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Thread: Infantry survivability - at the crossroads?

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Default Infantry survivability - at the crossroads?

    I have the impression that in modern combat infantry survivability is at a crossroads.
    I admit that the difference is not fully perceptible in occupation duty and against poorly armed opponents (yet).

    My thesis is this:

    Heavy infantry (the one that moves to contact in AFVs or supports AFVs as primary mode)
    - depends on suppressive fires for survivability
    - depends on smoke (artificial concealment) for survivability
    - depends on hard body armour (rifle bullet resistant) for protection (at least frontal)
    My reasoning is that heavy infantry has its most critical moments in the offensive combined arms fight. It needs to accomplish its mission quickly to not waste too much momentum of the AFVs (protected mobility - that should be exploited).
    That's why I assume that HI cannot emphasize covert (camouflaged/concealed/deception) approaches to tactical problems, but rather the brute and quick ones. HI can achieve surprise primarily through high tempo.

    I assume a completely different profile for light infantry
    (the infantry that fights only dismounted and usually without AFV support).
    Light infantry is slow by design. Armour protection is only available as body armour, which is detrimental to mobility. It's therefore limited anyway.
    The primary source for survivability should therefore be camouflage/concealment. The lethality of light infantry is in (besides the hopefully always available indirect fire support) its ability to ambush or at least to use surprise. The surprise would be generated not by tempo/speed, but by covert movement into position and a small dose of deception.


    Well, comments on this would already be interesting.

    I'm a notorious skeptic. I cannot limit myself to theory without fearing a failure of our forces (our=NATO) for this reason.
    Shouldn't the personal body armour be very different for heavy and light missions?

    We've seen lots of bullet-resistant hard/heavy body armour lately because our troops are almost permanently exposed to enemy observation.
    Light infantry that relies on covert movement and ambushes should have very little use for such heavy body armour. It's too heavy (mobility and sustainability problem).
    LI depends on its leg mobility and doesn't have much protection against indirect fires.
    Shouldn't light infantry have full fragmentation protection?
    At least when lying down on the belly (rear 180° of legs + butt protected)?

    Frag wounds in the legs are often a "mobility kill", sometimes even deadly (blood loss). All immobilized soldiers need assistance of comrades and reduce the unit's capability and mobility. Frag wounds to arms can be a "mission kill".

    There are a lot of minor issues about minor fragmentation wounds anyway. Every WIA in a hospital means that his unit is understrength. Teamwork and possibly even cohesion of the unit suffer with every even temporary casualty.
    I haven't found any non-EOD anti-fragmentation trousers or jackets (not vests) yet - but I have pretty good sources. Abdomen and shoulder protection seem to be the maximum extras besides inflexible armour elements and pouch inserts.




    P.S.: I'm sorry that I (re)defined light and heavy. I don't know official English terms that describe the difference perfectly and I know that some might object against my definition. Think: "Panzergrenadiere" and "Jäger".

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Some thoughts...

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I have the impression that in modern combat infantry survivability is at a crossroads. I admit that the difference is not fully perceptible in occupation duty and against poorly armed opponents (yet).
    You may be correct but I'm skeptical. The demise of many things has long been predicted long before the actual departure from the scene.
    ...That's why I assume that HI cannot emphasize covert (camouflaged/concealed/deception) approaches to tactical problems, but rather the brute and quick ones. HI can achieve surprise primarily through high tempo.
    Too often true but quite often not necessarily so. What you posit is true in a movement to contact when opposed or when in the attack but those two evolutions are a small percentage of total time in war.
    I assume a completely different profile for light infantry
    ...The lethality of light infantry is in (besides the hopefully always available indirect fire support) its ability to ambush or at least to use surprise. The surprise would be generated not by tempo/speed, but by covert movement into position and a small dose of deception.
    All true.
    I'm a notorious skeptic. I cannot limit myself to theory without fearing a failure of our forces (our=NATO) for this reason.
    I'm unsure why your two assumptions which are reasonably valid lead to that conclusion. Particularly as the same parameters affect the opponent.
    Shouldn't the personal body armour be very different for heavy and light missions?
    Yes -- IF armor is worn at all by light infantry. They are unlikely to wear it in the Jungle, for example -- not unless they want more heat casualties than combat casualties. My personal belief is that in mid to high intensity combat individual armor for LI should and will go by the wayside.
    Shouldn't light infantry have full fragmentation protection?At least when lying down on the belly (rear 180° of legs + butt protected)?
    The solution to that -- and I am totally serious -- is not to lay down, that's an invitation to trouble.
    Frag wounds in the legs are often a "mobility kill", sometimes even deadly (blood loss). All immobilized soldiers need assistance of comrades and reduce the unit's capability and mobility. Frag wounds to arms can be a "mission kill".
    Not that big a problem. Do the math. Percentage of force that become casualties is not generally large enough for that to be mission impactor in most cases.
    There are a lot of minor issues about minor fragmentation wounds anyway. Every WIA in a hospital means that his unit is understrength. Teamwork and possibly even cohesion of the unit suffer with every even temporary casualty.
    Again, do the math. There's a reason why the Marines have a 13 man squad and why the US Army will go from its current nine man peacetime squad to an eleven man squad in HIC. Teamwork and unit cohesion ALWAYS suffer in combat, peacetime 'ideas,' norms and habits will not work; they'll just get people killed unnecessarily.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    The math is not universal.

