Assessment of Effects Based Operations

[Bob's World]

I will concur fully that if the doctrine writers do to SOD what they did to COG theory, then burn it now and save us all. How one line of theory in "On War" turned into 8 pages of rigid process in the Joint Pub I'll never understand. Particularly, when for all of the rigidity of process, it is still so convaluted that if 20 staffs were asked to conduct COG analysis on the same problem they would come back with 20 different answers, with no way to validate any one of them.

I came up with my own model that is simple, validatable, and more importantly, produces product that is as useful for the squad leader as it is for the Corps Commander. Of course I was intelectually executed for failing to follow the doctrinal steps laid out in the Joint Pub... Can send the process and my GWOT product if anyone is intrested. Three simple slides. One for process, one for COIN, and one for CT. (or more accurately, one for FID to help the HN with COIN; and one to counter the external organizations that are conducting networked UW operations to influence the insurgency).

[Ken White]

...Three simple slides. One for process, one for COIN, and one for CT. (or more accurately, one for FID to help the HN with COIN; and one to counter the external organizations that are conducting networked UW operations to influence the insurgency).

I think most of us would be interested...

[Hacksaw]

Unless there is something proprietary... lets take a look

[Bob's World]

Not a problem. Due to the "thumb drive ban" this isn't something I can do over lunch. Will track down the trons and see about getting it up this weekend.

It really is a bit "CARVER" like in that it boils it down to "what projects should I do at the squad level to achieve my strategic COIN effects; and which Nodes should I target (or as important, not target) and which HVIs make those nodes function for the CT side, again to achieve the strategic effect. Whole idea is to achieve a focus and efficiency of effort. I don't have to worry so much about a elaborate EBO assessment on the back end if I did focused COG based planning on the front end.

I will say this though, this is theory. When I had an opportunity to operationalize at theater level, the intel community could not make the transition from "bad guy focus" to "environment focus." Since then the intel community has come to recognize that it needs to evolve, but they have a long ways to go.

[Tom Odom]

I will say this though, this is theory. When I had an opportunity to operationalize at theater level, the intel community could not make the transition from "bad guy focus" to "environment focus." Since then the intel community has come to recognize that it needs to evolve, but they have a long ways to go.

They are making progress. Look here if you have not seen it before:

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Collection Management in the Brigade Combat Team during COIN
Three Assumptions and Ten "A-Ha!" Moments on the Path to Battlefield Awareness
by Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Downey and Captain Zehra T. Guvendiren

And also send me the electrons as I can find use for them with CALL and JRTC.

Best

Tom

[Bob's World]

Ok, hopefully this uploaded properly...

[Bob's World]

Ok, I guess that posted ok.

This is just a wave tops presentation I threw together, so it may make more sense to me than to those seeing for the first time. Happy to elaborate.

I like the whole COG-CC-CR-CV construct, but the way everything derives from the CCs in the joint pub never made much sense to me. Also the lack of nesting and refining that comes from Drilling down within the same target set from CR down to CV down to HVT down to HVI that I use.

Key to this for use on the ground is interaction with the populace and solid assessment. What exactly is the failure of governance that is making this particular popualce support the insurgency? Using PMESII as your start point for CRs you may determine that in this region it is the lack of political voice and poor infrastructure. Breaking that down, you then determine CVs of corrupt elections and an exclusion of members of the religious group that dominates that region for "Politics"; and for "Infrastructure you determine that it is a lack of bridges and sewage systems that are the primary concern. Breaking this down further you identify several key positions that need to be put to a vote as soon as possible as HVTs, and facilitate an election that ensures candidates from the entire populace have a chance to run and that everyone has a chance to vote. Your HVTs for bridges may be 3 key bridges that connect the community to larger commerce and allow the children to get to a school that is not corrupt with insurgent ideology. You also secure funding, bring in a contractor and hire local help to tackle the sewage problem.

