I think we agree completely.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I have great doubts about anything to do with science in war, which is why I am sceptical of science based approaches. I tend towards the idea that the Military is a craft, rather than an art. Semantics maybe.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think we agree completely.
Wilf... why either/or
Art and science to everything...
There is a large body of thinking related to the space/time realities of combat operations that require a sound education in the physics of battlefiled math...
(Science) I need x amount of gas at t time at grid location AB1234 to extend legs of air mobility mission to hop BCT(-) 150 km north...
(Art/craft) because I anticipate that my opponent will to use the poor weather conditions to mask the movement of an Armor Div that most pundits say my opponent will never do since it protects the family of the tyrant we are fighting to depose
One without the other is useless, no need to relegate either to the trash heep
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
I would put that opinion in the box of not understanding science and being woefully uneducated in the various epistemologies. Don't feel slighted though I've found in the last decade few people even in academia understand the difference between empiricism and observation or induction and deduction. You are likely using the tools you are skeptical over but haven't been given a good understanding of where they come from. The very word skeptic is indicative of the rules based approach you use to knowledge acquisition. Science is as much art and craft as it is based on faith and rules. In attempting to separate you actually illuminate a common mythos of understanding the world of military affairs.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
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All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Not merely semantics if you understand it the way the Greeks used the terms episteme and techne, which we usually translate, respectively as knowledge and craft/skill. The ancient Greeks included Art within the realm of craft/skill.
And with regard to art and warfare, I submit that even art has different possible aspects. As a painter, I could be a Realist, Impressionist, or Surrealist (among others). I submit that the best military leaders, were they painters, would paint from a style palette that included a mixture: a little Monet or Corot, some Courbet or Millet, plus a dash of Bosch or Dali.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Well I used to think I had a pretty good understanding of epistemologies, and especially empiricism... but apparently not.
My direct experience is that the study of war from a practitioners viewpoint pays little regard to empirical observation and even less to the origin and development of the bodies of knowledge and teaching they take for granted. Manoeuvre Warfare being an excellent example.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Likely true. There is a big difference between simply using science or technology and studying the science or technology. Often when talking about the craft or art people are talking about the application of some set of principles that have been derived. Yet the second you turn around and start studying that application you move from application (technology) into science and the different methods and types that are inherent.
I know that is a bit circular. Consider this. When you are fighting a war and applying the principles and even defining new principles you are engaged in the craft and application. In this process you will be gathering evidence. When the battle is over and you are shaping your perceptions, gather ideas, and investigating and describing the way of war you are engaged in the science. There are a variety of ways to describe or use science in that process such as measure, test, gather results but there are others that are just as valid.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
To me this scientific vs art debate is like mental vs physical (or land vs air) . Well war requires both. Recently there was too much emphasis on measurable things (physical that is), the pendulum swings back now as we discover war is as much about mental/moral struggles as it is about physical and they are much more difficult to measure.
While mediocre leaders were excelling in one aspect, the ones who were able to combine both became historic figures. Lee, Patton, Rommel, Montgomery etc. were able to coordinate major operations and motivate their people at the same time. Former is pure science the latter is real art.
Just my 0.02 USD's.
Nihil sub sole novum.
I don't think anyone would argue that it does not require both or that a synthesis of ideas and disciplines may be appropriate and useful.
My "emotional" beef is with the attempt to try and apply technology based approaches to the philosophy, art and craft, which makes up the thinking that militaries do as a professional body. To me this is like suggesting that paint by numbers will make you a great artist or that fine art all about the brush and the paint.
Modern military thought (like modern art) has mostly used pseudo-scientific language and even altered, or constantly changing definitions. I might even suggest that some folk out there lack good enough common language to make any progress on the subject at all.
Again like modern art, I know a dog turd on a brick (call it EBO), placed in a gallery is not art.
Yes technology is vital. I can only be a writer because of word processing technology. Without it, I'd be a pretty poor shop assistant somewhere. Word processing enables me to write, but as my readers know to their cost, there is a limit to my insights and the usefulness of my writing.
