I wonder how much EBO as a process is driven by the USAF seeking to conceptualize how airpower can win wars by itself? The article I linked above says as much. The "thought leadership" of the concept seems to be centered at Maxwell in the 90's.
I wonder how much EBO as a process is driven by the USAF seeking to conceptualize how airpower can win wars by itself? The article I linked above says as much. The "thought leadership" of the concept seems to be centered at Maxwell in the 90's.
I suspect that this is a reasonable assumption. The AF is seriously tech-centric, and EBO is focused almost totally on technology. EBO can also be packaged as conflict on the cheap, which is something the AF has been pushing since the end of World War II. I'd also think that it channels a great deal of Warden's thinking.Originally Posted by Cavguy
Not saying that this was planned, but more a matter of like minds finding like theories and latching on.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
That might also help to explain
Why the focus is so often on the nodes vs the paths between them
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Because the AF is not especially "into" either close air support or interdiction, at least at the higher policy level. Also, the promise of hitting a node and knocking an opponent out of the conflict is far more attractive from a political standpoint than a prolonged interdiction campaign. One of the odd takeaways that some higher command types got from Vietnam was that interdiction (i.e. Rolling Thunder) failed whereas node strikes (Linebacker II) succeeded. Both these simplistic "conclusions" are flawed, but they did survive for some time and became enshrined in the "lessons learned" from that conflict.Why the focus is so often on the nodes vs the paths between them
The promise of war on the cheap is based on being able to hit a small number of targets with precision weapons and take out an opponent without ever having to commit ground forces (or at least a very small number of forces).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
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