You get the idea. Focus. This type of engagement is not charity, nor is it bribery. It must be executed through and with the HN government. By understanding what is the most important to the populace you are trying to gain the support of, your efforts are likely to be more effective. Other projects are fine, but prioritize them accordingly. This tool also provides a means to sit down with State, NGOs, etc that are also there to help and allow you to influence their efforts to the same end.

Similar for CT. Instead of chasining faces on a deck of cards, you task your intel to determine what network functions are taking place in your AOR, and sorting out which ones are really critical to the insurgency, and of those which ones you can take down without negative side effects. Then figure out who the HVIs are that really make those nodes click, and remove them first. By being more surgical in your approach you are less likely to alienate the populace, and more likely to disrupt the network.

[Bob's World]

Oh, "CTAF" stand for "Counterterrorism Analytical Framework." I'm not sure if that is generally available. If not, I will post once I find the file. Nice tool for thinking about terrorist networks.

[Ken White]

Thanks, Bob

[Cavguy]

How would you differentiate from this?

The co-author works with me and this is taught in his sessions. I am not fully sold on the process (I think it is too cumbersome in the macro, but okay in the micro), but yours seems similar.

COIN COG analysis translates theory into practice from the bottom up, exposing insurgent lines
of operation (LOOs) and suggesting possible counters to them. rather than thrusting objectives from the top down that may or may not apply to a given situation, it balances counterinsurgent efforts and provides metrics. Links between COIN IPB and the root causes of a confict, and between COIN COG analysis and tactical actions, are analyzed to fgure out how to preempt
insurgent activity instead of merely reacting to it. the process approaches COiN from the dual perspective of the nature of the population and the nature of the insurgent, not from the perspective of the counterinsurgent.

PPT is here

[William F. Owen]

I will concur fully that if the doctrine writers do to SOD what they did to COG theory, then burn it now and save us all. How one line of theory in "On War" turned into 8 pages of rigid process in the Joint Pub I'll never understand. Particularly, when for all of the rigidity of process, it is still so convaluted that if 20 staffs were asked to conduct COG analysis on the same problem they would come back with 20 different answers, with no way to validate any one of them.

Concur 100%. By far the most sensible thing is to be sure of your own "Critical vulnerability" rather than looking for the enemies.

It does seem to me that US JP writing confuses "objectives" with "planning" when it comes the practical application of the process.

[Bob's World]

Ok, you tricked me into reading 79 slides of PowerPoint on a Saturday morning, so you got me there. In general, this is one of the better products I’ve seen. I’ll discuss some fine points that I think are important, but this guy is pretty close. The entire community was mentally hamstrung by national level COG analysis that insisted that “Ideology is the strategic COG,” and also by a rigid doctrinal approach to COG analysis. He has escaped both of those constraints, so kudos for that. Some points to consider:

Slide 15: Would enjoy discussing these three root causes. Completely agree that you must have a vulnerable population (dissatisfied might be more accurate). Can’t get on board with the rest though. “Lack of government control” really sticks in my craw. Sometimes too much governance can cause insurgency, and sometimes governance comes from informal tribal mechanisms that are not recognizable as “government” by our western eyes. I like to use “lack of good governance,” distinguishing that “good” is not the same as “effective.” Good is one the populace is satisfied with, regardless of form, effectiveness or degree of control.

Slide 34: “COI is to deny insurgents access to the population.” This is a common position. I prefer to take the position that “Government must regain support of the population.” Fact is that the insurgent IS part of the population and will be when the insurgency is over, possibly as part of the government as well. Goal is to address the failures of governance that sparked the insurgency, and bring the insurgent either to justice or back into the fold. This why it is key to distinguish groups and treat each based on their purpose. Do attempt to separate AQ waging UW from the populace, but this is addressed with the CT LOO.

Slide 37: His analysis is from the perspective of the insurgent. Why? The insurgent is just a symptom of the larger problem, and the COG is the populace. I say you must do your analysis from the perspective of the populace. Once you have earned the support of the populace no insurgency capable of seriously threatening the government can exist. But if you defeat the insurgent without doing this, a new one will replace the old. I believe this to be the crux of why most COIN operations are long affairs, and also the number one reason why civil leadership must remain in overall C2, to avoid the natural tendency to shift to defeating the insurgent.

