Afghanistan troop surge could backfire, experts warn

[Ken White]

The Canadians started it...

Still, while you're correct in all this:

...While religion might have played a role for the (suddenly interesting) Scotch Irish group, I doubt that it played quite as well with the more mercantile interests. Just one of those things...

The religion referred to was not so much Presbyterianism resisting CofE / Anglican / Episcopalian domination as it was the real Scotch Irish religions; the dual track 'resist all attempts at good governance while making and drinking as much whiskey as possible -- preferable on a nontaxable basis.'

[Ken White]

...Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

This last item is possibly true however, I'll point out that NATO to an extent and us to a great degree have supported extended campaigns (Kosovo; NATO and us, for one example) or expensive long duration stays in unkind locations (from Korea to Kuwait for us). Not theocracies per se but unpleasant regimes and not terribly stable on occasion. In any event, what will transpire is IMO impossible to predict at this point. We'll see.

Hmm. Those start with a 'K' -- Afghanistan doesn't, maybe it'll be a change. Which way...

[Entropy]

Entropy:
your post assumes two things;
1. Afghans will remain unchanged by the information revolution;
2. Partnering with the empire will not bring about deliverable advantages for the infant Afghan state.

I certainly don't assume #1. But at the same time I don't assume the information revolution is going to make the creation of an enduring and viable central authority (of whatever stripe) in Afghanistan any easier.

As for #2, no, I don't assume partnering won't bring advantages, but then again I don't assume that it will bring advantages either. The problem, as I see it, is not so much supporting a nascent Afghan state (which is what we're doing), but making that state legitimate in the eyes of the populace that State purportedly represents.

And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.

Ken,

What in that is inimical to our interest?

Not necessarily inimical, but little in the way of clear benefit for the US, especially considering the cost in blood and treasure. Some kind of central and stable government would be nice, but does it pass a cost-benefit test? A lot depends on what US strategic goals are or should be. Are they limited to dealing with the threat from AQ and associated groups or something more?

Why cannot the US and the rest of the coalition in Afghanistan do that?

History, for one thing. There have been many attempts at the creation of some kind of "Afghan" state and all failed. Attempts with foreign sponsors failed spectacularly. Tribal societies in general do not have a good history of enduring central authority. Given enough time - generations - it might be possible, but I agree with Eden's last sentence (which you quote above) and that is only one difficulty. One of the many other elephants in the room is Pakistan, which does not want a strong Afghanistan, nor one that it can't control. Pakistani fears are not unjustified from their point of view. Pakistan can, will and is playing spoiler in our nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.

So I don't have much hope for the long-term prospects of an Afghan state, but that doesn't mean it's not useful to try for the time-being.

[Ken White]

...And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.

I don't think similarity was the point; I think his aim was the benefit -- or not -- of US intervention and the resultant relative stability (important word, relative...). Stability in N.Asia and S. Asia are two very different things.

Not necessarily inimical, but little in the way of clear benefit for the US, especially considering the cost in blood and treasure.

Our intervention and long stay in Korea was and is of little clear benefit to the US. Kosovo? Even Viet Nam. We do a lot of things that are of little clear benefit to us; have for years.

Some kind of central and stable government would be nice, but does it pass a cost-benefit test?

Good question does it? What are the benefit parameters and over what period of time will they be measured (note future tense)?

A lot depends on what US strategic goals are or should be. Are they limited to dealing with the threat from AQ and associated groups or something more?

Not having been a fly on the wall at Foggy Bottom or the Five Sided Funny Farm much less the WH or Camp David, I can't answer your question. I can say from my perspective that the strategy is far more encompassing than either Afghanistan or Iraq; that Iraq is mostly about attacks on US interests worldwide that originate in or from the ME and Afghanistan is mostly about attacks on US soil --plus we intend to repair our earlier failing of helping remove the Russian and then abandoning the area. In short, our presence may or may nor bring added stability -- we've already discovered our absence guarantees less stability...

History, for one thing. There have been many attempts at the creation of some kind of "Afghan" state and all failed.

History is a good thing, it teaches many lessons. One thing it teaches is that the Afghans like to fight each other but have achieved a balancing act of relative calm on occasion.