    The USMC 13 squad is unique and even its leaders cannot insist that nothing changed after they took some casualties.

    Squads of 7-10 are usual, 9-10 seems to be typical for LI.

    Percentage of force that become casualties is not generally large enough for that to be mission impactor in most cases.
    Sorry, but that's the unique experience of a country that never joined really big wars early on and that never fought against intact 1st rate armies.
    And even under those conditions, U.S. forces were at times very much decimated, including complete destruction of battalions (1943-1950).

    I don't bother to think much about future conflicts against 3rd rate opponents because those tend not to be real threats until we turn them into foes.
    Competent enemy forces can inflict serious casualties, easily up to half the infantry of a brigade turning casualties in a matter of weeks.
    The Western world just avoided to fight such opponents since two generations (there's no guarantee that our governments will be able to keep it like that).

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Math is always universal, that's why they call it math.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    The math is not universal.
    There are obvious exceptions to every rule, even in math -- but the broad parameters are pretty constant. In most post WWI war, <25% Killed,wounded, captured or missing per major engagement; about 10% the rest of the time. COIN offers less but is not MIC or HIC.
    The USMC 13 squad is unique and even its leaders cannot insist that nothing changed after they took some casualties.
    Yes, it is unique -- that's why I cited it, it's exemplary and it works. Didn't say that things didn't change, in fact what I did say was ""...Teamwork and unit cohesion ALWAYS suffer in combat, peacetime 'ideas,' norms and habits will not work; they'll just get people killed unnecessarily."" You must have missed that.
    Squads of 7-10 are usual, 9-10 seems to be typical for LI.
    Usual does not equal right or even adequate. You must've also missed this; ""...why the US Army will go from its current nine man peacetime squad to an eleven man squad in HIC.""
    Sorry, but that's the unique experience of a country that never joined really big wars early on and that never fought against intact 1st rate armies. And even under those conditions, U.S. forces were at times very much decimated, including complete destruction of battalions (1943-1950).
    Of course. You can look at it that way. You can also realize that EVERY Army has had Battalions get decimated -- that's why they call it war.

    In any event, I'm unsure to what you refer with "...the experience of a country that never joined." don't think anything I said alluded to that -- what i did allude to was generic MIC - HIC casualty rates across many nations.

    I'll also point out that the condescension in your unnecessary "...never fought..." comment has little or nothing to do with the discussion at hand and just invites counter comments like: As for joining big wars late, better late than never, I guess -- how'd that turn out for you? So we can both probably lay off them, they add nothing to any discussion.
    I don't bother to think much about future conflicts against 3rd rate opponents because those tend not to be real threats until we turn them into foes.
    Or until they're ignored long enough to do so. You did note I stipulated HIC, not LIC or COIN in my original post?
    Competent enemy forces can inflict serious casualties, easily up to half the infantry of a brigade turning casualties in a matter of weeks.
    You're kidding, right? During WW II, all the major combatants in all theaters had brigade sized units that had over 50% casualties in days, not weeks. During the maneuver war in Korea, both South and North Korea, the US and China had Brigade sized units rendered ineffective due to losses in a few days on several occasions. The US and North Viet Namese even hit that in Viet Nam on a couple of occasions.

