One good thing about OODA

[ericmwalters]

Reed11b:

I don't mind the nitpicking and we do this kind of stuff around here all the time--but I'd suggest we move it into another thread or do it via PM. It's hard enough keeping people on the OODA Loop subject (and I'm just as guilty--if not more guilty) for creating tangent after tangent...many of your issues/questions are ours as well. Some are things people are working (redesiging TACP/JTAC air request target "talk ons"), others (MARPAT and MTV) they're not (I'm still lamenting 5.56mm over 7.62mm myself). We can debate whether micro-UAVs really are cost-effective or not and do it for quite a long time. But the real issue is this--and I'm jumping ahead a good bit of where I'd hope to go (and how I hoped to get there) regarding the OODA Loop "utility" issue.

Before we had the OODA Loop, we might have been grappling with these kinds of issues, but the mental model wasn't there, wasn't widely understood and agreed upon, and certainly wasn't something that people tried to design equipment, processes, procedures, and techniques to. When we talk about saving time in these kinds of discussions, we move along relatively quickly because we use common terms, a common understanding, and be comfortable that we know what we're really talking about. Typical intelligence issue before Boyd Loop: Combat information vs. intelligence. Pick a process. How much of one? How much of the other? Now, we look at problems differently with the Boyd Cycle. Regarding the question of whether 'tis better for a particular process to be supported with combat information or with intelligence, we now mount our enquiries with a bit more saavy. How much "orientation" is needed with the information? Is it minimal? Are the "decisions" easy to make/relatively simple (e.g., shoot or don't shoot)? If the answer is that the supported OODA loop doesn't require much context/understanding supplied with the information to aid orientation and decsion, then combat information may be enough. But if a good bit of context is necessary or the intuitive answer will get you the WRONG answer--and thus you need a good bit of analysis to steer you the right way, despite what your tummy is telling you--then you need more intelligence, not so much combat information.

Hopefully this makes some degree of sense.

[Eden]

Before we had the OODA Loop, we might have been grappling with these kinds of issues, but the mental model wasn't there, wasn't widely understood and agreed upon, and certainly wasn't something that people tried to design equipment, processes, procedures, and techniques to. When we talk about saving time in these kinds of discussions, we move along relatively quickly because we use common terms, a common understanding, and be comfortable that we know what we're really talking about. Typical intelligence issue before Boyd Loop: Combat information vs. intelligence. Pick a process. How much of one? How much of the other? Now, we look at problems differently with the Boyd Cycle. Regarding the question of whether 'tis better for a particular process to be supported with combat information or with intelligence, we now mount our enquiries with a bit more saavy. How much "orientation" is needed with the information? Is it minimal? Are the "decisions" easy to make/relatively simple (e.g., shoot or don't shoot)? If the answer is that the supported OODA loop doesn't require much context/understanding supplied with the information to aid orientation and decsion, then combat information may be enough. But if a good bit of context is necessary or the intuitive answer will get you the WRONG answer--and thus you need a good bit of analysis to steer you the right way, despite what your tummy is telling you--then you need more intelligence, not so much combat information.

...but that influence has, at times, been pernicious. My experience has been, at both the tactical and operational levels, that the best commanders are those who can selectively ignore the enemy. Napoleon commented that, "there are many good generals in Europe, but they see too many things at the same time." I have seen the same fault handicap operations in Afghanistan.

I know, I know, the OODA-loop doesn't require us to react to every enemy action; unfortunately, the mind-set it engenders encourages the average commander or staffer to do just that. It takes moral courage to ignore enemy actions, and using the OODA-loop as a paradigm for warfighting (as opposed to dogfighting) saps that courage. As a result, we have great difficulty in massing fires, boots on the ground, whatever, and end up dissipating resources.