One good thing about OODA

[wm]

My objective is the destruction of the enemy. I'm a Clauswitian!

You'd always be looking to gain a positional and temporal advantage. I take that as read. Yes, I may want to infiltrate for the purposes of raiding, but again, I want to know where the enemy is, not where he is not.

I'm not trying to be a semantic pedant. The first core function is FIND, meaning find the enemy.

Unless we are talking about the mercenary armies that characterized warfare in Italy during the Renaissance, I concur with Wilf. Even then, the concept was to put one's army in a position such that the opponent would choose to surrender rather than fight and be destroyed--that to me is the essence of maneuver.

BTW, F2T2EA seems to have replaced OODA as the buzzword of choice in certain circles (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess). Recon pull can support this model easily. The main difference is, again as Wilf pointed out, that what your reconnaissance efforts uncover is used to pull your forces to engage, not to avoid, the enemy.

Others have commented on the problem of the trap--pushing forces into a gap could easily turn into a modern day Cannae. I worked for a guy who planned to conduct a number of Bde-sized L-shaped ambushes during WWIII in Germany. His idea was to allow the bad guys' recon assets to find a "boundary" to exploit (their doctrine). He had massed forces in vertical arrays on the real boundary with a small blocking forces (sort of like Hannibal at Lake Trasimene)--he tested out his theory during a REFORGER and was wildly successful--got a star as a result.

The picture of the scouts strung along across the entire force's front, probing for holes in the enemy defense reminds me too much of linear static warfare like WWI and the later phases of WWII in Europe--certainly seems likely to devolve very quickly into attrition warfare. And, as danced around in earlier posts, still no discussion of how to protect a force's support echelons once the battlefield becomes non-linear as combat power "pours" through a hole (that isn't a trap). 507th Maint Co at Nasiryah, anyone?

[reed11b]

My objective is the destruction of the enemy. I'm a Clauswitian!

You'd always be looking to gain a positional and temporal advantage. I take that as read. Yes, I may want to infiltrate for the purposes of raiding, but again, I want to know where the enemy is, not where he is not.

I'm not trying to be a semantic pedant. The first core function is FIND, meaning find the enemy.

I think Wilf has a good point, particularly once you go beyond HIC. What I DO like about the reconn-pull concept, as I have stated before, is that it requires a reduction of the upper-level micro-managmnet that can currently ham-string our forces. The concept of lateral communications I think could still be a force multi-plier. This would also, IMHO, require greater organic firepower at the unit level, since air-power and artillery will remain cued into higher echelon control by necessity. Of course I'm biased since I have a nearly complete small unit infantry doctrine theory.
Reed

[Steve Blair]

My point is simply that recon pull has its uses, and to reject it out of hand smacks of "either/or-ism," which seems to be one of the major banes to American thinking (military and otherwise). It may also be germane to consider that as recon forces are weakened (or made lighter), their ability to find and fix anything decreases. They may well FIND it, but if they're swatted aside it's not likely that they'll report back with anything useful....

I also think another factor in this discussion (and one that seems to fade from view from time to time) is the question of space. Something like recon pull becomes less useful in constricted areas like Western Europe, but as you get more space maneuver becomes more important. Probing for holes can degenerate into attrition warfare, but so can using your recon to find the enemy and then going at him. And if you're fighting on a restricted front, finding those holes isn't necessarily useful. But if you shift the example to more open spaces (say Russia or the majority of the Western Theater in the Civil War) you start having to consider more things. And if your operational objective is to damage your opponent's logistics, then recon pull can certainly help you find clear paths to your objective.

Recon pull seems to me to be quite useful at the operational level, but less so as you move up and down the combat food chain. But it's also just one of many tools in the box, and "either/or" usually ends up sounding dogmatic and over time becomes very predictable to any opponent.

[ericmwalters]

Wilf writes:

I guess I come from the school of thought, where I want my Recon Forces to find the enemy and not the gaps. I want my Recon Forces to begin fixing/reducing the freedom of action of the enemy, so that my teeth arms can destroy him. Recon is just the whiskers for the tooth and claw.

Probably can't articulate a better example of the Soviet School MW perspective than this, although it also applies to the Attrition style of warfare. What betrays Wilf's perspective is the focus on maneuver and recon as a precursor to application of destructive power first and foremost--at least the way this comes across in print. I also find it interesting that recon forces are fixing forces that actively reduce freedom of action. Well, I suppose cavalry units do that. But I'm thinking of a more all-encompassing concept that this. I'm thinking of recon screens/pickets made up of all sorts of units. And there are some dedicated recon units I want to keep stealthy--I don't want them doing "direct action" or other target acquisition efforts. In recon-pull, there's certainly plenty of "tooth and claw," but only to facilitate gap creating and getting people through the gaps (if we're talking about holes in spatial dispositions here).

