One good thing about OODA

[wm]

Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.

As I see it, the foundational beliefs postulated are all different ways of describing one thing: exploiting asymmetry with one's opponent. If you have done a good job, you are able to leverage your strengths against your opponent's weaknesses to win That does not necessarily equate to maneuver warfare. And it is no great feat of brilliance to saty that you can probably beat your opponent if you use your advantage well. However, your advantage has to be one upon which you can actually capitalize.
Some examples:
Rommel was able to maneuver much better than the British in N. Africa. He neded to execute all of his operational efforts quickly because he had a limited logistics base to resupply him. He well knew that he could not hope to beat the British once the American industrial base kicked into gear and started delivering. Once that happened, it matter little how well and how quickly Rommel could observe, orient, decide, and attack--he no longer had enough "stuff" in his arsenal to win against the industrial juggernaut whose products were lumbering across the Atlantic. If all you have is pebbles, how quickly you run around an elephant throwning them at him does not really matter. You will never win. And, once you tire yourself out, the elephant can just stomp on you when you have to lie down to rest.
I submit that a similar analysis applies to Napoleon's Russian campaign--no matter how quickly the French were able to campaign, they were unable to overcome the sheer geographical size of the Russian Empire. The asymmetry between "how fast" and "how far" resulted in a mismatch that French speed could never overcome.

[ericmwalters]

WM writes:

If all you have is pebbles, how quickly you run around an elephant throwning them at him does not really matter. You will never win. And, once you tire yourself out, the elephant can just stomp on you when you have to lie down to rest.

Yes, and the best case of this that I think you are alluding to (and I intend to get to this later) is Rommel in the aftermath of the December 1941 CRUSADER battles. I honestly believe there are more examples than just this and we can talk about those.

Which is why in this particular premise we use the "initial" preference of maneuver over strike and protect when uncertainty is high. It may not always stay that way. But you go in that way first. Of course, this means you must have the capacity to transition into those those other modes effectively--and ideally when your opponent is relatively unready for them. Ideally is the operative word. It doesn't always happen that way. In fact, it won't happen that way with uncomfortable frequency. The idea is that it happens often enough that--on balance--you end up gaining advantage more than you lose it and end up with net gain. And this is one of the implicit things about the OODA loop, particularly WRT the quality of decisions.

Indeed, some of the most interesting things about the CRUSADER battles is how often wrong the Axis was, especially in decentralized C2 modes. Fritz von Mellenthin is pretty blunt about that in his chapter in Panzer Battles. Yet because C2 was decentralized and because the commanders had an implicit understanding of intent, the mistakes were generally self-correcting. The most important Higher Headquarters intervention was when the operations and intelligence officers countermanded Rommel's orders during his "dash to the wire"--incredibly, German two-star and Italian three and four-star generals deferred to the orders of lieutenant colonel and major on the staff when Rommel couldn't be raised on the radio. Still, all that improvisation brilliance won the tactical battles but at the cost of the operational position. Hmmmm.

As the example and discussion points out, all is for naught if (1) you have no capacity for switching between strike, maneuver, and protect (again, a tip of the hat to Robert Leonhard for that insight); and (2) you neglect the essentials of Opertional Art/Campaigning--the sinews of which tend to be on side of force sustainment/survivability over the long haul. The first I hope to cover later, the latter I won't but it's worth noting because we see a number of other examples of this. I should point out, however, an institutional bias in the Marine Corps that papers over this last shortfall. We win battles. We are a purely tactical organization with only limited capability in campaigning compared to other outfits like the Army and Air Force. So it's perhaps natural that you don't see much discussion of this in Marine circles.

[ericmwalters]

reed11b writes regarding the MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.

The historical failure of airborne operations would stand in strong contrast to any historical support for this theory. The AH-64 deep strike failure in OIF is another historical counterpoint. Decentralized control provides greater “maneuverability” then emasculating the force structure TO&E
Reed

Hmmm. I probably need to talk about a SPECIFIC example here. Some will say that airborne operations were not historical failures. Even the German air assault on Crete in 1941--catastrophic in casualties as it was--proved an operational success.

The crux of the issue here is "maneuver" in the MW sense of the term and "decisive maneuver" which is what most airborne operations sought to accomplish on the battlefield, which was generally confined to a single, decisive, vertical envelopment. This is not what MW "maneuver" means, particularly when we are talking about the OODA loop. What "maneuver" means in this context is the imagery of two wrestlers, each seeking leverage over his opponent. There are many, many maneuvers--not just one that is judged to be decisive ahead of time. Indeed, the wrestlers aren't sure what pin or hold is going to win the match for them...or whether they're going to win on points.

