Combat Outpost Penetrated in Afghanistan, 9 dead

[jcustis]

Here is an item from the Ares Blog I thought might be of interest.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs...entId=blogDest

It is about success the French are having going out on up to 10 day long patrols with Afghan forces.

I'm unpleasantly surprised that this is a big revelation for the command element mentioned in the article.

I am pleasantly surprised that they have found a way to get the Afghan security forces working with them to stay out that long (perhaps they are rotated halfway through the ten days ), because at about the 72-96 hour mark, I've observed effectiveness to plummet.

[120mm]

Bill, that sounds dangerously like former defense secretary Rumsfeld's comment: "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

I hate to envision the ground casualties suffered without modern body armor and MRAP/M-ATVs. Without today's UAS, attack helicopters, lift and MEDEVAC aircraft flying a much broader area than Vietnam and suffering far fewer battlefield and accident losses, our ground forces could have been in a world of hurt. Those casualties easily could have cut the Iraq War short resulting in a different outcome due to homeland pressure ala Vietnam.

Really? Rumsfeld telling the truth is dangerous?

Personally, I hate to actually experience a political and military leadership too cowardly to allow soldiers to dump their "modern body armor" and force them to stay in their MRAPs/M-ATVs. I'd prefer winning, which you cannot do if you are married to Michelin man suits and your vehicle the size of a three story building.

Today's armor is much lighter. Technology could evolve to make armor even more so and include cooling fluid tubes adjacent to Soldier skin using weight saved with lighter armor. Hard? Yes. But if the effort is not made, Soldiers continue to be jeopardized needlessly. To quote a pretty smart General, hard is not impossible.

I'm assuming you have no idea what you are talking about, here. The armor weighs the same, though it's more effective. And every time something gets made lighter, military morons in the leadership use that occasion to find something worthless to add to the soldiers' load.

Cowardice on the part of leaders and risk aversion is not how you win a war, COIN or not.

I'd choose greater casualties and a will to do what it takes to succeed over better body armor 7 days a week.

[ganulv]

I'd choose greater casualties and a will to do what it takes to succeed over better body armor 7 days a week.

And time scale is worth considering. If body armor (or anything else) contributes to fewer casualties on a day-to-day basis but also contributes to prolonging an operation then it might not actually contribute to fewer casualties, after all. By way of comparison, while a lot of contemporary views of Grant paint him as recklessly sending those under his command to their deaths in a series of frontal assaults it seems pretty clear that they themselves were willing to accept the risks if it lessened the chance they would end up dying of cholera on the march or in a Confederate POW camp.

[Cole]

Really? Rumsfeld telling the truth is dangerous?

Personally, I hate to actually experience a political and military leadership too cowardly to allow soldiers to dump their "modern body armor" and force them to stay in their MRAPs/M-ATVs. I'd prefer winning, which you cannot do if you are married to Michelin man suits and your vehicle the size of a three story building.

So you would prefer not to improve HMMWVs with additional armor and future chimneys? There's no value in getting farther from the COP in a M-ATV or JLTV that is survivable? Getting out of the vehicle is another matter entirely unrelated to the need for survivable vehicles against major current (and future) battlefield killers. If you get to the patrolling area before exerting yourself excessively walking there, seems to me you have more energy to go farther and stay more alert during the patrol. You also cover a larger patrolling area and have a vehicle to carry your supplies.

At 6 gallons of water per Soldier per day, how much weight would Soldiers at Wanat have carried if they had "patrolled" to COP Kahler instead of driving there? They also would have been carrying two .50 cal machine guns and tripods, two 40mm grenade launchers, and two mortar systems, plus an LRAS3.

I'm assuming you have no idea what you are talking about, here. The armor weighs the same, though it's more effective. And every time something gets made lighter, military morons in the leadership use that occasion to find something worthless to add to the soldiers' load.

Cowardice on the part of leaders and risk aversion is not how you win a war, COIN or not.

I'd choose greater casualties and a will to do what it takes to succeed over better body armor 7 days a week.

Military cooling vests already are available to include for Soldiers, dogs, and military pilots. Nobody used body armor in Vietnam because it was heavier back then or unavailable and they did not have cooling vest technology. If a vest can be made around 2 pounds and the Army spends more for body armor 2 pound lighter, my peabrain head calculator indicates no increase in Soldier load.

Casualties not experienced are casualties that don't take several to all troop's attention away from the patrol, yes?

