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Thread: After Action Report-General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) Afgahanistan

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    Default After Action Report-General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) Afgahanistan

    21-26 July 2008 - Excellent observation and analysis

    http://www.west-point.org/publicatio...fghanistan.pdf

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    Default Unity of Effort vice Unity of Command?

    There is no unity of command in Afghanistan. A sensible coordination of all political and military elements of the Afghan theater of operations does not exist. There is no single military headquarters tactically commanding all US forces. All NATO military forces do not fully respond to the NATO ISAF Commander because of extensive national operational restrictions and caveats. In theory, NATO ISAF Forces respond to the (US) SACEUR…but US Forces in ISAF (half the total ISAF forces are US) respond to the US CENTCOM commander. However, US Special Operations Forces respond to US SOCOM…..not (US) SACEUR or US CENTCOM. There is no accepted Combined NATO-Afghan military headquarters. There is no clear political governance relationship organizing the government of Afghanistan, the United Nations and its many Agencies, NATO and its political and military presence, the 26 Afghan deployed allied nations, the hundreds of NGO’s, and private entities and contractors. There is little formal dialog between the government and military of Pakistan and Afghanistan, except that cobbled together by the US Forces in Regional Command East along the Pakistan frontier.

    Not exactly a recipe for success according to anyone's doctrine about unity of command. The mix and match relationships between US military forces (SOCOM, CENTCOM, SACEUR) isn't as cumbersome as it sounds. Plenty of close personal relationships there to overcome the lack of a solid wiring diagram. The tie to the Afghan military and the tie with NATO is more problematic, and has been for several years.

    The lack of a clear US national oversight to employ all aspects of national power is much more troubling than the soup of military chains of command.

    Someone (at the Ambassador level) has to be tying this together, wouldn't you think?

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    Default C2 comment may be in error

    I think the comment reference SOF C2 is not correct. Although there are different SOF organizations (both within the US C2 structure and the NATO structure) all US SOF (less those under the NATO structure) are under the C2 of the theater commander. While there are most probably problems with the C2 structure none of the US SOF is under SOCOM control while in theater.
    David S. Maxwell
    "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence

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    While this report is tremendously informative, I also am not sure what Gen McCaffrey is referring to when he states that USSOCOM directs SOF in Afg. I think that both HQ USSOCOM and the SOF in Afghanistan would question the accuracy of that assertion. The other points about other issues of concern with the present C2 arrangements make sense, but the statement that SOF in Afg take their direction from USSOCOM is not accurate.

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    Default Thanx

    for supplying the url to the report.

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    Default Sof c2

    The Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the 1986 DOD Appropriations Act which created USSOCOM (and ASD-SO/LIC) also created the SOF C2 structure. For normal SOF ops C2 was in the hands of the regional combatant commander through his SOC (as in SOCCENT, SOCEUR. or SOCSOUTH). However, the legislation reserved to USSOCOM C2 of such SOF missions as the NCA might direct. While that authority was rarely used prior to the current administration, SECDEF Rumsfeld was on record (in the media) as expanding the use of SOCOM directed SOF missions.

    Don't know the extent to which this applies in Afghanistan but it is a plausible interpretation given both the legislative authority and recent history.

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Council Member MSG Proctor's Avatar
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    The magnificent, resilient Afghan people absolutely reject the ideology and violence of the Taliban (90% or greater) but have little faith in the ability of the government to provide security, justice, clean water, electricity, or jobs. Much of Afghanistan has great faith in US military forces, but enormous suspicion of the commitment and staying power of our NATO allies.

    �� The courageous and determined NATO Forces (the employable forces are principally US, Canadian, British, Polish, and Dutch) and the Afghan National Army (the ANA is a splendid success story) cannot be defeated in battle. They will continue to slaughter the Pashtun insurgents, criminals, and international terrorist syndicates who directly confront them. (7000+ killed during 2007 alone.) The Taliban will increasingly turn to terrorism directed against the people and the Afghan National Police. However, the atmosphere of terror cannot be countered by relying mainly on military means. We cannot win through a war of attrition. The economic and political support provided by the international community is currently inadequate to deal with the situation.
    ��
    Sounds like a "lead, follow or get out of the way" situation to me. GEN Mac argues forcefully for the necessity of NATO and yet descibes a situation where many NATO partners are nothing but icons as far as their actual battle efficiency.

    Its also hard to fathom that after 6 years there are only 63,000 combat ready ANA troops. I think that 'surge' of forces in Afghanistan is way overdue, however, as the good general describes,
    Many of these troops and their leaders through general officer level are on their 4th or more combat deployments since
    “911.” We have suffered 36,000 US killed and wounded. Their families are getting tired. The country [USA] is not at war. The Armed Forces and the CIA are at war. We are at the point of breaking faith with our troops.
    Decisions made back in 2002 NOT to expand our active duty military are proving now to be utterly tragic. Not to turn this into a political argument, but I believe one party is adamant about not growing the Armed Forces.

    I've been saying since 911 that we need at least 4 more divisions with the MTOE [design] of 10th Mountain Division.
    Last edited by MSG Proctor; 08-03-2008 at 10:37 AM.
    "Its easy, boys. All we have to do is follow my simple yet ingenius plan..."

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MSG Proctor View Post
    Sounds like a "lead, follow or get out of the way" situation to me. GEN Mac argues forcefully for the necessity of NATO and yet descibes a situation where many NATO partners are nothing but icons as far as their actual battle efficiency.
    I believe to remember a specific book excerpt. It was about partisans in WW2 in the Balkans.

