Page 1 of 2 12 LastLast
Results 1 to 20 of 39

Thread: Leadership in History Pertaining to the Present

  1. #1
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Posts
    47

    Default Leadership in History Pertaining to the Present

    As a bit of an amateur military historian, I have always held the Germans in high regard when it came to the subject of leadership. Erwin Rommel might be the best example of leadership in wartime. In contrast to other fronts during WW II, the North African campaign is often characterized as "the gentleman's war." Rommel's leadership style was forceful--in The Infantry Attacks he threatened to shoot a soldier on the spot when the individual refused to partake in a trench raid. In the desert campaign, Rommel drove his men mercilessly, but he always led from the tip of the spear, enduring the same privations as his men. In Knight's Cross, Rommel recounts three weeks of continuous battle when at the end, even he could not motivate his men to continue the offensive.

    When Rommel was recalled to mainland Europe to prepare defensive positions, he was a whirlwind of energy and activity. Upon realizing the war was lost, Rommel helped launch the plot to kill Hitler. For that, he paid with his life. I consider Rommel a role model and example of exemplary leadership. In combat, there was none better. When it came to honor and pragmatism, he was peerless.

    So, here's my question: Is there any difference between the office corps of the United States Army as opposed to the Wehrmacht? Was the Prussian tradition of producing military leaders substantially different than the United States? And finally, what was it that made the German officer corps so effective?

    I would like to know what we can learn from the WW II German officer leadership that could help the U.S. Army become even better today.

    One final thing. Being rather young, I have never known "Mad" Max Thurman other than from stories. I'm sure many who are a part of this forum have served/interacted with the General. Does his style of leadership have merits? I've heard he "jacked people up" as a way of doing business because he understood that enacting change within a large organization is extremely difficult. He assumed (I'm recalling peoples' comments who served under him) that any Army organization had issues and the best way to deal with them was to assume that nothing worked. When, his underlings demonstrated competence, he threw money at them so they could continue to do what they did best. Does any of this sound familiar to SWJ followers? Was he a largely peacetime Rommel?
    Last edited by Menning; 07-26-2008 at 12:46 AM. Reason: Forgot something I wanted to add

  2. #2
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default

    One final thing. Being rather young, I have never known "Mad" Max Thurman other than from stories. I'm sure many who are a part of this forum have served/interacted with the General. Does his style of leadership have merits? I've heard he "jacked people up" as a way of doing business because he understood that enacting change within a large organization is extremely difficult. He assumed (I'm recalling peoples' comments who served under him) that any Army organization had issues and the best way to deal with them was to assume that nothing worked. When, his underlings demonstrated competence, he threw money at them so they could continue to do what they did best.
    Mad Max was not a term of endearment. He was not what I would call a soldiers soldier, rather he was a ruthless bureaucrat. Didn't serve under or near him. Had good friends who did and regretted every minute.

    Tom

  3. #3
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Posts
    47

    Default Thurman

    "Maxatolla" is another name I've heard mentioned. Not very endearing either. He cajoled (probably not the right term) two staffs from the Army while TRADOC commander so they could keep up with his manic lifestyle. He definitely was not a soldiers soldier. However, can we learn anything from his way of leadership or was it worthless? I heard he virtually singlehandedly established a new military base in the western U.S.

  4. #4
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    3,189

    Default

    And finally, what was it that made the German officer corps so effective?
    German officers began (and the ones for leading troops instead of technical stuff still do) their career as simple soldier, progressed to NCO and then became officer. The personnel for the officer corps was chosen since late 1890's with what we call today "assessment center" method, based on discovered potential.
    Officer courses had a high rate (IIRC at times 40%) of drop outs; the teachers not only educated, but also tried to detect which NCOs were too bad for being an officer.
    There was almost never such a thing as the stubborn and laughable Prussian officer caricature that we see in movies.

    The WW2 officer corps was very much based on the personnel of the 1932 Reichswehr, very well trained (because everything else but training was gutted by the Allied Control Commission).

    WW2 generals had WW1 battle experience almost without exception (usually full WW1, 1914-1918, usually with Eastern and Western front experience, sometimes also Italy experience of the final Isonzo battle like Rommel).

