What is the "Surge?"

[MSG Proctor]

Unlike in Sunni areas, Shia sheikhs are unwilling to risk confronting the militia because they rightly perceive that Shia militia equals unaccountable political power. Their provincial governor, with a 5th grade education, takes his marching orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I've been in several meetings with this guy, as a fly on the wall. He does nothing but put roadblocks in the way of those few ISF who are willing to go after JAM.

These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.

I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?

Wow. I won't even attempt to answer your penetrating question other than to say that there's another layer of C2 at work here and that is the powerful Shiite clerical heirarchy. Americans tend to disregard religious actors on the COIN battlefield except when they wield explicit political decision-making power. This is a gross underestimation of the Shiite religious system of tiered religious echelons aligned with the Marja.

Your assessment that the governor is beholden to SICI (they have publicly removed the "R" for revolution but I know what you mean) indicates the religious chain of command is at work, regardless of the formal political network as recognized in the Parliament. Shia are obligated to obey the fatwas of their Marja until the Ayatollah/Hojat al Islam dies. This is 180 degrees the opposite of Sunnaism which recognizes no formal clergy heirarchy, is dependent on scholarship and consensus, and utilizes no religious chain of command. Moreover, it is religion that cements the ties between Iraq's Shia and the Iranian revolutionary council.

I share your frustration with this thorny problem and agree that there is not much external military forces can bring to bear to untangle this corruption. However the government of Iraq will have to confront the issue (as they did in Bosra) of cleric-run militias under Iranian influence without creating 'martyrs' and inflaming fanatics. One must take into account that the majority of Shia believe that we are living in the End Times just before the appearing of Imam al Mahdi, the Shiite Savior. This apocalyptic furor is instrumentalized by many clerics as explicit justification for political and military action. Few CF INTEL/IO/PSYOP planners are fluent in these dynamics and may be operating in the dark in that regard.

[jkm_101_fso]

I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?

Alsultani--Welcome. Your experience and opinions will be much appreciated here. Your thoughts and insights into Iraqi politics are unique, but certainly not unfamiliar to many of us. The unfortunate reality of the Surge and our Operations in Iraq is that many unpleasant and unsavory characters will gain power and wealth. It irks me as much as you, trust me. Most people would like to focus on the tactical portion of the Surge, but the political aspect is actually what matters, in regards to many of the "benchmarks" our leaders set for the Iraqi leadership. The bottom line is that Iraqi leaders, starting with Maliki on down, will determine their own destiny. Who they choose to lead and grant power too is ultimately up to Iraqis, not us. Although, I've seen U.S. favored actors gain power and perform miserably (as far as acting in the interest of their represented population) I also believe that Shia factions tied to JAM and Iran are certainly the most dangerous and unpredictable. You highlight many good points, there. Your question is a hard one to answer, but is actually one of the most crucial, outside of security gains met because of the tactical part of the Surge.

[Ken White]

These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.

Are they? Or is the 'surge' (really silly term...) working to provide some stability to ALL Iraqis insofar as is possible? While those clowns try to game the process as is in their genes...

Being the ME, there will be no all encompassing stability; that area is going to change only slowly. My guess, having spent a couple of years there some time ago, is that lacking the invasion of Iraq (Afghanistan is not in the ME and occurrences there do not affect the ME...), it would have taken five generations for much change to be effected there. I believe the invasion and subsequent actions will speed that up to possibly as little as two generations. Will that be true and will the result have been worth it? I think so but only time will tell us for certain.

I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?

I suggest they are two different things; the political reality is the ME, raw and as it has been for at least 800 years since Islam, once at the forefront of human knowledge, turned inward. The 'surge' -- it is really much more than that and encompasses a lot of things -- is opening a window for the ME to hop out and breathe some fresh air. We can't drag them outside, it's up to them; they can stay inside and stifle or come out that window. There will be internal and external pressures both ways. What will occur is in the hands of the fates.

The probability is that it will work but if it does not, at least we tried.

[Rank amateur]

I have no faith in the Iraqi political system, which is where I think the definition of success has to come from.

Thanks for the excellent comments and insight. I suggest that we have a great deal of influence over the definition of success. There's no reason we can't declare supporting an Iraqi government until it asks us to leave a roaring success. I realize Obama is just a senator, but if he and Maliki can work out a withdrawal timetable, there's no reason that Maliki and a president can't. (The British haven't spent a lot of time worrying about what's happened to Malaysia since they left.) The Middle East is obviously more strategical important than Malaysia but no one is even think about abandoning our military presence in the Middle East.

[SteveMetz]

I take a shot at this question in my recent SSI study.

[MikeF]

I take a shot at this question in my recent SSI study.

A must/should read, but renamed by me as The Surge: All those unparked cars are parked along the sidewalk.

[SteveMetz]

A must/should read, but renamed by me as The Surge: All those unparked cars are parked along the sidewalk.

But, but, but.....

Actually, I had to fight this battle with my organization. I deliberately chose to NOT name it that to make the point that I believe that the "surge"--the troop increase--gets way more attention than it deserves.