A Battle Over 'the Next War'

[Fuchs]

Not true at all. Defense expenditures are less than 4% of GDP. That's quite sustainable and the low figure is all the more impressive considering the significant military commitments the US has to defend allies around the world.

It's close to 6% if not only the most obvious costs, but also Coast Guard and some other costs are counted.
The trade balance deficit and federal budget deficit are clear indicators that the current U.S. economy and state are not sustainable. There's nothing to argue about it, both is evidence - defining indicators.
The high military-related expenditures (of which only a small part can be considered as investment into economic development - all else is state consumption) can easily be identified as a probable cause.

Alliances are a major reason why we have a comparatively large military. The US taxpayer is essentially subsidizing the defense of several countries around the world, including some of the world's biggest economies. If the US didn't have all these commitments to defend allies, then the US could have a much smaller military.

Not really. It's still a free choice. Many allies have saved a lot of their military expenditures after 1990. The NATO is not a one-way alliance. The alliance members have the same obligations - but some governments/parliaments chose to keep expenditures high.

Alliances are usually understood as lowering the need for defense expenditures. To believe that the opposite is true seems to require somee kind of political brainwashing in my opinion.
I've herd this subsidizing idea before (and it is somehow true), but it's still a free choice, and nothing that could be blamed on partners. I doubt that Taiwan could force the U.S. to have more than three CVBGs, for example.
Most of the U.S. military power is in fact excess power - European forces are strong enough to protect Europe, South Korea is superior to North Korea, Australia, Taiwan and Japan can take care of themselves with their strong economies and island geography as well.
In fact I cannot think of any alliance conflict that would require any U.S. forces at this time.

[Entropy]

The trade balance deficit and federal budget deficit are clear indicators that the current U.S. economy and state are not sustainable. There's nothing to argue about it, both is evidence - defining indicators.
The high military-related expenditures (of which only a small part can be considered as investment into economic development - all else is state consumption) can easily be identified as a probable cause.

Saying that military expenditures are unsustainable is not the same thing as saying a budget deficit is unsustainable. Besides, defense spending as a percentage of total US government spending has steadily decreased since the 1950's. One might therefore argue that other federal spending/taxation is more easily identified as a "probable cause" of US deficits.

Not really. It's still a free choice. Many allies have saved a lot of their military expenditures after 1990. The NATO is not a one-way alliance. The alliance members have the same obligations - but some governments/parliaments chose to keep expenditures high.

And the US has saved a lot on military expenditures too since 1990. Look at the data yourself. (And you can find graphs of US defense spending using a variety of measures here).

Furthermore I never said NATO or any other alliance was one-way, but the relative differences in capability are pretty stark regardless. NATO has very little capability to project any kind of force beyond its borders - just look at Yugoslavia in the 1990's and that was in Europe.

Alliances are usually understood as lowering the need for defense expenditures. To believe that the opposite is true seems to require somee kind of political brainwashing in my opinion.

Alliances are not formed for the purpose of saving defense money in national budgets - at least that's how I believe alliances are usually understood. I would like to see some data or analysis that show any kind of linkage between forming an alliance and a corresponding decrease in defense expenditure to back up your assertion - I suspect the opposite is actually true in most cases.

[Entropy]

The discussion quickly drifted into by comparison pretty irrelevant details, I'm sorry for that. My attempt to point out the inferior importance of small wars wasn't understood.

There's a lot in there I agree with.

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs, point taken, I'll write it off as a communication failure on my part, so now back on topic.

Not too long ago I would have agreed with you on the relative importance of major wars versus smaller wars, but now I tend to believe the smaller wars fought during the Cold War were important to our national survival and our international status; furthermore, and more germane to today, I think the series of small wars we are waging against an enemy who is intent on destroying our way of life is equally important, or perhaps more than some some major wars. If we revisit history and assume we were unable to oust Saddam from Kuwait that would be a terrible upset in the global order with profound consequences, but in the end Saddam would still sell the oil and the West would still exist. Other major wars could have much more serious consequences. The point is I don’t think we can determine the relative importance of war by its scale anymore, and I think that will increasingly become the case as irregulars and individuals become increasingly empowered with greater technology. The level of importance of small wars is approaching, or has approached parity with major wars. While I agree we must be able to win major wars, we also must be able to defeat emerging irregular threats that threaten our way of life. Defeating irregulars requires a different strategy than defeating regulars, and it also requires different formations and equipment in addition to our current conventional capabilities.