    The whole leadership & command system (Auftragstaktik) emphasized subsidiarity and initiative.

    The general officers of both World Wars were in great part schooled in the General Staff courses, a great preparation for corps & higher leadership & understanding of large unit actions.

    Junior officers were especially successful because they lead from up front, really "lead" their men. That was extremely important morale-wise in the offense. Another success factor was that German NCO training was also very good (with some doubts about it since the early 90's).

    Officers up to Army Group commanders usually ate the same meals and shared some hardships with their men.
    Today (and afaik it was like this in all unified German states), we have different free time clubs for enlisted, NCO and officers in the Bundeswehr, but the in-service time meals are identical and there's just one canteen.
    This lack of distance helps a lot to foster trust and morale.

    The social prestige of the German officer corps was extremely high till at the very least 1915, probably till the early 1920's. Not only aristocrats joined the ranks of the officer corps, but also very capable citizens. A high social prestige is important because it attracts the best & brightest candidates into the officer corps.
    The social standing of an officer is nothing special today, probably comparable to the golden star policemen (top 5% of police and kind of officers in the police).

    The officer corps of the pre-1914 time (and also till 1939) was extremely professional and it's been said that the majority of military writing pre-1914 was in German (likely including Austrian-Hungarian's writings). There were many military books published in the inter-war years, but the Bundeswehr officers rarely publish any book before retirement - and then usually not about military theory.

  5. #5
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Posts
    47

    Default Thank you, Sir

    I appreciate your post. Please keep the information coming. Allies can always learn from one another. God speed.

  6. #6
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default Some (rambling) thoughts

    Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff 1657-1945 (orig. Der Deutsche Generalstab; trans. Praeger 1966, my copy), seems a decent survey (re-read it a couple of months ago); and provides answers to many of your questions. There are probably other equally good or better sources by the dozens. See here:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_General_Staff

    I'd look into Rommel a bit more before sanctifying him (I've read the two books you cited; a long time ago when I was young and also into German military history). E.g.,

    Rommel was removed after a short time however, to take command of Adolf Hitler's personal protection battalion (FührerBegleitbataillon), assigned to protect him in the special railway train (Führersonderzug) used during his visits to occupied Czechoslovakia and Memel. It was at this period that he met and befriended Joseph Goebbels, the Reich's minister of propaganda. Goebbels became a fervent admirer of Rommel and later ensured that Rommel's exploits were celebrated in the media.
    ....
    Rommel continued as Führerbegleitbataillon commander during the Polish campaign, often moving up close to the front in the Führersonderzug, and seeing much of Hitler. After the Polish defeat, Rommel returned to Berlin to organize the Führer's victory parade, taking part himself as a member of Hitler's entourage.
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Rommel

    Maybe too cynical a view, but I have sanctified too many models (including myself) - only to find feet (or other parts) of clay.

    I think you will find that the US constructs of officer development are ecclectic - not easy to cram into a single mold. The current emphasis is certainly on education. Most of the guys here (includes gals in my jargon) can match sheepskins with me - and win the tossup.

    Unless you can reincarnate (here in US) the Prussian land system of a semi-starving, military-oriented lower nobility, direct application of their development process (here in US) would be impossible. I suspect that most all of the good features of the Prussian system have been reviewed, modified and incorporated; but that question would be better answered by others here who are or have been serving officers.

    Some of the Prussian features were not that great - snobby and arrogant are not virtues to me (though sometimes my vices). Maybe, I watched "The Blue Max" (George Peppard) too many times:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blue_Max

    Of course, Rommel was not a Prussian; but a Württemberger from Heidenheim.

    PS: Fuchs is accurate; my comment above solely deals with the narrow Prussian tradition, which was much modified as the Generalstab developed a more national German service.
    Last edited by jmm99; 07-26-2008 at 02:20 AM. Reason: add a PS

  7. #7
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Location
    Rancho La Espada, Blanchard, OK
    Posts
    1,065

    Default I did work for GEN Thurman

    in SOUTHCOM. I did not like him but I came to have a lot of respect for him. He was intellectually honest and able to admit that he made mistakes. An 06 friend and boss (perhaps the reverse) gave me some good advice on dealing with Thurman - never tap dance. if you don't know something say so, he would not hold it against you. But God help you if you tap danced!

