Leadership in History Pertaining to the Present

**Menning** · 07-26-2008

As a bit of an amateur military historian, I have always held the Germans in high regard when it came to the subject of leadership. Erwin Rommel might be the best example of leadership in wartime. In contrast to other fronts during WW II, the North African campaign is often characterized as "the gentleman's war." Rommel's leadership style was forceful--in The Infantry Attacks he threatened to shoot a soldier on the spot when the individual refused to partake in a trench raid. In the desert campaign, Rommel drove his men mercilessly, but he always led from the tip of the spear, enduring the same privations as his men. In Knight's Cross, Rommel recounts three weeks of continuous battle when at the end, even he could not motivate his men to continue the offensive.

When Rommel was recalled to mainland Europe to prepare defensive positions, he was a whirlwind of energy and activity. Upon realizing the war was lost, Rommel helped launch the plot to kill Hitler. For that, he paid with his life. I consider Rommel a role model and example of exemplary leadership. In combat, there was none better. When it came to honor and pragmatism, he was peerless.

So, here's my question: Is there any difference between the office corps of the United States Army as opposed to the Wehrmacht? Was the Prussian tradition of producing military leaders substantially different than the United States? And finally, what was it that made the German officer corps so effective?

I would like to know what we can learn from the WW II German officer leadership that could help the U.S. Army become even better today.

One final thing. Being rather young, I have never known "Mad" Max Thurman other than from stories. I'm sure many who are a part of this forum have served/interacted with the General. Does his style of leadership have merits? I've heard he "jacked people up" as a way of doing business because he understood that enacting change within a large organization is extremely difficult. He assumed (I'm recalling peoples' comments who served under him) that any Army organization had issues and the best way to deal with them was to assume that nothing worked. When, his underlings demonstrated competence, he threw money at them so they could continue to do what they did best. Does any of this sound familiar to SWJ followers? Was he a largely peacetime Rommel?

**Tom Odom** · 07-26-2008

One final thing. Being rather young, I have never known "Mad" Max Thurman other than from stories. I'm sure many who are a part of this forum have served/interacted with the General. Does his style of leadership have merits? I've heard he "jacked people up" as a way of doing business because he understood that enacting change within a large organization is extremely difficult. He assumed (I'm recalling peoples' comments who served under him) that any Army organization had issues and the best way to deal with them was to assume that nothing worked. When, his underlings demonstrated competence, he threw money at them so they could continue to do what they did best.

Mad Max was not a term of endearment. He was not what I would call a soldiers soldier, rather he was a ruthless bureaucrat. Didn't serve under or near him. Had good friends who did and regretted every minute.

Tom

**Menning** · 07-26-2008

"Maxatolla" is another name I've heard mentioned. Not very endearing either. He cajoled (probably not the right term) two staffs from the Army while TRADOC commander so they could keep up with his manic lifestyle. He definitely was not a soldiers soldier. However, can we learn anything from his way of leadership or was it worthless? I heard he virtually singlehandedly established a new military base in the western U.S.

**jmm99** · 07-26-2008

Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff 1657-1945 (orig. Der Deutsche Generalstab; trans. Praeger 1966, my copy), seems a decent survey (re-read it a couple of months ago); and provides answers to many of your questions. There are probably other equally good or better sources by the dozens. See here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_General_Staff

I'd look into Rommel a bit more before sanctifying him (I've read the two books you cited; a long time ago when I was young and also into German military history). E.g.,

Rommel was removed after a short time however, to take command of Adolf Hitler's personal protection battalion (FührerBegleitbataillon), assigned to protect him in the special railway train (Führersonderzug) used during his visits to occupied Czechoslovakia and Memel. It was at this period that he met and befriended Joseph Goebbels, the Reich's minister of propaganda. Goebbels became a fervent admirer of Rommel and later ensured that Rommel's exploits were celebrated in the media.
....
Rommel continued as Führerbegleitbataillon commander during the Polish campaign, often moving up close to the front in the Führersonderzug, and seeing much of Hitler. After the Polish defeat, Rommel returned to Berlin to organize the Führer's victory parade, taking part himself as a member of Hitler's entourage.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Rommel

Maybe too cynical a view, but I have sanctified too many models (including myself) - only to find feet (or other parts) of clay.

I think you will find that the US constructs of officer development are ecclectic - not easy to cram into a single mold. The current emphasis is certainly on education. Most of the guys here (includes gals in my jargon) can match sheepskins with me - and win the tossup.

Unless you can reincarnate (here in US) the Prussian land system of a semi-starving, military-oriented lower nobility, direct application of their development process (here in US) would be impossible. I suspect that most all of the good features of the Prussian system have been reviewed, modified and incorporated; but that question would be better answered by others here who are or have been serving officers.

Some of the Prussian features were not that great - snobby and arrogant are not virtues to me (though sometimes my vices). Maybe, I watched "The Blue Max" (George Peppard) too many times:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blue_Max

Of course, Rommel was not a Prussian; but a Württemberger from Heidenheim.