This is why Soviet School MW does not recognize the utility of reconnaissance-pull; certainly attrition style warfare does not either. Soviet School MW decides where the opportunities are ahead of time, during planning. Exploitation of those opportunities are already programmed into the plan. There is little to no provision for creating the unexpected and taking advantage of it at the scene. This is because of the risk that the operation will lose focus and coherence. That's a real risk. If you don't have the expertise, the self-disciplined forces, the cohesion to execute reconnaissance pull, then you are left with this kind of approach if you are going to do MW.

Additionally, it is implicit that to find gaps you have to have some idea of where the enemy is--otherwise how do you know a gap is a gap? So I'm a bit mystified regarding Wilf's point on that score. He says FIND--find the enemy. I say find the enemy, too. Of course we want to know where the enemy is. I think we agree on that. Where we part ways is what is next. Wilf is after bringing destructive power to bear. I'm not necessarily interested in that right off the bat. If uncertainty is high and the situation is fluid, I'm more interested in where the enemy isn't--where can we go around him? Through him? How can I most quickly get to his critical vulnerability or key weakness? I'm aiming at pre-emption, or dislocation, or disruption first and foremost. If I see an enemy force, one of the first questions I'm thinking is whether the gaps/weaknesses I see in it are worth going after now...or are there other gaps that promise an even bigger payoff later? And when I bring down destructive power, it's only where I want to (1) deceive my enemy where the main effort will be, and (2) suppress those elements of the enemy array that are slowing down my maneuver.

Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance.

Steve.Blair writes:

Part of the point of recon pull in the MW context as I understand it is to avoid the meeting engagement by moving where the enemy either isn't or where he's so weak that you can punch through quickly.

Not exactly true. It's not that you want to avoid the meeting engagement every time. There are some times you want the meeting engagement--you just want it on your terms. You hope to shape it in such a way you uncover a weakness you can exploit. This issue here is how that would be done. Wilf isn't sure of how a "formation-level meeting engagement" would work under recon-pull concepts. I'll try to provide a very general illustration below--and even give Wilf his wish to apply some "tooth and claw" against it...

Imagine an enemy probe. Pick your favorite kind of formation--Soviet-style MRD advance guard, Route Opening Detachment, "Groupe Mobile 100," it doesn't matter. Some commanders might adopt the superficial aspects of recon pull--they put out the recon screen. But they still reserve the right to change unit missions and move units unto themselves. So the recon screen finds where the enemy is pushing with his probing element and may detect an exploitable gap between elements (the march column is looking like an accordion...and there are fleeting times when you can get in there and pick off elements). Let's imagine that the enemy flankers got held up by some particularly nasty terrain but the road-bound artillery serials are hanging out there for any ground force that wants to charge in there to take them out. But by the time CO gets the report, gets oriented, figures out what to do, and issues the order, too much time has gone by. The flankers that were held up when the initial report came in have long since wriggled free and are back in place covering the roadbound guns...and no doubt a new vulnerability exists that the CO doesn't know about--say the air defenders in their eagerness to get the engagement envelopes over that same artillery gaggle have left the rear logistical element out of adequate coverage. What is more, the follow on force behind the column is lagging WAY behind, and there's an entry venue to get into the enemy's rear/operational depth and wreak all kinds of havoc for a friendly force bold enough to try it.

If we're waiting for the commander to make the call, it's going to be too late.

Recon pull doesn't wait. If we are units in the recon screen, we look at the mission and the intent and decide what to do. In the above example, there's all kinds of gaps/weaknesses. Imagine that out of six elements in the recon screen, three see enemy units in column with nothing that looks promising and three spot gaps--one sees the arty uncovered by flankers, one sees the log train uncovered by air defense, and one sees the big hole to "the green fields beyond" into the enemy depth. Imagine that we see all three simultaneously, or sequentially. Take your pick. Which ones we go after depends on what the intent is and what our mission is. We can argue whether it's better to go after the artillery in one moment, or the log train in another moment, or ignore this meeting engagement force altogether and plunge ourselves into "the great beyond" in the enemy rear. The point is, those decisions are made on the spot by the units that see them. They aren't calling back to the Headquarters asking "mother may I?" They know what their commander would want. They are communicating laterally and forces are moving, cooperating, improvising--and they are calling back and TELLING the commander what they are doing. If the CO doesn't like what they are doing, he'll command "by negation."

There are issues with this, however, and that is on maintaining coherence. Recon-pull will naturally cause disunity if leaders aren't ruthless in sticking to commander's intent (at minimum) and where the main effort is aimed against.

Getting back to OODA Loop applications, the CO of this force ought to be considering what he wants most. There are opportunities in this example to pre-empt, to dislocate, and to disrupt (to use Leonhard's categories from The Art of Maneuver) The OODA Loop application aplies to all of them. It's a matter of relative speed. And it's a matter of tempo and timing, particularly the latter. The CO is best advised to choose recon-pull technique if timing is essential and the window for action is small...so small that only leaders on the spot can action them effectively.

