Why Have We Not Been Attacked Again? Competing and Complementary Hypotheses

[Bill Moore]

There are multiple terrorist groups affliliated with AQ, and while they share some common beliefs they still have their individual interests (motivations) and capabilities. It is fruitless to attempt to explain why another attack has not succeeded since 9/11 against the homeland, since there are countless variables involved, but I agree with David's post that various groups have attempted attacks since 9/11 that have been have been successfully pre-empted. Unfortunately good news apparently isn't news. Furthermore, if I recall my recent history correctly the purpose of the 9/11 attack was to draw us into a conflict in Afghanistan where AQ thought they could teach us a lesson. Osama was reportedly quoted as stating that he was surprised at the extent of the U.S.'s response and when he thought he was going to get killed apologized to his men. Who knows, it was media reporting, so take it for what is worth, but if the purpose of 9/11 was to drag us into the Middle East and South Asia they suceeded, but I don't think it is turning out the way that they anticipated. Another major attack on the homeland would not only provoke a firmer reponse (regardless of who gets elected), but further alienate the moderate Muslim world, which they were attempting to mobilize to support their bankrupt radical cause. AQ and the other extremists are clearly losing, it will take time, there will be set backs, but it is impossible (in my opinion) for them to win. We have seen the radicals surface in the past and they always end up defeating themselves.

[davidbfpo]

Many, maybe all here, know that AQ and it's allies seek to drive the "mainstream" (a far better term than moderate IMO) Muslim communities towards their view, or neutrality.

As a Muslim friend told me early this year, the extremists do not hate you, you are the kufr etc. The people they really hate are those Muslims who vocally oppose them (I'd add those who do not get paid by the state).

Here in the UK terror attacks have several objectives in very simple terms: cause loss of life, create fear and divide the community.

After the London and Glasgow "Doctors Plot" there was an upsurge in attacks on Muslims and those thought to be Muslims.

In Birmingham, with the plot to kidnap and behead a Muslim British soldier, pre-empted by police action, there was cause for concern at the impact of such a plot on community relations. In 1974 after the once infamous Birmingham pub bombings there was an upsurge in attacks on the Irish community; anecdote suggests my use of upsurge is being polite.

Could the reaction of the "mainstream" Muslim communities, let alone the vast majority of non-Muslims, have impacted AQ etc in their attack planning? Would another 9/11 exact too high a price? I suspect AQ has not heeded this, the communities can and have done (other threads have touched upon this).

COIN which pre-occupies most here I suspect is not the same as counter-terrorism or preventing violent extremism. We can still learn from each other and take in lessons from outside our normal vision.

davidbfpo

[Bill Moore]

David, I concur COIN isn't the end all be all for the global violent extremists, but COIN obviously applies applies where insurgencies exist. Since this is the Small Wars journal, mostly visited by military types (fortunately we have other participants who make significant contributions), and the discussion is largely focused on the wealth of historical data on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

As for pure terrorist movements (versus insurgents who use terrorism as a tactic) the information is much more limited, and on the homefront it is primarily an intelligence and law enforcement problem set.

The direct threat to to countries such as England, France, Italy, Neatherlands, and the U.S. to a lesser extent is pure terrorism (for this discussion I'll limit it to Muslim violent extremists). Law Enforcement/Special Operations/Intelligence operations, etc. currently provides a mechanism for pre-empting and disrupting most attacks, but they are not decisive in defeating the extremist movement. If they are skilled and lucky enough they may be able to destroy entire cells and organizations, but the movement can still exist and eventually sprout new extremists willing to blow up a bus or worse. I think the Brits and the French have more historical experience than most in dealing with this problem, though I question their effectiveness, which is telling since both have extremely capable intelligence and law enforcement organizations.

I think it is a topic we need to discuss in this council in much greater depth.

[davidbfpo]

Drawing on Bill's last note and excluding France - which I know little about - where do we start on the "Home Front"?

In the UK, particularly drawing upon the Northern Ireland experience, counter-terrorism has focussed on pursuing the plotters, or violent extremists; other strands in the national CT strategy called Op Contest: Prepare, Prevent and Protect have had less immediate impact.

Containing violence by law enforcement and intelligence gathering - which eventually we got right in Northern Ireland - enabled political compromise via lengthy negoitations. Successful AQ / extremist attacks if kept to the minimum have been likened to being short and painful, not war.

Oddly the Prevent strand - which effectively seeks mobilisation against violent extremists - has yet to get far beyond rhetoric and funding the "usual suspects".

Incidentally a fifth 'P' is added by some; not to Provoke. I am sure the Muslim communities are the normal, primary consideration; let us not overlook the majority non-Muslim population.

A small start.

davidbfpo

[Ron Humphrey]

Drawing on Bill's last note and excluding France - which I know little about - where do we start on the "Home Front"?

In the UK, particularly drawing upon the Northern Ireland experience, counter-terrorism has focussed on pursuing the plotters, or violent extremists; other strands in the national CT strategy called Op Contest: Prepare, Prevent and Protect have had less immediate impact.

Containing violence by law enforcement and intelligence gathering - which eventually we got right in Northern Ireland - enabled political compromise via lengthy negoitations. Successful AQ / extremist attacks if kept to the minimum have been likened to being short and painful, not war.

Oddly the Prevent strand - which effectively seeks mobilisation against violent extremists - has yet to get far beyond rhetoric and funding the "usual suspects".

Incidentally a fifth 'P' is added by some; not to Provoke. I am sure the Muslim communities are the normal, primary consideration; let us not overlook the majority non-Muslim population.

A small start.

davidbfpo

I would suggest that we consider that any given subset of society has ways within which it deals with its own(per se) to directly approach Terrorism's roots with a solution in search of a problem might be a big tendency we must over come before really getting into the meat of the prevention.

In relation to the P I would posit in order to believe that one is proactively seeking to avoid provocation then one must have already decided that that provacation does indeed exist. This would in some ways seem like giving up the war before the battle is even begun.

[davidbfpo]

For some data and so history check: http://counterterrorismblog.org/ which today has a long article No Attack in the US Since 9-11? By Madeleine Gruen & Frank Hyland. Which ends with a suggestion mre analysis to come.

davidbfpo

[selil]

As a "victim" the touchstone of 9/11 is hugely important. As the aggressor 9/11 is a complete operation and the next "big" operation is being planned and 9/11 is ignored. As such in the plans of Al Queda 9/11 has little to no relevance other than a "lessons learned".

Even then 9/11 for Al Queda was only about 75 percent successful. One of the four planes did not hit it's intended target. As such the relevance is how to be more successful in the future. So far as a domestic entity Al Queda has succeeded with a truck bomb and a jet liner.

I would propose that the time delay to the next big successful attack is partially caused by looking for a new vector to to create fear and terror. That is why we haven't been attacked yet.