PS: Fuchs is accurate; my comment above solely deals with the narrow Prussian tradition, which was much modified as the Generalstab developed a more national German service.

**John T. Fishel** · 07-26-2008

in SOUTHCOM. I did not like him but I came to have a lot of respect for him. He was intellectually honest and able to admit that he made mistakes. An 06 friend and boss (perhaps the reverse) gave me some good advice on dealing with Thurman - never tap dance. if you don't know something say so, he would not hold it against you. But God help you if you tap danced

!

I saw Thurman take critical comments from subordinates in his stride when the subordinates knew what they were talking about. I saw him gently tell two of us that what we gave him was not what he wanted but he gave us time to get him what he wanted and the guidance to know what it was. I also saw his prejudices, inconsistencies, and total lack of concern for the personal lives of his staff.

On balance, GEN Thurman was a good leader at the unified command level. His record on leading the Army into an effective all volunteer foce is enough to cement his legacy.

Frankly, we could have done a lot worse and have .

Cheers

JohnT

**zenpundit** · 07-26-2008

So, here's my question: Is there any difference between the office corps of the United States Army as opposed to the Wehrmacht? Was the Prussian tradition of producing military leaders substantially different than the United States? And finally, what was it that made the German officer corps so effective?

I mostly agree with the summary of Fuchs. A few additional comments.

The tiny, 100,000 man Reichswehr under von Seeckt consisted almost entirely of officer material, most of whom initially had combat experience ( 7 year enlistments, if I recall correctly). The cap imposed by Versailles allowed von Seeckt to select the very cream of the crop. Many outstanding WWI officers tried to finagle Army slots, even on half pay or in the reserves and failed.

The Wehrmacht, based upon conscription, was not like the Reichswehr and the former was far more egalitarian than the old Imperial Army of the Kaiser ( the Waffen-SS even moreso). The middle class and lower middle-class made deep inroads into an officer corps whose higher reaches had previously been dominated by the junkers class. Politicization creeped in as well.

Hitler had far more operational control over the Wehrmacht in WWII than the Kaiser had over the Imperial Army in WWI. The Fuhrer had assumed the powers of the War Minister with the dismissals of von Blomberg and Fritsch, the chief of Staff and the creation of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht under Keitl. Additionally, Hitler's sometime number #2 in the Nazi hierarchy, Goering was both Air minister and head of the Luftwaffe.

The U.S. military culture is -and has always been - unlike that which prevailed in the German military during the Kingdom of Prussia or during the Second and Third Reichs. The personal oath of loyalty taken to Hitler, for example, is inconceivable here as is the Imperial Army's position as a State within a State that existed under Wilhelm II. The American military is ultimately both more subordinate and less servile to the civil power in America than it's counterpart was in Germany during that period of time.

**Fuchs** · 07-26-2008

And finally, what was it that made the German officer corps so effective?

German officers began (and the ones for leading troops instead of technical stuff still do) their career as simple soldier, progressed to NCO and then became officer. The personnel for the officer corps was chosen since late 1890's with what we call today "assessment center" method, based on discovered potential.
Officer courses had a high rate (IIRC at times 40%) of drop outs; the teachers not only educated, but also tried to detect which NCOs were too bad for being an officer.
There was almost never such a thing as the stubborn and laughable Prussian officer caricature that we see in movies.

The WW2 officer corps was very much based on the personnel of the 1932 Reichswehr, very well trained (because everything else but training was gutted by the Allied Control Commission).

WW2 generals had WW1 battle experience almost without exception (usually full WW1, 1914-1918, usually with Eastern and Western front experience, sometimes also Italy experience of the final Isonzo battle like Rommel).

The whole leadership & command system (Auftragstaktik) emphasized subsidiarity and initiative.

The general officers of both World Wars were in great part schooled in the General Staff courses, a great preparation for corps & higher leadership & understanding of large unit actions.

Junior officers were especially successful because they lead from up front, really "lead" their men. That was extremely important morale-wise in the offense. Another success factor was that German NCO training was also very good (with some doubts about it since the early 90's).

Officers up to Army Group commanders usually ate the same meals and shared some hardships with their men.
Today (and afaik it was like this in all unified German states), we have different free time clubs for enlisted, NCO and officers in the Bundeswehr, but the in-service time meals are identical and there's just one canteen.
This lack of distance helps a lot to foster trust and morale.

The social prestige of the German officer corps was extremely high till at the very least 1915, probably till the early 1920's. Not only aristocrats joined the ranks of the officer corps, but also very capable citizens. A high social prestige is important because it attracts the best & brightest candidates into the officer corps.
The social standing of an officer is nothing special today, probably comparable to the golden star policemen (top 5% of police and kind of officers in the police).

The officer corps of the pre-1914 time (and also till 1939) was extremely professional and it's been said that the majority of military writing pre-1914 was in German (likely including Austrian-Hungarian's writings). There were many military books published in the inter-war years, but the Bundeswehr officers rarely publish any book before retirement - and then usually not about military theory.