Generation Kill

[Tom Odom]

Ok I watched part 2 last evening and in keeping with the pro and con format I used before, here are my comments:

Pro:

a. Good Marines/Soldiers do well regardless of obstacles human or otherwise. Good leaders reduce obstacles.

b. Humor comes in all forms and Marines/Soldiers provide some of the better stand up routines....'quiet down, I can't hear the artillery.."; "These Hajjis are hotties..."; and "Hello! Vote Republican..."

c. Good portrayal of reactions to combat from the sniper to the young troop who kept wanting to shoot his weapon.

Con:

a. Captain America seems to have a number of companions. Bad leadership breeds such companions.


Mixed:

"In my darkest moments, I fear doing something General Mattis does not like..."


Tom

[selil]

I'm afraid I thought last nights episode was hilarious. The roll over a tank is going by routine was a memory straight out of a dark night long ago. I can still hear the snickering all these years gone by as guys rolled over.

The abject fear and courage in the face of violence is neither glamorous or sexy. It is though a reflection of reality. A pale often tainted reflection. The what is likely relative few times I've stood toe-to-toe with the devil I did not dance with glee, crack wise ass jokes, or beat my chest. All I can say is I survived. I see some of that in the made for television veneer.

[Wildcat]

I was on vacation in Yellowstone last week, so for the past 36 hours I've been playing catchup with "Generation Kill." I've had the DVR set to record the whole series and I've been thoroughly impressed with the first two episodes. The realism, the banter. Like VMI_Marine, I was struck by Lt. Fick addressing Sgt. Colbert as Brad. The way I've been taught, that just doesn't typically happen in the Marine Corps, particularly in the field. It's a culture thing for Marines, I think.

I'll share more thoughts later. In a rush right now.

[MikeF]

Generation Kill is spot on. As a member of the western flank (3rd ID), this story encapsulates my memories. As I watch, I remember what occured- specifically, the karoake of the popular songs of that period.

One disturbing note,

In episode two, on the onset of the strike into Nassiriyah, the Marines remarked that they thought that the Army had already cleared the town.

That was never the mission. We left Nassiryah three days before they arrived, and our mission was west of the town-

Specifically, bypass Nassiriyah, seize Talil Airfield, destroy the 11th ID, and seize the bridge. We accomplished our mission. Subsequently, the Fedayeen secured the town. I always wondered why the marines suffered so many casualites on the onset of the war, and now I guess I know why.

[VMI_Marine]

Generation Kill is spot on. As a member of the western flank (3rd ID), this story encapsulates my memories. As I watch, I remember what occured- specifically, the karoake of the popular songs of that period.

One disturbing note,

In episode two, on the onset of the strike into Nassiriyah, the Marines remarked that they thought that the Army had already cleared the town.

That was never the mission. We left Nassiryah three days before they arrived, and our mission was west of the town-

Specifically, bypass Nassiriyah, seize Talil Airfield, destroy the 11th ID, and seize the bridge. We accomplished our mission. Subsequently, the Fedayeen secured the town. I always wondered why the marines suffered so many casualites on the onset of the war, and now I guess I know why.

Mike, I was with TF Tarawa, and I remember being told that 3rd ID was supposed to secure it before we got there. How that got passed around, I don't know. It had nothing to do with the casualties suffered in the city, however. 1/2 was the lead battalion in the TF, and they encountered the survivors of the 507th Maintenance Convoy, so they were aware that Nasiriyah was going to be a fight. Most of their casualties came as a result of bad communications during the push through Ambush Alley - one company pushed all the way north through the city and inadvertently drove into the Iraqis' engagement area on the north side of the city.

Marines in the Garden of Eden by Richard S. Lowry is the best book I've come across so far on the battle. Cobra II fills in a few blanks as well. Both were very useful for someone who never saw more than 100-200m in front of my platoon's lines.

[MikeF]

Thanks for the update VMI_Marine.

Initially, after bypassing the main town and seizing W Nassiriyah (11th ID HQ, Talil airfield, and the bridge), we were told that Marines would relieve us in place. On the 20 or 21st, we were told to push west to As Samawa without a relief. I always wondered what happened to the Marines when they eventually pushed through.

Like you, I was a simple platoon leader looking 100-200m out.

