What is the "Surge?"

**MSG Proctor** · 07-30-2008

Originally Posted by Alsultani

Unlike in Sunni areas, Shia sheikhs are unwilling to risk confronting the militia because they rightly perceive that Shia militia equals unaccountable political power. Their provincial governor, with a 5th grade education, takes his marching orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I've been in several meetings with this guy, as a fly on the wall. He does nothing but put roadblocks in the way of those few ISF who are willing to go after JAM.

These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.

I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?

Wow. I won't even attempt to answer your penetrating question other than to say that there's another layer of C2 at work here and that is the powerful Shiite clerical heirarchy. Americans tend to disregard religious actors on the COIN battlefield except when they wield explicit political decision-making power. This is a gross underestimation of the Shiite religious system of tiered religious echelons aligned with the Marja.

Your assessment that the governor is beholden to SICI (they have publicly removed the "R" for revolution but I know what you mean) indicates the religious chain of command is at work, regardless of the formal political network as recognized in the Parliament. Shia are obligated to obey the fatwas of their Marja until the Ayatollah/Hojat al Islam dies. This is 180 degrees the opposite of Sunnaism which recognizes no formal clergy heirarchy, is dependent on scholarship and consensus, and utilizes no religious chain of command. Moreover, it is religion that cements the ties between Iraq's Shia and the Iranian revolutionary council.

I share your frustration with this thorny problem and agree that there is not much external military forces can bring to bear to untangle this corruption. However the government of Iraq will have to confront the issue (as they did in Bosra) of cleric-run militias under Iranian influence without creating 'martyrs' and inflaming fanatics. One must take into account that the majority of Shia believe that we are living in the End Times just before the appearing of Imam al Mahdi, the Shiite Savior. This apocalyptic furor is instrumentalized by many clerics as explicit justification for political and military action. Few CF INTEL/IO/PSYOP planners are fluent in these dynamics and may be operating in the dark in that regard.

**Alsultani** · 07-30-2008

[QUOTE=MSG Proctor;53392]Wow. I won't even attempt to answer your penetrating question other than to say that there's another layer of C2 at work here and that is the powerful Shiite clerical heirarchy. Americans tend to disregard religious actors on the COIN battlefield except when they wield explicit political decision-making power. This is a gross underestimation of the Shiite religious system of tiered religious echelons aligned with the Marja.

Right. Most have no idea how much Shia eschatology and feelings of historical persecution have added to the sociological stew. At first the Shia street welcomed political expressions of Shia power, so long denied. After these last few years though, a good majority of the Shia street realize the incompetent nihilism that the Shia militias represent. What do large scale extortion, assassination and kidnapping against Shia have to do with Shi'ism, they ask.

Another element is that the Shia militias have totally coopted the tribal system. Shia sheikhs don't like this and, consummate survivors that they had to become under Saddam, are experts in risk aversion. The historical interchange between tribes, honor besmirched requiring shame/honor response, sheikh involvement in finding a solution maintaining the honor of both parties - done to avoid the otherwise honor demanded necessary mutually assured destruction, has been turned on it's head. The Shia militia has become the biggest tribe, with unaccountable political power, and is not afraid of besmirching the honor of anyone or tribe. It has turned the shame/honor system on it's head. Young, proud men see this dynamic, and are easily led from allegiance to their tribe to allegiance to the militia. Believe me, Shia sheiks would like some payback, but there is nothing empowering them to get it.

One on one, many Shia on the street wish for a strong man to come back because it's the only thing that will work in Iraq. Some of them wish Saddam was back. A name I heard mentioned frequently by Shia ISF officers from CPT to LTC level was Ayad Allawi as someone who could "finish" the terrorists and militias.

The Mahdi Army does NOT have the popular support of the Shia street. Ostensibly a religious organization, they have more in common with a street gang out for themselves. I've analogized that they are a cross between the branch davidians and the crips and bloods.

Moqtada Sadr has his father's name. Outside of Sadr City, with which I am umfamiliar, Shia on the street do not respect him as a religious figure or intellectual. His reputation was that he was the Playstation champion of Najaf during his house arrest. Word on the street was that he was going to be fast tracked through the Hawza, the Shia theological education process, which is basically unheard of. As of when I left, we had not declared the Mahdi Army as a hostile force. The moniker of "special group" was created to distance Sadr from the activities of his worst and most effective insurgents. Believe me, he put minimal effort, if any at all, into reigning these guys in. What it did was give him deniability.

**MSG Proctor** · 07-31-2008

[QUOTE=Alsultani;53433]

Originally Posted by MSG Proctor

Right. Most have no idea how much Shia eschatology and feelings of historical persecution have added to the sociological stew. At first the Shia street welcomed political expressions of Shia power, so long denied. After these last few years though, a good majority of the Shia street realize the incompetent nihilism that the Shia militias represent. What do large scale extortion, assassination and kidnapping against Shia have to do with Shi'ism, they ask.

A name I heard mentioned frequently by Shia ISF officers from CPT to LTC level was Ayad Allawi as someone who could "finish" the terrorists and militias.

The Mahdi Army does NOT have the popular support of the Shia street. Ostensibly a religious organization, they have more in common with a street gang out for themselves. I've analogized that they are a cross between the branch davidians and the crips and bloods.

