The Georgia War and the Century of “Real Power”

[Rank amateur]

Would someone please explain to me why simply because there exists the natural competition between powers that it must constantly translate into miltary action simply because there are militaries with which to act.

The game of Chicken, also known as the Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift[1] game, is an influential model of conflict for two players in game theory. The principle of the game is that while each player prefers not to yield to the other, the outcome where neither player yields is the worst possible one for both players. The name "Chicken" has its origins in a game in which two drivers drive towards each other on a collision course: one must swerve, or both may die in the crash, but if one driver swerves and the other does not, the one who swerved will be called a "chicken," meaning a coward; this terminology is most prevalent in the political science and economics. The name "Hawk-Dove" refers to a situation in which there is a competition for a shared resource and the contestants can choose either conciliation or conflict; this terminology is most commonly used in biology and evolutionary game theory. From a game-theoretic point of view, "Chicken" and "Hawk-Dove" are identical; the different names stem from parallel development of the basic principles in different research areas.[2] The game has also been used to describe the mutual assured destruction of nuclear warfare.[3]

More at link.

[Ron Humphrey]

More at link.

But as I think your actually pointing out this is not chicken as one player is not driving on the white line but rather trying to point out to the other that they are literally playing it by themselves. Only such circumstances as we see right now can really show whats its like to be the good guy, and bad guy, and proported mediator to both, and all to the very same populous.

All in all it seem slightly incredulous.

This need not be a "game" between peers as the entirety of its basis stands to be addressed equally as effectively through other methods rather than Brute force.

[AmericanPride]

Realpolitik really T's me off considering from what I've seen of it in the history I've read it almost never truly helps the common joe shmoe until after they've been dragged through the mud for long periods.

It may be extremely over idealistic but darnit until someone can show me even one example of how or why Russia is suffering from these small countries actually changing, other then in it's collective head(ohwoes me, remember the good old days) I still can't see what excuse they have for their current actions other than to bully their way with the world community.

This need not be a "game" between peers as the entirety of its basis stands to be addressed equally as effectively through other methods rather than Brute force.

The fundamental maxim of politics is that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. This is because the power to destroy something (or someone) is absolute power over it. And that power is zero sum and relative. If you have not read the Melian Dialogue, I recommend it. I think it's dangerous in politics to somehow suggest that its about anything other than power. "Brute force" is simply the oldest, (generally) most effective means of excercising power. So my reading of the Russian-Georgian conflict is this: whether or not the Russians actually suffered from some material threat is not as important as 1) Russia's perception of the threat and 2) the power to destroy that threat. I would suggest that the Russians are more capable of playing this game because their politicians/policymakers have a different set of domestic incentives (read: more power) than their American and European counterparts.

it's not gonna be much fun having to watch over ones shoulder day and night for fear that someone somewhere might figure out how to get around the restrictions and thus lessen their vulnerabilities to the pressure.

I would argue in contrast that states are inherently paranoid because they suffer from a general lack of certainty of others' intentions and capabilities. So there's more incentive in having power and working to keep it than to share it with others.

[Ron Humphrey]

AmericanPride,

While I recognize that in life is unfortunately not fair, nor necessarily just it still remains that there is no such thing as absolute power and thus any efforts to attain it are doomed to failure. In that context the idea of zero sum considerations in politics, social settings, and other arenas must be kept in context with what are now known to be realities rather than what may historically have been known as legends.

I would challenge you to point out one time anywhere in recorded history that any one power was able to conquer let alone control any more than a segment of the world at any given time. From what I've read there always were and always will be outside interests which not only exist but affect one's power.

Also consider that there might be a balance between use of force. The more heavily one uses their power the less restrictively outsiders would tend to be when dealing with you. Consider this one reason (Small wars) irregular warfare exist in such abundance throughout history.

I have not said (that I'm aware of) that Russia can't do whatever they choose when it comes to their overwhelming force capability over many of these smaller countries/regions. That however has never been the question, rather I question the wisdom of doing what their doing and the manner in which they've chosen to do it, over the long term. Will they actually achieve what they are/were seeking to or will it be something that in the end cost them even more in areas which hadn't been considered.

As we are only human we cannot predict the future, but when you remember old sayings like "Best laid plans of mice and men" or "if one thing is consistent in the world its change" it would seem that humanity has a really bad habit of thinking its in control of things when later they come to rediscover not quite so much

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 22 Aug 08: Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout

The Russia-Georgia conflict has transformed the contemporary geopolitical world, with large consequences for peace and security in Europe and beyond. Moscow’s initial moves into South Ossetia as large-scale violence broke out there on 7-8 August were in part a response to a disastrous miscalculation by a Georgian leadership that was impatient with gradual confidence building and a Russian-dominated negotiations process.

But Russia’s disproportionate counter-attack, with movement of large forces into Abkhazia and deep into Georgia, accompanied by the widespread destruction of economic infrastructure, damage to the economy and disruption of communications and movement between different regions of the country, constitutes a dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations. It has undermined regional stability and security; threatened energy corridors that are vital for Europe; made claims with respect to ethnic Russians and other minorities that could be used to destabilise other parts of the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine a potential target; and shown disregard for international law.

Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from the independence of Kosovo to the placement of missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the personality and world view of Russia’s predominant leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.....

[AmericanPride]

...there is no such thing as absolute power and thus any efforts to attain it are doomed to failure. In that context the idea of zero sum considerations in politics, social settings, and other arenas must be kept in context with what are now known to be realities rather than what may historically have been known as legends.

I would challenge you to point out one time anywhere in recorded history that any one power was able to conquer let alone control any more than a segment of the world at any given time. From what I've read there always were and always will be outside interests which not only exist but affect one's power.

True. Absolute power exists only in theory. But there certainly have been persons, factions, countries, etc which have approached it relative to their counterparts. Near the end of the Melian Dialogue, the Athenian delegation concedes that the Athenian Empire will not last forever:

When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm

The object, therefore, is simply to have as much power as possible for as long as possible.

rather I question the wisdom of doing what their doing and the manner in which they've chosen to do it, over the long term. Will they actually achieve what they are/were seeking to or will it be something that in the end cost them even more in areas which hadn't been considered.

I'm not sure what the Russians are seeking, so it's difficult to measure the wisdom of their current activities. But regardless of what they are seeking in fact, there's risk in every action and inaction. My personal opinion is that the Russians are acting upon particular domestic drivers, not international. There's nothing Russia can gain from Georgia, nor much it can achieve through attempted blackmail of the West. The handful of domestic drivers I think include historical Russian fear which generates a culture based on strength, the dominance of the state by the security-intelligence faction which is inherently paranoid by the nature of its work, and the combination of demographic and economic failures which keeps the general populace more or less dependent on the state for guidance and subsistence. The dominant faction imposes upon the nation through its institutions its view of the "national good" and the threats to that good.