Obviously, our units had some breakdown over secure and bypass. Unfortunately, this miscommunication cost us Marines.

v/r

Mike

[120mm]

As I sat and watched this on BLUFOR tracker, back in the V Corps Rear TOC, it became obvious that the Marines and 3ID had two completely different understandings of their mission. Other than the "Operational Pause", 3ID appeared to be moving faster than V Corps expected, and TF TARAWA was moving slower than V Corps expected.

From reading the rough draft of the V Corps history, I'm not aware if anyone is actually studying why this was.

Is someone writing/has written something on this out there? I admit that I've not kept up on the details since 2004.

[VMI_Marine]

Thanks for the update VMI_Marine.

Initially, after bypassing the main town and seizing W Nassiriyah (11th ID HQ, Talil airfield, and the bridge), we were told that Marines would relieve us in place. On the 20 or 21st, we were told to push west to As Samawa without a relief. I always wondered what happened to the Marines when they eventually pushed through.

I reread some excerpts from Marines in the Garden of Eden this morning. TF TARAWA was briefed by COL Allen before the war that his brigade was going to secure the Hwy 1 bridge and etablish a blocking position on Hwy 7 south of An Nasiriyah. Somehow this got translated down to my level that you guys would clear the city ahead of us. According to the book, 3ID never set up the blocking positions on Hwy 7, but told the TF TARAWA staff when they conducted final coordination at Talil on the night of the 22nd.

120mm, TF TARAWA may have been moving slower because 2 out of the 3 battalions in the TF Ground Combat Element were mounted in trucks, not AAVs. In addition, our entire move from Kuwait to Hwy 7 near Talil was cross-country, which slowed us considerably.

I watched Episode 2 last night - it was about as close a depiction of An Nasiriyah as I think you're going to get. It was interesting that they showed Hwy 7 through Ambush Alley being a narrow 2-lane road, when in fact it was a 4-lane divided highway. It was nowhere near as tight through Ambush Alley as the show depicted. In addition, there were no destroyed AAVs on the bridge itself, they were all north of the Euphrates bridge. Marines were not clearing houses as RCT-1 pushed through the city - 3/1 was strong-pointing the major intersections in the city to allow the rest of the RCT to pass through.

Richard Lowry posted some criticism of the episode on OPFOR that, while I agree with on a factual basis, I think misses that the show wanted to portray the "grunt's eye" view of the war. Yes, the show has many factual inconsistencies about Nasiriyah, but I think it accurately portrays what the Marines of 1st Recon Bn believed about the battle at the time depicted in the show.

[Wildcat]

Marines in the Garden of Eden by Richard S. Lowry is the best book I've come across so far on the battle. Cobra II fills in a few blanks as well. Both were very useful for someone who never saw more than 100-200m in front of my platoon's lines.

I've been meaning to pick both of those up. Hey VMI_Marine, when you come home this weekend would you mind bringing those with you? I'll trade them for your "24" DVDs that I still have.

I read Generation Kill a few years back when it first came out and a friend lent it to me. I thought it was interesting, and exposed the reader to parts of the Marine Corps that weren't as visible in books like The March Up and No True Glory. Of course, the purposes of those books were radically different than the purpose of Generation Kill. GK examines the grunt culture, whereas the others look at how the battles were fought and won, geared more towards the intrepidity of the riflemen and the professionalism of their officers and NCOs. GK offers a vision that is a lot more cynical and abrasive, though to a lesser degree than books like, say, Anthony Swofford's Jarhead. Still, I consider it a valuable addition to the pantheon of Long War literature. (Not Jarhead. Different war, different times, and I didn't really like that book very much to begin with. But GK was a solid read.)

Nate Fick's book, One Bullet Away, is probably the biggest thing to hit the Marine Corps officer pipeline in years. I say that with a bit of hyperbole, but I've actually heard from officer candidates who said that Fick's book directly motivated them to try to become Marine officers. Practically everybody going through Quantico these days has read that book and raves about it, and they tend to elevate Fick to almost demigod status. I don't fall into the crowd of Fick-worshippers, but I do own a copy of the book and I definitely enjoyed reading it. I would say it had a minor impact on my decision to pursue a commission. He's a talented writer and a free-thinker, and his brand of idealism appeals to liberal arts wonks like myself. Still, I've heard of some accusations that details and events in Wright's and Fick's books were embellished, and that wouldn't entirely surprise me. But all the same, I'm really enjoying watching the miniseries so far.