Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn

[Eden]

It is true that Islam is inextricably intertwined with the fabric of Afghan society, and it is true that mullahs exert great influence as religious leaders. However, keep the following in mind:

1. To speak of 'the mullahs' as if they were some homogenous group with membership cards and annual conventions is misleading. They are as heterogenous as the society they spring from. Some - the minority - are great scholars respected nationwide or within their provinces; most are dreadfully ignorant with horizons bounded by their valley walls. They do not share common goals and are as subject to ethnic, tribal, and local prejudices as anyone else.

2. Some are less motivated by Islam than they are by the prospect of personal or fiduciary gain. Like certain televangelists, they exploit religious feeling for their own ends.

3. They are less important than they used to be. Urban elites - a small but growing and influential group - disparage them as obstacles to development. More importantly, the current generation of fighters is different from the one that drove out the Soviets. Those guys are dead. This generation - and especially the leaders - were raised far from tribal influence in madrassi in Pakistan or recruited from foreign fields. They are far less likely to respect or heed some threadbare mullah in an isolated mud-brick compound and far more likely to derive their sense of self from more pan-Islamic sources.

None of this is to deny the importance or influence of 'the mullahs', but it is a reminder that all politics in Afghanistan is local, and that 'the mullahs' are a product of that society. Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning an IO message that both appeals to the mullahs and forwards our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their influence is marginalized. They are not a silver bullet - there are none in Afghanistan.

[Tom Odom]

On Joe Galloway's commentary today:

Commentary: A top general says more troops aren't the answer in Afghanistan
By Joseph L. Galloway | McClatchy Newspapers
There's military slang that seemingly applies to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan today. The operative acronym is FUBAR - Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition. That first letter doesn't really stand for "Fouled," and the R sometimes stands for Repair.

One of the sharper military analysts I know has just returned from a tour of that sorrowful nation, which has been at war continuously since the Soviet Army invaded it in late 1979.

Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who retired from the U.S. Army with four stars and a chest full of combat medals including two Distinguished Service Crosses, says we can't shoot our way out of Afghanistan, and the two or three or more American combat brigades proposed by the two putative nominees for president are irrelevant.

[Ken White]

With all but particularly this:

... Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning an IO message that both appeals to the mullahs and forwards our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their influence is marginalized. They are not a silver bullet - there are none in Afghanistan.

[MSG Proctor]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to theological/ideological/moral superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.

I hear the "it might not work" and "Mullahs are not homogenous" etc...

GEN McCaffery's position that "we can shoot our way out of Afghanistan" is rather obvious in that we are dealing with a nasty religious-based insurgency there. It is a war of ideas. A war of cultures. And if as Eden states

"our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their [religious leaders] influence is marginalized."

is true, can you provide any evidence of this policy? Because that is suicide in a counterinsurgency. The more you marginalize religious leaders, the more you radicalize them. For God's sake, gentlemen, haven't we learned this already in OIF?

No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.

[Ron Humphrey]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.


No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.

that this is a very important aspect to focus on, that said
consider the rule of the Taliban over the years and how much "control" they actually had over many of these very areas we are talking about. For the most part aside from occasional visits to remind the locals who was in charge, or simply to take advantage of ones position in order to get what they would want. Even during that time how much was local security handled by anything other than locals.

In otherwords that part was pre-existing and would be a focus for change simply in how its done and what the tie-ins to the central govt are. As mentioned before the religious leaders/tribal leaders are almost interchangeable if not the same in many cases and along those lines this differs greatly from Iraq where although the power structures existed they seemed fairly often to be in seperate hierarchies

In order to bring change in those outlying areas they will have to develop a desire to tie in to the larger cities/ govt and that wont happen until the (Whats in it for me) aspects of their leaders are peaked in possibilities for differences. Long story short although those leaders of the faith will have a large part to play the factors which would draw them into the larger govt seem to be outside their faith base and more in the lines of normal human characterisitics.

[MSG Proctor]

I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.

Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.

But go ahead - continue to analyze Aghanistan like eastern Europe or Viet Nam. Islam recognizes no separation of religious and civil life, and every western attempt to impose it on the Afghans will be met with (a) gratutitous milking of CF bennies or (b) violent resistance.

Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it by the long term stake holders.

I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.

Afghanistan will never be Turkey or even Iran but it needn't be the perpetual Gethsemane of western ideologies.

[Eden]

I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.

Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.

Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it...

I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.