Most airborne operations sought to achieve a military fait accompli on the battlefield--and this requires a very high degree of certainty regarding the situation to pull off. That's quite different from MW/OODA, which is designed to work in situations of relatively poor certainty/high uncertainty. The problem with airborne operations is that, once the troopers are on the ground, their ability to execute fast transients is extremely limited against certain kinds of enemies. So you want to ensure that the blow truly is decisive just by landing it where you land it, and not depend on the flexibility of the airborne force to overcome signficant opposition once it's on the ground.

Bottom line--you can't execute just ONE "fast transient." In this MW essential premise, the OODA Loop is judged to be an interative process that constantly repeats/cycles, and you have to execute "faster" and "focused" overall/in aggregate, if not in any single iteration. Airborne ops execute one fast transient (operational-level insertion to tactical employment on the ground) and then they can have severe difficulties after that.

Lest anyone think I'm poking the paratroopers in the chest here, let me just say that it works very much the same way for amphibious operations. The one crutch that amphib forces have that airborne forces don't is the potential for very high throughput of follow-on reinforcement and logistical sustainment, provided sufficient facilities are seized early on, compared to purely vertical envelopment. Interestingly, the USMC's initial and tentative forays into Distributed Operations and Ship To Objective Maneuver tended to be much more reminsicient of airborne operations, with all the attendant advantages and disadvantages regarding being able to mount consecutive "fast transients" once on the ground....

[Ken White]

The historical failure of airborne operations would stand in strong contrast to any historical support for this theory.

but do not agree that all failed; that's a rather broad and sweeping statement. However, we've already argued that to no solution or agreement so, for the sake of thread continuity, let's ignore it this time.

The AH-64 deep strike failure in OIF is another historical counterpoint.

I understand this and generally agree but I'm not sure what your point is.

Decentralized control provides greater “maneuverability” then emasculating the force structure TO&E

I don't understand this at all...

Do you mean that decentralized control can harm the ability to mass???

[reed11b]

Do you mean that decentralized control can harm the ability to mass???

No no no...I am a proponent of decentralized command! My argument was that it was more effective to improve "maneuverability", then reducing force structure and firepower as was implied by Col. Walters statement that "If additional hitting power (strike) or force sustainment/survival (protect) cabilities are purchased at the price of speed..."
Reed

[reed11b]

but do not agree that all failed; that's a rather broad and sweeping statement. However, we've already argued that to no solution or agreement so, for the sake of thread continuity, let's ignore it this time.I understand this and generally agree but I'm not sure what your point is.I don't understand this at all...

To further my earlier statement, an AH Battalion is a MW wet dream. Maneuverable and capable off fast transits, check. Massed firepower at point of decision, check. Direct C2, check. Yet the failure of the AH Battalion's deep strike operations in OIF are well documented. Why? Combined Arms and effective tactical doctrine still mean more in HIC. In COIN, I think everyone here is agreement that "slow is steady and steady is fast". To me MW just doesn’t quite "click".
Reed
P.S. I have read most of Boyd's works and agree with many aspects of his observations, I just don't buy Lind's "finished product".
P.S.S. I have still learned heaps from Mr. Walters writings, please keep it up sir.

[Ken White]

That wet dreams contribute much to a conversation but that's just me.

To further my earlier statement, an AH Battalion is a MW wet dream. Maneuverable and capable off fast transits, check. Massed firepower at point of decision, check. Direct C2, check. Yet the failure of the AH Battalion's deep strike operations in OIF are well documented. Why? Combined Arms and effective tactical doctrine still mean more in HIC.

I'm also not at all sure that decision to launch a bunch of Helicopters at a fortified location passes the common sense test, much less has anything at all to do with maneuver warfare. In any level of war, dumb moves and poor tactics will get people killed.

In COIN, I think everyone here is agreement that "slow is steady and steady is fast". To me MW just doesn’t quite "click".

It's like any other theory, you cannot apply it in combat to the exclusion of common sense; it's neither good nor evil, it just is. Use it when it makes sense and don't use it if it doesn't.

I'm still not sure what you meant by the other comment but then, I took Eric's comment a little differently than you did; I think by 'purchase,' he just meant local operational or tactical trade offs, not actual force structure changes.

[ericmwalters]

Ken White wrote:

I'm still not sure what you meant by the other comment but then, I took Eric's comment a little differently than you did; I think by 'purchase,' he just meant local operational or tactical trade offs, not actual force structure changes.

