What is the "Surge?"

[MikeF]

Enthropy-
Excellent timing. We just had a thorough discussion on this in class (All services and SF/Seals represented). Many of us served as ground commanders throughout Iraq from late 2006 to summer of 2007.

Situation: Years of frequent policy shifts(Saddam, Interim IZ Gov’t, Civil War, Islamic State of Iraq) and the introduction of partisan forces and the evolution of radical Islamist Jihad (suicide bomber) deteriorated the social fabric of the Iraqi (self, family, tribe, religion, and state) leaving an acephalous society- confusion, lack of self-identity, loss of hope. The insertion of additional combat troops and COIN strategy colliding with internal Iraqi actions led to the perfect storm of “The Surge.”

First, my personal, emotional, and categorical answer- Combined with other components listed below, the decisive point of “The Surge” was Airborne, Strykers, Cavalry, and Marine units moving deep into denied areas taking the fight to the enemy. This action took away the enemy’s information advantage (terrorize the terrorist/denying safehaven). The increase in kinetics (facilitated by the AF, but triggered by the grunt) allowed us to control these areas. The psychological impact on the Sunni populace was exponential. After years of instability, the populace believed that we could secure them. Finally, we broke the enemy’s will to fight, and they turned away from AQI and began providing actionable intelligence.

Other significant components of the Surge:
1. Anbar Awakening.
2. AQI overplaying hand with increased civilian casualties.
3. Sadr ceasefire.
4. Additional troops to secure Baghdad.
5. Implementation of COIN strategy.
6. Patraeus decision to sequence operations (enemy based): a. AQI, b. Badr Corps, c. JAM
7. Patraeus decision to sequence operations against AQI (terrain based): a. Baghdad, b. outer belts, c. Mosul.
8. Crocker’s continued pressure on Maliki to lead.
9. Maliki’s decision to lead.
10. Maliki taking the fight to Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Diyala(?)

Now, the challenge is how to put humpty dumpty back together again.

I probably missed a few components, but it’s a start. I look forward to hearing others views, feedback, and additions.

[jkm_101_fso]

Other significant components of the Surge:
1. Anbar Awakening.
2. AQI overplaying hand with increased civilian casualties.
3. Sadr ceasefire.
4. Additional troops to secure Baghdad.
5. Implementation of COIN strategy.
6. Patraeus decision to sequence operations (enemy based): a. AQI, b. Badr Corps, c. JAM
7. Patraeus decision to sequence operations against AQI (terrain based): a. Baghdad, b. outer belts, c. Mosul.
8. Crocker’s continued pressure on Maliki to lead.
9. Maliki’s decision to lead.
10. Maliki taking the fight to Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Diyala(?)

Now, the challenge is how to put humpty dumpty back together again.

I probably missed a few components, but it’s a start. I look forward to hearing others views, feedback, and additions.

Mike, great work. How critical (or not) are the Sons of Iraq, do you think? I'm assuming you'd place them under #1, although that has thankfully trickled beyond Anbar, to a pretty good degree of success, from what I've heard.

Without question, it is my observation one of the most critical elements was Petraeus coming in and cleaning out the FOBs and getting the line units on the streets and in the neighborhoods. He employed this wildly successful strategy in Mosul in '03 and it was an absolutely blessing when he applied it to the entire theater. It has been great tactically and for also for morale.

[MSG Proctor]

Without question, it is my observation one of the most critical elements was Petraeus coming in and cleaning out the FOBs and getting the line units on the streets and in the neighborhoods. He employed this wildly successful strategy in Mosul in '03 and it was an absolutely blessing when he applied it to the entire theater. It has been great tactically and for also for morale.

Bingo! After MCO, most (not all) of the armored/mechanized formations in the invasion force quite naturally holed up in large bases (usually a palace remodeled by the USAF). The airborne/air assault forces did what we do - disperse maneuver companies and platoons in order to hold key terrain on foot. When people talk about the "new strategy" of GEN Petraeus, I just shrug. Our BCT assumed this exact posture in southern Baghdad in 2003 with the same results as the 101 in Mosul. I recall thinking the war must be over if they're consolidating us ground pounders into FOBs.