Slide 48+: I really don’t think you need to do this detailed “friendly vs. Enemy” COG analysis, because at the end of the day you are out to render the insurgent irrelevant and must remain focused on assisting the HN to regain the support of their populace. I can see where an enemy perspective analysis could help a commander to be more predictive of what the insurgent might be focused on though. In general, these are good “paint by number” charts to help a staff gain a better sense of what is going on to get to a focused scheme of engagement that has not lost sight of the overall COG, and that is good.

Slide 68: OK, I am a traditionalist. All of this is FID if done in a foreign country to assist a HN with a COIN operation. It is COIN when done in one’s own nation. (SFA is a subset of FID as well).

Slide 72: I’d want this taped out on a big white board, and then update w/dry erase constantly. Don’t let the permanence of ink lock you in as the situation continues to flux.

[Ken White]

Bob's World's slides: Good, usable but not, as advertised, by Squad Leaders; I'd add not even by most Company Commanders most of the time or by few Battalions. Though I'll caveat that and give Bob a prop by noting that people differ; the analytical type will appreciate his idea, the intuitive folks will note it and say "Well, yeah, isn't that what everyone does?" (Acknowledging that everyone is not an intuitive commander or leader).

The Leavenworth PPT show: Generally agree with Bob's critique with particular, strong, effusive and total agreement with his comments on Slides 15, 34 and 37. I think his comments are VERY important for the process and for the thinking of he who would be a COIN / FID fighter. I'd also add that for Slide 37 it can be extremely difficult to insure that you have accurately determined the Insurgent's desired end state while determination of the goals of the bulk of the populace are far simpler and more sure. They are, after all, what it's really all about.

Also agree that Slide 48 + series is probably overkill for most other than the really analytically inclined. On Slide 68, don't think it makes much difference what you call it, people will juggle and jiggle terminology in any event and DoD / DA / TRADOC will change the vernacular in any event. On Slide 72, Bob's comment is valid but it leads to a far larger point in my mind:

That process is all very well. I'm surprised that CGSC needs presentations with that much elementary detail (acknowledging that the course has foreign and civilian students and I haven't attended) but the Slides do lay out an effective presentation and a functional methodology. My concern is that the process gets so far down in the weeds that it will take an inordinate amount of time for the initial assessment (time that may not always be available), will require constant updating (previous remark applies plus manpower requirement) and will become an end to itself to some (a cynic might say "too many..."). I think that means that it's overdone and therefor needs significant paring and simplification in order to be usable by the Bn or Bde Staff which is operating at 50% strength due to casualties and personnel shortfalls...

[Bob's World]

Ken, good comments. To clarify, concur that i don't see a squad sitting down to a cup of coffee and some COG analysis, but what I meant is that a BCT commander can do this for his AO, refining to one level; his BN CDRs taking that and further refining and tailoring for their AOs as well, with Company CDRs taking it even lower. Ultimately it is that Sqaud that goes out into the populace, gathering the knowledge and executing the engagement that makes this work.

I spoke to my Son's BN and BDE CDRs when he came back from his first tour to Iraq, and am convinced that they were executing a very savvy and sound mix of COIN and CT; but at the PFC level the soldiers didn't understand or appreciate what they were doing and more importantly why. A simple model that says, "look, treat the people like this, and here is why, and for the next few months these are going to be our priority efforts, and here is why, here is how it supports the big picture." You know the deal, the American soldier accomplishes remarkable things when he understands the purpose and desired endstate. It is the greatest strength of the American military, and we need to maximize it.

[Cavguy]

Ken, good comments. To clarify, concur that i don't see a squad sitting down to a cup of coffee and some COG analysis, but what I meant is that a BCT commander can do this for his AO, refining to one level; his BN CDRs taking that and further refining and tailoring for their AOs as well, with Company CDRs taking it even lower. Ultimately it is that Sqaud that goes out into the populace, gathering the knowledge and executing the engagement that makes this work.

