How long does it take to train an Army?

[Fuchs]

Ken; you don't see the point.

I don't care whether Germans can train quickly, Americans can train quickly or anybody could. Let's assume that to raise an Army as a foreigner up to regional standard (and no more is necessary) takes ten years in wartime (actually, I wonder why the other side is much quicker, but who cares as Western trainers are obviously not).

The implication is that every conflict that cannot be ended before such an indigenous army has been raised would last for at least a decade.

That's pretty much a guarantee for
- a high rate of failure due to a lack of time for political, strategic and economic reasons
and
- a high rate of conflicts with excessive costs that turn a victory into a Pyrrhic victory

That is important for
- the governments that trust such support
and
- the governments that think about ordering such support
and
- the citizens of both states

It's a very major issue, dwarfing such stuff like COIN manuals easily.

To tell everyone that it takes a lot of time and be satisfied with that is not satisfactory imho. That's like working for a Pyrrhic victory.



-----------------

Cultural drift? Come on. That's regional difference at most, not a cultural difference that would make one part militarily inferior.
North and South Vietnam were separated for less than 20 years when Saigon fell, Eastern Germany existed for 50 years and failed to create greater cultural differences than exist between North and South Germany.

Thank you for acknowledging the cultural difference between Bayern and Niedersachsen.

The cultural differences between Niedersachsen and Bayern are smaller than the cultural differences inside both states, even within their cities and even inside individual houses.


Your whole response activity was quite obviously so fierce because I dared to criticize the U.S. armed services. In this forum. Sacrilege!

It's quite funny; the harshest criticism of U.S.Armed forces is usually audible when no Americans who could jump into their 'sacrilege!' mode are close.
British, Canadians, Australians, French, Germans, Scandinavians - it's really easy to find experienced people who have very U.S.-incompatible views. They're just not frank enough to tell about it in an English-language forum.
Because it's quite pointless.

[Ken White]

Ken; you don't see the point.

I don't care whether Germans can train quickly, Americans can train quickly or anybody could. Let's assume that to raise an Army as a foreigner up to regional standard (and no more is necessary) takes ten years in wartime (actually, I wonder why the other side is much quicker, but who cares as Western trainers are obviously not).

That depends on many factors, not least the standard to which is aspired.

The implication is that every conflict that cannot be ended before such an indigenous army has been raised would last for at least a decade.

Totally wrong on several levels. Depends on the individual situation. An indigenous army may be in existence or one may not be necessary. Tweaking the basically good Army that the British left behind in all their former colonies would be a very short term effort; those of the French would take slightly longer; those with no such background (again, Korea, Afghanistan and Iraq) would take considerably longer. Yes, I know Iraq was British trained and had an Army -- but some US idiot disbanded it so it had to start from scratch...

That's pretty much a guarantee for - a high rate of failure due to a lack of time for political, strategic and economic reasons...

Again, very much situation dependent

and- a high rate of conflicts with excessive costs that turn a victory into a Pyrrhic victory

Far from a given. Costs are relative (and we throw money away, it's an American thing...).

That is important for
- the governments that trust such support and - the governments that think about ordering such support and - the citizens of both states.

I suspect it's far less important than you seem to think it is.

To tell everyone that it takes a lot of time and be satisfied with that is not satisfactory imho. That's like working for a Pyrrhic victory.

I didn't do that -- I did say the two current examples would take that much time due to several factors; I also pointed out that training the support folks (and getting the system operating) and the senior leaders can take up to 20 years in peacetime and that would be true more places than not.

It's not a question of being satisfied, it is simply a question of what's achievable and realistic. As I pointed out, unrealistic expectations can be far more detrimental than more time than some impatient people would prefer. Politicians always want a quick and relatively painless fix; those are rare. As the old saw says, "You can have it quick, good and / or cheap; pick any two, you can never have all three."

Rush the training and standup and the end result will be failure. Some countries are okay with that; we generally are not.

Your whole response activity was quite obviously so fierce because I dared to criticize the U.S. armed services. In this forum. Sacrilege!

Not at all. Totally incorrect. First, trust me; that wasn't fierce or even very pointed. I was chuckling the whole time I was typing (still am) because you're funny. My response was slightly pointed because as I told jmm above, your gratuitous and totally unnecessary comment:

""I've observed discussions about this where people refrained about an oh-so-good U.S.-trained Georgian brigade. Well, maybe we should create a thread to identify the armies that were trained by the U.S. military and didn't afterward suck asap?I've got difficulties to remember any.""

was pointless except to make a supercilious and apparently uninformed comment based on your opinions designed to invite controversy. That may seem sensible to you, it does not to me. It is off thread, not germane and adds nothing to the topic being discussed; it is a casual tossed insult which calls your motives into question. You do that frequently. You may have noticed that many here do not respond to your digs; that's because they have work to do and don't give those things -- the digs, you're capable of excellent comment when you avoid the stupidity -- much credence. I OTOH respond to many of your little jibes; I do that because I'm retired and have time to waste and tilt at windmills I have, I'm sure, heard and seen far more serious slams against the US over the years than your little digs, so no sacrilege; just unnecessary, to little avail and of quite minor import.