Interesting, though I would point out that Afghanistan is not Iraq, and any attempt to fit our OIF model to Afghanistan is as likely to fail as any proposed by us poor blinkered westernizers. Anyway, thanks for the corrective - I came away from Afghanistan thinking that the real power brokers were those who could bankroll the largest private armies, normally through criminal enterprises.

Also, while I agree that you can't marginalize Islam in Afghanistan, you can marginalize the local mullahs. One, they are neither as universally respected nor as influential as they would like us to believe; two, this is exactly what the bad guys are doing or attempting to do, through a combination of bribery, coercion, and invitations to the bandwagon.

It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.

Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

[Ken White]

...Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

This last item is possibly true however, I'll point out that NATO to an extent and us to a great degree have supported extended campaigns (Kosovo; NATO and us, for one example) or expensive long duration stays in unkind locations (from Korea to Kuwait for us). Not theocracies per se but unpleasant regimes and not terribly stable on occasion. In any event, what will transpire is IMO impossible to predict at this point. We'll see.

Hmm. Those start with a 'K' -- Afghanistan doesn't, maybe it'll be a change. Which way...

[MSG Proctor]

It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.

Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

Gladly, Mr. Eden.

"Co-opting" as a COIN colloquialism in this instance actually is more akin to promulgating existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals. In COIN, the population must buy-in. That is almost 100% impossible for them if the ideas/concepts are injects from foreign powers who will eventually leave.

The way this is done is by covertly backing religious leaders that have of their own accord developed themes that wed Islam to the future of the Afghan nation state. Per good COIN principles, NATO/CF stay in the background and support these clerics (and their surrogates) with all PMESII assets (political/military/economic/social/information/infrastructure) making these traditional/orthodox Islamic clerics the 'hero' in the eyes of the population.

The narrative will already include support for the Karzai government (and his legitimately elected successors). This will quickly present opportunities to build cross-tribal and trans-provincial coaltions through the erection of religious leader councils. The councils will require the support of the Islamic scholars who will have the ear of many of the Mullahs and mosque leaders.

Deliverables from these councils will include credible fatwas that endorse the GoA and the goals of the nascent republic. This religious network has 1000x more credibility than NATO PSYOPs messages or canned IO themes. It also has the potential to spread very rapidly and of course counter the enemy's IO. This is the model that turned the tide in Anbar Province in 2006 although the popular accepted narrative is that the tribal Sheikhs were the key spheres-of-influence. The Sheikhs however would not oppose the clerics when the clerics reached some semblance of consensus in favor of stability. The appetite for Islamic revolution has been greatly exaggerated by the enemy.

[For an example of the power and potential of religious councils in COIN, click here.]

There are those who will object to the potential for a theocratic state - but that is a distant and unlikely prospect with the recent memories of the Taliban's 'government' and the failure of AQI's policy of conversion-by-the-sword in Iraq. The standard model for Islamic states that survive is a traditional cooperation between the local mosque and the local government. That is the missing link in Afghanistan as I understand it.

Until NATO/CF aggressively counter the enemy's IO strategy of co-opting religious leaders, all gains in Afghanistan will be temporary and dependent upon foreign military assistance.

[Ken White]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to theological/ideological/moral superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.

I hear the "it might not work" and "Mullahs are not homogenous" etc...

I think number 2 is correct and number 1 may be but submit that our ability to implement number 1 will be limited by the follow-on "...not homogeneous" and other factors; not least by this:

"our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their [religious leaders] influence is marginalized."

is true, can you provide any evidence of this policy?

I'm unsure it is a stated goal but if it is, it's an exercise in futility if that goal is to be attained in less than a couple of generations. Even then it is at best dubious. While I'm unsure it is a stated goal, I have little doubt that it is the intent or at least the unstated desire of some in high places -- and that, unfortunately, desired sooner rather than later...

What I do know is that approaching Afghanistan with western thought processes, religious or irreligious, and anticipating a quasi-western society is likely to not succeed. Nor do I think it has to do so. Best is frequently the enemy of good enough...

[MSG Proctor]

Best is frequently the enemy of good enough...

Ah. The wisdom of the ages. Well said, Ken. The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

[Entropy]

The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

One might suggest that in addition to the "western analogous filter" you identified earlier, one can add the concept of a "state." I would agree that Islam is the "only hope for a unifying principle" but seriously doubt it is unifying enough to hold "Afghanistan" (a state whose unnatural borders were drawn by outsiders) together for any significant length of time. Even if the US were to somehow succeed in establishing such a state, Afghanistan's neighbors will be sure to meddle as they always have once the US departs.

So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.

