Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn

[Ken White]

1. In COIN, tactical success means little without population buy-in. Kill all the insurgents you want - until you get the CoG and the IO pieces right, you'll be playing whack-a-mole and creating more insurgents.
2. Tribal sheikhs will not go against the Mullahs. Period.
3. Many Mullahs are in fact tribal leaders and wield significant power to marshall militia forces.
4. The enemy knows the religious leaders are the #1 sphere of influence and works hard to engage them with anti-CF IO themes.
5. Even Mullahs that do not possess direct militia authority influence everything that goes on in every tribe, neiborhood and village via the Friday afternoon sermon. Failure to grasp the legitimacy, significance and relevance of the Friday Mosque sermon in IO suicide.

All totally true not too many years ago. A large number of Mullahs and Imams led fighting bands and all those that did not influence and pushed those that did. I very strongly doubt that's changed other than for the worse.

... but whoever defines Islam wins... As long as the enemy engages the mosque and we don't, our 'secularizing' influence will be portrayed across Afghanistan (and the greater Islamic world) as a threat to Islam thereby serving as the optimal recruiting tool for more Hirabists and insurgents from Pakistan and other points of origin.

Unfortunately true.

[Eden]

It is true that Islam is inextricably intertwined with the fabric of Afghan society, and it is true that mullahs exert great influence as religious leaders. However, keep the following in mind:

1. To speak of 'the mullahs' as if they were some homogenous group with membership cards and annual conventions is misleading. They are as heterogenous as the society they spring from. Some - the minority - are great scholars respected nationwide or within their provinces; most are dreadfully ignorant with horizons bounded by their valley walls. They do not share common goals and are as subject to ethnic, tribal, and local prejudices as anyone else.

2. Some are less motivated by Islam than they are by the prospect of personal or fiduciary gain. Like certain televangelists, they exploit religious feeling for their own ends.

3. They are less important than they used to be. Urban elites - a small but growing and influential group - disparage them as obstacles to development. More importantly, the current generation of fighters is different from the one that drove out the Soviets. Those guys are dead. This generation - and especially the leaders - were raised far from tribal influence in madrassi in Pakistan or recruited from foreign fields. They are far less likely to respect or heed some threadbare mullah in an isolated mud-brick compound and far more likely to derive their sense of self from more pan-Islamic sources.

None of this is to deny the importance or influence of 'the mullahs', but it is a reminder that all politics in Afghanistan is local, and that 'the mullahs' are a product of that society. Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning an IO message that both appeals to the mullahs and forwards our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their influence is marginalized. They are not a silver bullet - there are none in Afghanistan.

[Tom Odom]

On Joe Galloway's commentary today:

Commentary: A top general says more troops aren't the answer in Afghanistan
By Joseph L. Galloway | McClatchy Newspapers
There's military slang that seemingly applies to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan today. The operative acronym is FUBAR - Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition. That first letter doesn't really stand for "Fouled," and the R sometimes stands for Repair.

One of the sharper military analysts I know has just returned from a tour of that sorrowful nation, which has been at war continuously since the Soviet Army invaded it in late 1979.

Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who retired from the U.S. Army with four stars and a chest full of combat medals including two Distinguished Service Crosses, says we can't shoot our way out of Afghanistan, and the two or three or more American combat brigades proposed by the two putative nominees for president are irrelevant.

[Ken White]

With all but particularly this:

... Moreover, I have difficulty envisioning an IO message that both appeals to the mullahs and forwards our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their influence is marginalized. They are not a silver bullet - there are none in Afghanistan.

[MSG Proctor]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to theological/ideological/moral superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.

I hear the "it might not work" and "Mullahs are not homogenous" etc...

GEN McCaffery's position that "we can shoot our way out of Afghanistan" is rather obvious in that we are dealing with a nasty religious-based insurgency there. It is a war of ideas. A war of cultures. And if as Eden states

"our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their [religious leaders] influence is marginalized."

is true, can you provide any evidence of this policy? Because that is suicide in a counterinsurgency. The more you marginalize religious leaders, the more you radicalize them. For God's sake, gentlemen, haven't we learned this already in OIF?

No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.

[Ron Humphrey]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.


No one is offering a silver bullet - but I am submitting that we aim the pistol at the enemy instead of at our own heads.

that this is a very important aspect to focus on, that said
consider the rule of the Taliban over the years and how much "control" they actually had over many of these very areas we are talking about. For the most part aside from occasional visits to remind the locals who was in charge, or simply to take advantage of ones position in order to get what they would want. Even during that time how much was local security handled by anything other than locals.

In otherwords that part was pre-existing and would be a focus for change simply in how its done and what the tie-ins to the central govt are. As mentioned before the religious leaders/tribal leaders are almost interchangeable if not the same in many cases and along those lines this differs greatly from Iraq where although the power structures existed they seemed fairly often to be in seperate hierarchies

In order to bring change in those outlying areas they will have to develop a desire to tie in to the larger cities/ govt and that wont happen until the (Whats in it for me) aspects of their leaders are peaked in possibilities for differences. Long story short although those leaders of the faith will have a large part to play the factors which would draw them into the larger govt seem to be outside their faith base and more in the lines of normal human characterisitics.