Are there ways to "exploit opportunity" without doing recon-pull? Sure. Recon pull is but one way to exploit opportunity, but what that particular command technique brings to the table is timing and ambiguity of action, perhaps more so than other methods.

[ericmwalters]

Steve.Blair writes:

I also think another factor in this discussion (and one that seems to fade from view from time to time) is the question of space. Something like recon pull becomes less useful in constricted areas like Western Europe, but as you get more space maneuver becomes more important. Probing for holes can degenerate into attrition warfare, but so can using your recon to find the enemy and then going at him. And if you're fighting on a restricted front, finding those holes isn't necessarily useful. But if you shift the example to more open spaces (say Russia or the majority of the Western Theater in the Civil War) you start having to consider more things. And if your operational objective is to damage your opponent's logistics, then recon pull can certainly help you find clear paths to your objective.

I will argue that recon-pull was adopted at an extremely decentralized level BECAUSE of higher troop densities and "less maneuver space" in Western Europe. What space affects would seem to be what level recon-pull is practiced at--the more open the space for maneuver, the higher such prerogatives are held. The development of infiltration tactics at the small unit level--down to the platoon and squad using recon-pull technique--was in response to the incredibly high troop densities characteristic of WW I Western Front warfare (although it is true, it made its debut at Riga, on the Eastern Front, and later at Caporetto on the Italian/Austrian Front).

The reason I bring this up is that it illustrates the problem with the term "maneuver," which all too often is understood purely in terms of movement and mobility. If I substitute those terms for "maneuver" in Steve.Blair's complaint, I'm more ready to agree with him. Mostly because while movement/mobility as maneuver was achieved at the tactical level with stosstruppen despite the relative troop densities, such movement/mobility just could not be sustained at the operational level (particularly given the rail networks of the defenders).

And that hearkens back to one of the major difficulties with doing recon-pull...you can easily recon-pull yourself into tactical successes at the cost of operational failure. We can get into that kind of discussion, but I feel we're getting into a tangent away from the OODA Loop; maybe this should be a new thread?

[wm]

Additionally, it is implicit that to find gaps you have to have some idea of where the enemy is--otherwise how do you know a gap is a gap? So I'm a bit mystified regarding Wilf's point on that score. He says FIND--find the enemy. I say find the enemy, too. Of course we want to know where the enemy is. I think we agree on that. Where we part ways is what is next. Wilf is after bringing destructive power to bear. I'm not necessarily interested in that right off the bat. If uncertainty is high and the situation is fluid, I'm more interested in where the enemy isn't--where can we go around him? Through him? How can I most quickly get to his critical vulnerability or key weakness? I'm aiming at pre-emption, or dislocation, or disruption first and foremost. If I see an enemy force, one of the first questions I'm thinking is whether the gaps/weaknesses I see in it are worth going after now...or are there other gaps that promise an even bigger payoff later? And when I bring down destructive power, it's only where I want to (1) deceive my enemy where the main effort will be, and (2) suppress those elements of the enemy array that are slowing down my maneuver.

Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance.

The first paragraph certaintly seems to describe what we used to call the active defense. The second paragraph seems to describe Soviet MW as EMW has characterized it. What's new here?

Imagine an enemy probe. Pick your favorite kind of formation--Soviet-style MRD advance guard, Route Opening Detachment, "Groupe Mobile 100," it doesn't matter. Some commanders might adopt the superficial aspects of recon pull--they put out the recon screen. But they still reserve the right to change unit missions and move units unto themselves. So the recon screen finds where the enemy is pushing with his probing element and may detect an exploitable gap between elements (the march column is looking like an accordion...and there are fleeting times when you can get in there and pick off elements). Let's imagine that the enemy flankers got held up by some particularly nasty terrain but the road-bound artillery serials are hanging out there for any ground force that wants to charge in there to take them out. But by the time CO gets the report, gets oriented, figures out what to do, and issues the order, too much time has gone by. The flankers that were held up when the initial report came in have long since wriggled free and are back in place covering the roadbound guns...and no doubt a new vulnerability exists that the CO doesn't know about--say the air defenders in their eagerness to get the engagement envelopes over that same artillery gaggle have left the rear logistical element out of adequate coverage. What is more, the follow on force behind the column is lagging WAY behind, and there's an entry venue to get into the enemy's rear/operational depth and wreak all kinds of havoc for a friendly force bold enough to try it.

Examples again look like active defense (or meeting engagement as part of active defense). How about cases for deliberate attack or movement to contact where our side starts on the offensive--perhaps something more like Marines storming ashore at Tarawa.