Sorry to be contentious, repetative and even boring, but at least you all know where I stand!...and I may also be very wrong.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think it is a human failing to always want an either/or exclusivity situation. Frankly, I don't "get" the need to label warfare as "science" or "art", either. I'm strongly an intuitive learner, but I "get" the need to "do the math", too.
This "art vs science" debate over empiricist epistemology has been with us since Kants "Critique of Pure Reason" and Hume's "problem of induction".
Basing knowledge on observing what happens and relating that to causes is great in situations where reductionist approaches to determining cause and effect work. But we are finding more and more cases where this causal network is changed by our attempt to tease out those relationships, making empirical approaches unproductive. There how however ways to think about such problems that are "methodolically logical" (something that is often confused with "scientific" - but under positivism "science" has boxed itself into an epistemological corner in many ways) but look at what happens when things work together (synthetic) rather trying to isolate parts and assume indepedance (analytic).
This focus on synthetic (or in C. S. Peirce's triadic scientific philosophy abductive) reasoning is someting that current reductionist methods of empiricism are having some trouble with. Popper's critical rationalism and Peirce's fallible pragmatism and semiotic provide some glimpses into how to deal with these issues, but "its not soup yet"...
These issues have bubbled up into JFCOMs "post EBO thinking: such as:
https://jko.cmil.org/usjfcom-jwfc-jo...on-july-2008-0
which wrestles with "design" (synthetic, pragmatic in approach) as a counterpoint to "engineering" (analytic, empiricist in approach) and manner in which a variable mix of the two is required to solve "wicked problems" - like those in warfare.
This may seem like a lot of semantic mumbo jumbo - but part of the problem is we have gotten used to use words like "analyze", "science", and "effect" sloppily.
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
All very true. The synthesis of social, science, and intersection of technology create entire matrixes of implausibilities that can be observed but rarely explained.
At the suggestion of a council member I am currently reading Black Swan, which is interesting, and according to the author a new set of knowledge issues are appearing.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
I enjoyed the Black Swan (and being an 'analyst' doing a lot of 'synthetic' reasoning in my work, particularly liked his pointed barbs at analysts which were like IT types and Dilbert cartoons to me - over the top - but with enough truth to evoke a "laugh or cry" response) though Talebs "skeptical empiricsm" approach seems incomplete and could do with some more discussion relative to Popper and Peirce (and similar skeptics of empericism).
What is needed to my mind is more study of what is going on when we have "aha moments", "flashes of intuition", "moments of genius" or whatever you want to call it when concepts in our heads merge to form new wholes.
To bring this back to OODA loops - that is what is going on in the "orient" box of the OODA loop, which, when you zoom into it in boyds depiction almost makes you look for the box labeld "then a miracle occurs" rather than amass of arrows captioned "an interactive process of many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations and rejections".
This to me is where the "meat" of the OODA loop conceptualization is and its part most seem to miss to get to the "loopiness". "Getting inside your opponets OODA Loop is less about speed and more about geting inside his orientation process - understanding how he is constructing the context for what he is observing (which for organizations vice fighter pilots is effectively a continuum of data collection not a periodic "cockpit scan").
The reduction of this insightful framework of observation leading to action through a lens of contexual orientation that frames decision - and thus action to a mechanistic competition over information processing times, misses the point "its all about orientation" - properly understanding what you observe in context of what it is you are trying to accomplish. AND understanding that your adversaries are doing the same.
That we have reduced what Boyd characterizes as 'an evolving, open ended, far from equilibrium process of self-organization, emergence and natural selction" to "spinning our wheel faster" shows just how far ahead of his time Boyd was...(and may still be).
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
I'm going to be doing a review of a new Boyd book hitting the shelves soon.
