One good thing about OODA

[ericmwalters]

wm writes:

While Tarawa may be a good example of recon pull, I doubt that it fills the bill as an MW example--pretty tough for me to consider it MW given the size of the available maneuver space, the fact that you outnumber your opponent about 7 to 1, and the opponent really has no place to go to get reinforcements to alter the balance of power. Omaha might be a better case but I doubt it.

Whose definition of MW are we using (Leonhard's? USMC? Other?). And at what scale? Tarawa and Omaha can possibly be justified as MW cases at the operational level, even if they are attritional contests at the tactical level, but we'd need to agree on whose definition we want to use.

But this is a theoretical/academic exercise. Tarawa or Omaha battles weren't PLANNED or INTENDED to go the way that they did. U.S. forces weren't DESIGNED to execute recon-pull in those battles, they just did it under the extreme exigencies of combat. Sure, this is why I wouldn't want to use them as MW examples either...especially when compared to other assaults on heavily fortified areas, such as the Michael Offensives against Hough's Fifth Army in March 1918. German stosstrupp units were planned, intended, and designed to use recon-pull, so that makes it a better example to use.

wm also suggests that:

Perhaps we might be better off by just identifying MW as a flexible state of mind, one that recognizes that the best offensive solution is not always a "3 yards and a cloud of dust fullback smash up the middle."

Well, once you make that association, then what is the difference between MW and "The Art of War?" This gets back to an original complaint of Wilf--and one I am sympathetic to. If MW is nothing more than "common-sense tactics," then what is the Art of War at the tactical level? I think Boyd was right to classify styles of war: MW being one of them and Attrition Warfare and Moral Warfare being the other two.

Thus, if I make the answer to "Isn't MW just good leadership?" an affirmative response, then what do I say to the proposition, "Isn't the Art of War just good leadership?" If I say yes to that, where does this leave me?

We think of leadership in a lot more ways than just tactical and technical proficiency in doing operations/tactics. I'd argue you can have terrific leaders who fall short in the MW department (to say nothing of the Art of War), and there are plenty of MW and/or "Art of War" advocates/fans/ students who aren't terribly capable in the leadership department (I know, I wargame against some of them).

Just my two cents on that.

[wm]

Whose definition of MW are we using (Leonhard's? USMC? Other?). And at what scale? Tarawa and Omaha can possibly be justified as MW cases at the operational level, even if they are attritional contests at the tactical level, but we'd need to agree on whose definition we want to use.

I suspect that MW is a concept with applicability at the operational level. Now that requires some level of debate about what constitutes the operational level of warfare. Once upon a time, I would have tried to draw that distinction based on the size of the headquarters conducting the effort {with the caveat that headquarters implicitly have a set of support forces/functions associated with them--e.g, a division has a fire support element (DIVARTY w 3/4 firing Bns,, a recon element (Cav squadron), a maneuver support element (Engineers, Intel/EW, AD, MP) and a sustinment base of supply, maintenance, trans (DISCOM)}. Now I think I'd draw the line at the force's ability to be self-sustaining for a duration of time that I am open to discuss, but about a month seems right to me.

Below that level of command/force structure we are talking tactics and above it we are talking strategy or even grand strategy. So Tarawa on the ground was tactical application of standard fire and maneuver--the kind of stuff that hapens as low as the squad level using two fire teams. Leading up to the landings one might see MW at play (if US Forces were actively probing the whole area of the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas, looking for the "soft" spot to attack and draw the greatest Japanese response into a fire pocket of annihilation). But that seems not to have been what actually happened. In fact at least one perspective is that we made the Japanese think they needed a build up on Tarawa--apparently we needed Tarawa out of the way so we could have free supply lines to island hop up to the Phillipines. But I'll drop the historical discussion as tangential to the main point being discussed here.

But this is a theoretical/academic exercise. Tarawa or Omaha battles weren't PLANNED or INTENDED to go the way that they did. U.S. forces weren't DESIGNED to execute recon-pull in those battles, they just did it under the extreme exigencies of combat. Sure, this is why I wouldn't want to use them as MW examples either...especially when compared to other assaults on heavily fortified areas, such as the Michael Offensives against Hough's Fifth Army in March 1918. German stosstrupp units were planned, intended, and designed to use recon-pull, so that makes it a better example to use.

