Leadership in History Pertaining to the Present

[Fuchs]

Maybe he meant it politically?

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Some German officers expressed their opinion post-war that the U.S.Army approach was 'right' in that it replaced blood with ammunition.
Wartime officers and troops apparently despised the rather cowardly and unskilled style of simply using superior quantities of heavy weapons and ammunition instead of trying hard with tactics and other non-material strengths.
I thought/think that these opinions had little merit; The different material intensity was an expression of capabilities and lack thereof, not really a free choice.
The armies had no genies in a bottle to change their circumstances. They had to do the best with what they had. And Germany didn't have enough artillery, ammunition supply and tanks left for land warfare (partially due to the anti-air defenses of the Reich).

[zenpundit]

Despite the obvious historic, moral and even ethical problems, the IDF adopted the German model of leadership in one gulp - rejecting the British.

Perhaps due to the political dominance of the Ashkenazim with their central European orientation in pre-1948 Palestine. That and the firsthand experience some Jewish refugees had in fighting against German arms either in national armies or in underground resistance.

Some German officers expressed their opinion post-war that the U.S.Army approach was 'right' in that it replaced blood with ammunition.

The U.S. with it's tradition of vastly expanded wartime armies of citizen-soldiers and numerically few professional officers had to be pragmatic in pressing hard what strengths the U.S. Army possessed.

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps due to the political dominance of the Ashkenazim with their central European orientation in pre-1948 Palestine. That and the firsthand experience some Jewish refugees had in fighting against German arms either in national armies or in underground resistance.

All good points, but I'd be rather more inclined to believe that the very strong socialist tradition in the early pioneers, was largely responsible.

...plus being outnumbered and out gunned made for an extremely pragmatic approach to combat operations. - to whit while I might say the IDF adopted the "German model", the IDF would probably say they adopted the "socialist model."

There is a very good account of IDF officer training in Reuven Gal's book, "Portrait of an Israeli Soldier."

[Uboat509]

Somebody correct me if I am wrong but didn't the Wehrmacht parallel tracks for officers, one for commanders and one for staff officers? I have always heard that a big part of the reason for the debacle at Stalingrad was that Paulus had been rewarded with a command for his skill as a staff officer (which I have read was considerable) but was not up to the task of command. I know that Rommel had his famous quote about the difference in the qualities that make up a good staff officer vs. a good commander. Perhaps there is some merit to that. Being good at one (staff or command) does not necessarily make you good at the other. That's not to say that you don't need to understand how both work, just that you don't necessarily be good at both.

SFC W

[Steve Blair]

The Germans did tend to strip officers out of the field command side if they passed the examinations allowing them to enter the staff officer track, BUT they also had a rather different view of staff work than we did at the time (and possibly still do). For the Germans (at least in the idealized view of operations), the chief of staff was supposed to be the field commander's alter ego. It was in theory a complementary position. This is in direct contrast to American staff positions in the 1800s through the early 1900s, which were a way to get out of any field work. The rivalry between line and staff officers in the 1800s is legendary, and caused a great deal of heartache.

Root did some good things, but he also saddled the Army with a dysfunctional personnel system. It seems we have discarded most of his "good" while clinging to the "bad."

[Ken White]

...It seems we have discarded most of his "good" while clinging to the "bad."

We're masters at it...

[Fuchs]

The staff work at higher than army group level (OKH, OKW) was badly distorted by politics (Hitler), but at army group, army and corps levels it was approximately like this:

- A relatively small staff (mobile, often using hotels or French chateaus as HQ, sometimes HQ trains)

- chief of staff runs the everyday business (which was in calm times very bureaucratic, in hot times/crisis very much communication with superior and subordinate units) and keeps as much minor work and decisions away from the commander

- the commander of the army group/army/corps made the big decisions when in the staff, but was also free to visit superiors/subordinate units and frontline

- the chief of staff usually had the commander's trust and had the commander's powers in the staff during his absence. An army group chief of staff could give an army a new mission if the original commander was absent, for example.

- staff personnel was if possible carefully chosen for good cooperation. Extreme commander characters got complementing partners as chief of staff, for example. Proved officers were often kept in a commander's staff even if he was promoted from corps to army and such.

- Commanders and staffs didn't give much detailed orders and some commanders like Manstein refrained entirely from giving advice as well.

- The commanders led by assigning (replacing) commanders of subordinate units and giving missions. Junior and medium-ranked officers (maximum colonel) were used as couriers and to check something in exceptional circumstances (not as routine couriers).

- If possible, Fieseler Storch STOL liaison aircraft were used for quick travel and even for occasional terrain reconnaissance on the Eastern Front. Cars (usually former civilian upper class cars) were used even more often.

- Keep in mind that corps were often very much reduced in strength and very often (especially on the Eastern Front) just at division strength in 1943-1945. The command became more direct in such cases, like missions directly for individual tank battalions (as a tank corps often didn't have more than a single tank battalion left...).

- There were ARKOs at corps level, dedicated artillery coordinators (Bruchmüller style) for the static phases. These had a very small staff, but they were afaik independent of corps staffs and assigned on an as-needed basis.



I had a look at the different "battlefield management" systems and alike. I was surprised by the lack of functions (at least publicly showed functions) of such software.
Nevertheless, I thought for a while (and came to no real conclusion yet) whether the C4I functions and the leadership function could/should be separated. This old staff model might be a basis for that. A commander who's deeply involved in a video game screen might be useless for the human (morale) factors that are so important for leadership.
I'm thinking of a more strict separation than just between commander and S3.