    However, as I said, that's the exception, not the rule -- the rule is about what you stated, 50% in weeks in reasonably intense combat (do 10% every two to five days for a couple of weeks and see what you get, math wise). That's what I based my statements upon.
    The Western world just avoided to fight such opponents since two generations (there's no guarantee that our governments will be able to keep it like that).
    True -- which has little or no bearing on anything you or I said.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The solution to that -- and I am totally serious -- is not to lay down, that's an invitation to trouble.
    Light infantry survivability (in the defense) stems from entrenching tools, not body armor IMO. The "rear 180° of legs + butt" are quite well protected when they are in the ground. On the offense, you have already mentioned that mobility + concealment = survivability for the light infantry.

    Here was my thought process on body armor for the infantry, from another thread:

    I participated in a MARCORSYSCOM survey about two weeks ago regarding the MTV. According to SYSCOM, BLT 1/6 and 2/7 have been fielded a plate carrier that is very similar in design to the MTV (I believe it is pretty much the same as PPI's Hornet). The plate pockets have soft armor backing for the plates (a requirement, for those who are not familiar with the difference between "in conjunction" and "stand alone" plates). The cummerbund design is identical to the MTV. Currently SYSCOM is considering issuing GCE units the MTV and the plate carrier.

    A PPI rep brought along a vest they have designed that is a plate carrier with removable soft armor panels. With the soft armor panels, the coverage is equivalent to IBA; with them removed it is equivalent to the Hornet shown above. I like the concept, but am not crazy about the attachment system - it requires threading a wire through loops on the plate carrier and armor panels.

    The reason I like the concept is because I picture using different levels of body armor for different phases of an operation. For instance, an infantry company doing a movement to contact would wear the plate carrier in order to have protection from small arms fire, but also the additional mobility and breathability for dismounted movement, and in case of chance contact or a meeting engagement where they need to maneuver aggressively. Once the unit reaches its assault position, the Marines (or Soldiers) don their soft armor in order to have the additional frag protection for the assault.

    The survey group was interesting - I was the only infantryman in the room, the rest of the group were MPs, tankers, or amtrackers. I was the only voice in the room that wanted to reduce coverage in favor of mobility, and/or have a modular armor system that incorporated removable soft armor. Personally, I think we passed the good idea cutoff point when we added side SAPIs, but the casualty averse mentality has eliminated any chance of getting rid of those things.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    I don't trust field fortifications anymore.
    The accuracy improvement of 120mm mortars and 152-155mm guns and the capabilities of sensors (especially aerial ones) are scary. Some radars can produce accurate pictures of trenches (even between bushes) at a distance of more than 300 km. The technology was available to NATO nations 20 years ago - and initially (much less impressive performance) used in the Vietnam War. We might be on the reflecting end of this soon.

    Entrenching doesn't work very well when you need to be mobile anyway.

    It doesn't work well if you need to cover a large area / wide frontage with few troops as is usual requirement in staff exercises.
    Our brigades need to cover frontages as did corps in earlier wars. That cannot be done by entrenched troops, not even on the static defense.

    It's always good to dig for added protection when you've got time and strength to do so, but I believe that it's not remotely as important or effective against 1st rate opponents as it was a generation ago.


    @Ken;
    Collective experiences coin expectations and perceptions. That's why I mentioned the seemingly unrelated stuff.

    I didn't take the most extreme losses of WW2/Korea as example to close in on the more modern low casualty perception. The plan was to reduce the dissent to keep the discussion easy. No kidding.

    The solution to that -- and I am totally serious -- is not to lay down, that's an invitation to trouble.
    I don't get why.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default We can agree on that.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I don't trust field fortifications anymore.
    The accuracy improvement of 120mm mortars and 152-155mm guns and the capabilities of sensors (especially aerial ones) are scary. Some radars can produce accurate pictures of trenches (even between bushes) at a distance of more than 300 km. The technology was available to NATO nations 20 years ago - and initially (much less impressive performance) used in the Vietnam War. We might be on the reflecting end of this soon.

