Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
Other significant components of the Surge:
1. Anbar Awakening.
2. AQI overplaying hand with increased civilian casualties.
3. Sadr ceasefire.
4. Additional troops to secure Baghdad.
5. Implementation of COIN strategy.
6. Patraeus decision to sequence operations (enemy based): a. AQI, b. Badr Corps, c. JAM
7. Patraeus decision to sequence operations against AQI (terrain based): a. Baghdad, b. outer belts, c. Mosul.
8. Crocker’s continued pressure on Maliki to lead.
9. Maliki’s decision to lead.
10. Maliki taking the fight to Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Diyala(?)
Excellent list, although I would nuance #2 to underscore AQI's momentous mistake in finally pushing the Shiite militias and population into revenge mode with the February 2006 al-Askari (Samarra) mosque bombing.

Up to that point it was striking that the Shiite militias had typically NOT taken engaged in sectarian revenge attacks--a rarity for a civil conflict. With the upsurge of sectarian violence (and sectarian-"unmixing") in 2006, the Sunni population and non-AQI militias suddenly learned to count (as in "ummm.. so we're 20% of the population.. the Shiites and Kurds are 80%... maybe we better rethink our security interests...")