    Control is a "task" to exercise physical or psychological influence over a specified area, population, or resource to prevent its use by the enemy.

    In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control.

    Control measures range from the severe to the gentle persuaive arts of propaganda (talking points, films, fliers, engaging key local leaders) etc. However, regardless of the method used the most important supporting task is protecting the populace. Both sides will strive for legitimate control of the populace where the populace willingly supports them; however, the insurgent will use coercive measures to control the population as required as we are again seeing today. If the counterinsurgent can't protect the populace he CANNOT control them. To protect them he must be there, so combat outposts are essential. They are dangerous and in my opinion the hardest fight in COIN. Anyone can do raids and drop bombs on insurgents, but it is hard work to live 24/7 among the populace and protect them and yourselves, and there will be set backs. Commanders have to have realistic expectations and expect loses, but over time control can be established, if it can't then we need to reassess why we're there.

    We controlled the American Indians by killing, displacing them and implementing a reservation system. The Soviets controlled their population with a secret police and fear. Mao used fear (mass murder) and brainwashing. However, they lacked legitimate control and they could only afford to swing the stick for so long, so it clear why these systems failed.

    Realistically the host nation must establish control with our support. Occupiers cannot provide legitimate control. However, assuming the people don't want to be controlled by the insurgents and once they are convinced you're their to help them and that you will act on their intelligence tips they'll begin pointing out the insurgents to you, so you can start draining the swamp. It takes time and there will be set backs.

    Now my politically incorrect thought, if the people honestly desire to be ruled by the insurgents and are supporting them because they believe in their cause, not because they are being coerced, we then have a much bigger problem. At this point we may have to use various degrees of coercive measures initially to control the populace until we can mobilize them to support the host nation government. If for some reason this can't be done, then the insurgency cannot be defeated. This is where we need to set aside our political correct assumptions and fight the populace as we did against the Indians and in the Philippines. How do you sustain national and international will to engage in this type of war? Perhaps another option is to allow the insurgents to win, then coerce the new State, which will be much more vulnerable to our military power.

  10. #50
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default We can disagree on a lot of that

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Controlling the population a task, not a theory. It is a task that must be achieved to obtain a victory in a COIN.
    Population control is one of several COIN theories; it can be a task if you want to make it one, or it cannot be if you use another approach.
    Fail to control the population and you might as well pack your bags and go home.
    Tell me about the populations we're 'controlling' in Afghanistan and Iraq...
    Forget Malaysia, rather focus on what control means, then adapt your measures to your unique situation.
    I forgot about Malaya (not Malysia) over forty years ago when I figured out it was so different that the lessons were generally not applicable. Much of which I picked from the two Troops (+) from 22 SAS who came to Bragg for fun and games in 19-ought-62 and most of whom had been in Malaya. Unfortunately, a lot of other people haven't forgotten it and learned some bad lessons. Like population control (not influence, I agree with that, physical control is not a viable option nowadays).

    To put that in perspective, there are few similarities between Viet Nam and Afghanistan but look at the math; VN in the late 60s was a nation of about 18M people in an area of ~65K square miles; over a million South Viet Namese, US, South Korean, Australian/NZ, Thai and other troops not only could not control the population, they couldn't even control the ~1,200 miles of border to neighboring sanctuaries. In the 'Stan, we've got about 200K total Coalition troops in a nation of 32M people and an area of 250,000 square miles, just a tad smaller than Texas and a border of 2,400 clicks with Pakistan alone plus far more rugged terrain and a population that is significantly more violent and warlike. *

    Point is even without that control, the insurgency in Viet Nam was effectively dismantled and Afghanistan is far harder thing in which to exercise control...*
    Control is a "task" to exercise physical or psychological influence over a specified area, population, or resource to prevent its use by the enemy.
    Thank you for that little tutorial. We can agree on your definition -- though I'll note you have now broadened control to exercise psychological as well as physical influence (which by definition may not include finite control; i.e. 'influence' does not equal 'control'). I know you know this but for others, here's the appropriate definition from the DoD Dictionary:

    "3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed."

    I submit that for over 3,000 years a lot of folks have been trying to get to that point with the Afghans and none were successful; thus indications lead me to believe that we also will fail if try to get them to "respond as directed." We can and do influence them and we can parlay that into success -- so 'control' is not necessary, it just makes life easier. I BTW totally agree that under any theory of COIN one must be able to influence the population and that people are the center of mass.