I submit that no battle/operation/campaign goes at it was planned to, which makes suspect any discussion of what really happened (as compared to what was planned to have happened).

I think we could say that understanding MW based on the German Spring 1918 series of offensives is a case of recognizing that maybe the game plan ought to be to let the QB call a lot of audibles rather than try to coach from the sidelines. Sometimes, we just hand the halfback the ball and let him pick his own hole to run through; sometimes we use a fullback dive through the 3 hole; sometimes we even quick kick. That's all fine provided you have a Glenn Davis and an Arnold tucker and not just a Doc Blanchard (1947 Army backfield). But it goes back to the point that Ken White and I have made in many places on these discussions (Ken recently in this thread)--you make your plans and execute based on METT-TC.
And that answers the following:

Well, once you make that association, then what is the difference between MW and "The Art of War?" This gets back to an original complaint of Wilf--and one I am sympathetic to. If MW is nothing more than "common-sense tactics," then what is the Art of War at the tactical level? I think Boyd was right to classify styles of war: MW being one of them and Attrition Warfare and Moral Warfare being the other two.

Thus, if I make the answer to "Isn't MW just good leadership?" an affirmative response, then what do I say to the proposition, "Isn't the Art of War just good leadership?" If I say yes to that, where does this leave me?

We think of leadership in a lot more ways than just tactical and technical proficiency in doing operations/tactics. I'd argue you can have terrific leaders who fall short in the MW department (to say nothing of the Art of War), and there are plenty of MW and/or "Art of War" advocates/fans/ students who aren't terribly capable in the leadership department (I know, I wargame against some of them).

Just my two cents on that.

First let me say that the "art of war" is not applicable at the tactical level. Second, Boyd's categorizations may be valuable shorthand, but being shorthand descriptions, they are as likely to cause confusion as to clarify--to simplify is to inject error.
Next, I assert that great leaders are able to motivate those who work for them to get great results. (Good leaders get good results; poor leaders, poor results.) Part of the process of doing that is being able to evaluate what one has to do in terms of what one has to do it with. To place that in an OODA context, think of Observe and Orient as being not only looking and understanding the other guy. One must also observe and orient oneself to the area in which he is operating and the forces with which he operates. One's staff is part of that force. So are the logistics assets available to the force.
The difference between Good Leadership and the Art of War is in the ability to make the best of what you have--that's good leadership--and providing a force that has the capabilities leaders need to fight and win--that's the art of war. On another thread, I suggested that prior to reading Clauswitz one ought to read Machiavelli's Art of War--most of that book is about building an army and then organizing it in garrison, camp and on the march so that it can react effectively on enemy contact. It's been a while, but I seem to recall that Vegetius spends a lot of time on the same types of subjects as Machiavelli.

BTW, my biggest heartburn with wargaming is that the problem of motivating subordinates, the real challenge of leadership, is usually not included in the sim. I'll quote Vizzini in The Princess Bride, "You fell victim to one of the classic blunders! The most famous is never get involved in a land war in Asia, but only slightly less well-known is this: never go in against a Sicilian when death is on the line!" How does any wargame simulate that vital piece of war?

[selil]

...I submit that no battle/operation/campaign goes at it was planned to...

I would suggest that as a cliche of military activities the "No plan withstands contact with the enemy - Helmut von Moltke" line should be excised with extreme prejudice.

First, it by reference it suggests there really is no point in planning. I'm not going to believe that planning has no place and I think the cliche comes from large battle formation high intensity warfare where communication was limited. I like dead Prussian writers as much as the next guy but the over use of homilies erodes the discussion as much as religious pandering and zealotry would.

Second, it is to often used as an excuse or a sideways attack against discussing strategy. It gets trotted out anytime somebody wants to shut somebody else up working through a set of strategies.

Third, we have high speed, high density, high reliability communications and it is a matter of fact that broad intentions can have as much relevance to planning while relying on technology for coordination. Mogadishu swarm attacks anybody?

