Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn

[jmm99]

from the aged.

from Proctor
"Co-opting" as a COIN colloquialism in this instance actually is more akin to promulgating existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals. In COIN, the population must buy-in. That is almost 100% impossible for them if the ideas/concepts are injects from foreign powers who will eventually leave.

No beef with this, except to note "co-option" is a very loaded term. I'd prefer the concept of "promoting existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals." Semantics, perhaps, but "promulgating" smacks (to my ear) a bit too much of agitprop. Anyway, the key is "that emanate from the locals."

from Proctor
The way this is done is by covertly backing religious leaders that have of their own accord developed themes that wed Islam to the future of the Afghan nation state. Per good COIN principles, NATO/CF stay in the background and support these clerics (and their surrogates) with all PMESII assets (political/military/economic/social/information/infrastructure) making these traditional/orthodox Islamic clerics the 'hero' in the eyes of the population.

We been der, done that: in the late 1940s to mid 1960s programs promoting local political parties, media outlets, academic organizations, labor unions and student associations, in foreign countries (think Willi Brandt) - which were supported by cognate groups in the US, such as the National Student Association (NSA). Generally, the foreign groups were to the left of US mainstream politics of that era. In general, those programs (the brain-children of Cord Meyer and others) worked.

But, lots of stuff hit the fan when the lid was lifted in 1966-1967. Which led to all sorts of flak. See, for a perspective that is NOT mine:

http://www.cia-on-campus.org/

As a former NSA campus co-ordinator in the early 60s, I was on the other side; and still am - knuckle dragging Neanderthal that I am.

The point of digging up this ancient history is that what you are proposing, while perhaps theoretically sound ("covert" becomes "non-covert" rather easily), is subject to blowback prospects. That seems especially so where religion is concerned - a far more explosive materiel than student affairs.

[MSG Proctor]

No beef with this, except to note "co-option" is a very loaded term. I'd prefer the concept of "promoting existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals." Semantics, perhaps, but "promulgating" smacks (to my ear) a bit too much of agitprop. Anyway, the key is "that emanate from the locals."

We been der, done that: in the late 1940s to mid 1960s programs promoting local political parties, media outlets, academic organizations, labor unions and student associations, in foreign countries (think Willi Brandt) - which were supported by cognate groups in the US, such as the National Student Association (NSA). Generally, the foreign groups were to the left of US mainstream politics of that era. In general, those programs (the brain-children of Cord Meyer and others) worked.

But, lots of stuff hit the fan when the lid was lifted in 1966-1967. Which led to all sorts of flak.

...while perhaps theoretically sound ("covert" becomes "non-covert" rather easily), is subject to blowback prospects. That seems especially so where religion is concerned - a far more explosive materiel than student affairs.

jmm99:
Thanks for the feedback. Co-opt is a military colloquialism and my usage (hopefully) explained the intent. Promulgate in the way I am using it just means to disseminate with a clear intent of obtaining compliance, ie, a high ranking cleric council issues a fatwa defining Muslim sacred obligation to support the government and defeat the taqfirists in armed jihad.

By covert I do not mean SECRET. In COIN, as Dr. Kilcullen and others point out, them (host nation) doing something tolerably is better than us doing it with excellence. Perhaps covert is the wrong term and I should have said something to the effect of CF staying in the background and out of the headlines as they support orthodox Muslim leaders and interreligious councils.

Thanks for the corrections...

[jmm99]

the thanx, Proctor.

By covert I do not mean SECRET

That's a relief - so, I guess we are talking about a low-keyed overt operation to promote the promulgation of that what emanates from the locals. How's that for casuistics - in the non-confessional sense.

I seem to recall an historical example of something like that, but will have to relook some Jesuit history to see what was done. Tricky stuff - trying to harmonize religions - as Jean-Louis Tauran could explain better than I.

[MSG Proctor]

Such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen? I think your view of Islam as a unifying force is somewhat inappropriate for Afghanistan. It is certainly a major factor, but it is not the single unifying symbolic force you appear to assume it is. If you want to talk about symbols of national unity, you would be better off discussing the Afghan monarchy.

Marc, perhaps you joined the discussion a bit late, but my suggestion was not to implement Islam as a symbol of national unity per se; but to utilize the only existing unifying vehicle. If the monarchy is a better vehicle, so be it, but I doubt that it has the transnational appeal that a virulent form of nationalism with the impramatur of the Islamic scholars would at this time.

My position is that Afghanistan lacks a national identity that most Afghans see as a cause worth sacrificing for - which may be mission essential in a COIN fight where ANA troops have to deploy, fight and die in other regions of the country. Islam at least holds the potential for operationalizing fatwas into a cogent nationalist theme. maybe.

[marct]

Hi MSG Proctor,

Marc, perhaps you joined the discussion a bit late, but my suggestion was not to implement Islam as a symbol of national unity per se; but to utilize the only existing unifying vehicle. If the monarchy is a better vehicle, so be it, but I doubt that it has the transnational appeal that a virulent form of nationalism with the impramatur of the Islamic scholars would at this time.

The problem, as I see it, is that there is no "nationalism" per se in Afghanistan, at least in the sense that it exists in the US. What there was, centered on the monarchy and various tribal coalitions. I truly doubt that any real (as opposed to Potemkin Village) form of "virulent nationalism" will exist for at least another 20-30 years, regardless of support from Islamic scholars.

My position is that Afghanistan lacks a national identity that most Afghans see as a cause worth sacrificing for - which may be mission essential in a COIN fight where ANA troops have to deploy, fight and die in other regions of the country. Islam at least holds the potential for operationalizing fatwas into a cogent nationalist theme. maybe.

I truly doubt that . By its very nature, Islam is trans-national and, with some limited exceptions, there has been a fairly strong differentiation between the "community" and the "state". About the only option that would create something like a virulent radical nationalism would be a theocracy along the lines of Iran; but Iran is primarily Shi'a, with a very different view of community and state from that of the Sunni schools or a return of a Taliban-esque Revitalization Movement.

I'm not saying that it's impossible, just that I think it is very unlikely.

[MSG Proctor]

I truly doubt that . By its very nature, Islam is trans-national and, with some limited exceptions, there has been a fairly strong differentiation between the "community" and the "state". About the only option that would create something like a virulent radical nationalism would be a theocracy along the lines of Iran; but Iran is primarily Shi'a, with a very different view of community and state from that of the Sunni schools or a return of a Taliban-esque Revitalization Movement.

I'm not saying that it's impossible, just that I think it is very unlikely.

Marc,
Most people were saying the same thing about Iraq in 2006, except they were using much stronger adjectives - hopeless, lost cause, civil war, etc... But the COIN strategy eventually (and long overdue) invited the powerful clerics into inter-religious dialogue councils and the results have been breathtaking.

The fact is, for good or for evil, nothing else even comes close to providing a vehicle for uniting the Afghans against a common foe and a bleak situation. At least faith in God offers hope and provides a common framework for defeating a religiously aberrant insurgency. My strong conviction is that any solution that does not posit Islam in the very core of its plan is doomed.