and arrive at startlingly different conclusions on what was written...

1. I didn't see his adoption or espousal of "The 'theory' of Global insurgency is assumed as a significant fact." I did see him use the phrase on four occasions almost as a shorthand method of summing up the current -- important word, that -- Islamist trend. A phrase I'd note he picked up from a Dave Kilcullen article...

2. Seemed to me he was saying the glass was half empty (he's an Intel guy, after all ) and was suggesting that it would've been better had other types, locations and variations of insurgency been added to the historical mix. On that, I have to agree with him.

a. I agree with you.

b, I agree that it works.

3. Here we differ; I read it as suggesting that the faith can affect the insurgent, not that he or she was an insurgent due solely to Islamic issues.

I thought his conclusion summed up his intent:
"Well schooled students of military history recognize that the practice of a weaker enemy trying to defeat a stronger adversary through asymmetric means—the very heart of what an insurgency is attempting to do—did not begin with Britain’s experience in Malaya or even the French experience in the Spanish Campaign of 1808. With that in mind, why do we continue to limit our collective focus to a small set of historical examples whose relevance in today’s security environment is increasingly questionable?"
That, to me, simply says that history is indeed all we have -- but we ought not be unduly selective in our use of that history; we should try to be as all encompassing as possible. Put another way, alluding to two big well documented Type A efforts using many techniques that cannot be applied currently as paradigms while ignoring less well documented but perhaps more applicable Types B-E efforts is not advisable. Add to that his suggestion that we need to be more flexible in our approaches if we intend to succeed...

I have to agree with both points.