[MSG Proctor]

Entropy:
your post assumes two things;
1. Afghans will remain unchanged by the information revolution;
2. Partnering with the empire will not bring about deliverable advantages for the infant Afghan state.

IMO the greatest obstacle to a stable Afghanistan is the poppy industry. Legitimate industry has a funny way of dispelling illegitimate commerce. Look at South Korea, a nation with virtually no natural resources - and is now a top 10 world economy since US intervention.

Have hope, folks. And think 1776, not 2001.

[Ken White]

So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.

Actually, two whys:

What in that is inimical to our interest?

Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?

[slapout9]

Ah. The wisdom of the ages. Well said, Ken. The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there

[Fuchs]

So in other words most here agree that the war is lost because its objective of a stable, power monopoly central state that keeps AQ out won't happen?

A victory (using unaspiring definitions of victory that I usually don't share) would then only be possible if the very goals of the war were changed by our governments (especially deleting the "secular" and allow sharia - you know that won't happen).

What's the difference to just leave and let the civil war parties fight on, supporting the non-Taleban civil war parties along the late 2001/early 2002 invasion model?
It's not like all warlords had disappeared, after all. Afaik they're just saving their forces for the final fights after the Westerners left, just like most militias in Iraq do afaik.

[MSG Proctor]

MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there

SlapOut9,
Thanks, I'm nobody and I know nothing, I am doing PSAs for CH(COL) Kenneth Sampson's brilliant strategy published in his War College monograph attached to reply #11 in this thread.

I am certainly not an expert on Afghanistan (although COL Sampson is) but have extensive experience in helping unravel the religious arteries and veins in Iraq. We have no hope of any kind of success at all with any anchor point that is antagonistic to [traditional, more orthodox expressions of] Islam. We have every reason to hope and expect progress and long term partnerships with Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the greater Islamic world if we can adapt to conditions that allow Islam to inform democracy.

There are no panaceas, no silver bullets, no ready-made solutions in Afghanistan. The subject of this thread questions the wisdom or utility of a "Surge" of forces in OEF to stop the hemmorraging there similar to the way the Petraeus strategy did in OIF in 2007. My opinion is that the surge of forces informed by the right IO strategy can be highly successful. The ONLY truly transnational values in Afghanistan now are the common creed of Islam; the only transnational 'media' that exists is the Mosque sermon.

People much smarter than me can make the case that religion can be a potent force in fueling nationalism, and nationalism in this stage of the Afghan Republic's infancy would probably be a good thing.

I agree with Ken White's assessment that lasting, enduring change will take 20-40 years, but these concrete steps must surely be part of that strategy:

1. Co-opt the Islamic scholars, preachers and prayer leaders by forming councils and federations for mutual advantage;
2. Distribute mass media infrastructure to link Afghans together in purpose and identity;
3. Promote literacy;
4. Reward Afghan military leaders that lead well and demonstrate loyalty to the Afghan ideal;
5. Involve the UN/NATO in replacing the poppy trade with a legitimate commodity for international trade. This may involve outrageous sums of subsidies from donor nations (probably already underway, at least from our government's standpoint).

OK, I'm off my soapbox for a while. Kudos to all for a stimulating discussion....

[wm]

The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

The goal in any nation building effort ought to be a stable state. All of the rest: source of stability, partnership in GWOT, source of economic power needs to be flushed with the list in the second sentence. Otherwise, the US effort (or any other "state stablizing/building" intervention by any country/coalition that is imbued with the latest instantiation of the huiman predilection for "missionary zeal") will be palliating short term suffering at the expense of introducing the seeds of long term instability.
Western states have been doing this kind of misguided crap for at least 4 centuries now; one would think they might have smartened up a little by now.

The most important thing, IMHO, about the aftermath of the American Revolution is that the 13 colonies figured out for themselves what kind of nation they wanted as/after they succesfully got the armies of George III to depart. While they had French help in ejecting Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis, et. al., they had no such help in writing the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederacy or Constitution. Maybe the ISAF/US coalition should try taking a page from American history and allow the Afghans to practice some self-determination instead of cramming its interpretation of stability and civilization down their throats.

[Ken White]

Too logical, though, I suppose...

[DaveDoyle]

Galloway had to have loosely paraphrased GEN McCaffery, a man I respect and admire.

Two combat brigades will make a huge difference in Afghanistan if skillfully employed. A combat brigade can do more than kill Taliban. And combat brigades bring with them leaders; creative, intelligent, and motivated leaders.

Our leaders can figure out how to solve problems that involve more than kinetic options.