Attempts with foreign sponsors failed spectacularly.

True, thus our ultra light hand in the area -- which IMO is good and I disagree that a large amount of troops infused will be a pure benefit.

Tribal societies in general do not have a good history of enduring central authority.

True; onlly as they transition to post-tribal does that occur.

Given enough time - generations - it might be possible

Or even probable; the number of generations required then becomes the issue. I'd have put it at five or more five years ago; now it may be possible in a couple.

...I agree with Eden's last sentence (which you quote above) and that is only one difficulty.

If you noticed, I politley disagreed with that contention. I still do. The American people as a whole are far more tolerant of stuff like this than the media and the academics (and too many Generals...) think. NATO is another subject and will probably be less tolerant but I doubt that will have much effect on the US effort.

One of the many other elephants in the room is Pakistan, which does not want a strong Afghanistan, nor one that it can't control. Pakistani fears are not unjustified from their point of view. Pakistan can, will and is playing spoiler in our nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.

I totally agree and as R.A. and I agreed some time ago, something needs to be done about that. My sensing is that we are starting to get slowly pissed. We'll see.

So I don't have much hope for the long-term prospects of an Afghan state, but that doesn't mean it's not useful to try for the time-being.

It is not our job to bring stability of any sort at any level to South Asia -- but someone has to try. We had the audacity to do that. Whether we will be successful or not is TBD. Either way, the long term prospects of an Afghan state are IMO a tertiary issue at most.

[jmm99]

open-source, online ? I'd like to read what he says - not what he is said to have said. So, if there is a url to the report, please.

Otherwise, I'm staying out of this one, where I've found out that:

1. My French-Canadian ancestors and relatives started the American Revolution. Not so; but they could have prevented it if Coulon had executed Washington at Fort Necessity.

2. The Revolution was started by the Scotch-Irish. That I can believe, since my wife is 1/8th Scotch-Irish (Blair).

Seriously, an interesting discussion, which is most timely in light of current, breaking events.

[MSG Proctor]

MSG Proctor where have you been hiding......that is some Strategic Stuff you got there

SlapOut9,
Thanks, I'm nobody and I know nothing, I am doing PSAs for CH(COL) Kenneth Sampson's brilliant strategy published in his War College monograph attached to reply #11 in this thread.

I am certainly not an expert on Afghanistan (although COL Sampson is) but have extensive experience in helping unravel the religious arteries and veins in Iraq. We have no hope of any kind of success at all with any anchor point that is antagonistic to [traditional, more orthodox expressions of] Islam. We have every reason to hope and expect progress and long term partnerships with Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the greater Islamic world if we can adapt to conditions that allow Islam to inform democracy.

There are no panaceas, no silver bullets, no ready-made solutions in Afghanistan. The subject of this thread questions the wisdom or utility of a "Surge" of forces in OEF to stop the hemmorraging there similar to the way the Petraeus strategy did in OIF in 2007. My opinion is that the surge of forces informed by the right IO strategy can be highly successful. The ONLY truly transnational values in Afghanistan now are the common creed of Islam; the only transnational 'media' that exists is the Mosque sermon.

People much smarter than me can make the case that religion can be a potent force in fueling nationalism, and nationalism in this stage of the Afghan Republic's infancy would probably be a good thing.

I agree with Ken White's assessment that lasting, enduring change will take 20-40 years, but these concrete steps must surely be part of that strategy:

1. Co-opt the Islamic scholars, preachers and prayer leaders by forming councils and federations for mutual advantage;
2. Distribute mass media infrastructure to link Afghans together in purpose and identity;
3. Promote literacy;
4. Reward Afghan military leaders that lead well and demonstrate loyalty to the Afghan ideal;
5. Involve the UN/NATO in replacing the poppy trade with a legitimate commodity for international trade. This may involve outrageous sums of subsidies from donor nations (probably already underway, at least from our government's standpoint).

OK, I'm off my soapbox for a while. Kudos to all for a stimulating discussion....

[MSG Proctor]

I certainly don't assume #1. But at the same time I don't assume the information revolution is going to make the creation of an enduring and viable central authority (of whatever stripe) in Afghanistan any easier.

