David, I concur COIN isn't the end all be all for the global violent extremists, but COIN obviously applies applies where insurgencies exist. Since this is the Small Wars journal, mostly visited by military types (fortunately we have other participants who make significant contributions), and the discussion is largely focused on the wealth of historical data on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

As for pure terrorist movements (versus insurgents who use terrorism as a tactic) the information is much more limited, and on the homefront it is primarily an intelligence and law enforcement problem set.

The direct threat to to countries such as England, France, Italy, Neatherlands, and the U.S. to a lesser extent is pure terrorism (for this discussion I'll limit it to Muslim violent extremists). Law Enforcement/Special Operations/Intelligence operations, etc. currently provides a mechanism for pre-empting and disrupting most attacks, but they are not decisive in defeating the extremist movement. If they are skilled and lucky enough they may be able to destroy entire cells and organizations, but the movement can still exist and eventually sprout new extremists willing to blow up a bus or worse. I think the Brits and the French have more historical experience than most in dealing with this problem, though I question their effectiveness, which is telling since both have extremely capable intelligence and law enforcement organizations.

I think it is a topic we need to discuss in this council in much greater depth.