Alsultani, excellent insights and riveting to read. I am encouraged to hear you mention Shia eschatology, a concept I have rarely heard mentioned outside theological/chaplain circles. Until one grasps the role of the Mahdi in contemporary Shia thought and action, the Shia remain mysterious and incomprehensible. There is a good deal of religious conceptualizing required to appreciate what the Shia think of as relevant, and it comes rather slowly to those who have not comitted to unraveling the various layers of Shia tradition and history. Blessings upon you!

I am also heartened to hear Dr. Alawi's name is being bandied about on the Shia street. If anyone has the right values, character, experience and vision, its Iyad Alawi. And he is a Shia, but is not an Islamist. Would to God his influence would increase in Baghdad!

I understand that Moqtada al Sadr was on the 'fast track' to becoming an Ayatollah - something that in reality cannot be done. Titles may be conferred on him by some, but real gravitas as a Shiite holy man require decades of preparation and experience as a cleric. Sistani is still the primary Ayatollah in Iraq. He's 80. He's a traditional quietist and not at all in step with his neighbors to the east.

I appreciate your incredible insights and I am glad you posted here for the benfit of this community of interest.

**MSG Proctor** · 07-31-2008

Originally Posted by Alsultani;[B

53433Another element is that the Shia militias have totally coopted the tribal system. Shia sheikhs don't like this and, consummate survivors that they had to become under Saddam, are experts in risk aversion. The historical interchange between tribes, honor besmirched requiring shame/honor response, sheikh involvement in finding a solution maintaining the honor of both parties - done to avoid the otherwise honor demanded necessary mutually assured destruction, has been turned on it's head. The Shia militia has become the biggest tribe, with unaccountable political power[/B], and is not afraid of besmirching the honor of anyone or tribe. It has turned the shame/honor system on it's head. Young, proud men see this dynamic, and are easily led from allegiance to their tribe to allegiance to the militia. Believe me, Shia sheiks would like some payback, but there is nothing empowering them to get it.

Interesting. Because this is the same flawed tack taken by AQ in Anbar that resulted in the Sunni Awakening. That awakening is popularly understood as a movement led by the tribal Sheikhs (and it was/is) but the clerics were the pivotal leaders in procuring tribal buy-in.

CF/GOI need to develop the same coalitions of co-optible religious leaders among the Shia as they did with the Sunnis in Anbar. I realize its a completely different animal with Shiites, but there's probably no other way to solve this problem.

**Bullmoose Bailey** · 12-16-2008

Originally Posted by MSG Proctor

Interesting. Because this is the same flawed tack taken by AQ in Anbar that resulted in the Sunni Awakening. That awakening is popularly understood as a movement led by the tribal Sheikhs (and it was/is) but the clerics were the pivotal leaders in procuring tribal buy-in.

CF/GOI need to develop the same coalitions of co-optible religious leaders among the Shia as they did with the Sunnis in Anbar. I realize its a completely different animal with Shiites, but there's probably no other way to solve this problem.

Very good discussions here friends. I see several new advantages to the escalation as I call it.

I find the term "surge" a bit inappropriate, I respectfully protest that a surge in western parlance applies more to electrical power than military power.

I feel the main stream media loved the term because it served to dehumanize the Troops. So extension or escalation is a superior term.

Yesterday & other days our C-in-c used the term so it does pass into history. I wonder who will be identified most with it in history; McCain, Petraeus, Bush, Pelosi ???

**Schmedlap** · 12-16-2008

Originally Posted by Bullmoose Bailey

Yesterday & other days our C-in-c used the term so it does pass into history. I wonder who will be identified most with it in history; McCain, Petraeus, Bush, Pelosi ???

Perhaps I am overly optimistic, but I think the fighting men and women will be most identified with it, as they should be.

**MikeF** · 11-12-2009

Kim Kagan just released this documentary titled Understanding the Surge (H/T Andrew Exum). COL Gentile describes it as COIN porn. I admit that I was a fan of her earlier Iraq Reports, and I have not read her book. I thought she did a brilliant job of interpreting the available data at the time; however, this documentary seems very weak on analysis. I felt dirty after watching it.

Here's my reaction,

It took us four years to comprehend that the various insurgencies were conducting classic Mao protracted war- "clandestine organization, psychological preparation of the people, expansion of control, and consolidation of power." It's a failure of leadership on many levels that it took this long. Kim doesn't even acknowledge it in her documentary, and I would submit that many leaders still don't get it. She just shows the by-product of a Phase III civil war- lots of people were dying, and it was bad. Duh, but it didn't happen over night. During my one staff tour in 2005, it was increasingly apparent to many leaders on the ground that a civil war had sparked long before the mosque in Samarra was blown. Some acted- Remember McMasters and Tal Afar?

After we finally defined the situation for what it was NOT what we wished it to be, we employed a counter-strategy of population control measures, increased kinetics targeting leaders, facilitators, and bomb-makers, denial of safe-havens, destruction of training camps, and turning reconciliables. Additionally, GEN Patraeus and Ryan Crocker pressured the Iraqi Gov't to govern.

Am I off here? What are others' thoughts?