Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Military Commentary

[jmm99]

from Render
....Finnish tactics be somewhat predicated on a lack of available manpower (ie cannonfodder), a perennial shortage of ammunition and equipment, and an institutionalized national unwillingness to acquire new territory?

Assuming the sequence of policy > strategy > operations > tactics, the predicates you cite (Russian preponderence in manpower and equipment; and Finland's non-interventionism) go more to its national defense policy - defensive & counterpunching.

Counterpunching operations would depend on the path(s) of the Russian invasion: (1) coastal plain - Viipuri, Helsinki, Turku-Tampere, Vaasa, Oulu, Tornio (as in the successful 18th & 19th century Russian attacks); and/or (2) into Central Finland from Russian Karelia (not successful in Winter-Continuation War).

All of that would end up driving tactics, but those would depend on what personnel and equipment are still available; and the landscape (which in Central Finland is tough - except to Finns).

The MoD is tight-mouthed about scenarios; and Russia is not featured as the big, bad enemy.

The new White Paper, The Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, published in September 2004, guides national defence policy. The document is prepared cooperatively in different ministries and is approved by Parliament. The latest report focuses on Finland’s changing security environment and defines the line of action in the field of defence policy.

http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=61

But, why else have 64 F-18s - to attack Sweden ?

Finnish equipment is not bad, but it is not about to defeat Russia in an all out attack - see links in # 63 and

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_Defence_Forces

Georgian Defense Forces were not in the same order of magnitude as Finland's - assuming the latter can get mobilized before the Novgorodians cross the border.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Georgia

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What I make of the 2004 White Paper and associated documents - Phase I would be a conventional defense, hopefully killing as many of the enemy as possible before getting killed.

Phase II, not really stated in official documents, would be the Juho Paasikivi policy, as related in spring 1944 by John Scott, a Time-Life reporter:

Repeating to me what he had probably told Molotov - a description of what the result would be if Russia overran Finland. Paasikivi stood up, shook a bony finger in the air and said: "We will shoot from behind every stone and tree, we will go on shooting for 50 years. We are not Czechs. We are not Dutchmen. We will fight tooth and nail behind every rock and over the ice of every lake. I will not fight long. I am old, but others will fight."

The idea of this mutual suicide pact is to require Russia to answer the question: "Do we really want to do this ?" Uncle Joe Stalin answered "nyet".

Since Suomi is a homogeneous country, what it may or may not do has little relevance to Georgia. But, it will be interesting to see what effect Russia's Georgian adventure will have on upcoming Finnish defense budgets. Right now, quite a few euros are being spent on improved command, control and communication networks - all in the White Paper & associated documents.