Exactly so.

[ericmwalters]

To recap:

MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.

What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characteristics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.

So here are the quibbles/challenges to this idea and the USMC Maneuver Warfare doctrinal responses:

Challenge: Speed alone is not enough. Even speed with focus means little if the focus is misdirected and/or speed only is in a single spurt and cannot be sustained.

Response. MW/OODA Loop theory has no argument with this particular challenge, but nevertheless maintains that an uncertain environment puts a premium on capabilities to enjoy greater speed of action/response than one’s opponent and the ability to focus that action effectively. The theory does not encourage reckless speed in a number of instances:

MCDP 1 Warfighting says (pages 62-64):

In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast, and there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly. With time we must consider the closely related factor of timing….Making maximum use of every hour and every minute is as important to speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving….A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We feel guilty if we are idle. We never waste time, and we are never content with the pace which events are happening….We employ speed and use time to create tempo. Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest opportunity. It is also a matter of timing—acting at the right time.

Additionally, MCDP 1 argues (pages 65-66

As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meaningful militarily onlyl if we are acting faster than the enemy. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed.

To be consistent, superiority in relative speed must continue over time. It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then because when we are not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, passes to him. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed but must then halt for a considerable period to recover between bursts. During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage. We realize that we cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, and the challenge is to be consistently faster than the enemy.

I’d like interject here that most of the complaints I’ve read in the threads are about acting so fast that no good judgments are possible. Nobody is talking about the other half of the way to win the OODA Loop contest, which is by slowing the enemy down. If you think your force is going too fast to effectively understand what it’s doing before it does it, then there’s the other option of getting the enemy to slow down to the point where this is less of a risk to your force.


Challenge: An overemphasis on speed/tempo in this sense means there is little provision for times when it is best to wait for the situation to develop out of uncertainty.

Response: The MW/OODA Loop is designed to help us concentrate on building capacity for speed/tempo and focus in execution of operations. There is a difference between the German and Soviet schools on how this works in planning, which we’ll have to cover in the future. But USMC MW theory admits that knowing when to act—and when not to—is part of the speed/focus emphasis. Again, from MDCP 1 Warfighting (pages 64-66):

Timing means knowing when to act, and equally important, when NOT to act [Emphasis in the original—EMW]…If our concept of operations involves a diversion, we need to allow time for the diversion to take effect. If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap. If a situation is still forming, we may want to develop it further before we commit to a course of action….Decisive action is our goal, and it must be timed to occur at the proper moment. There are times to act, and there are other times to set the stage and wait.

As has been said, simply using speed and focus is no panacea for effective thinking. Discrimination in application matters--and practice/experience in doing so is essential.

[ericmwalters]

To recap:

MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."

What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).

Challenge: If the OODA Loop concept was originally designed to explain how the F-86 could generate a higher and better tempo in “fast transients” against a MiG-15 in a Korean War era dogfight, is it still relevant/valid in understanding missile versus aircraft engagements?

Response: I would argue it certainly is. This is very clear if we look back to Vietnam War surface-to-air missile engagements—Randy “Duke” Cunningham knew exactly when to put his F4 into a steep dive when one of those “flying telephone poles” would come up to greet him. Timing was everything; the advantage the pilot had was he knew how the missile would react—after all, missiles had no brain. So if the pilot understood the guidance system, the pilot knew the missile G-loading characteristics (which were usually more than what humans could tolerate), the pilot knew the characteristics of his own aircraft, he could devise a response based on what he knew the missile was capable of.

Certainly as guidance systems and missile performance has improved, this has gotten harder and harder to do. Certainly the OODA Loop as ONE of a number of analytical lenses would help to paint the problem. Still, aircraft countermeasures against missiles (whether inherent to the aircraft or from other aircraft executing SAM suppression missions) are aimed at lengthening the missile engagement OODA Loop to the point where the pilot can effectively react and negate the threat. If we need to get into specifics here, we can, certainly…even if we are talking about theoretical scenarios.