WM I don't think you were trying to use that trite cliche as overly broad but I have noticed it getting trotted out more and more lately. I think that the meaning of it has been lost and it has become a stop sign for debate. Cliches can often take on new meanings that were never intended.

[CR6]

I would suggest that as a cliche of military activities the "No plan withstands contact with the enemy - Helmut von Moltke" line should be excised with extreme prejudice.

If anyone relies on that quote to justify not planning, they should be excised with extreme prejudice!

You make a good point Sam, but I think thst the value of Moltke's quote stems from the idea that commanders and staffs cannot remain wedded to their plan in conditions on the ground prove their assumptions to be invalid or if things have changed to the point where the plan is irrelevant. You plan in order to be prepared to achieve your objective, but it needs to be flexible enough to deal with changes rather than serve as a script to be adhered to at all costs. As Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything."

[selil]

If anyone relies on that quote to justify not planning, they should be excised with extreme prejudice!

You make a good point Sam, but I think thst the value of Moltke's quote stems from the idea that commanders and staffs cannot remain wedded to their plan in conditions on the ground prove their assumptions to be invalid or if things have changed to the point where the plan is irrelevant. You plan in order to be prepared to achieve your objective, but it needs to be flexible enough to deal with changes rather than serve as a script to be adhered to at all costs. As Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything."

That is very true. I have been seeing the "No plan withstands contact" meme so much lately in regards to the financial crisis, the recent flood in my region (FEMA), and discussion on how to handle Afghanistan. It seems to have become an excuse for poor planning or lack of planning.

[slapout9]

I have posted this before, but it still applies. "Plans That Survive First Contact" by Major John Garrett
Point 2. That wasn't exactly what Moltke said as is explained in the paper. Link to paper is posted below.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...earch=%22Plans that survive first contact%22

[selil]

I have posted this before, but it still applies. "Plans That Survive First Contact" by Major John Garrett
Point 2. That wasn't exactly what Moltke said as is explained in the paper. Link to paper is posted below.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...earch=%22Plans that survive first contact%22

I hadn't seen this before but read the first pages. Looks like I might be on the right track maybe going the wrong direction. I'll add it to the read pile for today.

[wm]

I would suggest that as a cliche of military activities the "No plan withstands contact with the enemy - Helmut von Moltke" line should be excised with extreme prejudice.

First, it by reference it suggests there really is no point in planning. I'm not going to believe that planning has no place and I think the cliche comes from large battle formation high intensity warfare where communication was limited. I like dead Prussian writers as much as the next guy but the over use of homilies erodes the discussion as much as religious pandering and zealotry would.

Second, it is to often used as an excuse or a sideways attack against discussing strategy. It gets trotted out anytime somebody wants to shut somebody else up working through a set of strategies.

Third, we have high speed, high density, high reliability communications and it is a matter of fact that broad intentions can have as much relevance to planning while relying on technology for coordination. Mogadishu swarm attacks anybody?

WM I don't think you were trying to use that trite cliche as overly broad but I have noticed it getting trotted out more and more lately. I think that the meaning of it has been lost and it has become a stop sign for debate. Cliches can often take on new meanings that were never intended.

Sam,
Thanks. You're right that was not how I was using it. I was instead using it to point ought how trite EMW's response was about Tarawa and Normandy not going as planned.
BTW, the use of the Michael Offensive as a postivie example is subject to the same rebuttal--the plan to do recon pull MW didn't quite come off as expected. If it had, folks might all be speaking German in what is now France, Belgium and the Netherlands, a guy named Adolf Hitler may not have been able to orchestra a holocaust, we might not be embroiled in the GWOT because the French and Brits wouldn't have screwed up the Mid-East so badly as a result of their execution of provisions of the Treaties of Versailles and Lausanne, and Georgia might not have been invaded because the former Soviet Union might have had to actually honor the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

But we really shouldn't be doing "what if" history now, should we?

I'd say that the real point is that one needs to be prepared for the unexpected and be nimble enough to react to it. Planning is not a "done once and over" effort--it is a continuous process informed by developing situational awareness as things go forward. (This is where the disparaged chess analogy comes into sharp focus IMHO.) While one may not be able to plan for every contingency, one can plan for the fact that things may (probably will) not go exactly as expected and have a reaction capability on call.