I spoke to my Son's BN and BDE CDRs when he came back from his first tour to Iraq, and am convinced that they were executing a very savvy and sound mix of COIN and CT; but at the PFC level the soldiers didn't understand or appreciate what they were doing and more importantly why. A simple model that says, "look, treat the people like this, and here is why, and for the next few months these are going to be our priority efforts, and here is why, here is how it supports the big picture." You know the deal, the American soldier accomplishes remarkable things when he understands the purpose and desired endstate. It is the greatest strength of the American military, and we need to maximize it.

Bob,

FYSA the COG method on the PPT was taught at the COIN academy @ Taji from mid 2005- early 2006 and then removed. It is also covered in a few of our Leader Workshops @ the COIN center.

The presentation you viewed is probably V11 of the slides, it took that long to make it comprehensible! It also benefits from actually being instructed - it doesn't lend itself to PPT education alone unless (like you) you get the whole COG methodology.

My problem is that when I tried to apply LTC Ulrich's method to my old company sector as a test, it was far too large and required an immense amount of attention to update. It does focus RFI's and PIR's well, and aligns end-ways-means. I guess I advocate just doing the process on defined targets and not the entire environment. It also forces the commander to consider ECOA and second/third order effects.

BTW, it is called "Center of Influence" analysis because CoG irritated too many doctrine purists.

If you haven't seen it, check out LTC Ulrich's entire workshop @ COIN.ARMY.MIL in the knowledge center. It covers the IPB I-III and some other subjects as well.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Oh, "CTAF" stand for "Counterterrorism Analytical Framework." I'm not sure if that is generally available. If not, I will post once I find the file. Nice tool for thinking about terrorist networks.

Very useful graphics. You've given me some infights on what to brief in an upcoming OPD here in OIF. I see much related to yours & COL Mansoor's work that applies to the upcoming PH IV of this op.

Glad for the simplistic presentation you've exploited so that we may easily distinuish the levels at which your analysis applies.

[Bob's World]

I make house calls...

[slapout9]

Bob's W, neat paper but I offer of couple of comments based upon Colonel Warden's original concept on Systems Warfare.

1-You originally posted that you had to understand the systems purpose, that is absolutely critical before any COG analysis can take place at all.

2-You may not like this one. Whether or not a COG has a critical vulnerability has nothing to do with the strategic question of is it or isn't it a COG. Whether or not it is vulnerable is more a function of your organizations tactical capability, not the Strategic level analysis.

3-What Colonel Warden means when he says COG in Army terms is High Payoff Target Targets are chosen based upon their ability to accomplish your objective and the highest payoff from your expendature of energy.

EBO should have been changed to CBO (Change Based Operations), becuase that is what you are trying to do. You want to change a system from how it is now to what you want to be. And kinetic attacks may not be the best way to do that at all.

Here is a link form Colonel Warden's Blog to how the 5 rings were adapted to be used on understanding people in an organization. It is a civilian business application but it has good points for COIN I think. Also has a link to a paper AU on COG. They are better expressed as focus or focal points.

http://customerinnovations.wordpress...er-experience/

[BobKing]

Last week a note about this subject in the Air Force Magazine's Daily Report eNewsletter started a lively email discussion within our teaching department at the Army Command and General Staff College.

We had just stood up our new blog, Joint Chatter, the day before. So the discussion was moved there under the post Effects-Based Operations: Bastardization of Airpower?

[Ron Humphrey]

Last week a note about this subject in the Air Force Magazine's Daily Report eNewsletter started a lively email discussion within our teaching department at the Army Command and General Staff College.

We had just stood up our new blog, Joint Chatter, the day before. So the discussion was moved there under the post Effects-Based Operations: Bastardization of Airpower?

Pretty much seem to track with the discussions we had here a while back