The Demise of Secretary Wynne

[Cavguy]

Well as one of the few resident zoomies here let me say that Dr. Andres and Mr. Compton do not represent a lot of us in their views - they're more akin to that embarrassing uncle you wish was related to someone else.

This is just another example of the kind of counterproductive "criticism" some air power advocates will stoop to. There is plenty to justify the role of air power in all its forms without denigrating the other services while overemphasizing the role of your own. The irony is that is exactly what the author accuses the Army of doing.

Entropy, good points. That's why I charaterized Dr. Andres as the "Ann Coulter" of the USAF - he is partisan beyond belief.

Hacksaw made a good point when discussing the speech I referenced above - why did the Air Force send him to make such a partisan speech at a high profile conference? That sent a message about the USAF leadership's view in and of itself. BTW, MG Dunlap was the other major USAF presenter, besides a COL from the CAOC in Qatar.

I just acquried a USAF Major as a neighbor, she confirmed what many have said to me from the USAF recently - there is a senior leader/airman disconnect right now. Your perspective?

[Entropy]

I just acquried a USAF Major as a neighbor, she confirmed what many have said to me from the USAF recently - there is a senior leader/airman disconnect right now. Your perspective?

I would say there is definitely a disconnect. It runs from how the AF publicly portrays itself all the way down to uniforms.

[slapout9]

For all.
The Air Force calls it Air Control Theory, there version of COIN or Pennies From Heaven link to a good paper below. There are others out there but they all say about the same thing.

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...in00/corum.htm


What the Army is doing with ODIN might well end up being COIN from the Air invented by the Army and the Air Force is not to happy about it.

[LawVol]

I would say there is definitely a disconnect. It runs from how the AF publicly portrays itself all the way down to uniforms.

Concur. From what I see, the AF views everything from a lethal lens. Bombs on target is the end all and be all. There is no concept of using a soft touch (read non-lethal).

The "police action" comment is to be expected. The AF sees lethal airpower as the answer to all war scenarios, whether they be conventional or unconventional. As I see it, the fact son the ground show that airpower, while agressively supporting the fight, has not been the deciding factor in our recent sucesses. This does not bode well for those that argue airpower's infallibility in war. Thus the change from war to "police action." If airpower had been the determitive factor, rest assured he'd have said war.

but what the heck do I know, I'm just a lawyer...

[MikeF]

I've been considering this post for some time IOT word it correctly.

I have no disagreements with any of the above dissent IRT the AF's future.

However, it must be addressed that they are a combat multiplier. I would submit that we should credit them with their role as a supporting component in the surge.

I can comment on four of the more kinetic operations of the surge(specifically November2006-June2007): Turki Village/Diyala River Valley (my unit, 5-73 Recon) and Najaf/Baqubah (Strykers out of Fort Lewis).

Furthermore, it must be understood that these situations were esentially counter-state denied areas (i.e. areas that the enemy controlled and CF/GOI did not regularly patrol). These situations were unique to the time period.

The AF brought to bear the combined weight of the American military power in certain almost linear conflicts (e.g. in Turki Village (JAN 2007), 38 x 2000 lbs JDAMs in under two hours on an entrechment of Wahabi fortiments. In a prior conflict, we were throwing hand grenades back and forth. This time, the AF reigned supreme.)

However (again), it must be addressed that these were supportive roles. Enemy fortifications were not identified solely by Predator drones; in 90% of the PID, enemy activity was identified by covert reconnaissance, movement to contact, OR specific intelligence gathered from the populace.

Regardless, I love the AF as long as they don't make any assumptions on their superiority over the boys on the ground.

[selil]

Concur. From what I see, the AF views everything from a lethal lens. Bombs on target is the end all and be all. There is no concept of using a soft touch (read non-lethal).

As of today I really really really realize that. In the morning I'll tell you about my meeting after the panel session.

[slapout9]

Here is a more complete study of "Air Policing" based upon the British experience. This is very interesting because that used Air officers in a ground/cultural intelligence collection process to control tribes, also developed the the Inverted Blockade Technique (they kept people away from their homes and farms) most common weapon was a 5 pound bomblet.

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/saas_T...a/longoria.pdf

[Cliff]

Concur. From what I see, the AF views everything from a lethal lens. Bombs on target is the end all and be all. There is no concept of using a soft touch (read non-lethal).

While the focus of the Air Force is more on high-intensity conflict, I don't think everything is focused on blowing things up.

There is a definite understanding that right now ISR, Non Traditional ISR, mobility, force support, and in-lieu of taskings are how we support the joint force in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Armed overwatch of the folks on the ground is the main kinetic operation, but even in that we've developed some great TTPs to reduce the force used to the neccessary levels.

See this article for examples:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...aendschke.html


The main way the AF is directly involved in counterinsurgency (IE as a supported force if you will) is in training the HN AF. Our Coalition Air Forces Training Team (CAFTT) in Iraq is being hugely plussed up, and is supported not just by AFSOF but also by AETC and a host of other folks.

Finally, there's a lot the AF can do on the support side to help with counterinsurgency. A good example is this article:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...m08/brown.html


I want to make it clear I am not advocating air policing in Iraq or Afghanistan, nor am I saying it would be effective or could replace the Army.

At the same time, you have to understand that some of these articles (MGen Dunlap is one example) have problems with the doctrine as written. Just because air policing wouldn't work in Iraq or Afghanistan doesn't mean it won't ever work... it is simply another tool or capability. At some point it may be the right tool. That decision will be based on both the situation/country in question but may also be based on the US population/leaderships will to commit money/people/resources... IE, there could be a situation (just like in Iraq for 12 yrs following Desert Storm!) where the will of the nation will support air policing, but not boots on the ground. Attacking debates on doctrine just because they wouldn't work in the current fight leads to dogmatism.

Again, I am not agreeing with all of the arguements made by some of the airpower enthusiasts, I am simply arguing that a healthy debate on doctrine isn't bad.

V/R,

Cliff

[SWJED]

The New Role of Air Strike in Small Wars
A response to Jon Compton

By Richard Andres, Small Wars Journal

In a recent Small Wars Journal article entitled “The Demise of Secretary Wynne,” Jon Compton offered some observations about the role of airpower in counterinsurgency operations. The article has received a good deal of attention and spurred some debate. Like most other readers, I agree with some parts of the article and disagree with others. However, since Jon cited me and my name has been linked to his in what has become a contentious discussion, I would like to offer some thoughts of my own.

I should begin by saying that I have no intention of laying out a complete summary of counterinsurgency theory here. I will talk mainly about the role of airpower, and particularly airpower in an ISR and strike role. Except where these subjects are concerned, I am generally in agreement with John Nagl on transforming the Army for the COIN mission and with James Corum on the role of airpower. I will leave it to the reader to determine the delta...

[Norfolk]

Perhaps I have misunderstood Professor Andres, but if he is proposing the use of airpower in an economy-of-force role, isn't this much the same sort of error the British made in Iraq during the 1920's?