    I'll also note that in Viet Nam though the population was never controlled and there were never enough troops to sit in every village and hamlet, the population was effectively influenced and that influence was adequate to eliminate the insurgency as a threat. Later, conventional attacks may have done in SVN but the insurgency got whipped -- and that without controlling the population -- who never got to the point of reponding as directed.*
    In COIN the key terrain is the populace, and failure to control it puts you in an unwinnable situation. The populace is the key terrain that the insurgent and a good counterinsurgent is struggling to control.
    The first part is true, the second is possibly true -- as is this:
    ... If the counterinsurgent can't protect the populace he CANNOT control them. To protect them he must be there, so combat outposts are essential. They are dangerous and in my opinion the hardest fight in COIN. Anyone can do raids and drop bombs on insurgents, but it is hard work to live 24/7 among the populace and protect them and yourselves, and there will be set backs. Commanders have to have realistic expectations and expect loses, but over time control can be established, if it can't then we need to reassess why we're there.
    So what is your solution and recommendation for the situation in Afghanistan?
    Last edited by Ken White; 07-19-2008 at 05:40 AM. Reason: * added paragraphs

  11. #51
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2008
    Location
    Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    27

    Default

    Here is the account from Stars and Stripes.

    http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?s...&article=56237

    Soldiers recount deadly attack on Afghanistan outpost

    Everything was on fire. The trucks. The bazaar. The grass.

    It looked surreal. It looked like a movie.

    That was what Spc. Tyler Stafford remembered thinking as he stepped onto the medical evacuation helicopter. The 23-year-old soldier would have been loaded onto the bird, but the poncho that was hastily employed as his stretcher broke. His body speckled with grenade and RPG shrapnel, the Vicenza, Italy, infantryman walked the last few feet to the waiting Black Hawk.

    That was Sunday morning in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province. At a forward operating base — maybe as big as a football field — established just a few days prior.

    Outnumbered but not outgunned, a platoon-plus element of soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team accompanied by Afghan soldiers engaged in a fistfight of a firefight.

    After maybe two hours of intense combat, some of the soldiers’ guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly. Insurgent bullets and dozens of rocket-propelled grenades filled the air. So many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many.

    That was July 13. That was when Stafford was blown out of a fighting position by an RPG, survived a grenade blast and had the tail of an RPG strike his helmet.

    That was the day nine Chosen Company soldiers died.

    It was just days before the unit was scheduled to leave the base.
    Last edited by Tom Odom; 07-19-2008 at 12:31 PM. Reason: compliance with accepted use

  12. #52
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2008
    Location
    Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    27

    Default

    I think the reporting, in general, on this event shows how poorly the media can cover an incident due to a fundamnetal lack of knowledge on the subject they are reporting on accompanied by the fog of war and a sincere lack of journalistic integrity.

  13. #53
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,169

    Default Solutions require expertise

    Ken,

    I have very limited experience in Afghanistan, so I'm not prepared to offer any specific solutions, because specific solutions require local area expertise. About all I can offer is an appreciation for the terrain. However, I can rehash some basic principles such as controlling the populace, but the how to must be determined by the units on the ground in close consult with local authorities/experts who know intuitively what the effects of a particular measure will be, or if they don't they'll quickly learn because they will hear the locals before we do (in most cases).

    Unfortunately you have the trump card on Vietnam since you were there, and I wasn’t (I think you can control the populace, but you can’t control when you’re born). However, based on my studies, GEN Abrams did implement a control approach by pushing units out to protect the villages and Operation PHOENIX effectively targeted the insurgent infrastructure, which is a key component of populace and resource control.

    If I interpreted controlling the populace from the perspective of a hard core communist where psychological and physical influence is absolute, then I would agree with you, it isn’t feasible in 2008. While your definition of control may be one of many, the Army definition of control means to prevent the enemy from using it. Controlling terrain for example can be accomplished by occupying it or covering it with fires to prevent the enemy from occupying it. How do you prevent the enemy from using the populace to provide support to them? The answer to that question is how you control the populace.