    Entrenching doesn't work very well when you need to be mobile anyway.
    Totally. Agree with the other comments on field fortifications as well.
    I didn't take the most extreme losses of WW2/Korea as example to close in on the more modern low casualty perception. The plan was to reduce the dissent to keep the discussion easy. No kidding.
    No problem, however, I think those rates are very germane to and actually reinforce your positions.
    I don't get why.
    If one is laying down, one is not moving, same thing applies to laying down as applies to armor (individual or vehicular) as applies to field entrenching which is never a good idea IF it can be avoided -- and it quite often can be if one is tactically agile.

    Stasis is death; if it can seen and isn't moving, it can be killed. Movement is life; rapid and agile movement is a long life while rapid, agile and effective movement is death to the opposition while you live. Simple to say; harder -- but far from impossible -- to do. The key to units being able to do that consistently is simply good training and effective intuitive leaders (as opposed to he whose turn it happens to be...).

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default True. But...

    Quote Originally Posted by VMI_Marine View Post
    Light infantry survivability (in the defense) stems from entrenching tools, not body armor IMO. The "rear 180° of legs + butt" are quite well protected when they are in the ground. On the offense, you have already mentioned that mobility + concealment = survivability for the light infantry.

    Here was my thought process on body armor for the infantry, from another thread:
    Read your earlier post. If one has to have Armor, then I agree with your approach. Since I'm not the Emperor, I guess we'll have Armor but I'm not a fan. I fully understand what it is and what it does and I do agree with it in an Iraq-like situation; I agree less with it for dismounted troops in Afghanistan. As I said above, if we end up in a jungle somewhere, there will be no armor worn (not after the first few weeks of heat casualties anyway). Individual armor impedes troop mobility, in some situations, the benefit is worth it, in others it will not be. METT-TC again...

    I also agree with you on the entrenching tool but I submit two thoughts for consideration:

    - The US does not defend well; we are very poor at it. We don't dig well, partly because we can't do it in training at home station due to environmental constraints (unlikely to change for the better) and partly because you have to almost beat Americans to get them to dig. Recall that every memorable British battle is a defensive one; virtually every one of ours is an attack. The upshot of all that is one thing and you can add that the days when the defense offered advantages are, I think going or gone. If you're static you can be made dead too easily. Sometimes a limited defense cannot be helped but it should be avoided by us if possible.

    - Initiative and agility are tenets of our doctrine; yet we go out of our way to stifle the former and impede the latter with too much stuff and nonsense.

    We really need to change that latter problem to preclude the former one.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Stasis is death; if it can seen and isn't moving, it can be killed. Movement is life; rapid and agile movement is a long life while rapid, agile and effective movement is death to the opposition while you live. Simple to say; harder -- but far from impossible -- to do. The key to units being able to do that consistently is simply good training and effective intuitive leaders (as opposed to he whose turn it happens to be...).
    Yet it's possible to hide rather well as long as you don't move. In fact movement is still extremely helpful for detection, especially when camouflage or when radar is being used.
    And you cannot move 24/7 anyway, especially not as infantry.

    Firefights (direct fire) produce lots of fragments - 40mm, rifle grenades, hand grenades, recoilless weapons, spalling cover. Anti-frag is not only indirect fires.
    Light infantry depends on its leg mobility - a perforated leg is a real problem on patrol or when attempting to break contact.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Read your earlier post. If one has to have Armor, then I agree with your approach. Since I'm not the Emperor, I guess we'll have Armor but I'm not a fan. I fully understand what it is and what it does and I do agree with it in an Iraq-like situation; I agree less with it for dismounted troops in Afghanistan. As I said above, if we end up in a jungle somewhere, there will be no armor worn (not after the first few weeks of heat casualties anyway). Individual armor impedes troop mobility, in some situations, the benefit is worth it, in others it will not be. METT-TC again...
    Ken, I couldn't agree with you more. Even within Iraq, different situations require different levels of protection. In Ramadi, summer 2006 timeframe, wearing an MTV with ESAPIs and ESBIs makes a fair amount of sense. In rural Habbaniyah, trying to keep up with IA patrols in 120° heat, it made no sense at all. GOs have completely removed the ability of company grade officers to make those kinds of decisions, which goes with your second point below.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    I also agree with you on the entrenching tool but I submit two thoughts for consideration:

    - The US does not defend well; we are very poor at it. We don't dig well, partly because we can't do it in training at home station due to environmental constraints (unlikely to change for the better) and partly because you have to almost beat Americans to get them to dig. Recall that every memorable British battle is a defensive one; virtually every one of ours is an attack. The upshot of all that is one thing and you can add that the days when the defense offered advantages are, I think going or gone. If you're static you can be made dead too easily. Sometimes a limited defense cannot be helped but it should be avoided by us if possible.

