Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn

[Entropy]

The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

One might suggest that in addition to the "western analogous filter" you identified earlier, one can add the concept of a "state." I would agree that Islam is the "only hope for a unifying principle" but seriously doubt it is unifying enough to hold "Afghanistan" (a state whose unnatural borders were drawn by outsiders) together for any significant length of time. Even if the US were to somehow succeed in establishing such a state, Afghanistan's neighbors will be sure to meddle as they always have once the US departs.

So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.

[MSG Proctor]

Entropy:
your post assumes two things;
1. Afghans will remain unchanged by the information revolution;
2. Partnering with the empire will not bring about deliverable advantages for the infant Afghan state.

IMO the greatest obstacle to a stable Afghanistan is the poppy industry. Legitimate industry has a funny way of dispelling illegitimate commerce. Look at South Korea, a nation with virtually no natural resources - and is now a top 10 world economy since US intervention.

Have hope, folks. And think 1776, not 2001.

[Rex Brynen]

Have hope, folks. And think 1776, not 2001.

1776? Wouldn't that be when the backwater locals rose up against the beneficent Empire and the foreign troops that sought to uphold the rule of law?

[MSG Proctor]

1776? Wouldn't that be when the backwater locals rose up against the beneficent Empire and the foreign troops that sought to uphold the rule of law?

Or was it the revolution of rebellion against imposed religious ideology in favor of self-determination?

[Steve Blair]

Or was it the revolution of rebellion against imposed religious ideology in favor of self-determination?

No.

[Ken White]

No.

Not the diaper; depends on whether you accord to the Scotch Irish view of that rebellion or not...

[Steve Blair]

Not the diaper; depends on whether you accord to the Scotch Irish view of that rebellion or not...

I don't tend to, frankly. I'm not a big revolutionary war type, but my experience with studying history in general (and my specialty areas in particular) leads me to be very suspicious of any *single* cause put forward for a major event. Religion played a role, but so did economics, ambitions (both of people and groups), and a certain amount of manipulating (conscious or otherwise) of outside parties. While religion might have played a role for the (suddenly interesting) Scotch Irish group, I doubt that it played quite as well with the more mercantile interests. Just one of those things...

[Entropy]

Entropy:
your post assumes two things;
1. Afghans will remain unchanged by the information revolution;
2. Partnering with the empire will not bring about deliverable advantages for the infant Afghan state.

I certainly don't assume #1. But at the same time I don't assume the information revolution is going to make the creation of an enduring and viable central authority (of whatever stripe) in Afghanistan any easier.

As for #2, no, I don't assume partnering won't bring advantages, but then again I don't assume that it will bring advantages either. The problem, as I see it, is not so much supporting a nascent Afghan state (which is what we're doing), but making that state legitimate in the eyes of the populace that State purportedly represents.

And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.

Ken,

What in that is inimical to our interest?

Not necessarily inimical, but little in the way of clear benefit for the US, especially considering the cost in blood and treasure. Some kind of central and stable government would be nice, but does it pass a cost-benefit test? A lot depends on what US strategic goals are or should be. Are they limited to dealing with the threat from AQ and associated groups or something more?

Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?

History, for one thing. There have been many attempts at the creation of some kind of "Afghan" state and all failed. Attempts with foreign sponsors failed spectacularly. Tribal societies in general do not have a good history of enduring central authority. Given enough time - generations - it might be possible, but I agree with Eden's last sentence (which you quote above) and that is only one difficulty. One of the many other elephants in the room is Pakistan, which does not want a strong Afghanistan, nor one that it can't control. Pakistani fears are not unjustified from their point of view. Pakistan can, will and is playing spoiler in our nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.

So I don't have much hope for the long-term prospects of an Afghan state, but that doesn't mean it's not useful to try for the time-being.

[Ken White]

...And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.

I don't think similarity was the point; I think his aim was the benefit -- or not -- of US intervention and the resultant relative stability (important word, relative...). Stability in N.Asia and S. Asia are two very different things.

Not necessarily inimical, but little in the way of clear benefit for the US, especially considering the cost in blood and treasure.

Our intervention and long stay in Korea was and is of little clear benefit to the US. Kosovo? Even Viet Nam. We do a lot of things that are of little clear benefit to us; have for years.

Some kind of central and stable government would be nice, but does it pass a cost-benefit test?

Good question does it? What are the benefit parameters and over what period of time will they be measured (note future tense)?