Have less than fond memories of an incident where I was training Soldiers in MOPP IV conducting a road march and a Soldier experienced a heat injury...in springtime Germany. Of course I was the bad guy.

Bottom line. Just because guys like you and me are in reasonable shape does not mean today's 18-30 year old is. Get them in shape, sure. But physiology and body heat remain a concern in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and elsewhere no matter your condition.

Some day I'll tell you all about the study I volunteered for where they sent us out flying after being injected with atropine in varying quantities...and what that does to your body temperature and how they measure it.

[Fuchs]

There was a time when weight-inefficient steel was used for helmets (M1 'steel pot'). A helmet weighed about 2.85 lbs then.

Other (more weight-efficient) materials appeared, a kevlar helmet (PASGT-helmet) was adopted. Significant weight saving was possible. It weighed 3.1 to 4.2 lbs.

Then came MICH, with reduced coverage. It weighed a bit less than 3 lbs.

Then came ACH. It weighed 3 - 3.6 lbs.

The Marines introduced the LWH, at a medium version weight of 3.05 lbs.

More weight-efficient materials, roughly the same coverage - no loss of gear weight. In fact, now you can add a NVS' weight to a helmet.

------------

Rifle bullet-proofed body armour had its revival in the 90's; Dyneema used pressed PE, the Russians like titanium and steel plates, but most inserts used ceramic plates since.

Improvements in ceramics lead to better weight effectiveness, better multi-hit properties, higher rating (protection against SVD with AP, not just against AK with ball). Weight didn't drop, though.
Whenever there was some 'room for improvement' generated by 'weight savings', something was added. NIJ Level II basic vests instead of simple flak vests have been introduced. The front plate of the Ranger assault armour became the example for the ISAPO vest with back coverage as well. Interceptor improved protection again. Upper body side plates were invented & added, even some shoulder plates.

Again, vests have not significantly shedded their weight since 1995. The materials advanced and became more weight-efficient, but vests did not become lighter.

- - - - -

There's a lot of buzz about "weight savings" for the "warfighter" blah blah, but all weight savings merely free up some weight for some other tool or toy.
Maybe it's human nature, maybe it's bureaucratic nature - or maybe political nature? In the end, there are no weight savings. There are additional tools ("capabilities") enabled by cutting weight off old tools.


Occasionally, some people fantasize about "light infantry" as "lighter individual load" infantry, even if only as a sidekick to heavy infantry of the conventional pattern. I did it several times as well.
It's hopeless. Auxiliaries may patrol & fight "light", but not our troops. They're Marius' mules and will stay so as long as we can afford their gear.

[Ken White]

So you would prefer not to improve HMMWVs with additional armor and future chimneys?

A poor truck can only take so much unplanned weight...

There's no value in getting farther from the COP in a M-ATV or JLTV that is survivable? Getting out of the vehicle is another matter entirely unrelated to the need for survivable vehicles against major current (and future) battlefield killers.

That's not entirely correct. A capability provided will be used; if it increases 'safety' its use will be demanded. That leads to a self defeating spiral.

If you get to the patrolling area before exerting yourself excessively walking there, seems to me you have more energy to go farther and stay more alert during the patrol.

Yes and no -- but it's obvious you haven't been on many real patrols. That's not a slam, it's something one has done or has not and one who has done it knows that the movement is a big part of the object of the patrol in a great many cases. It depends on what the purpose of the patrol happens to be.

Not to mention that Infantry, by definition, walks...

You also cover a larger patrolling area and have a vehicle to carry your supplies.

Again yes and no, many variables in that statement, too many to address here but I will note that the ability to carry your supplies is a mixed blessing. Room for more junk and nice to have stuff that can often detract from mission success.

At 6 gallons of water per Soldier per day, how much weight would Soldiers at Wanat have carried if they had "patrolled" to COP Kahler instead of driving there?

Nobody needs that much water. Nobody.

They also would have been carrying two .50 cal machine guns and tripods, two 40mm grenade launchers, and two mortar systems, plus an LRAS3.

Nor would anybody with any sense contemplate taking a .50 or a 40mm AGL on a foot patrol or in a foot borne approach march -- if it's an approach march to establish a COP (dumb idea...) you'd fly the stuff in later.