But just an example, Missile Warning gear is intended to alert the pilot that a missile is in the air, giving him the option to divert or abort (or press on). In other words, it provides an “earlier” observation than he might otherwise get, leaving him more time for “orientation” and “decision” and “action.” “Wild Weasel” missions flying support for strike packages have a number of options that can be described in OODA terms. Is this the ONLY way to express what is going on? Certainly not. There are a number of other tools that are necessary to understand what is happening, what can be done, etc. Especially for the air defender, there’s a lot of game theory/queuing theory going on before the engagement so that decisions can be made in split seconds. Is that an application of the OODA Loop concept? One can argue it either way. On the one hand, some will say that “orientation” and “decision” times must be cut to an absolute minimum, so automated/algorithmic solutions are sought. On the other hand, some might argue that the OODA loop as the maneuver warfare advocates portray it is pretty much useless in such scenarios. Okay. This is a technical argument—I think the OODA concept applies, but I’d readily concede you won’t find any discussion of “reconnaissance pull,” “commander’s intent,” and “mission tactics” in this. Roger. But given what we have talked about regarding maneuver warfare, this would be seen as a relatively arcane discussion compared to the “larger” issues regarding command and control of larger units on the ground. That’s where most the arguments come in.

[ericmwalters]

Challenge: What makes us think the OODA Loop concept—if we believe it works to explain single entity versus single entity conflict—can apply to understanding aggregates of entities fighting aggregate of entities?

Response: This is perhaps the most important question regarding the applicability of the OODA Loop. Certainly a number of thread posters have expressed doubt about this. So this deserves a lengthier response.

We’ve already talked about the wrestler analogy—this is perhaps most akin to air combat maneuvering. A single decisionmaker pitted against another single decisionmaker. I need to elaborate a bit here, because Wilf and others have brought up chess players as an analogy—where does application of the OODA Loop work for chess?

I’d ague it doesn’t. For the simple reason that chess play is regulated by turns. Each side will ALWAYS get to react to the move of the opponent’s last move. There are no possibilities to get in two moves instead of just one. I get a move, you get a move. So the pace/tempo of the game is regulated by the rules.

Now, it’s been brought up that, given timed moves, a player that exhibits superior OODA capabilities should be able to apply this to win. True, but irrelevant to OODA loop implications that I’ll get into in a bit. Sure, expert players can “orient” and “decide” better and faster. But the issue is ultimately about quality of the moves. The players (or the tournament) decide ahead of time how long the chess clock limits are. Those limits never change. And the question comes down to quality of decisions made in that never-changing time limit. I just don’t think this equates to war very well.

Now, for those familiar with Ed Glabus and Aegis Corporation’s old InfoChess game, elements of the OODA are introduced. It’s a double-blind game with the ability to buy Information Operations capabilities. It’s very possible in that game that the opponent won’t get to execute his move when it’s his turn, particularly if he’s the victim of a successful Electronic Attack (EA) mounted by his opponent. But this is relatively rare—most of the issues in InfoChess involve quality of the moves. Players are bent on deception and operations security versus intelligence and counterintelligence most commonly. Even in InfoChess, there is still that pacing function. Sure, you have a better shot at getting into two moves to the opponent’s one given a successful EA operation, but this is an example of lengthening the enemy’s OODA Loop and not tightening your own and dealing with the consequences of that.

Maneuverists do talk a good bit about chess masters. But mostly it’s about expertise—and how that expertise means that true experts take much less time to orient and decide. That’s why MW is so difficult. You need experts—and you need to develop them. The maneuverists argue that the results are worth the cost. If you disagree with that—that the U.S. military cannot grow that many experts—then the argument is pretty much over. You and the “German School” maneuverists have different assumptions and value systems; you aren’t going to be able to agree on anything. However, you may have something in common with the Soviet school, more on that later.

Anyway, back to the issue at hand--

An understanding of OODA Loop theory, developed from F-86 versus MiG-15 dogfights, explains much regarding why some ACM matchups in Vietnam worked the way they did. And Boyd certainly applied this understanding to E-M theory, which revolutionized how we design and evaluate fighter aircraft. Okay. If somebody wants to attack that idea, I’d welcome it. But let’s assume for a minute that this is true. What makes Boyd make the leap into other realms of war, particularly those involving larger formations?

Most of the maneuverists will point to how basketball players play basketball. Or soccer players play soccer. Or hockey players play hockey. Or so on. Sure, offensive/scoring ability counts, defensive skills count, but being able to manipulate the tempo of the game is something each team strives to achieve. In “blowout” games, usually it’s pretty clear the winning team completely dominated the opposition, being able to pre-empt, dislocate, and disorient the other team. Those maneuverists, such as John Schmitt, will explain this effect in OODA Loop terms. IN such instances, Schmitt points to the lateral communication between the team members—the coach is unable to influence much of the play from the sidelines compared to other games such as American football or baseball. The game is in the hands of the players. These kinds of games show recon-pull in action. When gaps or holes in the defense are found, players naturally gravitate to it/exploit it without waiting for someone (like the coach or the team captain) to tell them.

