A Battle Over 'the Next War'

[SWJED]

A Battle Over 'the Next War' - Barnes and Spiegel, Los Angeles Times

Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr. is not a fighter pilot, wing commander or war planner. But he is waging what many officers consider a crucial battle: ensuring that the U.S. military is ready for a major war.

Dunlap, like many officers across the military, believes the armed forces must prepare for a large-scale war against technologically sophisticated, well-equipped adversaries, rather than long-term ground conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan.

First, however, they face an adversary much closer to home -- Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates...

Many veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan side squarely with Gates. They believe future conflicts will look like the current wars, and argue that the U.S. must not lose its newfound expertise in counterinsurgency warfare.

"I think that nation-state and conventional war is in a state of hibernation," said Marine Gen. James N. Mattis, who commanded U.S. forces in Fallouja in 2004. "I don't think it's gone away, but the most likely threats probably today are not going to be conventional or from another state."

Mattis argues that the current fight is not an interlude.

"I recognize some people want to say: 'Let's hold our breath. The irregular world will go away, then we can get back to good old soldiering again,' " he said. "Unfortunately, in war, the enemy gets a vote."...

[William F. Owen]

Dunlap, like many officers across the military, believes the armed forces must prepare for a large-scale war against technologically sophisticated, well-equipped adversaries, rather than long-term ground conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Dunlap is correct. We should prepare for a large-scale war against technologically sophisticated, well-equipped adversaries, but who are they?

Should we also prepare to face the Borg and Klingons?

I am far more worried about 16,000 white Toyota Land Cruisers, each carrying an MRL, MANPAD, ATGM post, or HMG, than I am about X number of Armoured Divisions that no likely enemies have the competency or budget to employ effectively.

[J Wolfsberger]

"A Battle Over 'the Next War' " is, in fact, a battle over budget and prestige.

[Hacksaw]

and organizational culture (which might be the one that hurts the most).

[John T. Fishel]

The US has fought only 5 declared interstate wars in its entire history. If you include the American Revolution, the Civil War, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm that makes a total of 10 major wars against peer competitors. Every other military action falls into the Small Wars category beginning with the Indian Wars and the Whiskey Rebellion.

One could reduce the number of BIG wars by considering the Revolution our insurgency, Vietnam as COIN, and DS as a simple police action. But even if you don't, small wars are the most likely fights and have been throughout our history. Dunlap (and Gian) are correct that we should not let a peer threat grow to the point where we will have difficulty meeting it but, historically, that has not been the problem at least since 1945. Our problem has always been one of forgetting, ignoring, refusing to recognize the small wars threat and having to learn old lessons all over again - as in deja vu!

Cheers

JohnT

[Fuchs]

The US has fought only 5 declared interstate wars in its entire history. If you include the American Revolution, the Civil War, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm that makes a total of 10 major wars against peer competitors. Every other military action falls into the Small Wars category beginning with the Indian Wars and the Whiskey Rebellion.

One could reduce the number of BIG wars by considering the Revolution our insurgency, Vietnam as COIN, and DS as a simple police action. But even if you don't, small wars are the most likely fights and have been throughout our history. Dunlap (and Gian) are correct that we should not let a peer threat grow to the point where we will have difficulty meeting it but, historically, that has not been the problem at least since 1945. Our problem has always been one of forgetting, ignoring, refusing to recognize the small wars threat and having to learn old lessons all over again - as in deja vu!

Cheers

JohnT

That's likely all true, but here's another statistic:
How many of these wars were really vital for the nation's well-being and the shaping of the international environment?
- The involvement in WW2 and possibly Vietnam.

The other wars were unnecessary.

COIN proficiency is really only necessary if you ally with weak states or intend to invade & occupy foreign nations. Both doesn't seem to be advantageous for your nation's well-being.

It's furthermore a strange assumption that no peer should be allowed to rise. Why not? That sounds more like a world domination adventure plan than reasonable policy.
The economic structure and development of the USA doesn't allow for such grandiose expectations anymore. The U.S. military expenditures aren't sustainable (real expenditures including some DHS budget and such is quite as big as the trade balance deficit and a bit larger than the federal budget deficit) and the industrial base is simply absent.

Did you look at the shipbuilding industry of the U.S. recently?
It's less than a per cent of world-wide production capacity.
Even Polish, Croatian and Danish shipbuilding industries are bigger.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shipbuilding

The real U.S. industrial value added is inferior to PR China's.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....ial-power.html

It's reasonable if a power doesn't want to be inferior militarily, but that needs to be seen in context of alliances, possible arms control and conflict prevention/solution.

[jkm_101_fso]

and organizational culture (which might be the one that hurts the most).

The Army was the worst about this...but the AF has us beat.

[Old Eagle]

It doesn't help that the author reports on relationships he really doesn't understand. There is no absolute dichotomy between preparing for future wars and fighting the currnet one. Like it or not, we have to do both, and like commanders at every level, our senior leadership needs to decide where to accept risk.

[Rank amateur]

"A Battle Over 'the Next War' " is, in fact, a battle over budget and prestige.

Maybe we need to build cement barricades around the various factions in the Pentagon and not let them out until they reconcile.

[Tom Odom]

Maybe we need to build cement barricades around the various factions in the Pentagon and not let them out until they reconcile.

Only if we are allowed to water board at will...

[Entropy]

"A Battle Over 'the Next War' " is, in fact, a battle over budget and prestige.

...I think it's more a battle about the future of US foreign policy and what role the military has in that policy, but you're right that budget (and therefore Congressional politics) and prestige play into that.

[Ken White]

a priority sort -- and that is driven by J. Wolfsberger's ""...Battle Over 'the Next War' " is, in fact, a battle over budget and prestige.""

Entropy is, I believe, partly correct with ""...I think it's more a battle about the future of US foreign policy and what role the military has in that policy..."" but I'd suggest that Congress and the budget are extremely significant impactors on what passes as US Foreign Policy today.

Unfortunately...

[stanleywinthrop]

The borg are scary!

Seriously, I think people on both sides of this have forced us into a false dichotomy.

I believe I read somewhere that Chesty Puller (A guy who went on to have plenty of experience with symmetrical conflict) is supposed to have said, "The Marine Corps never designed such a good school as Haiti and Nicaragua."