Assessment of Effects Based Operations

TT · 08-17-2008

davidfpo,

The Effects Based Approach reportedly appears to have disappeared in in Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, British Defence Doctrine (3rd Edition), dated Aug 2008. EBA used to be found in Chapter Five and in this edition there is now no mention of the term in that chapter. Don’t have a copy I can post, but if you are interested, check The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, MoD (hmm, I just checked and cannot see the new edition

). So not sure whether the change is in a 'draft' or in an official version (DCDC does publish drafts).

Not sure yet what this absence means, beyond an apparent excising of the EBO/EBA terminology, for the British are (have been?) committed, last I heard to the Comprehensive Approach (another term for EBA) - as is NATO. EBA always made more sense to me, but as Cavguy says, and unfortunately I believe rightly so, the 'systems approach' types have not gone away.

Cheers

TT

**William F. Owen** · 08-17-2008

Originally Posted by TT

Not sure yet what this absence means, beyond an apparent excising of the EBO/EBA terminology, for the British are (have been?) committed, last I heard to the Comprehensive Approach (another term for EBA) - as is NATO. EBA always made more sense to me, but as Cavguy says, and unfortunately I believe rightly so, the 'systems approach' types have not gone away.

Yes the CA is still here and is EBA. It is also substantially faulty and a mis-reading of the military instrument. EBA is also in the last copy ADP Land Ops that I have. It's about to have another "whizz bang" concept bolted on to it, which I am currently researching.

I have it on very good authority, that the current FM-3, though "rejecting" EBO has a lot of Systemic Operational Design, which based on what I have read recently is about as useful as a chocolate tea pot, and a rehash of the old estimate process. To quote from Fig 6, in the work I have been looking at -
"Learning porblemization" - if it's not correct English then best not to use it.

**Bill Moore** · 08-17-2008

When I first heard of EBO, I admit I had high hopes for it, that was until I was actually trained in it, and saw the seriously flawed concepts of SoSA, ONA, and worse, much worse, MOE and MOP. Then I noted every one assumed their actions (unilaterally) we're creating these magical effects. At first I thought it was intended to flatten the organization and harmonize the interagency actors by arming everyone with the objectives and the associated effects, thus if you didn't have guidance from higher, you knew what needed to be done on the ground. However, after studying it and watching it in practice in the real world and during exercises it is clear that GEN Mattis's memo is spot on in most aspects.

I was a small bit player in one of the most successful interagency and multinational operations in recent history and that was JTF Liberia in 2003. Fortunately, it didn't receive much press outside of Africa, so we had considerable freedom of movement. During this operation the multinational forces and interagency were successfully harmonized with clear objectives that resulted in orders with clear cut task(s)/purpose(s). In this case leadership was decisive (both State Department and Military). I think we would have failed miserbly if we used EBO doctrine.

Unfortunately, this EBO like process has manifested itself in other ways, where U.S. forces inappropriately apply a CARVER matrix to terrorist and insurgent organizations, which resulted in the failed network approach where one attempts to destroy an insurgency by killing or capturing its so called key nodes (important individuals). In limited cases this method will work, and most cases it is a key supporting role, but not at the expense of failing to protect the population. What worked in Iraq was large scale population control measures that the surge enabled, where the focus was protecting the populace. I'm confident history will show that the much bragged about approach "it's the network stupid" was actually a failure or at most a minor enabler. Like EBO this was based on faulty assumptions that an insurgency is a simple system or simple system of systems like an electric power grid. It isn't, and surgical actions won't when the fight anymore than surgical bombings. That brings me to the key question, is EBO entirely flawed or is our practice (based on faulty assumptions) of it flawed? I think the answer is both, and if we focused on the objective of defeating the insurgency, vice all the sub effects, we would have realized from day one we needed more forces (Iraqi or otherwise) to get control initially.