    - Initiative and agility are tenets of our doctrine; yet we go out of our way to stifle the former and impede the latter with too much stuff and nonsense.

    We really need to change that latter problem to preclude the former one.
    I agree that we don't do defensive ops well, but I don't know that the advantages of the defense are gone. Also, I'm not talking about long-term field fortifications for a static defense, I'm talking about digging in when forced to go static for short periods of time. My company commander had us dig everytime we stopped in OIF I. Even a shallow hole provides better frag protection than leg armor.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs
    Firefights (direct fire) produce lots of fragments - 40mm, rifle grenades, hand grenades, recoilless weapons, spalling cover. Anti-frag is not only indirect fires.
    Light infantry depends on its leg mobility - a perforated leg is a real problem on patrol or when attempting to break contact.
    Agreed that leg mobility is very important - but providing infantrymen with leg protection will make them no longer "light" infantry, and will reduce their mobility to the point where you might as well treat them as heavy infantry. I don't believe the current state of body armor technology is capable of producing frag-resistant chaps that will not be a significant impediment to mobility.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default True, however...

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Yet it's possible to hide rather well as long as you don't move. In fact movement is still extremely helpful for detection, especially when camouflage or when radar is being used.
    And you cannot move 24/7 anyway, especially not as infantry.
    Got no problem with hiding, terrain and vegetation permitting and I've done a lot of that in a lot of places, it's not hard -- and light Infantry should not be employed where those factors do not exist -- and yes, people do need to eat and sleep but that does not require digging, which was my primary point. A secondary point is that going to ground under indirect fire is a no-no (or should be), one has to move out of it and rapidly.

    Radar is vastly overrated as a surveillance device in most terrain aside from the desert, even foliage penetrating radar cannot see through slight folds in the ground. Tactical surprise is obtained by doing the smart thing, not by being caught out on a dumb route.
    Firefights (direct fire) produce lots of fragments - 40mm, rifle grenades, hand grenades, recoilless weapons, spalling cover. Anti-frag is not only indirect fires.
    Light infantry depends on its leg mobility - a perforated leg is a real problem on patrol or when attempting to break contact.
    Recoilless weapons? you're showing your age...

    True but as VMI Marine says, the weight is a trade off. Plus it's really amazing how many people don't get wounded in firefights -- not to mention how many wounds are really superficial...

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    A secondary point is that going to ground under indirect fire is a no-no (or should be), one has to move out of it and rapidly.

    That was probably mildly valid at earlier times, but I think it's plain wrong against a 1st rate opponent. The difference lies in how the indirect fire engagement looks like - we seem to assume completely different ones.



    My assumption:
    An observer calls for MRSI strike on time by multiple barrels (like 3 rds each from 4 mortars). No ranging shots - fire for effect right at the beginning.
    The fire is accurate, dispersion is normal.
    The observer will see a lot of smoke/dust after the strike and not call in another strike for a while unless he can observe worthy targets.
    He might actually be deceived by "playing dead" as well.
    The indirect fire assets he had called for relocate to avoid counterfire asap. A continuation of fire would require other assets to join and would not be justified if there's no positive target confirmation.

    In short: To run wouldn't help, to hit the ground till it's over would help. And anti-frag clothes would help.