It's quite funny; the harshest criticism of U.S.Armed forces is usually audible when no Americans who could jump into their 'sacrilege!' mode are close. British, Canadians, Australians, French, Germans, Scandinavians - it's really easy to find experienced people who have very U.S.-incompatible views. They're just not frank enough to tell about it in an English-language forum. Because it's quite pointless.

Yes, it is pointless (which, pun intended, was my point) -- and most of those you cite don't have a clue why it's pointless. I've heard and seen a lot of it for a great many years. I'd also suggest some, a few, don't do that in an English language forum because they're polite.

Let me tell you, though, why it's pointless. Generally, the understanding of what they're criticizing is superficial or ill-informed (as was your comment I quoted here and a few others over the past weeks) and -- this is important -- we don't really care what you think but are willing to mention some things you might not have thought of. We can be polite also.

Let me remind you that I said and meant that you are capable of very intelligent comment and you are a valuable contributor; yet, when you slide into egregious anti-American jibes just so you can say you did, you effectively lower the worth of your sensible efforts. Pity, that.

[RTK]

Interesting points, Fuchs, especially since I trained 4 more of your lieutenants just last week.

But then again, your Army has been fighting for an opportunity to hold our jock strap for quite a while.

I can snipe too.

[William F. Owen]

You have to have an idea first. Training is the easy bit.

The things that screw up and prevent good training and pretty easy to identify, with national culture and religion being the top of the ladder. And the top spot is probably cognitive dissonance, and traditional male culture - "Willy waving" as my wife calls it - Some "waving" is required, but it should not be the desired end state.

For anyone really interested in case study, the Palmach pretty much ticks all the boxes. The South Koreans are also worth a look.

[Ken White]

You have to have an idea first. Training is the easy bit.

I'd add not only do you have to have the idea, the nation / army / people to be trained have to accept and buy into that idea -- totally. If they do not, there will be passive resistance that can take a long time and much effort to overcome.

The things that screw up and prevent good training and pretty easy to identify, with national culture and religion being the top of the ladder. And the top spot is probably cognitive dissonance, and traditional male culture - "Willy waving" as my wife calls it - Some "waving" is required, but it should not be the desired end state.

Too true. A good example is the Iranian Army -- and the Air force. They, as opposed to the Pasdaran / IRGC were well trained, fairly disciplined and quite effective forces during the Iran/Iraq War. Khomeini had to let some of the Shah's General out of jail to prevent a disaster (as my Son reminded me last night in phone conversation about another matter).

The US Training of the Iranian Army started in WW II; it effectively took off as a real development and training mission in the late 40s. By the time I arrived there in 1969, the Army was basically operationally and tactically competent, however, the logistic and maintenance elements were still only marginal. The few remaining op / tactical problems and all the log problems were cultural (and educational, a subset of culture). While there was some effort to appoint people on the basis of merit, the class level and who one knew or was related to had far too much impact and degraded capability and even affected operations. I recall one Bde level exercise where an attack got delayed for three hours while the "honor" of which Battalion would lead was sorted out -- and social parameters of the three Bn Cdrs became the determinant, not location or capability.

An additional and very significant impactor throughout the ME (and South Asia) is that the intrinsic politeness requires that subordinates tell seniors what they want to hear, not the truth of the situation -- thus, wrong impressions led and lead to bad tactical decisions. It takes years to break that habit (if, indeed, it can be done at all).

The South Koreans are also worth a look.

True, they're good and it took them almost fifteen years to break the class and face saving habits to become effective. Those habits weren't necessarily bad or wrong but they were and are different and they do impact military performance.

A part of the problem with training of the ROK Army was that, of necessity, early training focused solely on defense, there was no offensive training as the concentration on the immediate need. Same thing occurred with the Georgians lately; all the training effort was aimed at preparing just three (out of twelve or so) Battalion combat teams for service in the COIN role; no offense / defense -- and no higher formation training at all; no log training to speak of. It is one thing to train people quickly to integrate into a functioning Army, a whole different game to grow that Army from scratch -- and the culture and willy waving (or its local equivalent) are the big problems.

The Palmach is indeed an excellent example -- and it was mostly done internally with little exterior help (unless you count Orde Wingate ).

