Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn

[Ron Humphrey]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.


No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.

that this is a very important aspect to focus on, that said
consider the rule of the Taliban over the years and how much "control" they actually had over many of these very areas we are talking about. For the most part aside from occasional visits to remind the locals who was in charge, or simply to take advantage of ones position in order to get what they would want. Even during that time how much was local security handled by anything other than locals.

In otherwords that part was pre-existing and would be a focus for change simply in how its done and what the tie-ins to the central govt are. As mentioned before the religious leaders/tribal leaders are almost interchangeable if not the same in many cases and along those lines this differs greatly from Iraq where although the power structures existed they seemed fairly often to be in seperate hierarchies

In order to bring change in those outlying areas they will have to develop a desire to tie in to the larger cities/ govt and that wont happen until the (Whats in it for me) aspects of their leaders are peaked in possibilities for differences. Long story short although those leaders of the faith will have a large part to play the factors which would draw them into the larger govt seem to be outside their faith base and more in the lines of normal human characterisitics.

[MSG Proctor]

I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.

Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.

But go ahead - continue to analyze Aghanistan like eastern Europe or Viet Nam. Islam recognizes no separation of religious and civil life, and every western attempt to impose it on the Afghans will be met with (a) gratutitous milking of CF bennies or (b) violent resistance.

Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it by the long term stake holders.

I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.

Afghanistan will never be Turkey or even Iran but it needn't be the perpetual Gethsemane of western ideologies.

[Eden]

I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.

Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.

Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it...

I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.

Interesting, though I would point out that Afghanistan is not Iraq, and any attempt to fit our OIF model to Afghanistan is as likely to fail as any proposed by us poor blinkered westernizers. Anyway, thanks for the corrective - I came away from Afghanistan thinking that the real power brokers were those who could bankroll the largest private armies, normally through criminal enterprises.

Also, while I agree that you can't marginalize Islam in Afghanistan, you can marginalize the local mullahs. One, they are neither as universally respected nor as influential as they would like us to believe; two, this is exactly what the bad guys are doing or attempting to do, through a combination of bribery, coercion, and invitations to the bandwagon.

It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.

Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

[Ken White]

...Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

This last item is possibly true however, I'll point out that NATO to an extent and us to a great degree have supported extended campaigns (Kosovo; NATO and us, for one example) or expensive long duration stays in unkind locations (from Korea to Kuwait for us). Not theocracies per se but unpleasant regimes and not terribly stable on occasion. In any event, what will transpire is IMO impossible to predict at this point. We'll see.

Hmm. Those start with a 'K' -- Afghanistan doesn't, maybe it'll be a change. Which way...

[MSG Proctor]

It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.

Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

Gladly, Mr. Eden.

"Co-opting" as a COIN colloquialism in this instance actually is more akin to promulgating existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals. In COIN, the population must buy-in. That is almost 100% impossible for them if the ideas/concepts are injects from foreign powers who will eventually leave.

The way this is done is by covertly backing religious leaders that have of their own accord developed themes that wed Islam to the future of the Afghan nation state. Per good COIN principles, NATO/CF stay in the background and support these clerics (and their surrogates) with all PMESII assets (political/military/economic/social/information/infrastructure) making these traditional/orthodox Islamic clerics the 'hero' in the eyes of the population.

The narrative will already include support for the Karzai government (and his legitimately elected successors). This will quickly present opportunities to build cross-tribal and trans-provincial coaltions through the erection of religious leader councils. The councils will require the support of the Islamic scholars who will have the ear of many of the Mullahs and mosque leaders.

Deliverables from these councils will include credible fatwas that endorse the GoA and the goals of the nascent republic. This religious network has 1000x more credibility than NATO PSYOPs messages or canned IO themes. It also has the potential to spread very rapidly and of course counter the enemy's IO. This is the model that turned the tide in Anbar Province in 2006 although the popular accepted narrative is that the tribal Sheikhs were the key spheres-of-influence. The Sheikhs however would not oppose the clerics when the clerics reached some semblance of consensus in favor of stability. The appetite for Islamic revolution has been greatly exaggerated by the enemy.

[For an example of the power and potential of religious councils in COIN, click here.]

There are those who will object to the potential for a theocratic state - but that is a distant and unlikely prospect with the recent memories of the Taliban's 'government' and the failure of AQI's policy of conversion-by-the-sword in Iraq. The standard model for Islamic states that survive is a traditional cooperation between the local mosque and the local government. That is the missing link in Afghanistan as I understand it.

Until NATO/CF aggressively counter the enemy's IO strategy of co-opting religious leaders, all gains in Afghanistan will be temporary and dependent upon foreign military assistance.