Things changed a lot since fragmentation pattern design begun. Blast and non-prefragmented cases are surprisingly erratic in their lethality (especially if impacting at near-horizontal angles), a mortar bomb with a pre-defined fragmentation pattern, proximity fuze and near-vertical descent isn't.Originally Posted by wm
That's one of those techological advances that de-value old experiences.
Heh. Aside from the fact that all you list
is probably as old as you -- though admittedly far more common today than it was 40 years ago -- I have heard for over 60 years how "technology will change the rules."
As you have pointed out, an untrained tribesman with an old and rusty AK is still a threat. Technology still hasn't really managed to do more than slightly modify the rules...
Then let's rephrase. In our Army, we did away with seperate MOSs for mechanized and light infantrymen a number of years ago. If you're an 11B, you'd better be able to competently lead in both. Either way, it's the size of the weapons and the travelling method; fundamentals remain the same regardless.
Example is better than precept.
Having been one of those
11-Bush types who's done mechanized, walking heavy and airborne infantry, I don't see that there's a lot of difference; different techniques and equipement, sure -- but if you're Infantry, the bottom line is close with the enemy and kill people. It isn't that hard.
@RTK; the light infantry quality of the U.S. Army is widely not understood to have been 1st class during Operation Anaconda or in Afghan mountains in general.
The U.S.Army might have chosen not to differentiate anymore, but that doesn't tell us much about whether that was right or not.
"fundamentals" don't mean much either. Infantry "fundamentals" are soldier fundamentals, yet we specialize soldiers in different profiles.
The German FM on these fundamentals ZDv 3/11 is a central FM (ZDv) of Army, Navy, Air Force and Forces Base. It's not an army-specific FM (HDv) and never was, for good reason.
An angry wolf is still dangerous just like a 100,000 years ago. A WW2 AT mine design could still immobilize a modern MBT.Heh. Aside from the fact that all you list
is probably as old as you -- though admittedly far more common today than it was 40 years ago -- I have heard for over 60 years how "technology will change the rules."
As you have pointed out, an untrained tribesman with an old and rusty AK is still a threat. Technology still hasn't really managed to do more than slightly modify the rules...
But that's irrelevant. I was writing about increased lethality, not diminishing other's lethality. There's no doubt about lethality increases.
-------------------
There are obvious differences and obvious similarities between different forms of infantry combat.
Mankind knows since millennia that specalization offers advantages at a price.
My take on this is that the best approach to tactical problems varies quite consistently in different scenarios between infantry that fights without and infantry that fights together with medium/heavy AFVs.
There's one thing that's probably being more emphasized (and actually; revived during the 90's) in Germany: The operational speed of armoured units (which of course include infantry).
Light infantry has its capabilities, but its approach to, for example, capturing a bridge in a village would rather look like a slow-moving careful attack along lines of natural cover and if possible waiting for advantageous environmental conditions (night or unpleasant weather).
Mech/heavy infantry would arrive on the scene and be tasked to immediately clear the village in much less than an hour, so the armoured unit would not lose much of its momentum. The action would need to include more material and shock.
Infantry could be trained to be proficient in both styles, of course - but at a price. Besides the problem that it's difficult to have a perfect mindset for both light and heavy styles, you would need much more time (training time & cost) to train them for both.
Just think about the training necessary to cooperate well with tanks, to keep out of danger zones, to learn the timing and sharing of tasks.
Infantry is historically a quickly burnt-out (psychically) and even quicker decimated (physically) part of the ground forces. Few armies in history were able to keep up high training levels in wartime.
Look at the U.S. infantry. The last I heard is that although it's in principle suitable for both HIC and LIC, the HIC training suffers a lot. NTC tours and such are all about LIC now? That clearly shows the limitations that prevent all-round infantry training in wartime.
Well, light & heavy infantry have their roles next to each other in the same conflict and still happen to have very different profiles in many forms of conflict. My reasoning is that it's better to specialize a bit to leverage the advantages of specialization than to attempt to train can-all infantry.
This is not a proposal for a
100%/0% capability, but rather like
80%/20% instead of
50%/50% for all-round infantry or
70%/70% for all-round infantry with lots of training time.
80 beats 50 to 70. And few if any infantry will get enough training in wartime for 80/80.
Last edited by Fuchs; 07-23-2008 at 04:35 AM.
Tanks in the mountains, Tanks in the jungle.
Everyplace in the world is not central Europe...Not necessarily so; the command errors during Anaconda impacted the Infantry unfavorably; the units did okay. Since then, they're doing all right at both command levels and in unit performance.No but lethality increases do not equate directly to better performance in war, major or minor.But that's irrelevant. I was writing about increased lethality, not diminishing other's lethality. There's no doubt about lethality increases.Of course there differences and specialization does offer benefits -- no one is disputing that. The issue is how much specialization is required and how quickly one with specialty X can be retrained to specialty Y. The answer is not much and not long.There are obvious differences and obvious similarities between different forms of infantry combat.