Imagine that we see all three simultaneously, or sequentially. Take your pick. Which ones we go after depends on what the intent is and what our mission is. We can argue whether it's better to go after the artillery in one moment, or the log train in another moment, or ignore this meeting engagement force altogether and plunge ourselves into "the great beyond" in the enemy rear. The point is, those decisions are made on the spot by the units that see them. They aren't calling back to the Headquarters asking "mother may I?" They know what their commander would want. They are communicating laterally and forces are moving, cooperating, improvising--and they are calling back and TELLING the commander what they are doing. If the CO doesn't like what they are doing, he'll command "by negation."

What keeps this from becoming a series of piecemeal attacks that get defeated in detail? By the time the formation commander has enough situational awareness to "command 'by negation,'" things may have gone too far to extract some or all of the committed elements that got the commander's intent wrong, misread the situation, or just plain got surrounded by "Indians at the end of that box canyon they stormed into" because the bad guys reacted/acted faster than our own forces did.

Getting back to OODA Loop applications, the CO of this force ought to be considering what he wants most. There are opportunities in this example to pre-empt, to dislocate, and to disrupt (to use Leonhard's categories from The Art of Maneuver) The OODA Loop application aplies to all of them. It's a matter of relative speed. And it's a matter of tempo and timing, particularly the latter. The CO is best advised to choose recon-pull technique if timing is essential and the window for action is small...so small that only leaders on the spot can action them effectively.

Are these situations more likely to be the exception or the rule? I suspect that as the size of the formations grows, the likelihood of such "moments of decision" will be fewer and fewer.

[ericmwalters]

Reed11b writes about the utility of recon-pull:

This would also, IMHO, require greater organic firepower at the unit level, since air-power and artillery will remain cued into higher echelon control by necessity.

Okay, at the risk of completely hijacking this thread into a detailed discussion of reconnaissance-pull, I've simply got to address this observation by Reed11b. I do this for two major reasons: (1) he is touching on something that Robert Leonhard goes into great detail discussing in his fine book, Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War, and (2) this is the essence of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Warfare, which aims at getting air and artillery support as far down the food chain as we can. We don't WANT it "leashed" to "higher echelon control by necessity." Our whole "Enhanced Company Operations" effort is trying to bash down those kinds of inhibiting controls. I won't go into that here. But I do want to elaborate on where Reed11b and Robert Leonhard seem to agree.

First, Leonhard observes in Chapter Seven entitled "Opportunity" that higher level commanders can delegate all they want, but they still hold the resources. He tells a humorous story about a mother giving "commander's intent to a teenage daughter prior to a shopping trip, and of course the clothes she picks are not the ones mom is willing to buy. And she holds the cash. I'd argue in this case mom didn't do a good job of communicating intent, but you get the idea. Even if mom did a good job, if she's not willing to part with the cash/credit card, such delegation is more symbolic than real. Leonhard then goes into a very detailed discussion of what this means in a military context--and I strongly advise people to read it. He and I have gotten into a good bit of strong argument/heated discussion about a good deal of this, but we don't disagree on the premise or theory. What we disagree on is on the practice.

To hearken back to my earlier recon-pull example, recall six elements finding three weaknesses/gaps in a situation involving an enemy probe in a meeting engagement kind of situation. One of those weaknesses involved getting behind the force and launching into the enemy's operational depth "to the green fields beyond." Well, even if the commander's intent allowed--yea, even encouraged--that course of action, if on-scene unit commanders don't have the means or sustainment to pull that kind of bold maneuver off, it doesn't matter that they were told they could take such risks. They physically aren't able to until the higher level commander gives them the assets.

One has to go back to stosstruppen/infiltration tactics and the Soviet/German idea from the 1930s about "all-arms" formations. If you are going to build mobile units that practice recon-pull, you got to let them have a lot of stuff. That means decentralizing assets as well as command authorities. So the stosstruppen got flamethrowers and machine guns and trench mortars and all kinds of toys they never had as line rifle infantry before. And Guderian got his radio in every tank...and air-ground links to Stuka aircraft...and infantry on wheels/tracks...and light artillery that could keep up...and--you get the idea. The key is that units at the front end could cobble together tactical solutions with assets at hand rather than wait for higher headquarters to direct such cooperation.

So, if you are evaluating a military force based purely on what it says in its doctrine, see what they are doing in practice. Leonhard makes this point in The Art of Maneuver and it's the same one Reed11b has made elsewhere:

...it is important to note that while our doctrine and culture favor an appoach to command and control along the lines of Auftragstaktik and small-unit initiative, Operation Desert Storm was strictly controlled from the top down. There was no room for initiative, or even for significant maneuver options, below corps level. Commanders at all levels were instructed where and when to move and were not permitted to find their own way to the objectives. In essence, the coalition arms simply lined up and swept forward, careful to maintain contact with the friendly forces on their flanks. Like rigidly disciplined Macedonian phalanxes, divisions and brigades had to march and stay dressed to the flanks throughout the advance, crashing through both strong and weak points in the enemy's defenses.