    It's completely different if the observer needs to correct the first impacts and only then calls for fire for effect - then you could run.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    In short: To run wouldn't help, to hit the ground till it's over would help. And anti-frag clothes would help.
    Until they come up with a uniform that protects against frag without being any heavier or less breathable than current utility uniforms (MCCUU, ACU), anti-frag clothes are impractical - especially for light infantry. I've seen some pictures of kevlar "chaps" and such - no way in hell I would wear those on a dismounted movement.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default We can differ on that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    That was probably mildly valid at earlier times, but I think it's plain wrong against a 1st rate opponent. The difference lies in how the indirect fire engagement looks like - we seem to assume completely different ones.
    Still valid. The issue is being under indirect fire, who got it there or how they did it is irrelevant; you're under it. The quality of the opponent (your criteria) is immaterial -- indirect fire that goes 'boom' and is falling around you is totally independent of the quality of the cannoneer or mortarman who fired it or of the quality of the tube or launcher -- and the rounds themselves, as long as they explode, are not quality dependent. Having had a great deal of it poured my way over a fair number of years by 1st to 4th rate opponents and found it all to be equally hazardous regardless of the rating of the shooters, having lain under it and /or moved through it depending on the situation, I am not assuming anything.
    My assumption:
    Your assumption is possible but to run will help. Try it instead of reading about it. I'd also submit your assumption calls for the receiving troops to have exposed themselves and while tactical idiots and bad luck exist, they can be negated. As I said; ""Tactical surprise is obtained by doing the smart thing, not by being caught out on a dumb route.""
    In short: To run wouldn't help, to hit the ground till it's over would help. And anti-frag clothes would help.
    That's what we can disagree on...

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    A well-executed, modern indirect fire strike is over before the targets can know what direction is safer than others.

    So if you're caught in the kill zone, you're done.
    If you were caught near the kill zone, you'll be perforated while running and be perforated about 1/5th as much while lying.
    There's about one second forewarning and five to ten seconds impact, not enough to sprint much more than 50m - not enough to escape the fragmentation zone.

    Movement makes sense when the indirect fires last longer and are not well-aimed at first - or if you get several seconds early warning based on radar data and radio alert.


    Besides that; a combination of machine gun and mortar fire creates a dilemma that forbids running most of the time.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default That's an addition to the problem

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    A well-executed, modern indirect fire strike is over before the targets can know what direction is safer than others.
    Can be true -- or not; CEP is still an issue as is the type of ground and how many people are in the open.
    So if you're caught in the kill zone, you're done.
    If is a big word -- and even if one was so caught, fire does unpredictable things...
    If you were caught near the kill zone, you'll be perforated while running and be perforated about 1/5th as much while lying.
    There's about one second forewarning and five to ten seconds impact, not enough to sprint much more than 50m - not enough to escape the fragmentation zone.
    Not a given; a probability, yes but there are no definitives.
    Movement makes sense when the indirect fires last longer and are not well-aimed at first - or if you get several seconds early warning based on radar data and radio alert.
    Also true.

    Again, the best solution is to avoid being caught in a fire trap in the first place.
    Besides that; a combination of machine gun and mortar fire creates a dilemma that forbids running most of the time.
    Now that's correct -- but that's the addition to the problem under discussion...

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    P.S.: I'm sorry that I (re)defined light and heavy. I don't know official English terms that describe the difference perfectly and I know that some might object against my definition. Think: "Panzergrenadiere" and "Jäger".
    I just don't see a difference between Light and Heavy. Infantry is infantry. All the other stuff is cultural and organisational.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I just don't see a difference between Light and Heavy. Infantry is infantry. All the other stuff is cultural and organisational.
    I just don't see a difference between infantry and armor. Soldiers are soldiers. All other stuff is cultural and organisational.

    Wait. Rewind. I do.

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    A well-executed, modern indirect fire strike is over before the targets can know what direction is safer than others.

    So if you're caught in the kill zone, you're done.
    If you were caught near the kill zone, you'll be perforated while running and be perforated about 1/5th as much while lying.
    There's about one second forewarning and five to ten seconds impact, not enough to sprint much more than 50m - not enough to escape the fragmentation zone.
    I once was at Fort Sill attending a firepower demonstration. It was quite a while ago--we still had towed 8" in the inventory. The demo was an 8" battalion time on target on a tree line. After the firing finished, the announcer said, "No living thing could have survived that attack." And then, a family of 3 deer came walking out of the trees.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

  20. #20
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    I once was at Fort Sill attending a firepower demonstration. It was quite a while ago--we still had towed 8" in the inventory. The demo was an 8" battalion time on target on a tree line. After the firing finished, the announcer said, "No living thing could have survived that attack." And then, a family of 3 deer came walking out of the trees.
    Very true. Human beings are surprisingly resilient. No army on earth can afford prophylactic fire missions to take out "possible" infantry positions. Even in a "big war" no one is going to un mask their guns just to stomp infantry.

    The whole issue with infantry is that they are hard to find, and find it so easy to hide.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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