As for #2, no, I don't assume partnering won't bring advantages, but then again I don't assume that it will bring advantages either. The problem, as I see it, is not so much supporting a nascent Afghan state (which is what we're doing), but making that state legitimate in the eyes of the populace that State purportedly represents.

And I see little similarity between South Korea and Afghanistan. The history, culture and geographic position of each are wildly different.

Entropy:
Thanks for clarifying your positions. I would like to respectfully respond...

The information revolution overcomes the problem of linkage with outside forces. It may help the central gov't in Afghanistan promulgate its messages for national unity/identity in the long run. The erection of a serviceable and truly transnational information infrastructure is still a generation away.

The text I bolded above is the classical definition of a COIN problem statement. Winning legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans (not a monolithic entity) requires vigorous cultural, religious and economic engagement. There is no strategy for achieving success in a COIN fight in Afghanistan that does not include Islam.

As for Korea, while I do not intend to conflate apples/oranges here, Korea had few connections with the outside world, a devastated infrastructure, had just emerged from a brutal Japanese occupation, had little natural resources and hostile powers on its border. There are some similarities between the two models IMO.

[MSG Proctor]

It would be beneficial to hear more details on your plan to 'co-opt Islam' as an IO theme.

Just keep in mind that NATO and the US public are unlikely to support an extended and expensive campaign that, twenty years from now, leaves Afghanistan as a semi-stable theocracy.

Gladly, Mr. Eden.

"Co-opting" as a COIN colloquialism in this instance actually is more akin to promulgating existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals. In COIN, the population must buy-in. That is almost 100% impossible for them if the ideas/concepts are injects from foreign powers who will eventually leave.

The way this is done is by covertly backing religious leaders that have of their own accord developed themes that wed Islam to the future of the Afghan nation state. Per good COIN principles, NATO/CF stay in the background and support these clerics (and their surrogates) with all PMESII assets (political/military/economic/social/information/infrastructure) making these traditional/orthodox Islamic clerics the 'hero' in the eyes of the population.

The narrative will already include support for the Karzai government (and his legitimately elected successors). This will quickly present opportunities to build cross-tribal and trans-provincial coaltions through the erection of religious leader councils. The councils will require the support of the Islamic scholars who will have the ear of many of the Mullahs and mosque leaders.

Deliverables from these councils will include credible fatwas that endorse the GoA and the goals of the nascent republic. This religious network has 1000x more credibility than NATO PSYOPs messages or canned IO themes. It also has the potential to spread very rapidly and of course counter the enemy's IO. This is the model that turned the tide in Anbar Province in 2006 although the popular accepted narrative is that the tribal Sheikhs were the key spheres-of-influence. The Sheikhs however would not oppose the clerics when the clerics reached some semblance of consensus in favor of stability. The appetite for Islamic revolution has been greatly exaggerated by the enemy.

[For an example of the power and potential of religious councils in COIN, click here.]

There are those who will object to the potential for a theocratic state - but that is a distant and unlikely prospect with the recent memories of the Taliban's 'government' and the failure of AQI's policy of conversion-by-the-sword in Iraq. The standard model for Islamic states that survive is a traditional cooperation between the local mosque and the local government. That is the missing link in Afghanistan as I understand it.

Until NATO/CF aggressively counter the enemy's IO strategy of co-opting religious leaders, all gains in Afghanistan will be temporary and dependent upon foreign military assistance.

[wm]

Legitimate industry has a funny way of dispelling illegitimate commerce.

I guess that would explain why we still have a significant cigarette smuggling problem , which, BTW, I suspect will get worse as the taxes on tobacco are boosted even more.

[wm]

The goal in Afghanistan should be a stable Islamic state that is a partner in the WoT and is not dependent on narco-economics. Please flush the idea of a secular, 'moderate' Islamic republic and deal with the only IO venue fit for fostering concord (mosque preaching) and the only operable unifying principal (Islam).

The goal in any nation building effort ought to be a stable state. All of the rest: source of stability, partnership in GWOT, source of economic power needs to be flushed with the list in the second sentence. Otherwise, the US effort (or any other "state stablizing/building" intervention by any country/coalition that is imbued with the latest instantiation of the huiman predilection for "missionary zeal") will be palliating short term suffering at the expense of introducing the seeds of long term instability.
Western states have been doing this kind of misguided crap for at least 4 centuries now; one would think they might have smartened up a little by now.