Prior to EBO, I think the most damaging concept to our military was the force protection bureaucracy which was an off shoot of GEN Downey's investigation of the Khobar Towers incident. Force protection was always an inherit responsibility, and there were several anti-terrorism courses long before force protection level I thru IV training. This resulted in an another cottage industry of contractors, wasted military manpower and in too many cases operational paralysis. Force protection is important, it has always been our second priority, which in order are the mission, the men, then yourself. Prior to 9/11 we let force protection (the men) trump accomplishing the mission as a priority. I would like to see GEN Mattis tackle this one, and while he is at it take a hard look at Information Operations. I'm not anti-IO, but it would be helpful for all to see some clarity here also.

EBO is not the only practice in our military that lacks common sense.

**William F. Owen** · 08-17-2008

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

That brings me to the key question, is EBO entirely flawed or is our practice (based on faulty assumptions) of it flawed? I think the answer is both,

I am convinced EBO gained as much ground as it did, because officers saw huge personal gain in it's advocacy, rather than in it's understanding. EBO is flawed. It assumes you have knowledge and insights, that rarely and mostly never exist. It also assumes you can predict a second or even third order effect and that the effect you create is observable. I rarely if ever encountered an EBO advocate who did not admit this - but was usually just prepared to ignore this fundamental.

I am convinced that at the root of all this stuff is some bizarre belief that there must be "a better way," and that this "better way" should involve less killing and destruction. The problem is that this idea (and it's been around a while) is never argued in a way that considers how difficult complex ideas (SOD?) are made to work when action is opposed.

and while he is at it take a hard look at Information Operations. I'm not anti-IO, but it would be helpful for all to see some clarity here also.

I am an IO-sceptic purely because there is little if any clarity that I can see. The only valid explanation I have ever seen came from Tom Odom, when he told me it was matching the message with the action.

**Spud** · 08-17-2008

Like all of these things I think a simple concept got overly ‘technologified’ by people with far too much time on their hands ... IO in many regards is exactly the same.

To me EBO started simple for simple audiences … a process/terminology used at whole-of-Government level to let the military be the military and the politicians be the politicians and the other departments do what they needed to do in support of national needs. We (the military) could simply ask Government what end state they wanted and what effects they wanted to achieve and then we could go off and plan the military things to achieve it. We could also clearly identify those non-military things/elements that we needed for success. Really it was about letting the military plan to achieve the job with their complete arsenal of options rather than plan to meet the COA outlined by Government ... "We want to you to win (without defining it) without causing undue political pressure for us (without defining what that was) and you need to do it all within this arbitrary budget and with exactly 727 personnel.... oh by the way we want all of the services included and please make sure no one gets killed" I can really see the frustration that led us down this path ... "just tell us what you want done and let us go and do it" ... that's all EBO was really about.

It got caught up when a simple process for getting clear and coherent intent statement out of our political masters suddenly became something that influenced the operational art and played in tactics.

If we had left it up at the strategic (vice the military strategic) I think it would fly ... we'd end up with nice language that worked across Government and let everyone feel happy about things. Importantly the military then could do its normal planning (JOPES, JMAP whatever) and carry on. When you try to bring the language and theory down into the operational and tactical level it suddenly plays havoc with concepts of mission command and everything else.

Theorists, boffins and academics (ducking into my Stage 3 Fighting Pit here) have to accept a lot of responsibility for this ...

**William F. Owen** · 08-17-2008

Originally Posted by Spud

I can really see the frustration that led us down this path ... "just tell us what you want done and let us go and do it" ... that's all EBO was really about.

I beg to differ. EBO is "just tell us what you want the enemy to think and what you want the end state to look like as result, plus we want to risk very little, and use very little."

Theorists, boffins and academics (ducking into my Stage 3 Fighting Pit here) have to accept a lot of responsibility for this ...

Agreed, but the real problem was/is the soldiers who accepted the words and teachings of the theorists, boffins and academics, without holding them to rigour. Radical military thought is the slimming pill, hair restorative viagra, that few Officers can resist.

I submit, (from the same Stage 3 Fighting pit and digging to Stage 4) that the adherence to, and acceptance of certain modern schools of military thought is almost entirely emotional.

Would we even have heard of John Boyd if he had been a 35-year-old kaftan-wearing civilian woman academic called Joanna Boyd presenting the same ideas to the same audiences?