Photos by 1 photographer, who moved with Russian troops.
http://lsd-25.ru/2008/08/14/voyna-v-...iya-babchenko/
Photos by 1 photographer, who moved with Russian troops.
http://lsd-25.ru/2008/08/14/voyna-v-...iya-babchenko/
Great link and photos, Kaur !
Not to sound ungrateful, but it seems all those burning tank shots are the same 4 or 5 in all the Russian press. Begs the question: Just how many Georgian tanks were "actually" destroyed by Russian armor?
On another note, looks like we're cleared to go there and help out, as long as we dress like civilians
Ilusat Päeva Sulle, Stan
If you want to blend in, take the bus
FPRI, 13 Aug 08: Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military Performance in Georgia
.....No doubt Russia’s military action in Georgia will prompt many countries to view Moscow in a sharper light, from the capitals of Europe to Beijing and Tokyo. However the world eventually interprets Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s civil conflict—whether as a “humanitarian effort” as Moscow portrays or as a “full scale invasion” as Tbilisi portrays—it does demonstrate the Russian military’s renewed ability to prosecute a relatively complex, high-intensity combined arms operation. Still, the evidently high state of readiness of such a broad array of Russian military units across all three services raises more questions about Moscow’s intentions and planning prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
IIRC, the Russians had moved elements nearer to Georgia back in June-early July as a counter to the biennial Immediate Response Exercise (US, Georgia, Armenia and others) that began 15 Jul and ended 28 Jul. There's a lot more we don't know, open source, than we do but based on what I've seen since they had probably instituted provocations or very at least tacitly encouraged Georgia to attack, I suspect the fine hand of the FSB and a long time -- a year or more -- contingency plan. Time will tell.
Such a plan likely included all the things cited in the linked article and quite probably entailed prep, rehearsals and moves well prior to May or June predicated on Russian plan execution at Endex of the JEX and the beginning of the Olympics. Add to that some of the comments above in this thread and I don't see any significant improvement in Russian performance -- other than use of the media -- and, importantly, Vlad's shrewdness and will, which should not be underestimated.
Who, of course, was out of town and on international TV at the time, thus having a perfect alibi -- and allowing Dmitry to appear to be the BBMFIC. He loves it when a plan comes together...
I agree more with this opinion.
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/assau...a-conflict.htmStill, for serious military analysts, the remarkable thing has been how little Russian performance has changed over the years (and decades, and even centuries). Overwhelming force—the sledgehammer blow—remains the Russian approach to warfare. Nothing wrong with that in theory—it’s essentially the Powell Doctrine (which the Bush administration ignored in Iraq, leading to a near-disaster). The problem is that the Russian military remains indiscriminate in its targeting and horribly sloppy in its execution. Their sledgehammers tend to hit everything in the general area.
OPFOR Battle Book ST-107 gives better overview.
Only outsider who who has entered Tshinvali.
http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=europe&c=georgi
Last edited by kaur; 08-14-2008 at 06:17 PM.
Was thinking along 'Charlie Wilson's War' today, wondering what could have blunted the Russians within the Georgian capability to employ.
The answer I came up with would have been Javelin Missiles. Fire and forget, will take out a T-80 (or an M1). Could have made life nasty in the armored columns.
Just a late night musing.
Cavguy, I was in Estonian military in the middle of 90-s. It was time when in the service was quite many officers who sereved in the Soviet army (in the rank of majors and up). During 1 exercise couple of those Soviet ones worked as advisers to young officers, who had finished Finnish military school. We were playing OPFOR column and moved to west. Half a day our units moved like snails under the instructions of Finnish military school graduates. In front of every possible ambush site recce was sent out. If cou calculate that recce on foot moves 1 km per hour, then it was slow going. Soviet school people got enought and instructed to "bomb" every possible amush site. Finnish ones opposed that there are farms etc. Soviet ones said "Just do it!". After first order, referees reported destroyed ambush. Finnish ones continued this pattern and columns were moving average 40 km per hour and we were showing middle finger to guys crawling out from the bushes. So much about ROE and possible Javelin sites.
Last edited by kaur; 08-15-2008 at 09:25 AM.
should end anyone's thoughts about how the Georgians should have defended their border (sealing the Roki Tunnel, etc.).
One wonders what old Uncle Joe (½ Geo., ½ Oss.) would think about all of this - as the Russians took his home town of Gori.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_StalinJoseph Stalin was born Ioseb Besarionis Dzhugashvili in Gori, Tiflis to Besarion Dzhugashvili, an Ossetian [8] cobbler who owned his own workshop, and Ketevan Geladze a Georgian who was born a serf.
[8] Simon Sebag Montefiore. Young Stalin. 2007. ISBN 978-0-297-85068-7 p19
Bookmarks