I have maintained previously that this command-push approach to warfare is not necessarily a violation of maneuver warfare theory. Indeed, in many cases, as in Operation Desert Storm, it can easily overwhelm an enemy at small cost in time and lives. It is a method of fighting that emphasizes momentum (mass times velocity) instead of force (mass times acceleration), and it has a view towards unity of command rather than small-unit initiative. It descends from the Soviet school of maneuver warfare developed and perfected in World War II, and in Operation Desert Storm it found almost flawless expression....

[ericmwalters]

wm writes:

Quoting me: "Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance."

The first paragraph certaintly seems to describe what we used to call the active defense. The second paragraph seems to describe Soviet MW as EMW has characterized it. What's new here?

I will give you a different scenario later on. I wasn't thinking of Active Defense here, quite honestly. Certainly I see why you might.

The difference between the above and Soviet MW in OODA application is that the USMC concept of "wanting them to happen as automatically as I can make it" is that it's non-formulaic and decided upon by the man on the spot given the situation as he sees it. The Soviet MW approach, in contrast, is a preplanned response that is not conceived of on the spot, but merely applied on the spot. The Soviets distrusted initiative as not being "scientifically substantiated" at the tactical level and only allowed this at might higher formations--and even then, only during planning. Leonhard discusses this at length in The Art of Maneuver (pp. 113-121). I can cite the Soviet open source works on this issue, particularly Vladimir Lefebvre's notion of "reflexive control" which just doesn't work the same as what the West thinks of when we say "initiative."

[Ken White]

Desert Storm. That thing was an aberration in so very many respects. Well done? Yep -- but still an aberration. One should be exceedingly careful in drawing any lessons from that 'war.'

Not least because it was the only time since the Civil War other than early WW II in North Africa where the US actually fought at Division level -- the rest of the time, it's been by Bde / RCT and that is due essentially to terrain and nothing more. We actually do decentralized command and execution pretty well once the peacetime attitude and chains are broken -- and I'd note the current wars are just barely on the cusp of a tempo adequate to force that delegation on some reluctant Commanders...

METT-TC rules and DS/DS is as bad a military example as is Malaya

[ericmwalters]

wm writes:

How about cases for deliberate attack or movement to contact where our side starts on the offensive--perhaps something more like Marines storming ashore at Tarawa.

Tarawa is actually a terrific case of recon-pull. I could also cite Omaha Beach. When the whole plan went to hell, local leaders took charge and improvised solutions with what they had on hand, finding gaps and exploiting them to establish toe-holds inland. "There are two kinds of people on this beach--those who are dead, and those who are gonna die if they don't get off it." I can cite instances and sources if you want.

I only talked about the "meeting engagement" because Wilf was asking the question on how that might work. Recon pull also works in the defense--in fact, this is where the Germans first got the idea for it as they were economizing forces on the Western Front in WWI. I'd refer you to Bruce I Gudmundsson's excellent Stormtroop Tactics for a detailed discussion, but even Tim Lupfer traces this in his Fort Leavenworth monograph, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.

Does this answer your question? They key here is that the situation is uncertain--it doesn't matter what your force mission is (attack, defense, etc).

[ericmwalters]

wm asks:

What keeps this from becoming a series of piecemeal attacks that get defeated in detail? By the time the formation commander has enough situational awareness to "command 'by negation,'" things may have gone too far to extract some or all of the committed elements that got the commander's intent wrong, misread the situation, or just plain got surrounded by "Indians at the end of that box canyon they stormed into" because the bad guys reacted/acted faster than our own forces did.

That indeed is the difficulty with the concept--a good intent, a common understanding between element leaders of who or what the main effort is, and strong lateral communications are an absolute must to prevent this from happening. Many believe that establishing this is just too hard to rely upon. But we've got plenty of cases to show how it can work and why. I'll get into the cases later about when it doesn't. Certainly the Soviets felt much the same way as you do--and Leonhard (and I) would also agree that the United States ground forces often feel the same way as well. The question is whether we'll ever do better. The Marines are trying--thus their adoption of "German School MW" as doctrine.

[William F. Owen]

What betrays Wilf's perspective is the focus on maneuver and recon as a precursor to application of destructive power first and foremost--at least the way this comes across in print. I also find it interesting that recon forces are fixing forces that actively reduce freedom of action. Well, I suppose cavalry units do that.

You got me! Yes, that is where I am coming from. I do see Recon as Cavalry - horse archers, or Lancers. This is where I part company with UK doctrine and all the "Recce by Stealth" nonsense. Screening Force battle is essential both in Offence and Defence.