"I attribute our company’s success to several things. First, our squad leaders and platoon sergeants led by example throughout the deployment. Secondly, we maintained a vigilance and steadfast belief that we were making a difference in people’s lives. Last, we submerged ourselves into the Iraqi communities rather than sitting behind the walls of one of the many huge base camps that you see in Iraq today. We were capable of knowing the fine details of every road and back ally in our area of responsibility because we lived among these people on a daily basis. Developing friendships while compiling knowledge from our local informants, we were able to maintain a stable environment and growing economy for the citizens of Mosul that became the model for other cities around Iraq."

-1SG J. Bradshaw, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st ABN DIV
From The Long Hard Road: NCO experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq published by USASMA

[Rank amateur]

I probably missed a few components,

I think building walls around the population always "works." It's also worth noting that the objective changed from the impossible - spreading democracy across the Middle East - to the very achievable "lowering violence."

Setting the objective is above everyone's pay grade, but if you set an impossible objective, failure is guaranteed.

I've also longed maintained that the single most important metric - to the schlep watching TV - was US casualties. As long as few of "our guys" are getting killed, we're not too worried about much else going on in Iraq because we figure most government projects are SNAFU and if the bureaucrats didn't waste money in Iraq they'd waste it here, so we can't get too worked up about reconciliation, rebuilding or the lack there of.

[Rex Brynen]

Other significant components of the Surge:
1. Anbar Awakening.
2. AQI overplaying hand with increased civilian casualties.
3. Sadr ceasefire.
4. Additional troops to secure Baghdad.
5. Implementation of COIN strategy.
6. Patraeus decision to sequence operations (enemy based): a. AQI, b. Badr Corps, c. JAM
7. Patraeus decision to sequence operations against AQI (terrain based): a. Baghdad, b. outer belts, c. Mosul.
8. Crocker’s continued pressure on Maliki to lead.
9. Maliki’s decision to lead.
10. Maliki taking the fight to Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Diyala(?)

Excellent list, although I would nuance #2 to underscore AQI's momentous mistake in finally pushing the Shiite militias and population into revenge mode with the February 2006 al-Askari (Samarra) mosque bombing.

Up to that point it was striking that the Shiite militias had typically NOT taken engaged in sectarian revenge attacks--a rarity for a civil conflict. With the upsurge of sectarian violence (and sectarian-"unmixing") in 2006, the Sunni population and non-AQI militias suddenly learned to count (as in "ummm.. so we're 20% of the population.. the Shiites and Kurds are 80%... maybe we better rethink our security interests...")

[carl]

The insertion of additional combat troops and COIN strategy colliding with internal Iraqi actions led to the perfect storm of “The Surge.”

This seems a clear and concise definition of the "the Surge".

It is important to note that the elements coalesced into the perfect storm because we as a nation decided to keep on trying, and we were wise enough to do it a little harder and smarter.

[MikeF]

First Air Assualt,

"How critical (or not) are the Sons of Iraq, do you think? I'm assuming you'd place them under #1, although that has thankfully trickled beyond Anbar, to a pretty good degree of success, from what I've heard."

-jkm_101

The list was simply a timeline of my own brain. As to the weight of the Sons of Iraq, I simply don't know. I left at the end of July 2007 before they trickled into Diyala Province. Although, from NIPR, it appears that both Sons and Daughters of Iraq are succeeding there.

To rank amateur,

"I think building walls around the population always "works." It's also worth noting that the objective changed from the impossible - spreading democracy across the Middle East - to the very achievable "lowering violence.'"

Interesting tactic-I initially summarized it under secure Baghdad, but the decision to wall off Baghdad is significant.

To Rex,

"Excellent list, although I would nuance #2 to underscore AQI's momentous mistake in finally pushing the Shiite militias and population into revenge mode with the February 2006 al-Askari (Samarra) mosque bombing."

Yeah, I summarily categorized AQI's violence as one. In the macro sense, a decision to kill civilians and Shia outweights time- Samarra mosque bombing, Diyala attacks, and Sadr City attacks...

To Carl,

Quote:
Originally Posted by Carl

This seems a clear and concise definition of the "the Surge".

No issues there.

Looking foward to further submittals....Did we miss anything?