    I saw Thurman take critical comments from subordinates in his stride when the subordinates knew what they were talking about. I saw him gently tell two of us that what we gave him was not what he wanted but he gave us time to get him what he wanted and the guidance to know what it was. I also saw his prejudices, inconsistencies, and total lack of concern for the personal lives of his staff.

    On balance, GEN Thurman was a good leader at the unified command level. His record on leading the Army into an effective all volunteer foce is enough to cement his legacy.

    Frankly, we could have done a lot worse and have .

    Cheers

    JohnT

  8. #8
    Council Member zenpundit's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Chicago
    Posts
    262

    Default The Wehrmacht

    So, here's my question: Is there any difference between the office corps of the United States Army as opposed to the Wehrmacht? Was the Prussian tradition of producing military leaders substantially different than the United States? And finally, what was it that made the German officer corps so effective?
    I mostly agree with the summary of Fuchs. A few additional comments.

    The tiny, 100,000 man Reichswehr under von Seeckt consisted almost entirely of officer material, most of whom initially had combat experience ( 7 year enlistments, if I recall correctly). The cap imposed by Versailles allowed von Seeckt to select the very cream of the crop. Many outstanding WWI officers tried to finagle Army slots, even on half pay or in the reserves and failed.

    The Wehrmacht, based upon conscription, was not like the Reichswehr and the former was far more egalitarian than the old Imperial Army of the Kaiser ( the Waffen-SS even moreso). The middle class and lower middle-class made deep inroads into an officer corps whose higher reaches had previously been dominated by the junkers class. Politicization creeped in as well.

    Hitler had far more operational control over the Wehrmacht in WWII than the Kaiser had over the Imperial Army in WWI. The Fuhrer had assumed the powers of the War Minister with the dismissals of von Blomberg and Fritsch, the chief of Staff and the creation of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht under Keitl. Additionally, Hitler's sometime number #2 in the Nazi hierarchy, Goering was both Air minister and head of the Luftwaffe.

    The U.S. military culture is -and has always been - unlike that which prevailed in the German military during the Kingdom of Prussia or during the Second and Third Reichs. The personal oath of loyalty taken to Hitler, for example, is inconceivable here as is the Imperial Army's position as a State within a State that existed under Wilhelm II. The American military is ultimately both more subordinate and less servile to the civil power in America than it's counterpart was in Germany during that period of time.

  9. #9
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    3,189

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by zenpundit View Post
    Hitler had far more operational control over the Wehrmacht in WWII than the Kaiser had over the Imperial Army in WWI. The Fuhrer had assumed the powers of the War Minister with the dismissals of von Blomberg and Fritsch, the chief of Staff and the creation of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht under Keitl. Additionally, Hitler's sometime number #2 in the Nazi hierarchy, Goering was both Air minister and head of the Luftwaffe.

    The U.S. military culture is -and has always been - unlike that which prevailed in the German military during the Kingdom of Prussia or during the Second and Third Reichs. The personal oath of loyalty taken to Hitler, for example, is inconceivable here as is the Imperial Army's position as a State within a State that existed under Wilhelm II. The American military is ultimately both more subordinate and less servile to the civil power in America than it's counterpart was in Germany during that period of time.
    But this didn't increase the fighting power of the Wehrmacht - it rather reduced the fighting power.
    The manpower drain called "Luftwaffe" that took too many young men away from the army and later (when it was obvious that you don't need 300,000 young men to monitor the space of France for just 200 fighters stationed there) formed field units that were badly trained and performed poorly.
    The Waffen-SS was initially too unexperienced and had too high losses as well.
    Both existed for political reasons only and together were so seriously that not doing these mistakes might have meant Soviet defeat in WW2.

  10. #10
    Council Member zenpundit's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Chicago
    Posts
    262

    Default Hi Fuchs

    But this didn't increase the fighting power of the Wehrmacht - it rather reduced the fighting power
    Hitler's greater personal command was a mixed bag for the Wehrmacht. Despite postwar recollections to the contrary by German generals, many times Hitler had a better grasp of military opportunities or pitfalls than they did. This however did not outweight Hitler's numerous grand strategic errors or tactical rigidity later in the war.