[Fuchs]

Maybe in some cases you don't really need to train an army because a militia is all that you need?

The Afghan government can be considered as one of several powers/civil war parties in the country. Why does it need a real army if terrain has been controlled effectively by more militia-like forces in AFG in the past?

Why does nation-building need to build a Western-like nation, why not just build a region-typical nation that works?

A perfect solution can prevent a timely good solution sometimes.


I'm actually surprised that you think that a military culture can be changed in 15 years. At least in the case of present old officer/NCO corps I'd expect a generation (30 years).
But breaking old patterns and re-building to a new products isn't necessarily what I understand as advisable form of army buildup in times of war. There's probably no time for that, as the war might be lost before the training is done.
Who cares whether a unit discusses something irrelevant for three hours if its opponents aren't better?

[Ken White]

Maybe in some cases you don't really need to train an army because a militia is all that you need?

Of course -- however, real and perceived need can differ. Most Nations tend to want an Army. In every nation discussed in this thread, the real and perceived need coincided.

The Afghan government can be considered as one of several powers/civil war parties in the country. Why does it need a real army if terrain has been controlled effectively by more militia-like forces in AFG in the past?

You'd have to ask the Afghans themselves, not me. I rather suspect their answer would have something to do with British incursions (they have long memories) where the tribes were effective, the invasion by the USSR where they were also effective but took to long and too much damage was incurred and their concern for both Russian and Pakistani intentions added to the capability of modern weapons...

Why does nation-building need to build a Western-like nation, why not just build a region-typical nation that works?

I suspect the answer to that question is that everyone is not a Fuchs and they may have ideas that differ from yours. Fair rhetorical question but there is no answer.

A perfect solution can prevent a timely good solution sometimes.

Frequently. Yet another human foible.

I'm actually surprised that you think that a military culture can be changed in 15 years...

I don't. You did but now apparently don't. Here's what I said up thread:

""An army formed from virtually nothing (Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq) is not going to be effective for at least a decade. Your time frame for the training of riflemen and junior leaders is correct for western nations -- those times need to be doubled for non-westerners for a variety of reasons; to train the all important logisticians and senior leaders takes at least a decade and usually longer. That, BTW, is with a war -- in peacetime it typically takes 20 to 30 years.""

You then disagreed saying:

... A quarter century after the training started. Not impressive

Yet today you say:

At least in the case of present old officer/NCO corps I'd expect a generation (30 years).

You are priceless. As Schmedlap pointed out, you have a tendency to make an argument; have it countered and then you return and try to turn that counter argument back on the person who made the point in the first place. You really ought to look at that. Anyhow, on this topic, you need to make up your mind; is 25 years bad or is it possible, even necessary to do it in less time; you also earlier said:

The U.S. forces have failed to train foreign armies properly in time spans that were longer than the American Civil War or the First World War. That's outright failure. Such training missions should be expected to train foreign troops in a year up to junior NCO and in two years up to medium-rank officers. That's the speed of training demonstrated by national armies after mobilization.

And this:

Ten years might be OK in peacetime, but it's not OK in wartime.

If you can show me how wartime will significantly change a culture, we can agree -- until then, it looks like you're trying to have it both ways and are just arguing for the sake of arguing...

You go on today to say:

But breaking old patterns and re-building to a new products isn't necessarily what I understand as advisable form of army buildup in times of war. There's probably no time for that, as the war might be lost before the training is done.

That is true, no question -- so one does what one has to as one understands the need at the time (and the real need may nor be clear until the benefit of hindsight is attained). You also said earlier:

A track record of inability to train a new foreign army to region-typical combat effectiveness in less than four years needs to have an impact on nation-building related foreign policy planning.

I disagree that it's a track record thing; it is -- as you now seem to acknowledge -- a systemic and cultural problem.

However, I do agree that, knowing that, different policy options should be explored. That, however, is a quite different topic and thread.

Lastly:

Who cares whether a unit discusses something irrelevant for three hours if its opponents aren't better?

Probably no one; then again, if they are even a little better, that's a different thing, isn't it...

[William F. Owen]

The Palmach is indeed an excellent example -- and it was mostly done internally with little exterior help (unless you count Orde Wingate ).

Though Palmach was originally British trained they soon worked out a lot of minor tactics stuff didn't work, and that all methods had to be adapted to their terrain and mostly importantly their culture. - so first to go was the British class system. Formed in 1941, by 1948 they end up fighting at the Theatre level on 3 fronts, out numbered, and winning - using purely Israeli doctrine. Contrast that with the fiasco of 2006!

Orde was a bit of an extreme character, a cousin of T.E. Lawrence, and a far more skilled soldier. There is a new and excellent Biography coming out by Simon Anglim, of which I have read a draft.