The most important thing, IMHO, about the aftermath of the American Revolution is that the 13 colonies figured out for themselves what kind of nation they wanted as/after they succesfully got the armies of George III to depart. While they had French help in ejecting Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis, et. al., they had no such help in writing the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederacy or Constitution. Maybe the ISAF/US coalition should try taking a page from American history and allow the Afghans to practice some self-determination instead of cramming its interpretation of stability and civilization down their throats.

[Ken White]

Too logical, though, I suppose...

[marct]

There are those who will object to the potential for a theocratic state - but that is a distant and unlikely prospect with the recent memories of the Taliban's 'government' and the failure of AQI's policy of conversion-by-the-sword in Iraq. The standard model for Islamic states that survive is a traditional cooperation between the local mosque and the local government. That is the missing link in Afghanistan as I understand it.

Such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen? I think your view of Islam as a unifying force is somewhat inappropriate for Afghanistan. It is certainly a major factor, but it is not the single unifying symbolic force you appear to assume it is. If you want to talk about symbols of national unity, you would be better off discussing the Afghan monarchy.

Maybe the ISAF/US coalition should try taking a page from American history and allow the Afghans to practice some self-determination instead of cramming its interpretation of stability and civilization down their throats.

It would have been nice if that had happened at the 2003 Loya Jirga . Still and all, you are quite right that the ISAF/US coalition needs to agree to Afghan self-determination.

[jmm99]

from the aged.

from Proctor
"Co-opting" as a COIN colloquialism in this instance actually is more akin to promulgating existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals. In COIN, the population must buy-in. That is almost 100% impossible for them if the ideas/concepts are injects from foreign powers who will eventually leave.

No beef with this, except to note "co-option" is a very loaded term. I'd prefer the concept of "promoting existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals." Semantics, perhaps, but "promulgating" smacks (to my ear) a bit too much of agitprop. Anyway, the key is "that emanate from the locals."

from Proctor
The way this is done is by covertly backing religious leaders that have of their own accord developed themes that wed Islam to the future of the Afghan nation state. Per good COIN principles, NATO/CF stay in the background and support these clerics (and their surrogates) with all PMESII assets (political/military/economic/social/information/infrastructure) making these traditional/orthodox Islamic clerics the 'hero' in the eyes of the population.

We been der, done that: in the late 1940s to mid 1960s programs promoting local political parties, media outlets, academic organizations, labor unions and student associations, in foreign countries (think Willi Brandt) - which were supported by cognate groups in the US, such as the National Student Association (NSA). Generally, the foreign groups were to the left of US mainstream politics of that era. In general, those programs (the brain-children of Cord Meyer and others) worked.

But, lots of stuff hit the fan when the lid was lifted in 1966-1967. Which led to all sorts of flak. See, for a perspective that is NOT mine:

http://www.cia-on-campus.org/

As a former NSA campus co-ordinator in the early 60s, I was on the other side; and still am - knuckle dragging Neanderthal that I am.

The point of digging up this ancient history is that what you are proposing, while perhaps theoretically sound ("covert" becomes "non-covert" rather easily), is subject to blowback prospects. That seems especially so where religion is concerned - a far more explosive materiel than student affairs.

[MSG Proctor]

Such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen? I think your view of Islam as a unifying force is somewhat inappropriate for Afghanistan. It is certainly a major factor, but it is not the single unifying symbolic force you appear to assume it is. If you want to talk about symbols of national unity, you would be better off discussing the Afghan monarchy.

Marc, perhaps you joined the discussion a bit late, but my suggestion was not to implement Islam as a symbol of national unity per se; but to utilize the only existing unifying vehicle. If the monarchy is a better vehicle, so be it, but I doubt that it has the transnational appeal that a virulent form of nationalism with the impramatur of the Islamic scholars would at this time.