[Cavguy]

You got me! Yes, that is where I am coming from. I do see Recon as Cavalry - horse archers, or Lancers. This is where I part company with UK doctrine and all the "Recce by Stealth" nonsense. Screening Force battle is essential both in Offence and Defence.

Case in point #1 - 1st day at the Battle of Gettysburg, with Buford's 1st Cav Regiment holding the initial high ground against a division assault. First of many "turning points" that decided that battle.

We have gutted our Cav units of the ability to organically guard (and really screen without significant air/arty support), which I am not sure is a good thing.

[Steve Blair]

Case in point #1 - 1st day at the Battle of Gettysburg, with Buford's 1st Cav Regiment holding the initial high ground against a division assault. First of many "turning points" that decided that battle.

We have gutted our Cav units of the ability to organically guard (and really screen without significant air/arty support), which I am not sure is a good thing.

Different thread, perhaps, but I'm convinced it's not a good thing.

[reed11b]

Okay, at the risk of completely hijacking this thread into a detailed discussion of reconnaissance-pull, I've simply got to address this observation by Reed11b. I do this for two major reasons: (1) he is touching on something that Robert Leonhard goes into great detail discussing in his fine book, Fighting By Minutes: Time and the Art of War, and (2) this is the essence of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Warfare, which aims at getting air and artillery support as far down the food chain as we can. We don't WANT it "leashed" to "higher echelon control by necessity." Our whole "Enhanced Company Operations" effort is trying to bash down those kinds of inhibiting controls.

That is an interesting observation and an interesting choice of doctrine. I am a huge decentralization and combined arms fan, but my efforts to crunch the numbers on air-power and arty distributed to Batt. and lower formations has convinced me that this is a BAD idea. I did a study a few years ago when the ARH and LUH competition was going on, to show that an armed utility helicopter at Batt. or Co. echelon, replacing both the ARH and LUH in function and acquisition and a large number of "mid" echelon UAVs would be cost effective as well as tactically preferable. The tactically preferable is still debatable, but cost effective it was not. The duplication of maintenance and support billets and equipment escalated to the point were they swallowed up the cost savings. (the study was based on the MD explorer since #s existed for it from the CG.) Fast movers are even worse cost wise. On top of that you lose the ability entirely for any concentration of effort w/ these assets. There are other means of improving the utility and firepower of the "line" units.
Reed
P.S. One surprising find of my study (unpublished) was that Batt and BCT echelon UAVs also have a bad cost-to-effectiveness ratio. Larger, longer ranged UAV's grouped in an aviation unit would be a better idea IMO.

[ericmwalters]

Reed11b writes:

I am a huge decentralization and combined arms fan, but my efforts to crunch the numbers on air-power and arty distributed to Batt. and lower formations has convinced me that this is a BAD idea.

When I was working the Counterinsurgency Targeting and ISR study for the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) here in Joint Forces Command, we looked at much the same cost-benefit analysis and the solutions are varied. Pick your poison. There is certainly an awareness that overhead may not be worth the coast of bringing the asset down. If you aren't going to do that, then you need to find a way to shorten the "observe" cycle time since requesting the asset eats up precious moments. That's mostly what we're working on for the Enhanced Company Operations concept.

Certainly the problem of "penny-packeting" or "peanut butter spread" of resources/assets is germane, but we expect the higher level commander to set the rules on that, based on the situation. If the scenario requires the ability to quickly mass such assets, then the C2 rig must allow it. If not, then it's not a problem. Currently we're doing COIN and not feeling any ill effects in this realm.

Soviets had that wonderful C2 machinery for taking ownership of assets at a stroke--a Division-level Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery (CRTA) on the Division staff could, with just a call on the Division Fires net, get control of every artillery and mortar tube in the Division to fire on a particular target within range. Not something they did very often, but they could. They also were able to put disparate, dispersed, and discrete elements of various penetrating forces onto one comm net...and put everyone under a single Operational Maneuver Group commander when required so that these forces could congeal in the depth of the NATO defenses and attack vulnerable targets in the rear in a concerted way. Great theory--and I'm glad to say we never had to see how good they were at doing this in practice!

As Marines, we're somewhat luckier than the U.S. Army in getting responsive air support, be it UAVs/UASs or fixed wing aircraft. These are flown by Marines for Marines and there's a lot of professional pressure put on the aviators by the ground guys to provide good service. Reputations are made and broken in this very clubby Marine Corps through successes and failures in this. Our issues generally are on streamlining procedures--but we do "det out" rotary wing aviation packets based out of Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) for days at a time...almost like decentralizing assets!