    First you identify why they are supporting the insurgents and determine what support they provide such as recruits, intelligence, money, safe haven, etc. This must be assessed at the local level, as the motivation may vary neighborhood from neighborhood and village to village. If the support is provided due to insurgent coercion then the government must provide adequate protection, which is what we have seen in Iraq with the clear, hold, build approach. If the support is due to ideological reasons, then it is a tougher problem that at first may require sterner control measures such as dominating the area with a big stick (establish numerous check points, conduct cordon and search operations, establish curfews etc.) initially, but simultaneously we also assess what the locals need and prompt the government to provide it, thus undermining the insurgent's psychological control of the populace. The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.

    To address your math problem (I always hated math), you have to use to the oil spot strategy. You establish control over an area that you have the resources to control, and then gradually expand. In theory you could get to a tipping point where the people in the uncontrolled areas hear about the better quality of life in the government controlled areas and thus are eager to rapidly get rid of the insurgents in their area (an assumption of mine, I'm not aware of any historical examples). I think we may be spread to thin in Afghanistan and we’re responding to fires from what I read. I think we to start somewhere, then expand out. The insurgents will do the same, but we have more resources than they do, but first we need a strategy to use those resources in an effective manner. This is slow progress, but it is progress. That doesn’t mean that SOF and other units can’t conduct disruption operations in insurgent controlled areas (they should), but the main effort should be expanding control of the populace.

    As for other nations providing support such as North Vietnam and Pakistan, it depends on how much political risk we’re willing to undertake, but I think in most cases we could convince most states to limit support to insurgents. I don’t recall in my studies where we made the same effort as the French did in controlling the border between Algeria and Tunisia. It would have been expensive and resource extensive, but over the long run I think it would have been more cost effective than dragging the conflict out for years because we couldn’t cut their international supply links.

    We also could of put much more pressure on North Vietnam militarily, but we were walking a political tight rope and not risk a wider war with the PRC or the USSR. Reality frequently gets in the way of the best theories.

  14. #54
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Or common sense...

    Thanks for the reasoned response.
    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    ... the how to must be determined by the units on the ground in close consult with local authorities/experts who know intuitively what the effects of a particular measure will be, or if they don't they'll quickly learn because they will hear the locals before we do (in most cases).
    Totally agree.
    ...GEN Abrams did implement a control approach by pushing units out to protect the villages and Operation PHOENIX effectively targeted the insurgent infrastructure, which is a key component of populace and resource control.
    Some village protection measures were undertaken from 1962 on, the problem was that there were never enough Troops to cover many. The Oil spot theory is not new -- it too was tried in VN. Problem with oil spots is that they work both ways. Phoenix was in operation over five years before Abrams got to VN, He and Colby just expanded it.
    If I interpreted controlling the populace from the perspective of a hard core communist where psychological and physical influence is absolute, then I would agree with you, it isn’t feasible in 2008.
    That is the way, in my perception, Rank Amateur was using the phrase and thus my response to him was couched as it was.
    While your definition of control may be one of many
    Words are important, we should not use words like 'victory' and 'defeat' in COIN because lacking killing a whole lot of people, there won't be either of those things, the best you can get is an acceptable outcome. Control as a word implies just this that you say:
    the Army definition of control means to prevent the enemy from using it. Controlling terrain for example can be accomplished by occupying it or covering it with fires to prevent the enemy from occupying it.
    Agreed.
    How do you prevent the enemy from using the populace to provide support to them? The answer to that question is how you control the populace. ... The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.
    Again we've morphed from 'control' to influence -- with which I totally agree. This is more than a semantic argument of little import; as I said, words are important. Not only can the wrong words send messages to own or target population, they can also induce a mindset in own forces. Gearing up to achieve the unachievable is sort of a waste. We are emphatically not going to control the population of Afghanistan, we don't have the manpower. We can influence that population and we're doing that. Heres' a quote from the Andres piece at "The new role of air strike in small wars." (here at SWJ):

    ""Large occupation forces make good tactical sense, however, there are two serious problems with an outside power like the United States injecting tens of thousands of troops into a foreign country. First, foreign soldiers are often viewed with mistrust and their presence has a tendency to stir up nationalist hostility in the local population. The more visible the occupation forces, the easier it is for insurgents to use their presence to discredit the indigenous government. Thus, a large force can undermine the legitimacy of the government it is there to support. Second, large expeditionary armies are expensive and hard to maintain. As a rule, the larger the army, the shorter the period the United States can maintain it in the field. Thus, increasing the size of the force used in a counterinsurgency operation has a tendency to decrease the amount of time Congress will be willing to dedicate to the war.""