Nobody used body armor in Vietnam because it was heavier back then or unavailable

Some -- few -- did use it, most did not. It was available, it was lighter than current Vest / plate carriers but it was too constricting and it encased the torso (as does any current model...) and that induced heat casualties. It also too severely impeded mobility and most Commanders at the time knew that and they wanted -- and needed -- that mobility. It was a different Army, different mores...

ADDED: Just for info; USMC M1951 vest weighed ~8 lbs, USA M1952 about 10 lbs. and today's Interceptor about 16 to 25 lbs depending on plates and add-ons.

and they did not have cooling vest technology. If a vest can be made around 2 pounds and the Army spends more for body armor 2 pound lighter, my peabrain head calculator indicates no increase in Soldier load.

Your calculator works, the rest of the brain isn't considering Drew's statement -- the 'leaders' will compensate for that weight reduction by adding something else -- that is, regrettably, pretty much proven by history.

Casualties not experienced are casualties that don't take several to all troop's attention away from the patrol, yes?

No. False choice. Casualties in combat are a fact of life. Having the technical ability to avoid some only lessens or weakens the skills needed to avoid others and thus increases those others -- sooner or later, in most (not all) circumstances, one has to leave one's vehicles. One should know how to do that. Increased reliance on vehicles lessens the skill in dismounted efforts.

It's a trade off. The real issue is not casualties and where and how caused but tactical and operational success, stasis or failure. That's the choice.

[Cole]

A poor truck can only take so much unplanned weight...:

Which is why you buy newer M-ATV and JLTV with V-Hulls and figure new ways to make old HMMWVs more survivable such as "chimneys" that vent the blast and keep the vehicle from getting airborne.

The Army is often guilty of looking backwards instead of forward, and being hesitant to try something new. I'm sure the horse cavalry thought being on a small, agile horse provided more advantages than a mechanically complex and heavy behemoth that uses lots of fuel. Or maybe they were partially correct! What would happen if the mech guys created a 15,000 pound JLTV-variant that was CH-47 or airdrop transportable, carried just three troops, and had glass-armor chimneys running through the middle between tandem-seated troops. At 3 foot wide like an attack helicopter, it would optimize V-Hull angle that doubled as side armor. The resulting armored scout and OP would further disperse Bradley dismounts in a teamed vehicle relationship.

You could spend $10 million buying each new GCV to carry 9 troops. Or for $2 million dollars each, you could upgrade Bradley and Stryker armor, and spend a million $ buying each JLTV-variant as just described. That vehicle would replace LRAS3 HMMWVs and M3 Bradleys, not to mention creating a common vehicle for airborne and air assault divisions. Such a vehicle would be truly full spectrum capable safeguarding isolated OPs and checkpoints, and enhancing cordon and search, not to mention pursuit of insurgents firing from distant locations. Of course you could always run after the insurgents across 500-700 meters of open ground with numerous bounds, while the insurgents disappear and blend in....

A capability provided will be used; if it increases 'safety' its use will be demanded. That leads to a self defeating spiral.

That's a leadership issue...not a procurement one. It also is a branch and sub-branch perception issue.

I'm sure mech and motorized infantry see armored troop carriers differently than light infantry, particularly if facing a major artillery threat. Airborne infantry often won't consider inherent threats to C-130s in a forcible entry. Airlanding 50 miles away across an international border and driving to the objective will be seen as the wimpy way. Those espousing helicopter employment instead of vehicles will face aircraft shortages, weather, high/hot, LZ, and fuel-logistics challenges, and vulnerability landing in obvious LZs/PZs.

On the other hand having multiple options of different infantry types, keeps the enemy guessing and allows optimized employment for the situation. I read that Wanat was taken by the Taliban in the past week. Wonder what the enemy response would be attempting to land in the same location where COP Kahler had been occupied? Yet if the Infantry simultaneously infiltrated on foot, drove in vehicles, and air assaulted to the site, the enemy could not exclusively focus in any single area.

Yes and no -- but it's obvious you haven't been on many real patrols. That's not a slam, it's something one has done or has not and one who has done it knows that the movement is a big part of the object of the patrol in a great many cases. It depends on what the purpose of the patrol happens to be.

So there's no "shock value" in M-ATVs encircling a town or overwatch value in having crew-served weapons aboard? How can advantages in walking 50 miles to an LZ be superior to flying there and then patrolling 10-20 kilometers? Which offers greater surprise. You constantly read that the Taliban is never surprised by our dismounted patrols and an ample system of early warning exists.

Not to mention that Infantry, by definition, walks...