Mankind knows since millennia that specalization offers advantages at a price.I agree -- IF the terrain will support it...My take on this is that the best approach to tactical problems varies quite consistently in different scenarios between infantry that fights without and infantry that fights together with medium/heavy AFVs.Only if poor commanders allowed that to happen.Infantry is historically a quickly burnt-out (psychically) and even quicker decimated (physically) part of the ground forces.The Wehrmacht did amazingly well at that in WW II with many disadvantages...Few armies in history were able to keep up high training levels in wartime.Again, you miss the point. The issue is not that one man can do everything; the issue is that infantry tasks are similar across types of operations and that the retraining required to switch from mounted to dismounted or vice versa is not that significant. Neither is the switch from HIC to LIC though the reverse is more difficult; thus initial training should be for HIC, after that hopefully good grounding, switching is not problematic.Look at the U.S. infantry. The last I heard is that although it's in principle suitable for both HIC and LIC, the HIC training suffers a lot. NTC tours and such are all about LIC now? That clearly shows the limitations that prevent all-round infantry training in wartime.Possibly -- but they'll learn quick when they get committed...80 beats 50 to 70. And few if any infantry will get enough training in wartime for 80/80.
...but you're buying into the current accepted norms. This is not the way ahead, IMO.
If a "light" infantryman and an "armoured" infantry man have the same fitness and training standards and the same equipment, what is the difference? The MICV is protected mobility and stand-off fire support, plus some good sensors. Very nice to have. If you don't have it, then plan B.
Stryker Battalions are Light Infantry in armoured vehicles. How would then be any different if they were in well modified M-113s?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Exactly, Wilf. USMC infantry units are light formations; our armored vehicles are kept in an entirely separate battalion and attached to infantry units as needed. There are advantages and disadvantages to this, but it apparently didn't hinder 1st Marine Division during the march up to Baghdad. They were able to operate at a "mechanized" tempo, but the infantry units retained their light infantry flavor for when it was needed (i.e. Phase IV). Not to say it's a perfect system, but it's worked well for us so far.
I've often wondered if something similar might be appropriate for Army light infantry units. Perhaps A, B, and C Companies foot mobile and D Company with vehicles, mounted weapons, and crews but no dismounts.
As you said, there would be advantages and disadvantages.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
This is something similar to what was done with air cavalry squadrons in Vietnam. A,B,and C Troops were air, while D Troop was ground. Obviously, divisional cavalry squadrons used a similar organization, with D Troop being air and the rest ground.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
What I was really getting at was the separate Assault Amphibian Battalions. We typically "mech up" one rifle company for a MEU deployment. That company gets a platoon of AAVs and a platoon of tanks from the division's AA and Tank battalions, respectively. The AAVs and infantry train as completely separate entities before the MEU "locks on" and begins its workups. After the MEU, the AAVs and Tanks return to their parent battalion, and the rifle company trains as light infantry again. This was done on a divisional scale for OIF 1 - the AA Bn's were used to mech up all of the infantry battalions in 1st MarDiv. While there are advantages to dedicated mech infantry formations, this arrangement works pretty well for the USMC's missions.
Yes, I understood what you were getting at, I was just wondering if Army light infantry units would benefit from following the same general principal - having a unit with vehicles (Strykers, M113s, something else?) and crews but having the dismounts come from another unit.
I just suggested a company (of some suitable vehicle) per battalion for Army light infantry for the sake of discussion, but I understood that the USMC has a battalion of amphibious tractors per division.
Last edited by Rifleman; 07-24-2008 at 12:49 AM.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
@ Heavy vs Light Inf:
Major difference I see between heavy (mechanized) and light (foot) infantry is, that heavies are in a supportive role for the armor, whereas the lights do everything themselves. This might actually lead the heavies to be light (as their stuff, like mortars and guns are on the vehicles), and the lights be heavy (since they carry their stuff themselves). So it seems more a job discription than anything else.
Also, what about losses? You might run out of heavies (in case their AFVs are not kaputt) and need to use lights then anyway.
Or: In 15 years robot crawlers, walkers and exo-skeleton troopers will be heavy and pure humans light. Beware of Skynet!
@ Dropping vs Running:
Mostly a question of instinctive assessment of potential cover within a few meters in your forward field of view the moment you hear it coming, I think. When it goes boom it's too late to decide.
Digging makes really nice radar returns. But: Do the other chaps have it?
Basically I think the age of digging in is over, as the age of mass infantry assaults is also over (at least as long as we don't go back to WW1 style). For bivouacing shrapnell-protection you might use one of these really sturdy kevlar raincoats overhead. Might also help against IR. Entrenching doesn't work too well on rocky soil either. Saw a MG gunner on a picture from Afghanistan sitting behind a piled up wall of stones. Crazy!
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