My position is that Afghanistan lacks a national identity that most Afghans see as a cause worth sacrificing for - which may be mission essential in a COIN fight where ANA troops have to deploy, fight and die in other regions of the country. Islam at least holds the potential for operationalizing fatwas into a cogent nationalist theme. maybe.

[MSG Proctor]

No beef with this, except to note "co-option" is a very loaded term. I'd prefer the concept of "promoting existing themes and strategies that emanate from the locals." Semantics, perhaps, but "promulgating" smacks (to my ear) a bit too much of agitprop. Anyway, the key is "that emanate from the locals."

We been der, done that: in the late 1940s to mid 1960s programs promoting local political parties, media outlets, academic organizations, labor unions and student associations, in foreign countries (think Willi Brandt) - which were supported by cognate groups in the US, such as the National Student Association (NSA). Generally, the foreign groups were to the left of US mainstream politics of that era. In general, those programs (the brain-children of Cord Meyer and others) worked.

But, lots of stuff hit the fan when the lid was lifted in 1966-1967. Which led to all sorts of flak.

...while perhaps theoretically sound ("covert" becomes "non-covert" rather easily), is subject to blowback prospects. That seems especially so where religion is concerned - a far more explosive materiel than student affairs.

jmm99:
Thanks for the feedback. Co-opt is a military colloquialism and my usage (hopefully) explained the intent. Promulgate in the way I am using it just means to disseminate with a clear intent of obtaining compliance, ie, a high ranking cleric council issues a fatwa defining Muslim sacred obligation to support the government and defeat the taqfirists in armed jihad.

By covert I do not mean SECRET. In COIN, as Dr. Kilcullen and others point out, them (host nation) doing something tolerably is better than us doing it with excellence. Perhaps covert is the wrong term and I should have said something to the effect of CF staying in the background and out of the headlines as they support orthodox Muslim leaders and interreligious councils.

Thanks for the corrections...

[jmm99]

the thanx, Proctor.

By covert I do not mean SECRET

That's a relief - so, I guess we are talking about a low-keyed overt operation to promote the promulgation of that what emanates from the locals. How's that for casuistics - in the non-confessional sense.

I seem to recall an historical example of something like that, but will have to relook some Jesuit history to see what was done. Tricky stuff - trying to harmonize religions - as Jean-Louis Tauran could explain better than I.

[slapout9]

I just finished reading the report that MSG Proctor recommended by Col. Kenneth Sampson. I can be hard to impress sometimes but that paper is impressive. Closest thing to SBW (Slapout Based Warfare) I have ever seenIt covers Motive,Method and Opportunity. It is one of the best examples of what COIN should be at a Strategic Level. Don't destroy the network that is in place but take it and flip it. All at once if possible. Achieve our policy objectives don't worry about changing them to a democracy or their religion...figure out how we can cooperate together. I was once told that Strategy is the path of most Assistance. Col. Sampson hit that one straight on the head.

[marct]

Hi MSG Proctor,

Marc, perhaps you joined the discussion a bit late, but my suggestion was not to implement Islam as a symbol of national unity per se; but to utilize the only existing unifying vehicle. If the monarchy is a better vehicle, so be it, but I doubt that it has the transnational appeal that a virulent form of nationalism with the impramatur of the Islamic scholars would at this time.

The problem, as I see it, is that there is no "nationalism" per se in Afghanistan, at least in the sense that it exists in the US. What there was, centered on the monarchy and various tribal coalitions. I truly doubt that any real (as opposed to Potemkin Village) form of "virulent nationalism" will exist for at least another 20-30 years, regardless of support from Islamic scholars.

My position is that Afghanistan lacks a national identity that most Afghans see as a cause worth sacrificing for - which may be mission essential in a COIN fight where ANA troops have to deploy, fight and die in other regions of the country. Islam at least holds the potential for operationalizing fatwas into a cogent nationalist theme. maybe.

I truly doubt that . By its very nature, Islam is trans-national and, with some limited exceptions, there has been a fairly strong differentiation between the "community" and the "state". About the only option that would create something like a virulent radical nationalism would be a theocracy along the lines of Iran; but Iran is primarily Shi'a, with a very different view of community and state from that of the Sunni schools or a return of a Taliban-esque Revitalization Movement.

I'm not saying that it's impossible, just that I think it is very unlikely.