The question is whether you can believe that this analogy will hold for larger aggregates of units in violent competitions where there are higher levels of uncertainty.

Both the German and Soviet school advocates will concede that this holds—the OODA Loop is applicable in such instances. The difference between them is with regard to where the experts are. For example, to use the basketball analogy—do I have a team that’s played several seasons together? If I do, the players are able to decentralize command and control and implement “recon pull” to immediately exploit discovered gaps. The commander doesn’t have to explicitly direct such exploitation. Soviet school pretty much assumes you have a “pick up”/”back lot” basketball team—team members don’t know each other, implicit communication is at a minimum, and so on. So there’s much more emphasis put on preparation—speed and focus is achieved through better planning BEFORE the operation, as opposed to German school which depends on speed and focus occurring DURING the operation.

So the basic question that differentiates the two schools boils down to this: do you have people that can make independent decisions? If you believe that can’t happen at lower levels—such independence is reserved for senior levels—then you are a Soviet school advocate. If you think you can grow that kind of effective independence at low levels, then you’ll lean to the German school.

Commercial wargaming provide some potential insights. My favorite system to explore this is the MMP/The Gamers Tactical Combat System. In this game, players have to write operations orders with sketches in order for units to conduct operations. You must designate objectives, provide control measures (where to move, what unit boundaries are, etc), and so on. The interesting thing about the game system is that units don’t obey orders as soon as they get them. A number of variables come into play. The first (and some say the most important) variable is how quickly the inherent command and control system accepts new instructions. There are other variables, such as whether the formation is currently in contact or is out of contact (better). And so on. Every turn that an new order is levied against a formation, a die is rolled. The player cannot possibly be sure WHEN a formation will accept and then execute a given order. Playing the numerous games in this series leads players to prefer the sides that have the lowest implementation values. In other words, players want to play the side that accepts and executes orders faster. While they can’t predict when orders will be accepted and executed, there is the possibility that one side will accept and execute orders faster than the other side. While there are exceptions on a case by case basis (i.e., occasionally luck will cause the slower unit to execute orders faster than the faster unit), overall the faster implementing side will get the majority of “jumps” on the opponent in conducting operations. This is a huge insight and leads to a depth of understanding regarding how the OODA Loop works in practice.

But this won’t be convincing to a number of people who will want to judge how well this works given historical examples. Maneuverists will point to a number of well-worn examples where shorter OODA cycles (for the German School, this typically involves recon-pull examples) contribute to situations where the enemy’s actions are rendered “too little, too late.”

[ericmwalters]

Challenge: If one admits that the OODA Loop concept does apply to aggregates of entities fighting aggregates of entities (i.e., it is indeed valid), how can one know that one is being effectively faster in such a context? By the time you detect/see the results of your speed, isn’t it too late to effectively exploit it?

Response: This is another extremely serious question. The kind of answer you get depends on which MW school you belong to—German school or Soviet school.

First of all, Boyd wasn’t the only one who believed the OODA Loop concept applied to aggregates. The Soviets believed much the same thing as articulated in their “Troop Control” algorithms. Their basic equation for Troop Control ran like this: Tcon (Time needed for effective Troop Control) was equal to T1 (time for effective reports to HQ) + T2 (Headquarters functioning, to include direction from higher headquarters) +T3 (time for orders and signals for the headquarters to reach the unit of action. According to the Soviets, C2 was operative if “Tcon (T1 + T2+ T3) + Top (the time it took for the receiving unit to execute) < Tcrit…with Tcrit being the “critical time” or the time within which the operation must be executed to have the intended effect. A great deal of foundation work in this regard was laid out by Altukhov in “Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control” in 1984. It’s difficult to say whether Altukhov was influenced by Boyd or not. We just don’t know.

So, given the Soviet algorithm. T1 = Observation. T2 had elements of Orientation and decision contained within. T3 and Top were the “action” elements of the OODA. It is very clear they understood that you had to tighten the Tcon loop to beat the Tcrit parameter.

Here is where the German school diverges from the Soviet school. To the Soviet school, the problem of detecting change in time to effectively take advantage of it is huge. Basically, they admit that it can’t be reliably done—and “reliably” is the operative term. So the focus is on preparation before the operation. Likely outcomes are calculated ahead of time and when conditions roughly approximate the preconditions for one of the options, then that option is chosen and pushed through. Here the idea is that the high command will be ready for certain sets of conditions with a “branch plan” or “sequel” ready for execution. If something unexpected comes up, it isn’t seized upon, even if it appears to be advantageous. That’s just how it is. So if you believe that a command and control system cannot possibly take advantage of the unforeseen in a reliable way, you tend to subscribe to Soviet school MW. The way to deal with uncertainty is to prepare like nobody’s business and execute violently but according to the plan (with all its branches and sequels).