    The author had the opinion that the not battleworthy Italians were more effective occupiers because of their hesitation to fight than were the Germans (some of which were - as wasteful as it was - crack infantry troops from the Eastern Front like the 22nd ID which fought like two divisions in the Crimean campaign 1942).

    I acknowledge that the north is farther away from the supposed Taleban safe havens in Pakistan. It's still a bit puzzling that more fo the behaviour that was used in the now enflamed provinces was used should become the norm while the behaviour that apparently kept the North quiet by comparison should go away.
    In fact, it looks just perfect as it is; soft approach is likely not promising in the South (anymore), the hard tour is not promising in the North.
    Last edited by Fuchs; 08-12-2008 at 06:10 PM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Thumbs up That North - South cultural divide again...

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I acknowledge that the north is farther away from the supposed Taleban safe havens in Pakistan. It's still a bit puzzling that more fo the behaviour that was used in the now enflamed provinces was used should become the norm while the behaviour that apparently kept the North quiet by comparison should go away. In fact, it looks just perfect as it is; soft approach is likely not promising in the South (anymore), the hard tour is not promising in the North.
    Not only further away from Pakistan, but far more importantly, the north has fewer Pushtuns and no dominant Pushtun tribes. People who'd rather farm than fight are amenable to a soft touch; those who reverse that will run all over a soft touch.

    But I think you're correct on the current approaches by area...

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    Default A little history

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I acknowledge that the north is farther away from the supposed Taleban safe havens in Pakistan. It's still a bit puzzling that more fo the behaviour that was used in the now enflamed provinces was used should become the norm while the behaviour that apparently kept the North quiet by comparison should go away.
    In fact, it looks just perfect as it is; soft approach is likely not promising in the South (anymore), the hard tour is not promising in the North.
    The Germans were one of the first non-US NATO nations to deploy significant forces to Afghanistan. At the time, the north region was the only area allocated to NATO outside of Kabul proper, and the situation there was more turbulent and unsettled than it is now. I think the Germans deserve credit for there early contribution.

    Their live-and-let-live approach has indeed kept the north region relatively quiet, and they have had some success in reining in illicit trafficking, developing the transportation infrastructure, and promoting better governance. However, they have also made little effort to extend the writ of the Afghan central government into the troubled north and eastern parts of their region.

    More importantly, from the point of view of their allies, they have steadfastly refused to take much part in the actual fighting in other regions, and by 'they' I mean their political leadership. The fact that Germany is the only first-rate military in NATO to refuse even marginal support in these areas is what annoys people - and their touch of smugness when pointing out their success in the north doesn't help. NATO is short of everything in the south - infantry, MPs, helicopters, recon, SF, etc. Germany could do more.

    Working in ISAF, I also noted that many of the German officers I served with were personally and professionally embarrassed by their country's policies - though they acknowledged that there simply is not the political will in the country to expand Germany's role.

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    Default Eden's comment about German policy makers

    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    Working in ISAF, I also noted that many of the German officers I served with were personally and professionally embarrassed by their country's policies - though they acknowledged that there simply is not the political will in the country to expand Germany's role.
    Eden's point about the German policy makers is especially poignant in light of GEN McCaffery’s comments about NATO efficiencies. I had the same experience with several German officers. There is a sense among folks who make it back to bases at Bagram and Kandahar only periodically that the heavy lifting in Afghanistan is being done by fewer and fewer nations rather than more each year.

    I can’t account for every national contribution, as most of my work with other militaries was with Polish, Canadian, British and Australians. I will tell you that you can see almost every type of national uniform under the sun in the Kandahar dining facilities. Not as many uniforms make it off the base. Don’t get me wrong, I know there are people from many countries hanging it out there on a regular basis, and many of the contributions that take place on the “safe” bases are absolutely essential. However, there is clearly more of a burden that can be shared by capable military elements.

    I do wonder whether some nations' policy makers are still in the wait and see mode. They can still claim to be contributing without risking casualties by keeping small numbers in relatively safe missions. Some of our politicians here in the US are in the same stance.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    The Germans ...

    More importantly, from the point of view of their allies, they have steadfastly refused to take much part in the actual fighting in other regions, and by 'they' I mean their political leadership. ...
    And that's where you err.

    I discussed it at some length in another thread in this forum.

    A stable and significant majority of the Germans (about 55-65%) wants to end the whole German military mission in Afghanistan.

    The only reason why this didn't happen yet is likely because the two largest of our five parties are governing Germany together and since they usually compete for the same few per cent Germans to decide which one has the next Chancellor, there's no punishment by vote possible for this policy as long as both do the same.
    (Actually, there is - the SPD is losing terribly to "Die Linke", one of the three opposition parties. But that's related to domestic economic & social issues.)

    In short:
    The present military mission is the maximum possible.
    It's already straining our democracy.
    Try for more and the support for the mission breaks altogether, reducing the German troop count in Afghanistan to zero.
    That's likely to happen in about two to three years (after next elections) anyway.

    I didn't see any polls about it, but I would guess that Afghanistan civil war is probably barely in top 30 of the hottest German political topics for the citizens. We simply don't feel threatened by whatever some guys with AKs do at the end of the world.

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    Default I have always

    been a bit mystified by our support of Pakistan over India prior to 9/11. Why do we chose to support a very unstable fundamentalist nation and see this as being in our best interest? I know India is hardy our twin politically and culturally, but they seem to be far more compatible than Pakististan has ever been. I do realize that current world situation requires us to try and work well with Pakistan.
    Reed
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-15-2008 at 09:22 AM. Reason: spelling

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