[MSG Proctor]

I truly doubt that . By its very nature, Islam is trans-national and, with some limited exceptions, there has been a fairly strong differentiation between the "community" and the "state". About the only option that would create something like a virulent radical nationalism would be a theocracy along the lines of Iran; but Iran is primarily Shi'a, with a very different view of community and state from that of the Sunni schools or a return of a Taliban-esque Revitalization Movement.

I'm not saying that it's impossible, just that I think it is very unlikely.

Marc,
Most people were saying the same thing about Iraq in 2006, except they were using much stronger adjectives - hopeless, lost cause, civil war, etc... But the COIN strategy eventually (and long overdue) invited the powerful clerics into inter-religious dialogue councils and the results have been breathtaking.

The fact is, for good or for evil, nothing else even comes close to providing a vehicle for uniting the Afghans against a common foe and a bleak situation. At least faith in God offers hope and provides a common framework for defeating a religiously aberrant insurgency. My strong conviction is that any solution that does not posit Islam in the very core of its plan is doomed.

[Jonathan Mueller]

I read Chuck Spinney’s Counterpunch article, ‘Should Obama Escalate the War in Afghanistan?’ with concern. Chuck is a longtime friend and mentor, and a great public servant who is owed the gratitude of all Americans for his critiques of the corruption and inefficiency of the defense establishment. However, in this piece I fear he is going down the wrong road, arguing from some assumptions about the war in Afghanistan and about guerrilla warfare in general that are false. At the same time, I also see some dangerous elements in the potential Obama policies Chuck criticizes.



Both Chuck and Obama’s advisers I fear are being led astray by a very American misconception that the outcome of a guerrilla war is military victory. It is not, not usually. Insurgencies usually end in some sort of political settlement, although how and when military force is applied can have a big impact on who that settlement favors.



Clausewitz wrote that the most fundamental of all strategic decisions was the definition of what kind of war one is fighting, for all one’s actions flow from that definition.



In this regard, Spinney offers us a choice:

At the heart of this question is the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, specifically the question of whether or not it has mutated into something that is more akin to a classical guerrilla war as opposed to being part of a Fourth Generation War against al Quada.

This is a blinkered and narrow view of the war in Afghanistan which categorizes it by some of the tactics used to wage the war, not by its strategic nature. It was always much broader than our hunt for Al Quaeda, and the Taliban insurgency is just one aspect and the latest phase of a long-running conflict.

The war in Afghanistan is a civil war with a variety of Afghan factions resorting to force in their pursuit of power. As has become normal in failed states, it is an especially nasty and complicated war because of the great number of actors involved – state and non-state, domestic and foreign, regional and global. Not all the actors are party to the conflict – criminal gangs profit from the war and seek its continuation but are not actually combatants; NGOs and UN and other international organizations usually are not parties to the conflict but still have a role in resolving it.

The Afghan war to a certain extent pre-dated the Soviet occupation and provoked it, but today’s situation can best be seen as growing out of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, when the United States, having armed and organized the Afghans, walked away and left them to sort out their own post-war (dis) order. The result was a turbulent situation which produced the Taliban and provided the environment for Al Quaeda to base itself in Afghanistan.

Spinney today is one of a group of critics of US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan who argue that an outside power cannot defeat a nationalist insurgency because its support discredits its local collaborators. That may sometimes happen, but it is as much the result of defects in the collaborators’ legitimacy as of their association with the outside power. In Malaya, while the British were fighting a communist insurgency (1948-58), they never broke stride in their march to independence for Malaya. Malaya’s democratic politicians who participated in this process never suffered any damage to their legitimacy because of their cooperation with the British.

Today, in Afghanistan it is a fair question: is Karzai discredited by his dependence on the West, or is the West discredited by its support for Karzai? Since Pashtun tribal leaders have told me that for all their anger at how the US has treated them they don’t want the US to leave because they trust Americans more than Karzai, what do you think the answer is?

Karzai has not lived up to the hopes reposed in him in 2002 and there may need to be replaced, but the problem with western support for him is not that it is damaging his legitimacy but that it may be propping him up when his lack of legitimacy might otherwise force change.