    I don't agree with everything he says in that article but I do definitely agree with that quote -- and the Army had better absorb it.
    To address your math problem (I always hated math)
    Me too but unfortunately, it rules...
    ... you have to use to the oil spot strategy. ... The insurgents will do the same, but we have more resources than they do, but first we need a strategy to use those resources in an effective manner. This is slow progress, but it is progress. That doesn’t mean that SOF and other units can’t conduct disruption operations in insurgent controlled areas (they should), but the main effort should be expanding control of the populace.
    Seems to me that's what we're doing; the issue is the degree of control that can be exercised.

    As for other nations providing support such as North Vietnam and Pakistan, it depends on how much political risk we’re willing to undertake.
    True -- or how hacked off we get and -- this is important -- how the gut check factor is working in D.C.
    We also could of put much more pressure on North Vietnam militarily, but we were walking a political tight rope and not risk a wider war with the PRC or the USSR. Reality frequently gets in the way of the best theories.
    True dat...

  15. #55
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,366

    Default Wise words undermined by no government

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    First you identify why they are supporting the insurgents and determine what support they provide...If the support is provided due to insurgent coercion then the government must provide adequate protection...If the support is due to ideological reasons, then it is a tougher problem that at first may require sterner control measures .... simultaneously we also assess what the locals need and prompt the government to provide it, thus undermining the insurgent's psychological control of the populace. The government must destroy the credibility of the insurgent’s story.
    Bill and others,

    From my armchair the biggest weakness is the lack of what Westerners would regard as a government. Yes, in Kabul the Afghan government has a strong element of control and provides 'X' to the people. Along the border, including Helmand Province, there is no government - as I read it - nor a tradition of the national government providing anything of value to the locals.

    Add in corruption, drugs and more local factors - a mess.

    Reportedly the Taliban provide a level of governance in the areas they control and dominate - which can be a few hundred metres from Allied / ANP posts.

    davidbfpo

  16. #56
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Kansas
    Posts
    1,099

    Thumbs up Excellent posts by all

    I would just add and ask for thoughts about the following:

    The Oil spot analogy always sounded pretty good to me because it also requires a second third and fourth look at the HT Bill refers to. Where to do it or whether to do it somewhere(relates to populace commited against you) is to learn how to differentiate between wet and dry land(terrain). Water and oil don't mix and so also do COIN efforts and those directly within or very close to the insurgents support network.

    I do believe I mentioned before on a different thread that the good thing about this is as long as those areas which "can" are brought into the fold through a variety of means it will have a very much metrically unmeasurable, but physically palpable effect on the areas one cannot.

    It still seems to me that most of the "right" answers are going to come from those living there and what they want or can accept as possible for their own futures. Self determination really is a powerful thing.
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

    Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur

  17. #57
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,169

    Default Political War

    From my armchair the biggest weakness is the lack of what Westerners would regard as a government. Yes, in Kabul the Afghan government has a strong element of control and provides 'X' to the people. Along the border, including Helmand Province, there is no government - as I read it - nor a tradition of the national government providing anything of value to the locals.
    David, the objective for the government is to expand the government's reach over the ungoverned areas so they can control them. As I understand Columbia (I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong) is that the FARC controls a large area in the southern part of the country, but it is largely undeveloped jungle and drug production centers. The major cities are in government control and beginning to thrive economically. The FARC is still a threat, but it is a manageable one. As the government gets stronger it can gradually expand its control over the rest of the country. It will take time, so you work the most important areas first and consolidate power there, then eventually challenge the current status quo in the tribal/insurgent areas. There are certain areas that the government must control to be legitimate. In Iraq those are the major cities and the national money making resources, which in Iraq is the oil fields. In Afghanistan you have to secure the major the cities, major lines of communication, and develop a national money making resource other than opium. Does it really matter strategically if the tribes control the border area for another 5 years? Those are the types of questions we need to ask. I heard one NATO officer said that the insurgency starts where the road ends, which makes sense. It is hard for a government to control an area where it cannot readily project an overwhelming force or provide for the economic life of the locals. Maybe they don't need to control it.