On the other hand, German school embraces uncertainty and expects to “recon-pull” its way through the problem. So the German school adherents also admit that higher headquarters can’t judge the outcomes of actions in enough time to take advantage of them. So what the German school adherents advocate is decentralization—units see local conditions and act immediately, consistent with the higher commander’s intent. Decentralization buys the required speed—the cost is possibly the unity of effort. Commander’s intent is supposed to provide that unity of effort. Sometimes that occurs, sometimes it doesn’t. The criticism against German school MW is basically that you may not be able to rely on commander’s intent to govern initiative. If you don’t have cohesion, if you don’t have practiced experts, then I’d agree that they are right.

Of course, the requirements for expertise and cohesion throughout the system to accomplish this are much higher than it is for the Soviet school. It’s a lot less efficient but judged to be more effective. Like the basketball team, the players move the ball down the court and make the shots—there’s not much the coach can do on game day. His role was getting the team ready to play.

The German school advocates have a number of illustrations to show what they mean—and let’s admit it, these examples are pretty much a “best case” solution set. My favorite is SSgt Ruhbarth on the Meuse in 1940, pretty much pulling Guderian’s river crossing behind him (you can read all about that in Robert Doughty’s excellent book, The Breaking Point). And there are other equally compelling examples. But what is lacking are case studies that show breakdowns in this kind of command and control system. We have no shortage of cases showing the failures of Soviet School Maneuver Warfare (and I can provide those if anyone is interested). But we lack a comprehensive body of cases that show the risks in German school MW. Robert Leonhard tried to suggest one—Guderian’s conduct of the Battle of Yelnia in 1941—but I’d argue it’s not a good case (and I can provide my rationale why to anyone who asks—just send me a Private Message and I’ll send you a paper on it). Yet, I bet there are others. That said, I sense that these cases are illustrating poor applications of the theory rather than flaws in the theory itself. Of course, one might say the same thing about the Soviet school failures.

There are a number of cases that suggest the disadvantages of the German school approach that I will get into later. As far as the Soviet school failures, I would hope these are relatively self evident, but they may not be to some reading this thread. All I will say is that--despite these failures--they were good enough against the Germans and Japanese at the operational level of war to achieve success. This why Soviet School MW (and their understanding of the OODA Loop) is alive and well, even to this day.

There was no way the Soviets could attempt a German school solution. They had too many languages, conscription (even for NCOs) meant only a two to three year obligation, professionals were only to be found in the officer class—and of these, only at the field grade level (if at that) and above. The operative Soviet school problem was the risk that the situation would outrun the plan. They solved that through the echelon concept—basically, units would only be asked to do one thing and one thing only. Once they were done with that one thing, other units would follow them and carry on the fight. Therefore there was a huge emphasis on reconnaissance so units could prepare and plan to do that “one thing” and nothing more. Once units completed their mission, they were “expended.” Nothing further was asked of them. Other units continued the operation.

I’d hope this illuminates the effective challenges to this very key “MW Essential Premise.” Much depends on your particular experiences, studies, biases, and preferences as to whether you buy into Soviet or German school interpretations of the OODA Loop and how to implement it, or reject it altogether.

[reed11b]

German school of doctrine has two interesting dynamics that the American school has never adopted. One is the "General Staff" that created fairly concise strategic planning and guidance and the other is the decentrilization discussd in depth on this thread. American military has always paid lip service to decentrilization but never IMO actully utilized it well. What are the positives and negatives of there two concepts and why have American forces never truly adopted them?
Reed

[William F. Owen]

On the other hand, German school embraces uncertainty and expects to “recon-pull” its way through the problem. So the German school adherents also admit that higher headquarters can’t judge the outcomes of actions in enough time to take advantage of them. So what the German school adherents advocate is decentralization—

Is the "exploitation of opportunity" the same as Recon Pull?

The words "Recon Pull" were dropped from UK ADP Land OPs, because of the argument of two Officers, both of whom had served with the German Army and one of whom had attended their Staff Collage.

[ericmwalters]

Wilf writes:

Is the "exploitation of opportunity" the same as Recon Pull?

