How long does it take to train an Army?

[Steve Blair]

I suggest that the answer is not one or the other. If the US Army can't train a clan, region, tribe, or sect, then the methods need to be found to enable them to do so. Just because their belief system does not correlate with western values does not mean that are incapable of generating effective combat power if well trained and led.

Concur. Folks seem to forget that we did have a fair amount of success training Montagnard elements in Vietnam once we focused on basic skills. If Americans have a failing (and it's not genetic...it's more cultural) it's trying to do too much too soon. You can even find examples of this historically within our own training efforts (the Civil War springs to mind).

I'd also argue that we were successful in training activities in Central America during the 1920s. Granted, we were propping up some questionable regimes, but the training seemed to work well enough.

[reed11b]

I would suggest using experienced US (or NATO, UN etc.) personnel embedded in an oversight role, such as the equivalents of IG or internal affairs to help vet out some of the "tribal" bias and to foster an environment of loyalty to the organization.
Reed

[Old Eagle]

It's about developing the security environment, which includes developing all of the necessary security forces and the institutional/enterprise infrastructure. Without appropriate reforms throughout the security structure, training and equipping mean nothing.

I would also note that leaving behind a bunch of trained and armed militias in places like Afghanistan isn't the best idea I've heard. Flash back to 1992, and that's about what we did. The results were less than desireable.

On a positive note, South Korea was/is a success story in my book. 15 yr after the ceasefire, the ROK was able to secure its entire border with the exception of a narrow corridor in the 7ID/2ID sector, AND send two divisions to Vietnam! Now -- the rule of law/anti-corruption evolution took longer, but appears to be holding.

[Norfolk]

On a positive note, South Korea was/is a success story in my book. 15 yr after the ceasefire, the ROK was able to secure its entire border with the exception of a narrow corridor in the 7ID/2ID sector, AND send two divisions to Vietnam! Now -- the rule of law/anti-corruption evolution took longer, but appears to be holding.

Moreover, one of those two ROK Divs - the Capitol ("Tiger") Division - had the highest "kill-ratio" of any conventional Allied unit of the Vietnam War. The NVA and VC were scared to death of the ROK Corps, and deliberately went out of their way to avoid them. Certainly there were cultural frictions between the US and the ROK Army, but in the Korean case, culture also tended to help more so than hinder the Koreans' assimilation of US training and TTP's. Great example - even if my treatment of it wasn't exactly in line with Old Eagle's original thrust.

[Ron Humphrey]

I heard some interesting stories from the ROK about that

[Uboat509]

You're not trying to draw parallels between training the ROK army and the IA are you? Let's be honest. Not all foreign armies are equally trainable. Training Arab forces presents some very significant cultural obstacles that simply do not exist in Korea. I think that we are doing a decent job trainingthe IA/IP given what we have to work with (and around).

[Ken White]

On top of that little problem, all countries and their amenability to building a security environment also differ. Not least of the problems in that sphere is acceptability of western norms...

[jkm_101_fso]

You're not trying to draw parallels between training the ROK army and the IA are you? Let's be honest. Not all foreign armies are equally trainable. Training Arab forces presents some very significant cultural obstacles that simply do not exist in Korea. I think that we are doing a decent job trainingthe IA/IP given what we have to work with (and around).

Great point Uboat. I've never been stationed in Korea, but friends have told me the ROK was pretty squared away. Then again, they've been at it longer than the new IA. When I trained the IA, I had to remind myself daily what T.E. Lawrence said...

"Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is."

[William F. Owen]

Not all foreign armies are equally trainable. Training Arab forces presents some very significant cultural obstacles that simply do not exist in Korea.

I hear what you say and I partly of me agree with you. What I agree with is the "culture problem." What I have difficulty with is the idea that the "culture" is the problem.

It seems to me that bad or incapable militaries suffer from common and usually crippling belief sets. Arabs serving in the Israeli Army (Druzim, Bedouin etc) have generally all been through the Israeli School system and generally have belief sets that do not hinder their understanding or execution of military skills - but they are still live well within an "Arab Culture," with all the wailing music, bad Egyptian movies and goat recipes that entails. Generally they are excellent and even unusually aggressive soldiers.

As far as I can see the "crippling" beliefs are generally those associated with two areas. The first is self esteem, and social standing. The second is acceptance of empirical evidence and logic. Once you address those two issues in a way that says,

A.) "You are no better than anyone else. You are judged and advanced by words and deeds alone."
B.) "There is no other law than logic. G*d has no place in this."

...i think most of other problems go away, bezrat ha shem !