[MSG Proctor]

I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.

Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.

But go ahead - continue to analyze Aghanistan like eastern Europe or Viet Nam. Islam recognizes no separation of religious and civil life, and every western attempt to impose it on the Afghans will be met with (a) gratutitous milking of CF bennies or (b) violent resistance.

Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it by the long term stake holders.

I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.

Afghanistan will never be Turkey or even Iran but it needn't be the perpetual Gethsemane of western ideologies.

[Eden]

I think what is transpiring here is not that you gentlemen do not understand Afghanistan; its that you don't understand the Islamic religion.

Your western analagous filter precludes you from seeing what is obvious to the Afghans: any attempt to marginalize Islam in even the smallest, slightest ways is sealed with the kiss of death.

Religion is deeper, stronger, more resilient and more important than statism, military interventions, or democracy. You can either co-opt it as an IO theme or be beaten with it...

I apologize for my strident tone but having already fought this battle in OIF it is frustrating to see us hamstring our efforts in OEF by a wooden, modernist adherence to the wrong definitions of self-government, self-determination and religious ideology.

Interesting, though I would point out that Afghanistan is not Iraq, and any attempt to fit our OIF model to Afghanistan is as likely to fail as any proposed by us poor blinkered westernizers. Anyway, thanks for the corrective - I came away from Afghanistan thinking that the real power brokers were those who could bankroll the largest private armies, normally through criminal enterprises.

Also, while I agree that you can't marginalize Islam in Afghanistan, you can marginalize the local mullahs. One, they are neither as universally respected nor as influential as they would like us to believe; two, this is exactly what the bad guys are doing or attempting to do, through a combination of bribery, coercion, and invitations to the bandwagon.

It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.

Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

[Ken White]

None of Eden's rebuttals deal with these facts:

1. Islam is the only hope for a unifying principle/theme in COIN ops there;
2. The enemy is co-opting the religious leaders not due to theological/ideological/moral superiority but due to our exposing them to the coercive power of the insurgency.

I hear the "it might not work" and "Mullahs are not homogenous" etc...

I think number 2 is correct and number 1 may be but submit that our ability to implement number 1 will be limited by the follow-on "...not homogeneous" and other factors; not least by this:

"our stated goal in Afghanistan - a state where their [religious leaders] influence is marginalized."

is true, can you provide any evidence of this policy?

I'm unsure it is a stated goal but if it is, it's an exercise in futility if that goal is to be attained in less than a couple of generations. Even then it is at best dubious. While I'm unsure it is a stated goal, I have little doubt that it is the intent or at least the unstated desire of some in high places -- and that, unfortunately, desired sooner rather than later...

What I do know is that approaching Afghanistan with western thought processes, religious or irreligious, and anticipating a quasi-western society is likely to not succeed. Nor do I think it has to do so. Best is frequently the enemy of good enough...

[MSG Proctor]

Best is frequently the enemy of good enough...

Ah. The wisdom of the ages. Well said, Ken. The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

[Entropy]

The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

One might suggest that in addition to the "western analogous filter" you identified earlier, one can add the concept of a "state." I would agree that Islam is the "only hope for a unifying principle" but seriously doubt it is unifying enough to hold "Afghanistan" (a state whose unnatural borders were drawn by outsiders) together for any significant length of time. Even if the US were to somehow succeed in establishing such a state, Afghanistan's neighbors will be sure to meddle as they always have once the US departs.

So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.

[slapout9]

Ah. The wisdom of the ages. Well said, Ken. The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there

[wm]

The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

The goal in any nation building effort ought to be a stable state. All of the rest: source of stability, partnership in GWOT, source of economic power needs to be flushed with the list in the second sentence. Otherwise, the US effort (or any other "state stablizing/building" intervention by any country/coalition that is imbued with the latest instantiation of the huiman predilection for "missionary zeal") will be palliating short term suffering at the expense of introducing the seeds of long term instability.
Western states have been doing this kind of misguided crap for at least 4 centuries now; one would think they might have smartened up a little by now.

The most important thing, IMHO, about the aftermath of the American Revolution is that the 13 colonies figured out for themselves what kind of nation they wanted as/after they succesfully got the armies of George III to depart. While they had French help in ejecting Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis, et. al., they had no such help in writing the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederacy or Constitution. Maybe the ISAF/US coalition should try taking a page from American history and allow the Afghans to practice some self-determination instead of cramming its interpretation of stability and civilization down their throats.

[DaveDoyle]

Galloway had to have loosely paraphrased GEN McCaffery, a man I respect and admire.

Two combat brigades will make a huge difference in Afghanistan if skillfully employed. A combat brigade can do more than kill Taliban. And combat brigades bring with them leaders; creative, intelligent, and motivated leaders.

Our leaders can figure out how to solve problems that involve more than kinetic options.