Not at all. One can find and exploit opportunity without recon-pull. It's just slower. Reconnaissance pull means that your picket line/recon screen/forward elements find the gaps in the enemy disposition and immediately contact adjacent units laterally...these adjacent move towards and through the gaps if not given the mission to fix a particular enemy formation. Nobody is waiting for the commander to tell people to move in that direction. They just go. The unit commander will show up if the gap persists, potentially committing reserves and calling his adjacent commanders to follow him through.

Lind provides a very brief encapsulation in Maneuver Warfare Handbook on pages 18-19:

For a platoon, company, or even battalion commander, an enemy weakness is likely to be a physical gap in the enemy's position. How can he find the gap? Through what we call "reconnaissance pull" or "recon-pull."

Currently, most Marine units use the opposite of recon-pull tactics, called "command push." The axis of advance is chosen before the operation begins, and it is seldom altered. The commander pushes however many forces are needed down that axis to make the attack successful. Of course, this often results in throwing strength against strength. With recon-pull, the axis of advance is determined by the results of reconaissance rather than being fixed by command from above, and it shifts in response to what the recon finds.

An exapmle of one type of attack may be helpful in understanding this. Your forward element is a reconnaissance screen. Its job is to look for surfaces and gaps. When it finds a gap, it goes through, and calls other forces to follow. [my emphasis--EMW] If the gap seems to be promising, the unit commander commits more forces through it. Some of the forces widen the gap and roll out behind the enemy position that has been penetrated, collapsing it from the rear. Meanwhile, the reconnaissance screen continues to move forward, always seeking the path of least resistance. The recon pulls the main force around the enemy surfaces and ever more deeply into the enemy position.

Recon-pull requires a different type of reconnaissance from what Marines are used to. Today, most recon forces are committed deep, along the axis of advance chosen for the "command push." There is no reconnaissance screen. For recon-pull, you must have a recon screen. It is different from a security screen, in that it orients on the enemy, not on your own unit. It must be strong. Indeed, all your forward forces must be a part of it. In maneuver warfare, recon is everyone's responsibility.

The key to empower this recon-pull is lateral communications, as MCDP 1-3 Tactics instructs on page 75-76:

If all communication is up and down the chain of command, action will move slowly. If commanders and leaders at every level communicate laterally--if we, as leaders, talk directly to other leaders--action moves much faster....It results from the confidence of the higher commander who through past experiences has found that subordinates can exercise initiative based on the assigned mission and the commander's stated intent.

A good example of lateral communication comes from aviation. In the air, the pilots of a flight of aircraft communicate laterally as a matter of course. A pilot who needs to talk to another does so. A message need not go through the mission commander and then be relayed to the other pilot. Events would quickly outpace communication if pilots tried to talk that way. The same procedures may be employed by ground combat and logistics units as well.

This is very messy, as Lind points out (page 7):

The "reconnaissance pull"...tactics of the German Blitzkrieg were inherently disorderly. Higher headquarters could neither direct nor predict the exact path of the advance. But the multitude of German reconnaissance trusts generated massive confusion among the French in 1940. Each was reported as a new attack. The Germans seemed to be everywhere, and the French, whose system demanded certainty before making any decisions, were paralyzed.

Or course, a number of those gaps are going to turn out to be traps. Yep. And follow-on forces that survive will in turn recon-pull their way through newly developed gaps that perhaps aren't traps. And some will be traps. This is one of the reasons why MW can be so expensive in terms of casualties--particularly those of junior leaders who generally are at the front end, positioning themselves where they can change the direction/mission of these units.

But against a slower acting enemy, reconnaissance pull can have some devastating effects as the friendly force quickly infiltrates/penetrates/flanks/envelops faster than the other side can react, much less drive the situation.

Against an enemy that as just as agile, you get a very high-tempo battle and a lot of attrition!

[Kiwigrunt]

Let me first of all say that I’m loving these threads. A lot of it goes over my head but I’m learning plenty.

Or course, a number of those gaps are going to turn out to be traps. Yep. And follow-on forces that survive will in turn recon-pull their way through newly developed gaps that perhaps aren't traps. And some will be traps. This is one of the reasons why MW can be so expensive in terms of casualties--particularly those of junior leaders who generally are at the front end, positioning themselves where they can change the direction/mission of these units.

Is there not also a danger that if it is a trap, and you pull your lateral ‘friendlies’ into that black hole, you leave your flanks wide open for the enemy to recon pull all over you? Especially since recon pull appears to be based on committing a lot of your strength ‘up’ at the front in this recon role. That might suggest little weight in depth. Or am I seeing this wrong? Is this forward line thin enough to leave enough reserves? I suppose this is where my confusion is. At what point does recon pull default into command push?