    IMHO had there not been a Hitler but still a European war in 1939, Germany might have lost a smaller war over relatively insignificant stakes - like Danzig - faster to less cost to the world.

    The manpower drain called "Luftwaffe" that took too many young men away from the army and later (when it was obvious that you don't need 300,000 young men to monitor the space of France for just 200 fighters stationed there) formed field units that were badly trained and performed poorly.
    Agreed. The Luftwaffe never lived up to either Goering's promises or Hitler's hopes ( for that matter neither did American strategic bombing for the Allies) and was a bloated fiefdom for the Reichsmashall.

    The Waffen-SS was initially too unexperienced and had too high losses as well.Both existed for political reasons only and together were so seriously that not doing these mistakes might have meant Soviet defeat in WW2.
    The Waffen-SS was a political construct that was ideologically motivated to accept high casualties. To an extent, that was wasteful but the Waffen-SS also became militarily very effective elite formations ( not all of them, obviously, but the Hitler Bodyguard and Deutschland divisions stand out). This is the character of old fashioned elite units - " The guard does not surrender, it dies"

    Regarding whether the Germans could have won on the Eastern Front is one of the most interesting counterfactual questions of WWII. Time and space was always against them but greater political sense might have helped.

  11. #11
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2007
    Posts
    717

    Default

    This might be of some help to you, Menning:

    Check out the Introduction to the 1933 edition of the German Army's capstone doctrinal manual, H.Dv. 100/1 Truppenführung I. Teil (Troop Leading, Part I), and note particularly how the very first page and a half and starting with the very first sentence, are fundamentally about character as the basis for leadership:

    1. The conduct of war is an art, depending upon free, creative activity, scientifically grounded. It makes the highest demands on the personality.
    Compare how TF 33 and the 1941 edition of FM 100-5 Operations (which was deliberately modelled after TF 33) begin; the Introduction of TF 33 is all about the role of character, leadership, and trust; 1941's FM 100-5 begins with "Organization" and then proceeds to "Arms and Services". It is not until Page 18 that "Leadership" is dealt with - though in a way similar to that of TF 33, even if less aggressively. Then compare both TF 33 and 1941's FM 100-5's treatment of leadership to the current FM 3-0 (or even FM 6-22). Very different, needless to say; the German approach is very much about human beings, while the US approach is very much about organizations, and increasingly so over time.

  12. #12
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default I've learned a lot here. That post, Norfolk,

    is probably the single most important point anyone has made on this board since I first came. Gobsmacked by the blindingly obvious, that's me...

    Years of puzzlement as to why the potential wasn't being met, why the mediocrity -- swept away in a second.

    Thank you.

  13. #13
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default

    Very different, needless to say; the German approach is very much about human beings, while the US approach is very much about organizations, and increasingly so over time.
    JRTC versus NTC

  14. #14
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Seems to me that the Staff system of

    Berthier as improved by Scharnhorst and adapted to the US at the direction of Secretary of War Elihu Root had it right. The number One staff agent was the Personnel guy, followed by number Two, the Intel person. Seems logical, own troops and the enemy and their capabilities and intentions were needed by the number Three guy, the Operations Officer to do much of anything -- and the poor number four, the hapless Loggie, had to try to support said doing. That worked. We have now elevated the Three to two steps above primus inter pares and, as a long time Ops guy, I'm not sure we've done ourselves any favors...

    The dropping of the human element to a lower priority than organization and functions didn't have time to adversely impact performance to a great extent during WW II but it has slowly done some damage since.

    I wonder if the transformation with the 1941 edition of FM 100-5 owed its subordination of people to process to the then creeping bureaucratization in D.C or to the malevolent influence of Frederick Taylor and / or the Deming crowd? Or both? Probably both. McNamara accelerated the destruction for sure.

    I don't think that subordination has served the US Army at all well and it probably needs to be undone.

    We need to return to our Roots (bad pun intentional).

  15. #15
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    3,189

    Default

    Van Creveld wrote a lot about the management and individual-ignoring approach of the U.S.Army in "Combat Power". It was basically about Taylorism - wells-suited to primitive factories, but ill-suited for the stress and irregularity of war.