Does it? What about infantry in a Bradley or Stryker, or coming off an aircraft or C-130? If infantry only walks, it covers a very small area. If it does not use COPs and all it does is walk and dig, it has limited weapons, protection, and retains high logistical requirements difficult to support by walking alone.

Nobody needs that much water. Nobody.Nor would anybody with any sense contemplate taking a .50 or a 40mm AGL on a foot patrol or in a foot borne approach march -- if it's an approach march to establish a COP (dumb idea...) you'd fly the stuff in later.

Yet 5.9 gals of water per Soldier was a primary issue in the Wanat blame game. It was a cited rationale justifying not patrolling or digging more during the day. Iodine and hand pumps were available if less water was an option. The Marines used iodine and the ANA drank local water. Yet those became issues for which the C-o-C was going to receive reprimands. There was a helicopter/UAS shortage not under the C-o-C perview. At the time just prior to the Wanat attack, there were ongoing attacks in other valleys the battalion controlled that required attention/resources...yet inability to protect/supply/visit/supervise EVERYWHERE became issues for which the tactical C-o-C was blamed.

Some -- few -- did use it (Vietnam body armor), most did not. It was available, it was lighter than current Vest / plate carriers but it was too constricting and it encased the torso (as does any current model...) and that induced heat casualties. It also too severely impeded mobility and most Commanders at the time knew that and they wanted -- and needed -- that mobility. It was a different Army, different mores...

ADDED: Just for info; USMC M1951 vest weighed ~8 lbs, USA M1952 about 10 lbs. and today's Interceptor about 16 to 25 lbs depending on plates and add-ons.Your calculator works, the rest of the brain isn't considering Drew's statement -- the 'leaders' will compensate for that weight reduction by adding something else -- that is, regrettably, pretty much proven by history.

http://defensetech.org/2006/01/12/vi...s-soooo-light/

I researched it after posting and though flak vests were used, they would not stop 7.62mm while current ones with ceramic plates will. If the flak vest would not stop the primary direct fire threat and no cooling vest existed in very humid conditions, it is understandable that nobody wanted to wear them.

No. False choice. Casualties in combat are a fact of life. Having the technical ability to avoid some only lessens or weakens the skills needed to avoid others and thus increases those others -- sooner or later, in most (not all) circumstances, one has to leave one's vehicles. One should know how to do that. Increased reliance on vehicles lessens the skill in dismounted efforts.

It's a trade off. The real issue is not casualties and where and how caused but tactical and operational success, stasis or failure. That's the choice.

Come one Ken. You know that a primary justification for using bouncing Betty's and IEDs is to inflict casualties that distract Soldiers from their primary mission to a greater extent than combat deaths. They also have a psychological impact.

If a Soldier can survive 7.62mm and shrapnel because he is wearing effective body armor and helmets, he has NODs that give him night vision advantages, and effective fire support and attack helicopter/fixed wing CAS/lethal UAS support is nearby, he has ample tools for success. The sole thing he has little control over is getting blown up en route to the patrol location or objective, or during the patrol or maneuver while chasing Taliban firing from a distance.

If the enemy has effective artillery as many threats do, he has little control if the enemy places effective fires while he is in the open. Dismounted infantry are extremely vulnerable to artillery as you know...particularly without body armor and good helmets. A Stryker, Bradey, or M-ATV/JLTV/uparmored HMMWV also protect against artillery and expedite escape from an area being pounded by an unseen forward observer.

[Ken White]

That's a leadership issue...not a procurement one. It also is a branch and sub-branch perception issue.

No, it is a procurement issue. It is one because it is at the whim (yes, whim...) of people whose leadership is not focused on mission accomplishment other than minimally but on institutional survival, they are a product of that branch perception problem -- in short, it is a techno fix that is only peripherally aimed at the mission and it is a human foible issue that will induce more human foibles and arguably could lead to as many or more casualties.

Short sharp actions always have many casualties -- long drawn out actions invariably produce more casualties and more damage. Similarly, excessive efforts at self protection are generally counter productive and also lend to the stretching out, in time. of combat, thus arguably and possibly (but often...) entailing more casualties over time.

I'm sure mech and motorized infantry see armored troop carriers differently than light infantry, particularly if facing a major artillery threat...Those espousing helicopter employment instead of vehicles will face aircraft shortages, weather, high/hot, LZ, and fuel-logistics challenges, and vulnerability landing in obvious LZs/PZs.