[reed11b]

As Marines, we're somewhat luckier than the U.S. Army in getting responsive air support, be it UAVs/UASs or fixed wing aircraft. These are flown by Marines for Marines and there's a lot of professional pressure put on the aviators by the ground guys to provide good service. Reputations are made and broken in this very clubby Marine Corps through successes and failures in this. Our issues generally are on streamlining procedures--but we do "det out" rotary wing aviation packets based out of Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) for days at a time...almost like decentralizing assets!

My point was that there are other means of gaining the intangibles of the non-complimentary supports that are being pushed down to lower echelons then are ideal to support them. UAVs are a good example. Completely different fuel, parts, skill sets and equipment from anything else in the Co. and Bat. They do provide timely recon information however. There is other equipment that can provide this as well however. FLIR masts on tactical vehicles have become small enough to be included on non-dedicated platforms. There are parachute equipped cameras that can be fired from any 40mm GL. There is a mature DARPA program for an 81mm or 120mm mortar launched LTA UAV. Thrown recon balls instead of "micro backpack robots", etc etc. All these systems can be operated by infantrymen, do not create long logistical tails, or reduce unit mobility like Co and Batt. UAV's do. More firepower? XM-109 payload rifle is fantastic! 2000m point target range, combined w/ the potential for air burst fused rounds and an AP round that can defeat most light armor. Precision mortar rounds are another firepower bonus that does not create new skill sets and upkeep. Yep, a Marine can call on the awesome firepower of an F/A-18 fighter-bomber by calling for it on the radio, but they better be able to cope if that fighter-bomber has a higher priority mission. Sorry for the quick sloppy post, but hopefully the intent is readable. Happy to answer any questions.
Reed

[ericmwalters]

Reed11b wrote:

My point was that there are other means of gaining the intangibles of the non-complementary supports that are being pushed down to lower echelons then are ideal to support them.

Because we Marines typically live hand-to-mouth, we've been pretty inventive and innovative in rigging field expedient means. I wish the institution was better at formalizing some of these very successful arrangements.

With regard to UASs, it's been a mixed bag. DRAGON EYE hasn't been as good as we wanted for a battalion-level disposable UAV--mostly because it's not truly disposable. One goes down, we often send out a patrol to recover it. That really bugs me. WASP has been much better for the companies. Sure, we don't have the parts, maintenance tail. But our rationale has been to treat these assets as expendables, like batteries or ammunition.

Regarding air support, we pretty much live in a different world than anyone else. We generally don't find our fixed wing close air support pulled off for any "higher priority mission." If we lose air support, it's usually due to low visibility/adverse weather, even with the vaunted F/A-18D "All-Weather" fighter/bomber. Marine air exists to support ground forces--it's our "flying artillery." It exists for that purpose first and foremost. This is usually hard for our Army brethren to get used to. Trust me, I've seen the kind of close air support the USAF provides in wartime. It cannot possibly compare. USAF air has a bazillion competing missions. We don't.

When I was the G2 of 3d MAW in OIF I, we had scores and scores of targets for "joint air" over 3d ID/V Corps on the "March Up" to Baghdad. These aircraft would be burning gas in CAS stacks waiting for a target. The ASOC either wasn't getting many nominations or couldn't process them fast enough--I defer to any knowledgable USAF readers who were there to explain what happened. But these A/C would be running low on fuel and then "cross the line" over our boundary and we'd hand them a target. 3d ID only had a couple of divisions to deal with outside of Baghdad. I MEF had a bunch--I think I can recall roughly eight or so. We had no shortage of stuff to shoot up.

Still, there's lot of OODA Loop reducing measures we can take. When I was a tank officer, I had no Forward Air Controller (FAC). I also had no Forward Observer (FO). We had nothing like a FIST. I'd do my own calls for fire. I'd do my own "nine-lines" for bringing close air support on target. The infantry had FACs and had FOs. I didn't. My tank loader would help me work up the calls for fire and close air support missions while I was on the platoon net running my other four tanks, or talking to the company commander on the company net, or yakking to my tank crew as I was maneuvering (and sometimes shooting) my tank. I was a pretty busy guy as platoon commander with all the "turret tasks" I had to execute. But I could (and did) bring down my own fire support, thank you very much. And if I could do it, there's no reason why a squad leader or platoon sergeant/platoon leader can't. Without at FAC. Without a FO. We need to expand this to include ISR support--UASs tied to Off the Shelf Video Receiver Terminals (OSVRTs) and--even better--ROVER III with laptops and a voice comm link (NOT mIRC Chat!) to the sensor payload operator/UAS pilot/mission commander.

But I imagine "stosstruppen on steroids" these days, where sergeants can collaborate and cooperate in ground operations to execute recon-pull type operations. We're a long way from doing that across the USMC. Maybe some day. I'm hoping Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) will point the way. I could be grossly naive, but a man can dream, can't he?

[reed11b]

Reed11b wrote:



Because we Marines typically live hand-to-mouth, we've been pretty inventive and innovative in rigging field expedient means. I wish the institution was better at formalizing some of these very successful arrangements.

