What is the "Surge?"

[Cavguy]

Interestingly, the article COL MacFarland and I wrote has become ground zero for the debate over recent comments by McCain/Obama campaigns.

Not where I like to be as a military officer - having our work being quoted in the middle of a political squabble over terms.

<sigh>

My blog post in February (well before the current hubub) amplifying it included this:

Likewise, the major actions that enabled the “Awakening” pre-date the execution of the surge, publication of FM 3-24, and the arrival of General Petraeus to Iraq. Attributing the success in Ramadi to the “surge” would be erroneous. However, the change to population centric tactics, patrol bases, and local security alliances that the Ready First and some other units had used in 2006 were systemically spread and adapted to local conditions throughout Iraq under the leadership of General Petraeus and General Odierno. The additional forces in the surge coupled with new tactics and doctrine enabled the transformation of Baghdad and several other provinces. The actions of the Ready First in Ramadi and 3d Armored Cavalry in Tal Afar were validation and prototypes for the change in tactics that accompanied the surge, and validated the principles that now embody FM 3-24.

I would offer that perhaps people are talking past each other - two events are being discussed - the "surge" as defined as the addition of extra BCT's to Iraq (announced Jan 07, and used in the example above), and apparently a definition of the "surge" that was the shift to better COIN tactics (pop security, COPs, nested lines of operations) that can be reasonably described as beginning somewhere in 2005, and were standardized country-wide in 2007 with GEN P/GEN O. The above quote specifically refers to the first definition. I can handle the second, but it probably is confusing. I would describe it as "better operations and tactics through organizational learning."

As far as the Awakening, the article has the dates of when things happened - I'll let others hash on its relation to the "surge" depending on which version of the above you accept. SEN McCain (plus SENs Snowe, Liebermann, and Graham) visitied us in Dec 06 and got a full brief from COL MacFarland on the emerging turnaround. I can see how McCain might have included this in his definition of the "surge", because it directly played into the political debate over whether success was possible in Iraq - and the choice between the Baker/Hamilton plan and the Kaplan/Keane "surge" that was all the rage in the media.

As a personal opinion, I doubt that we would have had the flexibility to break Baghdad's "cycle of violence" without the addition of extra troops, combined with a coherent and synchronized operational plan based off of organizational learning. The Awakening probably would have occurred in Anbar regardless, but I doubt it could have spread into the "Sons of Iraq" movement without the addition of troops to mitigate the sectarian cycle of violence combined with evolved COIN practices (the above plus things like gated communities in B'Dad).

That's as far as I'm willing to wade into this one. All personal opinions above. I am endorsing neither side's account/interpretation, only responding to some commentator/blogger's use of our article for political hay that I have seen.

[PhilR]

If memory serves me correctly, the decision to send the extra troops was tied in with the decision to re-look at the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan and the decision to send Gen Petreaus. While the "surge" is usually assocated with extra troops, it also featured additional State Department resources (ePRTs and an embassy crew that was was pretty much the DoS "A-Team" headed by Amb Crocker).
While this isn't any official view, I believe that the surge, in all its parts, played a decisive role in the Anbar Awakening because it sent the signal that we (the coalition) were going to be around for awhile. This gave the tribal leadership the confidence that they could deal with us and not be left out to dry. Prior to the surge, the key strategy was to turn the war over to the Iraqis as fast as possible. That is still a part, but the new strategy emphasized securing key portions of the population first.

[Ron Humphrey]

If memory serves me correctly, the decision to send the extra troops was tied in with the decision to re-look at the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan and the decision to send Gen Petreaus. While the "surge" is usually assocated with extra troops, it also featured additional State Department resources (ePRTs and an embassy crew that was was pretty much the DoS "A-Team" headed by Amb Crocker).
While this isn't any official view, I believe that the surge, in all its parts, played a decisive role in the Anbar Awakening because it sent the signal that we (the coalition) were going to be around for awhile. This gave the tribal leadership the confidence that they could deal with us and not be left out to dry. Prior to the surge, the key strategy was to turn the war over to the Iraqis as fast as possible. That is still a part, but the new strategy emphasized securing key portions of the population first.

It would seem that Phil has it right in that the greatest overall change took place in the perspectives of the people within Iraq, their leaders, and foreign interests; and what they were willing and ready to do about it.

The point at which the HN proactively begins to work towards change large scale will always be decisive. And General P with the surge forces and associated use of them was able to provide the conditions for that to happen.

Ultimately the locals have to win the local war and our soldiers helped and are helping to get them there.

Just my take ---