Most of our potential enemies know that if they plan to challenge us in a conventional fight, they will have to move quickly to secure their objectives before we can project ample combat power. That means we must be prepared to fight this type of war coming out of the gate, and assume that we probably won’t have time for a train up prior to deploying to fight, it is a come as you are war, ready or not. Assuming this is true; then one could make an argument that MG Dunlap is correct and most of our equipment and training should be focused on this type of war, but do we do so at the expense of losing so called small wars? Of course not, so the challenge remains finding the correct balance. MG Dunlap expresses an extreme view and those who think the Armed Forces should complete revamp themselves to fight irregular wars represent another extreme view and the extremes inform the middle, so both views are useful.

I think our Soldiers are quite capable of rapidly transitioning between the regular and irregular warfare at the tactical level if they have capable leadership and the correct strategy. On the other hand, I don’t think our staffs are capable of shifting gears that quickly. I still support developing a cadre of expert irregular warfare (interagency) planners to form irregular warfare task forces (IWTF), complete with regional experts, that will can quickly provide a Hqs element for providing strategic/operational level planning and command and control for irregular warfare. I think this was missing in both Afghanistan and Iraq after the initial fight, so we had capable Soldiers on the ground who were rudderless are given poor guidance because their command didn't understand the nature of the new fight. V Corps was a good war fighting headquarters, but they were slow on the uptake to adapt to the irregular fight. We can’t afford to have two armies, one for conventional warfare and one for irregular warfare, but we may be able to afford forming IWTFs to command and control our warriors after the conventional fight is over with.

I'm not sure what this would like, or how you would transition from major offensive operations to stability like operations, but I know we don't do it that well. Our doctrine hasn't evolved significantly enough to address that transition so we can quickly take advantage of any windows of opportunity that offensive operations may have created.

[davidbfpo]

I've not read this thread in detail, but noticed the comments on the lack of capability amongst NATO's European members (excluding the UK - thanks Bill) and the question why.

During the Cold War and the confrontation with the USSR Western Europe (as distinct from current NATO) spent a huge amount on defence; Federal Germany hosted a huge garrison - not that the US Army will have forgotten. When the USSR collapsed a host of reasons led to a reduction in budgets, manpower and will etc.

Here in the UK we now know the British Army, dispite all the money, was flawed; the First Gulf War showed that to deploy a single armoured division (approx. 40K troops) the rest of the Army was stripped bare. There are signs today we are spending our money on the wrong things (see other threads).

Yes, there is a conspicuos lack of political and public will to think, let alone spend money on defence in European NATO.

I've yet to read the latest commenary by IISS: http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...-capabilities/

Do we care about the threats? Yes we do, just differently from the USA, as we always have and will in an alliance. An alliance few challenge now.

Now to work.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

Here in the UK we now know the British Army, dispite all the money, was flawed; the First Gulf War showed that to deploy a single armoured division (approx. 40K troops) the rest of the Army was stripped bare. There are signs today we are spending our money on the wrong things (see other threads).

Wallah! - as we say here. Actually only parts of BAOR was "stripped" and bear in mind we deployed an armoured Division that was never meant to be deployed. It relied on Corps level support based in Germany. - Now there were huge things wrong with BAOR, but it was never designed to deploy an Armoured Div to the Gulf - nor should it have been.

Yes, we are spending money on the the wrong things, because the Service Chiefs want to spend it on the wrong things and don't allow/want debate for forward thinking. The forward thinking is all in silly ideas like "EBO", "Complex Adaptive Warfighting" and other nonsensical gobbledygook.

.