wm writes:

Quoting me: "Now, the situation is uncertain and highly fluid--as a higher formation leader, I don't want to have wait for the situation to clarify before these things happen. I want them to happen as automatically as I can make it. As contact is made and the two formations grapple, the situation will begin to clarify. What is most important to me is that I get myself to that place in the fight where I can help speed up major "fast transients" to throw this force off-balance."

The first paragraph certaintly seems to describe what we used to call the active defense. The second paragraph seems to describe Soviet MW as EMW has characterized it. What's new here?
I will give you a different scenario later on. I wasn't thinking of Active Defense here, quite honestly. Certainly I see why you might.

The difference between the above and Soviet MW in OODA application is that the USMC concept of "wanting them to happen as automatically as I can make it" is that it's non-formulaic and decided upon by the man on the spot given the situation as he sees it. The Soviet MW approach, in contrast, is a preplanned response that is not conceived of on the spot, but merely applied on the spot. The Soviets distrusted initiative as not being "scientifically substantiated" at the tactical level and only allowed this at might higher formations--and even then, only during planning. Leonhard discusses this at length in The Art of Maneuver (pp. 113-121). I can cite the Soviet open source works on this issue, particularly Vladimir Lefebvre's notion of "reflexive control" which just doesn't work the same as what the West thinks of when we say "initiative."