    It still seems to me that most of the "right" answers are going to come from those living there and what they want or can accept as possible for their own futures. Self determination really is a powerful thing.
    Ron, I don't know if I concur entirely with this statement, but I have frequently viewed insurgency as a form of armed democracy. The side that can most effectively mobilize the populace to "actively" support them wins. Obviously not a civil method, but it is clearly political warfare. Tribal chiefs fight to maintain control of their tribe, insurgents fight to usurp government control of an area or country, and the government fights to maintain or regain control. The key is establishing control of the populace, thus insurgencies have accurately been called political warfare or psychological warfare (PSYWAR), as a matter of fact the first Special Forces Qualification Course was called the PSYWAR course. Funny how much we forgot over the years. The government usually has the advantage of resources and organization, thus most insurgencies have been defeated or marginalized to an acceptable level, but it requires the proper strategy, and I think your right only the locals can determine what that is.

  18. #58
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Columbus, GA
    Posts
    16

    Default Wanat

    In response to the posts on population control and given our limited current force structure, I would suggest that the Waygal Valley (where Wanat is located) is perhaps just a valley too far to effectively pacify. While Wanat is technically in Kunar Province, it is one of 9 major Waigali (Nuristani) villages located in the Waygal Valley or one of its capillary valleys. The valley itself has a population of perhaps 22,000, most residing in the major villages and speaking a unintelligible dialect of Nuristani and practicing a distinct culture forged in thousands of years of inter-tribal warfare.

    The Waigalis, at their heart, are isolationists. There are probably no Al-Qaeda members among the local insurgents and the actual Taliban influence, outside of the deobandist meta-narrative is negligible. Each of the 9 villages are so remote and in such extreme terrain, that U.S. forces have never even visited most of them including the most important and largest village, Waygal. Simply to occupy a position in each of the villages would require much of the resources of an entire infantry battalion, not to mention an additional heavy-lift rotary-wing company for resupply. This begs the question of whether control of the valley is worth the resources that could likely be utilized to much greater effect elsewhere with more strategic or at least national influence or importance.

    The Waygal vignette is an example of just how distant victory is in Afghanistan. One can find multiple other examples of similar valleys or regions with similar challenges; Kamdish, Korengal, Dawlat Shah are just some examples close to Wanat. This in no way minimizes the accomplishments of my fellow Sky Soldiers during the last 15 months in those most foreign of valleys, but extending the influence of the Government of Afghanistan across Kunar and Nuristan must be recognized as a distant goal.

    (View of Aranas Village, typical of others in the valley.)

  19. #59
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default Commander's Account

    From the 173rd ABCT Commander:

    Front page Mideast edition (in PDF)

    Commander: Media Reports On Afghanistan Outpost Battle Were Exaggerated

    173rd’s fight not symbol of more violent Afghanistan, says Preysler

    By Mark St.Clair, Stars and Stripes

    "The sky is not falling," Col. Charles "Chip" Preysler, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, said Saturday from Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

    Preysler spoke via telephone less than a week after his paratroops and their Afghan allies were involved in a fierce attack at a small post near the village of Wanat. In the July 13 battle, nine of his men were killed and 15 others wounded.

    But the attack is not a sign of conditions worsening in the country, he said.

    The battle occurred just after dawn at a temporary vehicle patrol base called Bella. A platoon-sized element of Chosen Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne) soldiers and a smaller Afghan National Army force were occupying a hastily built area as they had done many times over the 15 months they’d been in country, Preysler said. The soldiers were there on a reconnaissance mission to establish a presence and find a good location to connect with the local government, populace and Afghan National Police, he said.

  20. #60
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,169

    Default The Mighty Herd

    Tom,

    Thanks for posting that article, I know the Bde and Bn Cdr and there are no finer officers. Anyone familiar with the 173d know that they don't shy away from a hard fight. I just hope COL Preysler's interview gets disseminated beyond the Stars and Stripes so the record can be set straight on the home front.

    extending the influence of the Government of Afghanistan across Kunar and Nuristan must be recognized as a distant goal. posted by Meinertzhagen
    Well said, and many thanks to the men in 173d ABN (The Herd) for their hard fighting over the past 15 months.

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •