Leadership in History Pertaining to the Present

[wm]

Here is a quotation from the penultimate paragraph of Field Marshall Kesselring's memoirs (The Memoirs of Field Marshall Kesselring Greenhill 2007 reprint of the 1953 translation, p 314)

I had the honor to have under my command a large number of the best German divisions, and I know that the victories of German soldiers in the field would have been impossible had there not been a sworn comradeship between the men and their officers.

What is perhaps more instructive is his discussion about perceived failings of German leadership in the paragraph immediately preceding, which concludes,

The more astonishing, therefore, must it be to any reasoning person to hear that our military training and education was wrong all along the line and that we must revise our ideas in accordance with democratic principles--for example, those of the U. S. army. That is more than I can take.

Worth reading the whole paragraph, not just the conclusion I've lifted from it.

[Fuchs]

Maybe he meant it politically?

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Some German officers expressed their opinion post-war that the U.S.Army approach was 'right' in that it replaced blood with ammunition.
Wartime officers and troops apparently despised the rather cowardly and unskilled style of simply using superior quantities of heavy weapons and ammunition instead of trying hard with tactics and other non-material strengths.
I thought/think that these opinions had little merit; The different material intensity was an expression of capabilities and lack thereof, not really a free choice.
The armies had no genies in a bottle to change their circumstances. They had to do the best with what they had. And Germany didn't have enough artillery, ammunition supply and tanks left for land warfare (partially due to the anti-air defenses of the Reich).

[zenpundit]

Despite the obvious historic, moral and even ethical problems, the IDF adopted the German model of leadership in one gulp - rejecting the British.

Perhaps due to the political dominance of the Ashkenazim with their central European orientation in pre-1948 Palestine. That and the firsthand experience some Jewish refugees had in fighting against German arms either in national armies or in underground resistance.

Some German officers expressed their opinion post-war that the U.S.Army approach was 'right' in that it replaced blood with ammunition.

The U.S. with it's tradition of vastly expanded wartime armies of citizen-soldiers and numerically few professional officers had to be pragmatic in pressing hard what strengths the U.S. Army possessed.

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps due to the political dominance of the Ashkenazim with their central European orientation in pre-1948 Palestine. That and the firsthand experience some Jewish refugees had in fighting against German arms either in national armies or in underground resistance.

All good points, but I'd be rather more inclined to believe that the very strong socialist tradition in the early pioneers, was largely responsible.

...plus being outnumbered and out gunned made for an extremely pragmatic approach to combat operations. - to whit while I might say the IDF adopted the "German model", the IDF would probably say they adopted the "socialist model."

There is a very good account of IDF officer training in Reuven Gal's book, "Portrait of an Israeli Soldier."

[Uboat509]

Somebody correct me if I am wrong but didn't the Wehrmacht parallel tracks for officers, one for commanders and one for staff officers? I have always heard that a big part of the reason for the debacle at Stalingrad was that Paulus had been rewarded with a command for his skill as a staff officer (which I have read was considerable) but was not up to the task of command. I know that Rommel had his famous quote about the difference in the qualities that make up a good staff officer vs. a good commander. Perhaps there is some merit to that. Being good at one (staff or command) does not necessarily make you good at the other. That's not to say that you don't need to understand how both work, just that you don't necessarily be good at both.

SFC W

[Steve Blair]

The Germans did tend to strip officers out of the field command side if they passed the examinations allowing them to enter the staff officer track, BUT they also had a rather different view of staff work than we did at the time (and possibly still do). For the Germans (at least in the idealized view of operations), the chief of staff was supposed to be the field commander's alter ego. It was in theory a complementary position. This is in direct contrast to American staff positions in the 1800s through the early 1900s, which were a way to get out of any field work. The rivalry between line and staff officers in the 1800s is legendary, and caused a great deal of heartache.

Root did some good things, but he also saddled the Army with a dysfunctional personnel system. It seems we have discarded most of his "good" while clinging to the "bad."

[Ken White]

...It seems we have discarded most of his "good" while clinging to the "bad."

We're masters at it...