... that there were operational and combat support issues that left room for improvement. First, a lack of satellite support left the troops in an information deficit. The main problem was noted as “the
lack of the requisite space grouping and GLONASS receivers.”26
Electronic warfare systems were not used to suppress Georgia’s air defense systems and there was an
absence of aircraft controllers. This caused armored columns to advance without the proper cover. Second, traditionally weak areas for the Russian army, such as
nighttime actions, reconnaissance, communications, and logistical support, remain weaknesses. Night sighting devices are blinded by gunfire flashes and
old tanks did not have global navigation systems or friend or foe systems. Third, it was rare to see vehicles
fitted with shields or additional armor and, as a result,
soldiers still prefer to ride on the outside of these vehicles where, if thrown off, they have a chance of surviving. There was poor interaction between tanks and motorized infantry units and, on occasion, units sometimes fired on one another. Fourth, there was a
shortage of modern precision weapons in the Russian air
force and virtually a
total lack of drones. Pchela drones used in Chechnya are
practically worn out. Finally, a 1998 decision to remove helicopters from the ground force has turned out to be a problem.
There are no experts in army air aviation in the air force that know how to support ground troops.
Recommendations by Tsyganok included creating information troops that take into account state and military media, modernizing forces by the end of 2015, reconstituting army aviation in the combined-arms armies and corps, and equipping aircraft and helicopter gunships with modern systems.
It is also necessary to put more satellites in orbit (24 are needed but only 13 are in orbit) and procure more GLONASS receivers, to develop friend or foe systems, and to develop new radar stations. Journalist Mikhail Lukanin wrote that insufficient use was made of ground attack and tactical aviation. Other errors on the part of Russia’s armed forces were a lack of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use,
inadequate organization of communications,
inadequate personal gear and equipment, and the absence of precision weapons.
On 19 August the Presidium of the Globalization Problems Institute talked about South Ossetia and the question of information. They concluded that the
Russian political and military leadership experienced indescribable panic and confusion when they realized Georgia was actually
invading South Ossetia. They also wrote that the
Russian military command acted with incompetence. Soldiers in many cases had no knowledge of how to counter Georgian guidance systems which were searching for Russian signals from radios and mobile telephones. They concluded that the main goal of the war was to draw the Russian army into military operations.
...
Deputies wanted to know why
all types of reconnaissance had failed, why there were serious organizational shortcomings, why there were such tangible losses in heavy equipment (helicopters, jet aircraft, etc.) against such a haphazard army, and why so
much equipment
broke down while the world was watching.
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