[QUOTE=MSG Proctor;53392]Wow. I won't even attempt to answer your penetrating question other than to say that there's another layer of C2 at work here and that is the powerful Shiite clerical heirarchy. Americans tend to disregard religious actors on the COIN battlefield except when they wield explicit political decision-making power. This is a gross underestimation of the Shiite religious system of tiered religious echelons aligned with the Marja.

Right. Most have no idea how much Shia eschatology and feelings of historical persecution have added to the sociological stew. At first the Shia street welcomed political expressions of Shia power, so long denied. After these last few years though, a good majority of the Shia street realize the incompetent nihilism that the Shia militias represent. What do large scale extortion, assassination and kidnapping against Shia have to do with Shi'ism, they ask.

Another element is that the Shia militias have totally coopted the tribal system. Shia sheikhs don't like this and, consummate survivors that they had to become under Saddam, are experts in risk aversion. The historical interchange between tribes, honor besmirched requiring shame/honor response, sheikh involvement in finding a solution maintaining the honor of both parties - done to avoid the otherwise honor demanded necessary mutually assured destruction, has been turned on it's head. The Shia militia has become the biggest tribe, with unaccountable political power, and is not afraid of besmirching the honor of anyone or tribe. It has turned the shame/honor system on it's head. Young, proud men see this dynamic, and are easily led from allegiance to their tribe to allegiance to the militia. Believe me, Shia sheiks would like some payback, but there is nothing empowering them to get it.

One on one, many Shia on the street wish for a strong man to come back because it's the only thing that will work in Iraq. Some of them wish Saddam was back. A name I heard mentioned frequently by Shia ISF officers from CPT to LTC level was Ayad Allawi as someone who could "finish" the terrorists and militias.

The Mahdi Army does NOT have the popular support of the Shia street. Ostensibly a religious organization, they have more in common with a street gang out for themselves. I've analogized that they are a cross between the branch davidians and the crips and bloods.

Moqtada Sadr has his father's name. Outside of Sadr City, with which I am umfamiliar, Shia on the street do not respect him as a religious figure or intellectual. His reputation was that he was the Playstation champion of Najaf during his house arrest. Word on the street was that he was going to be fast tracked through the Hawza, the Shia theological education process, which is basically unheard of. As of when I left, we had not declared the Mahdi Army as a hostile force. The moniker of "special group" was created to distance Sadr from the activities of his worst and most effective insurgents. Believe me, he put minimal effort, if any at all, into reigning these guys in. What it did was give him deniability.