True, of course how much was squandered on items such as MARPAT and Marine Body Armor? Small ticket items yes, but certainly not ones that needed to be Marine unique.

With regard to UASs, it's been a mixed bag. DRAGON EYE hasn't been as good as we wanted for a battalion-level disposable UAV--mostly because it's not truly disposable. One goes down, we often send out a patrol to recover it. That really bugs me. WASP has been much better for the companies. Sure, we don't have the parts, maintenance tail. But our rationale has been to treat these assets as expendables, like batteries or ammunition.

So, what do you think of the non-UAS options I outlined? Dragon Eye and WASP may be disposable, but they were still large eneough to require a dedicated soldier that lost alot of his "manueverability", far more then the differance betweeen the SAW and the new Marine LAR replacement options.

Regarding air support, we pretty much live in a different world than anyone else. We generally don't find our fixed wing close air support pulled off for any "higher priority mission." If we lose air support, it's usually due to low visibility/adverse weather, even with the vaunted F/A-18D "All-Weather" fighter/bomber. Marine air exists to support ground forces--it's our "flying artillery." It exists for that purpose first and foremost. This is usually hard for our Army brethren to get used to. Trust me, I've seen the kind of close air support the USAF provides in wartime. It cannot possibly compare. USAF air has a bazillion competing missions. We don't.

Still, there's lot of OODA Loop reducing measures we can take. When I was a tank officer, I had no Forward Air Controller (FAC). I also had no Forward Observer (FO). We had nothing like a FIST. I'd do my own calls for fire. I'd do my own "nine-lines" for bringing close air support on target. The infantry had FACs and had FOs. I didn't. My tank loader would help me work up the calls for fire and close air support missions while I was on the platoon net running my other four tanks, or talking to the company commander on the company net, or yakking to my tank crew as I was maneuvering (and sometimes shooting) my tank. I was a pretty busy guy as platoon commander with all the "turret tasks" I had to execute. But I could (and did) bring down my own fire support, thank you very much. And if I could do it, there's no reason why a squad leader or platoon sergeant/platoon leader can't. Without at FAC. Without a FO. We need to expand this to include ISR support--UASs tied to Off the Shelf Video Receiver Terminals (OSVRTs) and--even better--ROVER III with laptops and a voice comm link (NOT mIRC Chat!) to the sensor payload operator/UAS pilot/mission commander.

Jeez, if I wouldn't have to go back through basic (boot) you would almost have me recruited. Higher tasking includes other Marines in higher need however, and I do believe that happens. There are also times when you need precision fires at less then 1,000kg of HE. As you mention earlier, calling in 9-line air support is fairly complicated, organic fires tend to be simplier, since the system operator is already "in the loop" and does not need as much situational description to act. Talk about OODA Loop reducing times.Also, as I mentioned earlier, instead of increasing the tasking on the PlSgt a great deal by making them operate a complicated ISR platform, just use a simpler one, ort better utilize the existing ones. Micro UAV's just don't add up for me, no matter how many times I do the math.

But I imagine "stosstruppen on steroids" these days, where sergeants can collaborate and cooperate in ground operations to execute recon-pull type operations. We're a long way from doing that across the USMC. Maybe some day. I'm hoping Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) will point the way. I could be grossly naive, but a man can dream, can't he?

I must admit that I like alot of what ECO has to offer.I still feel that EBO (Enchanced Battalion Opperations, not the "other" EBO) makes more sense. Pushing assets down the line beyond where they can be effectivly supported smacks of the big mistakes your big green brother made with the BCTs. Improving the human resources makes more sense IMO, though I know the MC has made big strides in this direction (actually the Army seems to be making big gains in this department too). The reason I want to nit-pick the details with you, is the same reason I nit-pick the details with Wilf, I really like your basic concept.
Reed

[Entropy]

Wow, what a fantastic thread, especially for a ground-ignorant guy like me. I'm learning a lot about this MW thing.

I do have to say that Eric's detailed posts on MW remind me of some naval history - Lord Admiral Nelsen in particular. The battle of the Nile in particular strikes me as a sort of naval variant of a recon pull, and Nelsen's plan at Trafalgar to split the line at the enemy flagship to disrupt fleet signals might be thought of as an OODA loop disruption - if I'm understanding the general concepts correctly.

One question on Soviet vs German school - is it possible to practice both at the same time? For example, could one "decide where the opportunities are ahead of time," as you put it earlier, in the planning process, yet allow for exploitation of those laterally-coordinated serendipitous opportunities should they appear?

Another question(s):

I'd do my own calls for fire. I'd do my own "nine-lines" for bringing close air support on target.

Was there a Marine-wide standard procedure you followed? If so, did you get to actually train beforehand, especially with actual aircraft?