I do have some thoughts though. Boyds OODA loop is very close to the drivers education IPDE, and motorcycle safety foundation SIPDE systems (search, identify, predict, execute). I think that is not a grand accident that these systems are similar though the Smith system (which IPDE/SIPDE are based on) pre-dates Boyd by 15 or so years. The systems are based originally in exercises/activities that are velocity oriented. Indecision or operational pauses do not occur in air to air combat or the traffic stream. Indecision in those cases is a decision to not act.
There are many risk/decision science models that attempt to insure "good" decisions are made and they usually do not include a "time" component. Balancing heuristic decision models against mathematical models each has an element of success in allowing fuzzy (gut feelings) logic into the model. None of them seem to really account for indecision or the need for instantaneous response.
In that void between the models is where I think the "black swan" lives. Where choice is either made for you by events, or discovered when pausing. I may not be explaining it very well but the symmetry has a particular appeal. Maybe after reading some more of Black Swan and even the new Boyd book I'll refute my own analysis, but maybe it will be an "aha" moment.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
@ There's another book? Or is this the Osinga one? That would make 4 books on Boyd, meaning he has more biography's than Liddell-Hart or Fuller.
@ Close? I'd say it's very close. Can you aim me at some source work on this?
...and, thanks to you, I have ordered "Black Swan."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
For SIPDE there is the wikipedia entry (pretty basic)
Some crazy internet writer has an article on it from about 15 years ago
Unfortunately the Smith System has been commercialized and is hidden behind costs to access (though the SIPDE wikipedia article has the five steps). IPDE and SIPDE both pre-date the Internet so you can find references to it from the past. IPDE was actually created by drivers education instructors attempting to expand on the Smith System.
A writer/rider Keith Code has written pretty extensively on the use of the different systems (and created his own).
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
In relation to these rediscovered wonders
Found a book at the second hand shop called:
A WAY TO VICTORY- The annotated book of five rings
(Miyamoto's Mushashi's classic guide to strategy)
Was I wrong to think it might be another descendant of some of our "great ideas
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Eating the OODA Elephant One Bite at a time...
I think I've captured all the relevant complaints about the OODA Loop concept and hope to publish a series of postings here and in the other OODA Loop thread (they'll be mirroring each other for starters) to hopefully lend some clarity to the issue, at least WRT how we in the Marine Corps intended to deal with it. That said, the concept is grossly misunderstood, mistaught, misapplied, and misused...and weeding through all that is going to be difficult. But separating all that chaff to get the germ of the wheat should be productive, if nothing else but to cast some light on what the issues behind the OODA Loop concept really are. Like any other concept, OODA has uses in situations best suited for it--and it is irrelevant in others or just plain dangerous in the hands of the unskilled. It's very difficult to make generalities regarding the concept outside of situations/scenarios. But I'll make that attempt. You'll find, however, that in a philosophical/conceptual disagreement I'll quickly "go to ground" in specific scenarios and situations, both to illustrate what I think your qualms are and what I think the proper understanding and utility of the concept is.
As an intelligence officer, I have a particular interest in the concept/model from a practical standpoint in designing intelligence architectures, systems, techniques and procedures, and in training Marines. How the OODA Loop concept helps me do this is something I probably won't get to for some time, because I've got to lay a helluva lot of conceptual foundation/groundwork to establish before I get there.
The complaints I see in the threads revolve around two areas:
The validity of the OODA Loop Concept
The utility of the OODA Loop Concept.
If you don't buy the validity of the concept, you generally don't think much of its utility. Even if you buy the validity of the concept, you may still think it's not terribly useful from a practical standpoint.
My Particular Bents and Biases on the Subject:
First, I am a "German School" Maneuver Warfare advocate for reasons established in other threads that I won't repeat here. I was also an armor officer with a light armored vehicle battalion commander in my tank battalion at one time (he retired a three-star general)--he was pretty big on deliberately designing shorter decision cycles with no compromises made on quality of judgments, even though mistakes were generally tolerated. But more to the point, I also learned "Soviet School" MW when in grad school--I got fairly engrossed in Soviet tactical cybernetic theory (what they termed "Troop Control" theory) which had very much of a mirror concept to the OODA Loop. Interestingly, the Soviets spent a huge amount of effort on the "Orientation" piece, trying to simultaneously shorten the time required to achieve it and increase the quality of the understanding to be achieved in that phase. Most of my judgments on the utility of OODA Loop theory is going to be founded on Soviet School MW practice, although there is quite a bit of German School MW utility as well. I'll cover both, but the German School applications appear relatively squishy in comparison.
