Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn

[Danny]

Of course we need a coherent strategy. As for the other subject, increasing troop levels (for which I have argued for half a year at my place) and killing Taliban will fix the problems with the Taliban.

I am not so worried about the overall problems with Afghanistan. We cannot construct an electrical grid there when our own bridges are collapsing and our infrastructure needs tending to.

Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, and 90% Muslim, but without any of the religious radicalism. Poverty doesn't create religious radicalism. That's just a myth.

I am all for trying to bring stability to Afghanistan and spending the resources to do so, but there is a limit to what we are able to accomplish there. Besides, we could spend until we ourselves were broke, and without ending the religious extremism, all we will have created will be rich religious extremists.

[MSG Proctor]

Of course we need a coherent strategy. As for the other subject, increasing troop levels (for which I have argued for half a year at my place) and killing Taliban will fix the problems with the Taliban.

I am not so worried about the overall problems with Afghanistan. We cannot construct an electrical grid there when our own bridges are collapsing and our infrastructure needs tending to.

Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, and 90% Muslim, but without any of the religious radicalism. Poverty doesn't create religious radicalism. That's just a myth.

I am all for trying to bring stability to Afghanistan and spending the resources to do so, but there is a limit to what we are able to accomplish there. Besides, we could spend until we ourselves were broke, and without ending the religious extremism, all we will have created will be rich religious extremists.

The only national identity the Afghans have is as Muslims. Afghans on different sides of the same mountain may have zero relationship and feel no obligation toward Afghanistan as a nation (hence, no motivation to support a national government via its fighting forces). Any strategy with a prospect of success will have to include the Mullahs, Islamic scholars and mosque preachers. [Monograph attached].

"This work argues that engaging Afghanistan’s indigenous religious leadership—mullahs and Islamic scholars—is critical to winning the battle of ideas within local populations of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theater."

[Ron Humphrey]

The only national identity the Afghans have is as Muslims. Afghans on different sides of the same mountain may have zero relationship and feel no obligation toward Afghanistan as a nation (hence, no motivation to support a national government via its fighting forces). Any strategy with a prospect of success will have to include the Mullahs, Islamic scholars and mosque preachers. [Monograph attached].

"This work argues that engaging Afghanistan’s indigenous religious leadership—mullahs and Islamic scholars—is critical to winning the battle of ideas within local populations of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theater."

Some of the things I've been reading from the regions history lately tells me that in this particular area that might not actually be the best way to go?

Have to dig some more but on the face of it, isn't the indigenous leadership there almost completely intertwined with the very groups we are seeking to overcome, (and in a much more established and well networked way.

Just pondering

Also: can anyone tell me when and who if ever an empire, state organized grouping under statelike pretenses, etc has actually come from within the area we call Afghanistan other than by being asbsored into a larger movement, being enabled(pressed) by an outside entity, or straight up conquered?

[MSG Proctor]

I understand the caution, but we have to ponder some givens...

1. Afghanistan is only about 25% literate. So, how does the National Identity message get conveyed? Answer: the Mosque.
2. Afghanistan's only unifying principle is Islam.
3. Mullahs, religious scholars and preachers have far more credibility than the government of Afghanistan (GoA). We spend most of our efforts seeking to legitimize the GoA in the eyes of the Afghans while marginalizing cleric influence.
4. The enemy knows bullets 1-3 and therefore pusues a vigorous policy of co-opting the Mullahs. D'ya think they know something?
5. Cleric engagement is not the same as supporting a Caliphate, a religious state or a theocracy; it merely acknowledges the most influential leaders among the population in a COIN fight and attempts to leverage their spheres-of-influence.
6. There is no long term solution in Afghanistan that does not include Islam. Most Muslims deplore the abberrant theology of AQ/Taliban; to offer secularism as a solution just strengthens the IO positions of the radicals. The worst nightmare of AQ/Taliban is a vibrant, orthodox Islam championed by the common people.
7. The war against Hirabists is global; support for Afghanistan's more orthodox Sunnis is a strategic blow to their movement.