That's called stating the obvious and it contributes little to this sub thread. Having been Mech, a Tanker, Cav and Airborne over the years, I certainly know it's true but suffice to say, METT-TC should be involved in all those issues.

On the other hand having multiple options of different infantry types...the enemy could not exclusively focus in any single area.

Again, the action and effort should be tailored to the situation; there is no one size fits all.

So there's no "shock value" in M-ATVs encircling a town or overwatch value in having crew-served weapons aboard?

Maybe, maybe not. Most likely the local warning net or the kids messed up any potential "shock value" -- plus, having done that few times, with and without vehicles, my assessment is that the "shock value" if it existed at all wore off very quickly.

All in all, that's again METT-TC -- there is NO single answer...

How can advantages in walking 50 miles to an LZ be superior to flying there and then patrolling 10-20 kilometers? Which offers greater surprise.

Depends on what you're trying to do, doesn't it? Perhaps the object is not to surprise but to loudly announce ones presence and to seek contact.

You constantly read that the Taliban is never surprised by our dismounted patrols and an ample system of early warning exists.

Don't believe everything you read. Talk to folks who are there or have been recently and you'll find that some units have problems like that while others do not -- and most will have such problems in the first few weeks after arrival until the experience factor builds up to compensate for our mediocre training. There's also the issue of not knowing the terrain because of tour lengths, stationing, etc. -- the opponent has a significant advantage there and that doesn't go away no matter how you move.

Does it? What about infantry in a Bradley or Stryker, or coming off an aircraft or C-130? If infantry only walks, it covers a very small area. If it does not use COPs and all it does is walk and dig, it has limited weapons, protection, and retains high logistical requirements difficult to support by walking alone.

In reverse order: Yes, that's why all that support structure and those aircraft AND vehicles (including Tanks) exist to let the three guys that survive in that rifle squad own that terrain or remove that opposition; It should do more than walk and dig, what is its purpose? If its limited weapons are as equal or surpass as the opponents, why have a lot of excess? What area do you want it to "cover" -- again the issue is what one is trying to do. Well, we aren't going to carry either vehicle in their current form on a 130, that means C5s or C17s and that means you aren't going to use an assault strip...

And if you need an airstrip where you don't have one, somebody has to get it or build it.

Yet 5.9 gals of water...

Can't -- or won't -- argue that. IMO, the Army wants a very excessive amount of water.

There was a helicopter/UAS shortage... supply transport and other issues for which the tactical C-o-C was blamed.

I cannot discuss Wanat sensibly because I wasn't there. As for resource allotments, that's a METT-TC issue which neither of us can address knowledgeably.

I researched it after posting and though flak vests were used, they would not stop 7.62mm while current ones with ceramic plates will. If the flak vest would not stop the primary direct fire threat and no cooling vest existed in very humid conditions, it is understandable that nobody wanted to wear them.

Um, yeah. What's the point? As a minor point, the old vests weren't designed to stop SA fire, they were to stop shell fragments as Artillery in WW II (and Korea) was theoretically the biggest killer on the battlefield. Viet Nam changed the rules because
Clyde didn't have much Arty, was not good with Mortars (in contrast to the Chinese in Korea) but was a good shot. Prep for last was and all that...

Come one Ken. You know that a primary justification for using bouncing Betty's and IEDs is to inflict casualties that distract Soldiers from their primary mission to a greater extent than combat deaths. They also have a psychological impact.

Come on, Ken? I'm here. Yes, I know that -- again, what's your point?

I also know that in good and /or experienced units the adverse psychological impact dissipates rapidly, in a matter of days of exposure and then increasingly becomes a negative for the planters and quite unfortunately, for the local populace. Did you know that?

If a Soldier can survive...he has ample tools for success. The sole thing he has little control over is getting blown up en route to the patrol location or objective, or during the patrol or maneuver while chasing Taliban firing from a distance.

We can disagree on that. I think, again, that if you talk to some folks, you'll find that as units gain theater experience, they do better at spotting, evading or destroying IEDS. Which lead me to wonder if your gripes are with the personnel system and policies or patrol methodologies.

If the enemy has effective artillery as many threats do... A Stryker, Bradey, or M-ATV/JLTV/uparmored HMMWV also protect against artillery and expedite escape from an area being pounded by an unseen forward observer.

No question about that. I totally agree.

Uh -- doesn't that take us back to METT-TC?