Secondly, I was and still am a big fan of MW influences in commercial hobby historical wargame design and development. There have been a number of efforts to model OODA loop processes for various historical periods, but the "German School" MW applications of C2--decentralized command to facilitate tighter OODA cycle time--has been the most problematic to model. So far the most successful effort I have seen (but still not the most perfect) is the Tactical Combat Series (TCS) games published by The Gamers and Multi-Man Publishing. Repeated play of these games--which are overwhelmingly focused on WWII, naturally--provides some compelling insights into what is theoretically (and practically) possible with the concept in ground warfare at the tactical level. There are other titles and game design systems that also do a good job, but a little more abstractly which makes them harder to visualize what is happening and accept some of the game outcomes. I'll get into that as well much, much later--probably at the end of my discussion.
Lastly, there are limitations and issues regarding the OODA Loop concept, and my interest here is to increase the understanding of what those truly are as opposed to what many perceive them to be. I may not be convincing enough as much depends on your particular background and desires. But it's worth a shot. If anything, if you fail to agree with how I lay this out, at least you understand why I'm thinking in the way that I do...and if we agree to disagree, it's because we're coming at the idea with widely differing assumptions borne from widely different experiences.
OODA Loop Catechism: Establishing Articles of Faith
If you are familiar with my posts in discussion threads elsewhere, you can perhaps better appreciate why I used the terms I did in the title.
Instead of plunging into Osinga's description of Boyd's concepts of the OODA Loop and "fast transients," I thought I'd start with the foundational MW theory as Marines understand it and work backwards. That way I can uncover the issues regarding validity and utility one onion layer at a time so we maintain some coherence in approach and cohesiveness in discussions. We'll eventually cover everything mentioned so far (and I expect a good deal more besides), but it's a very large subject and it must be tackled in layers. Each layer is going to build on the other layers.
Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.
MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.
What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characterstics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.
MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."
What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).
MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.
What does this mean? If additional hitting power (strike) or force sustainment/survival (protect) cabilities are purchased at the price of speed and focus to gain leverage/advantage (maneuver), then the force is potentially off-balance vis-a-vis an opponent who enjoys better speed and focus and can leverage these to advantage. MW interpretations of history (and possibly narrow selection of examples--we can talk about those) are that, given the dilemmas regarding balancing strike/protect/maneuver capabilities, one is better off putting more initial emphasis on maneuver over strike and protect, given an uncertain situation.
MW Essential Premise #4: Where agility and action quality in executing "fast transients" have been historically seen as important and improvements made in weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operations, and training to accomplish these have been made, the explicit intent to design all aspects of military command and control around this idea is a relatively recent occurrence.
What does this mean? Command and control--in all its components and aspects--is to be explicitly designed to execute fast transients. What differentiates German School and Soviet School MW is how command and control is designed to achieve it; each reflects differing requirements, restraints, constraints, and compromises made between tempo and quality. German School MW uses Boyd's decision cycle as its means of explanation/analysis, whereas Soviet School uses a similar conceptual device but with different emphases in the subcomponents.
My next post will catalogue and investigate the challenges to these premises before we move on. Once that is done, we'll delve into the Bill Lind and the USMC interpretions of the OODA loop and the various challenges to the validity and utility of the concept.
The historical failure of airborne operations would stand in strong contrast to any historical support for this theory. The AH-64 deep strike failure in OIF is another historical counterpoint. Decentralized control provides greater “maneuverability” then emasculating the force structure TO&E
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