[Fuchs]

I was never there and don't intend to change that - but wasn't there some kind of tribal thing and community leaders being relevant?
I remember stories about how Afghan warfare is basically about a show of force to enlist local forces into one's army. That explained pretty well the volatility there.

This "mullah" emphasis seems to overshoot the target a bit. I doubt that the mullahs lead troops.

[MSG Proctor]

I was never there and don't intend to change that - but wasn't there some kind of tribal thing and community leaders being relevant?
I remember stories about how Afghan warfare is basically about a show of force to enlist local forces into one's army. That explained pretty well the volatility there.

This "mullah" emphasis seems to overshoot the target a bit. I doubt that the mullahs lead troops.

You have inadertantly identified our achilles heel. You doubt that Mullahs lead troops.

1. In COIN, tactical success means little without population buy-in. Kill all the insurgents you want - until you get the CoG and the IO pieces right, you'll be playing whack-a-mole and creating more insurgents.
2. Tribal sheikhs will not go against the Mullahs. Period.
3. Many Mullahs are in fact tribal leaders and wield significant power to marshall militia forces.
4. The enemy knows the religious leaders are the #1 sphere of influence and works hard to engage them with anti-CF IO themes.
5. Even Mullahs that do not possess direct militia authority influence everything that goes on in every tribe, neiborhood and village via the Friday afternoon sermon. Failure to grasp the legitimacy, significance and relevance of the Friday Mosque sermon is IO suicide.

@Rex: COIN is about legitimizing the GoA in THEIR eyes. Build all the roads, hospitals, wells, clinics, schools and military outposts that you want - but whoever defines Islam wins. Our work is not to intercede in the crossfire between Islamic theological poles - but to ascertain, understand and articulate what the religious leaders think is legitimate and support them in our IO. As long as the enemy engages the mosque and we don't, our 'secularizing' influence will be portrayed across Afghanistan (and the greater Islamic world) as a threat to Islam thereby serving as the optimal recruiting tool for more Hirabists and insurgents from Pakistan and other points of origin.

[Ken White]

1. In COIN, tactical success means little without population buy-in. Kill all the insurgents you want - until you get the CoG and the IO pieces right, you'll be playing whack-a-mole and creating more insurgents.
2. Tribal sheikhs will not go against the Mullahs. Period.
3. Many Mullahs are in fact tribal leaders and wield significant power to marshall militia forces.
4. The enemy knows the religious leaders are the #1 sphere of influence and works hard to engage them with anti-CF IO themes.
5. Even Mullahs that do not possess direct militia authority influence everything that goes on in every tribe, neiborhood and village via the Friday afternoon sermon. Failure to grasp the legitimacy, significance and relevance of the Friday Mosque sermon in IO suicide.

All totally true not too many years ago. A large number of Mullahs and Imams led fighting bands and all those that did not influence and pushed those that did. I very strongly doubt that's changed other than for the worse.

... but whoever defines Islam wins... As long as the enemy engages the mosque and we don't, our 'secularizing' influence will be portrayed across Afghanistan (and the greater Islamic world) as a threat to Islam thereby serving as the optimal recruiting tool for more Hirabists and insurgents from Pakistan and other points of origin.

Unfortunately true.

[Rex Brynen]

2. Afghanistan's only unifying principle is Islam.

Given that 20% of the population is non-Sunni (largely Hazari Shi'ites), not entirely. Nor would I assume that Islam--as powerful as it is as a common narrative--is enough to overcome ethno-linguistic and even tribal cleavages. An Islamic identity wasn't sufficient to prevent civil war or sustain a shared sense of national interest and identity after the Soviet withdrawal--indeed, the fighting between self-proclaimed Islamic mujahiddin groups was as bloody as any in Afghanistan's history.

I also think there are some limits to the ability of coalition forces to play a leading role in effectively engaging local religious leaderships.

That being said, I don't doubt the wisdom of engaging local religious leaderships. I see it much more in terms of conflict management and stabilization, however, rather than "unifying" a fractious Afghanistan with a deep-rooted suspicion/aversion to both outsiders and central government control.