The US and its allies have now been present in Afghanistan for seven years. By the time the Soviets had been there for that long, they were in deep trouble, facing a broad-based war of national liberation involving multiple ethnic groups across most of Afghanistan. This is a great contrast to what we face in Afghanistan today – the Taliban are a minority of a minority (although the Pashtun are Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, and they claim to be a majority, other groups question that – without a reliable census nobody really knows). While a third of Afghanistan’s provinces are affected by the insurgency, the majority are not. That is not to say there are no problems, security or otherwise, in the rest of Afghanistan, but that the Taliban are only part of the problem.

It is still troubling to hear the Obama camp talking about both increasing troop levels and using more precision firepower in a new offensive against the Taliban. This sounds like another Vietnam-style escalation, based on a continuing American belief in a chimerical military victory over insurgents.

Military power may be part of the solution to an insurgency, but it rarely the whole solution. If an insurgency appears to be defeated militarily, it is usually because other measures have pulled the rug out from under the insurgents.

Usually all the military can do in an insurgency is create conditions under which other measures (political, economic, etc., as appropriate) can resolve the conflict. The first requirement for this is for the military to secure the civilian population and isolate them from the insurgents. These security operations are exceedingly manpower-intensive, but firepower, even so-called precision firepower, is usually counterproductive.

British officers recently returned from Afghanistan have told me that there is a trade-off there between troops and firepower. Lack of troops leads to over-use of firepower, leads to civilian casualties and property damage, undermining the coalition’s moral superiority over the Taliban. Therefore, in their view, more troops are required, in order to carry out effective security operations, not to launch a new offensive against the Taliban.

Our war against violent Islamic extremists is our Great War, just as the Cold War was for our fathers, World War II for our grandfathers, and World War II for our great-grandfathers. It is the real war of today, and any other war we can speak of is hypothetical. Well-chosen or not, Iraq and Afghanistan are the battlegrounds. In Afghanistan we missed an opportunity in 2002 by declaring victory and moving on to Iraq, making possible the Taliban resurgence. Although our neglect has cost us, the situation is not irretrievable. Some of the steps which need to be taken sooner rather than later include:

The Pashtun may or may not be a majority of Afghans, but they are the largest ethnic group, so it is hard to imagine a lasting settlement to Afghanistan’s civil war that does not draw them in. Instead, Karzai and the US have treated them as the enemy. We have to reverse that. The tribal leaders are not the Taliban, and the Taliban do not have majority support among the Pashtun.

The coalition needs more troops, and some members need to step up to a more active combat role.

Civil and military efforts need to be coordinated, and civilian agencies need to move faster. Military entry into a district needs to be accompanied by rapid action to employ the locals in reconstruction programs that will make their lives better while priming the pump with cash in their pockets.

Since I am advocating more troops for Afghanistan, you might expect me to support Gates’s just-announced plan to double the size of the Afghan National Army. I do not. It is not an easy thing to build an army, still less a national army in as divided a society as Afghanistan. It does not take a very deep knowledge of our training efforts in Iraq to see how too-rapid a build-up compromised the quality, and effectiveness, of the output. The ANA can only grow as fast as we can produce quality.

An alternative to stand up Afghan forces rapidly is to draw on our experience with Popular Forces (militia) in Vietnam and with tribal forces in Iraq, and set up tribal militias in the hottest conflict zones in Afghanistan. This requires reposing some trust in the Pashtun tribes, but not a lot – we don’t have to give them heavy weapons, and they already have lots of small arms. At least try it and see what happens.

The corruption, inefficiency, and unprofessionalism of the Afghan National Police (ANP) is one of the major failures of Afghan reconstruction. This needs to be a litmus test for Karzai – if he is not willing to de-politicize and de-criminalize the ANP, then he has to go. The Germans, who took the NATO mandate for advising the ANP, have totally dropped the ball as well, and also need to either radically invigorate their program or be replaced by somebody who will.

This is not a complete program, but just these steps would materially improve the situation in Afghanistan and open the door to other measures o bring further progress.

The author is a management consultant based in London, England. He was formerly legislative assistant for defense to Hon. Dick Cheney, M.C. and program officer for Afghanistan in the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.