A lot depends on what US strategic goals are or should be. Are they limited to dealing with the threat from AQ and associated groups or something more?

Not having been a fly on the wall at Foggy Bottom or the Five Sided Funny Farm much less the WH or Camp David, I can't answer your question. I can say from my perspective that the strategy is far more encompassing than either Afghanistan or Iraq; that Iraq is mostly about attacks on US interests worldwide that originate in or from the ME and Afghanistan is mostly about attacks on US soil --plus we intend to repair our earlier failing of helping remove the Russian and then abandoning the area. In short, our presence may or may nor bring added stability -- we've already discovered our absence guarantees less stability...

History, for one thing. There have been many attempts at the creation of some kind of "Afghan" state and all failed.

History is a good thing, it teaches many lessons. One thing it teaches is that the Afghans like to fight each other but have achieved a balancing act of relative calm on occasion.

Attempts with foreign sponsors failed spectacularly.

True, thus our ultra light hand in the area -- which IMO is good and I disagree that a large amount of troops infused will be a pure benefit.

Tribal societies in general do not have a good history of enduring central authority.

True; onlly as they transition to post-tribal does that occur.

Given enough time - generations - it might be possible

Or even probable; the number of generations required then becomes the issue. I'd have put it at five or more five years ago; now it may be possible in a couple.

...I agree with Eden's last sentence (which you quote above) and that is only one difficulty.

If you noticed, I politley disagreed with that contention. I still do. The American people as a whole are far more tolerant of stuff like this than the media and the academics (and too many Generals...) think. NATO is another subject and will probably be less tolerant but I doubt that will have much effect on the US effort.

One of the many other elephants in the room is Pakistan, which does not want a strong Afghanistan, nor one that it can't control. Pakistani fears are not unjustified from their point of view. Pakistan can, will and is playing spoiler in our nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.

I totally agree and as R.A. and I agreed some time ago, something needs to be done about that. My sensing is that we are starting to get slowly pissed. We'll see.

So I don't have much hope for the long-term prospects of an Afghan state, but that doesn't mean it's not useful to try for the time-being.

It is not our job to bring stability of any sort at any level to South Asia -- but someone has to try. We had the audacity to do that. Whether we will be successful or not is TBD. Either way, the long term prospects of an Afghan state are IMO a tertiary issue at most.

[jmm99]

open-source, online ? I'd like to read what he says - not what he is said to have said. So, if there is a url to the report, please.

Otherwise, I'm staying out of this one, where I've found out that:

1. My French-Canadian ancestors and relatives started the American Revolution. Not so; but they could have prevented it if Coulon had executed Washington at Fort Necessity.

2. The Revolution was started by the Scotch-Irish. That I can believe, since my wife is 1/8th Scotch-Irish (Blair).

Seriously, an interesting discussion, which is most timely in light of current, breaking events.

[MSG Proctor]

I certainly don't assume #1. But at the same time I don't assume the information revolution is going to make the creation of an enduring and viable central authority (of whatever stripe) in Afghanistan any easier.

As for #2, no, I don't assume partnering won't bring advantages, but then again I don't assume that it will bring advantages either. The problem, as I see it, is not so much supporting a nascent Afghan state (which is what we're doing), but making that state legitimate in the eyes of the populace that State purportedly represents.

And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.

Entropy:
Thanks for clarifying your positions. I would like to respectfully respond...

The information revolution overcomes the problem of linkage with outside forces. It may help the central gov't in Afghanistan promulgate its messages for national unity/identity in the long run. The erection of a serviceable and truly transnational information infrastructure is still a generation away.

The text I bolded above is the classical definition of a COIN problem statement. Winning legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans (not a monolithic entity) requires vigorous cultural, religious and economic engagement. There is no strategy for achieving success in a COIN fight in Afghanistan that does not include Islam.

As for Korea, while I do not intend to conflate apples/oranges here, Korea had few connections with the outside world, a devastated infrastructure, had just emerged from a brutal Japanese occupation, had little natural resources and hostile powers on its border. There are some similarities between the two models IMO.

[wm]

Legitimate industry has a funny way of dispelling illegitimate commerce.

I guess that would explain why we still have a significant cigarette smuggling problem , which, BTW, I suspect will get worse as the taxes on tobacco are boosted even more.

[Ken White]

So while the goal you've provided is theoretically more achievable than a western-style secular democracy, it's one that I think is not ultimately in America's interest, nor a goal the US can husband into existence even it it were.

Actually, two whys:

What in that is inimical to our interest?

Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?