    I mostly disagree with his conclusions in the book for some reasons, but it's nevertheless a source for some useful info.

  16. #16
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default The Germans!

    ...there is nothing special about them ,except that at the operational and tactical level they teach/do what works and dispense with the other stuff that doesn't. Historically as an Army, that makes then very special.

    Despite the obvious historic, moral and even ethical problems, the IDF adopted the German model of leadership in one gulp - rejecting the British. There is a very strong feeling in the IDF right now that the leadership style, above the tactical, has become "American" - that is technology based. "Plasma Screen Commander" is now a term of abuse.

    IMO, leadership is purely human, and about the most important human aspect of the military instrument.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  17. #17
    Council Member wm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    On the Lunatic Fringe
    Posts
    1,237

    Default

    Here is a quotation from the penultimate paragraph of Field Marshall Kesselring's memoirs (The Memoirs of Field Marshall Kesselring Greenhill 2007 reprint of the 1953 translation, p 314)

    I had the honor to have under my command a large number of the best German divisions, and I know that the victories of German soldiers in the field would have been impossible had there not been a sworn comradeship between the men and their officers.
    What is perhaps more instructive is his discussion about perceived failings of German leadership in the paragraph immediately preceding, which concludes,
    The more astonishing, therefore, must it be to any reasoning person to hear that our military training and education was wrong all along the line and that we must revise our ideas in accordance with democratic principles--for example, those of the U. S. army. That is more than I can take.
    Worth reading the whole paragraph, not just the conclusion I've lifted from it.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

  18. #18
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    3,189

    Default

    Maybe he meant it politically?

    ---

    Some German officers expressed their opinion post-war that the U.S.Army approach was 'right' in that it replaced blood with ammunition.
    Wartime officers and troops apparently despised the rather cowardly and unskilled style of simply using superior quantities of heavy weapons and ammunition instead of trying hard with tactics and other non-material strengths.
    I thought/think that these opinions had little merit; The different material intensity was an expression of capabilities and lack thereof, not really a free choice.
    The armies had no genies in a bottle to change their circumstances. They had to do the best with what they had. And Germany didn't have enough artillery, ammunition supply and tanks left for land warfare (partially due to the anti-air defenses of the Reich).

  19. #19
    Council Member zenpundit's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Chicago
    Posts
    262

    Default A little kibbitzing

    Despite the obvious historic, moral and even ethical problems, the IDF adopted the German model of leadership in one gulp - rejecting the British.
    Perhaps due to the political dominance of the Ashkenazim with their central European orientation in pre-1948 Palestine. That and the firsthand experience some Jewish refugees had in fighting against German arms either in national armies or in underground resistance.

    Some German officers expressed their opinion post-war that the U.S.Army approach was 'right' in that it replaced blood with ammunition.
    The U.S. with it's tradition of vastly expanded wartime armies of citizen-soldiers and numerically few professional officers had to be pragmatic in pressing hard what strengths the U.S. Army possessed.

  20. #20
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by zenpundit View Post
    Perhaps due to the political dominance of the Ashkenazim with their central European orientation in pre-1948 Palestine. That and the firsthand experience some Jewish refugees had in fighting against German arms either in national armies or in underground resistance.
    All good points, but I'd be rather more inclined to believe that the very strong socialist tradition in the early pioneers, was largely responsible.

    ...plus being outnumbered and out gunned made for an extremely pragmatic approach to combat operations. - to whit while I might say the IDF adopted the "German model", the IDF would probably say they adopted the "socialist model."

    There is a very good account of IDF officer training in Reuven Gal's book, "Portrait of an Israeli Soldier."
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

Similar Threads

  1. Who are the great generals?
    By JD in forum Historians
    Replies: 402
    Last Post: 02-12-2011, 02:18 AM
  2. Secretary Gates at the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign
    By SWJED in forum Military - Other
    Replies: 0
    Last Post: 07-16-2008, 08:11 PM
  3. "Lessons" of history -- not!
    By Ray Levesque in forum Training & Education
    Replies: 0
    Last Post: 11-28-2006, 04:41 PM
  4. Institutional Ignorance of Warfare
    By SWJED in forum Blog Watch
    Replies: 7
    Last Post: 10-02-2006, 06:07 AM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •