The Demise of Secretary Wynne

[SWJED]

The Demise of Secretary Wynne

By J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton, Small Wars Journal Blog

Recently I was privileged to witness a small piece of history. While visiting a friend at the Pentagon, I stood next to the office door of Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne as he left the building for the last time. After he left, and while all the rooms were still empty, I was given a quick tour of the offices. Surrounded by giant paintings of airpower, it was difficult not to reflect upon the current situation and how he got there.

My friend is Special Assistant to Secretary Wynne, Dr. Richard Andres, and once the Secretary had left, we sat down and had a long discussion on current topics. Rick and I have discussed our opinions on air power and the military many times before, and while I consider myself to be service agnostic, Rick is very much biased toward the Air Force, and I think with good reason.

Something I’ve often heard Rick say, and I believe he is correct, is that the Army does not understand air power. Often their plans minimize its use, and their after action reports under report its effectiveness. Case in point, the surge in Iraq. While sitting in Ricks E ring office, he asked me point blank whether or not I believed a 20% increase (or “surge”) in troop strength could really make much difference to the situation. It was obviously a baited question, but it wasn’t one I had to think about much. To my mind, the increase could not have been that effective; there had to have been some fundamental doctrinal change in order for that small an increase to have had the dramatic effect that it’s had. Prior to this discussion, I’d already been pondering the issue for some time...

[Tom Odom]

What had changed was clear. It wasn’t the extra boots on the ground that was turning the tide, it was the increase in HUMINT and the ability to hit a target with precision munitions from the air within a time frame of only 7 minutes. Gatherings as small as only 3 insurgents were being targeted for strikes, while predators and forces on the ground monitored the movements of any suspected insurgent. This aggressive doctrinal change was preventing insurgents from gathering, planning, and pulling off operations. It was classic COIN (Counterinsurgency) operations, conducted almost entirely from the air. But if we accept the Army’s version of things, it never happened.

Its the same song revisited. with a disco beat. Classic COIN from the air? All kinetic--according to him--delivered from the air. Yeah right. The HUMINT he allows came from somewhere but all those boots on the ground were just to watch movements. No mention of the Anbar shift in the tribes. No mention of population control. Just air strikes.

Right.

Tom

[Ken White]

Couldn't get enough sense out of it to comment. Does the Army not understand the AF -- or does it downplay the AF due to political game required by our dysfunctional Congress? A 1,000% increase in munitions released???

Then all those things Tom correctly illustrates. Plus this comment:

"...Although I felt privileged to be present at the Pentagon as Secretary Wynne departed the building for the last time."

Odd...

[Old Eagle]

Mike Wynne is an Army officer of the Rick Atkinson's storied West Point Class of '66

[Cavguy]

There was so much extrapolation to wild conclusions I couldn't follow the logic of the first half.

He makes the fundamental mistake that somehow we failed 2003-2006 to win Iraq because we weren't killing enough insurgents by dropping bombs? That bombs "forced" the awakening? The analysis fails on so many levels it saddens me. "Troops only increased by 20% and bombings by 400%, so the bombings MUST be behind it!" Why is the army covering this up?!?

To say his friend Andres is an AF fan is like describing Ann Coulter as a mainline Republican. He's the Ann Coulter of the USAF. Andres truly frightened me with his pro-AF speech at a conference I attended last year "if we would only allow the Iraqis to drop more bombs we would win Iraq", and "our soldiers inflame popular resistance, as they stand on street corners and harass the local women." It was so bad the major media news network reporter I was sitting next to with lots of time in Iraq (3+ years as lead for her network in Baghdad) was calling "bull####". After the speech, I confronted Dr. Andres about several of his pejoritve quotes characterizing ground forces, and told him straight out "You're dangerous and you scare me". Too close to shades of Wolfowitz/Feith and their dreamy theories, and lack of anything but ivory tower experience on the ground for me. The fact that someone with such opinions willing to air them in such a forum was a special assistant to the SecAF disappointed me more. I guess it is a harbinger - if he was characteristic of the thoughts around the USAF leadership then it's no wonder Gates cleaned house.

Anyway, I thought the article's second half was an accurate diagnosis of the situation - the USAF's "organizational" attitude turns off the other services and doesn't help win its arguments - as evidenced by this article. The "The Army and Marines don't understand airpower" argument is lame. The conspiracy theory regarding a coverup of the "real" surge success data is even sillier. Call the waaahbulance. I don't know what (if any) experience he has, but the Army and Marines are doing fairly well waging a joint fight with all of the tools in the kit. I just get the sense that the USAF sees itself as first among the services, and is throwing a tantrum because OEF/OIF have forced it into the back seat for awhile.

[Ken White]

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