Against an enemy that as just as agile, you get a very high-tempo battle and a lot of attrition!

A lot of attrition in MV? Hmmm... It appears that this would suggest ‘full circle’, which would support Wilf’s concerns against differentiating between the two.

[Steve Blair]

German school of doctrine has two interesting dynamics that the American school has never adopted. One is the "General Staff" that created fairly concise strategic planning and guidance and the other is the decentrilization discussd in depth on this thread. American military has always paid lip service to decentrilization but never IMO actully utilized it well. What are the positives and negatives of there two concepts and why have American forces never truly adopted them?
Reed

I think that some of the reasons go back to the innate distrust that existed for many, many years between the government (and public in many cases) and the standing military. Prior to World War II the thrust was always to keep the army as small as possible (and often so small that it couldn't perform its duties well), and any attempt to professionalize the officer corps was seen as "Prussianism" (a derogatory term in those days) and a threat to democracy in the case of some extremists. There was also a distinct separation between the line and the staff, with the staff seen by the line as a bunch of lazy bastards using their political connections (most staff assignments were in Washington) to avoid doing any real work. Heck, back then the general in chief didn't really command a fair part of the army. With structure like that, how could you have a general staff?

In terms of decentralized control, I'd argue that the army did practice this to a great degree during the Indian Wars period and also before World War I, but out of necessity rather than any doctrinal planning or thrust. It varied from regiment to regiment, but in many cases junior officers (and NCOs) were left to conduct their local affairs based on very general guidance from their superiors (an early version of commander's intent?). Interestingly, as communication methods improved, such decentralized control went away. I'd argue that part of this also had to do with the view of the army as a nucleus that large "volunteer forces" would grow around in time of national emergency (as sort of happened during the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and in an altered fashion during World War I). Faced with a large influx of unskilled men in command positions, centralized control became the order of the day.

Positives and negatives? Well...I'd say that both a good general staff and decentralized control depend to a great degree on personalities, so there's a possible positive and negative right there. Both depend on a well-educated and professional officer corps, as well as solid NCOs, to achieve maximum results. You also have to view staff duty as something of an honor and not a "staff puke."

I'd say in the German experience the general staff model led to a fixation on the operational level of war and something of tunnel vision when it came to anything other than ground operations. With the French it led to extremes in theoretical thinking. The British had issues, I think, based more on the historical composition of their officer corps (at least prior to and during World War I), but I'm not an expert on either the French or British militaries, so I'll leave more detailed comment (and rebuttal of my generalizations) to those who are....

[William F. Owen]

One can find and exploit opportunity without recon-pull. It's just slower. Reconnaissance pull means that your picket line/recon screen/forward elements find the gaps in the enemy disposition and immediately contact adjacent units laterally...these adjacent move towards and through the gaps if not given the mission to fix a particular enemy formation. Nobody is waiting for the commander to tell people to move in that direction. They just go. The unit commander will show up if the gap persists, potentially committing reserves and calling his adjacent commanders to follow him through.

I guess I come from the school of thought, where I want my Recon Forces to find the enemy and not the gaps. I want my Recon Forces to begin fixing/reducing the freedom of action of the enemy, so that my teeth arms can destroy him. Recon is just the whiskers for the tooth and claw.

Lind's examples always seem very selective and even archaic to me. I'm not sure how "Recon Pull" would work in a formation level meeting engagement.

I understand the theory. I just don't see practical application.

[Steve Blair]

I guess I come from the school of thought, where I want my Recon Forces to find the enemy and not the gaps. I want my Recon Forces to begin fixing/reducing the freedom of action of the enemy, so that my teeth arms can destroy him. Recon is just the whiskers for the tooth and claw.

Lind's examples always seem very selective and even archaic to me. I'm not sure how "Recon Pull" would work in a formation level meeting engagement.

I understand the theory. I just don't see practical application.

There's plenty of application if you're looking to move where the enemy isn't. Part of the point of recon pull in the MW context as I understand it is to avoid the meeting engagement by moving where the enemy either isn't or where he's so weak that you can punch through quickly. Granted it's most useful in either mobile warfare or some sort of deep raiding activity (just to wet your "archaic example" whistle I'd submit that most successful Civil War cavalry raids are good examples of lower level recon pull...as their point was to move to an objective by avoiding contact), but that's also its practical application. It all depends on what your overall objective is.

Examples are always selective. It's kinda their nature.

[William F. Owen]

It all depends on what your overall objective is.

My objective is the destruction of the enemy. I'm a Clauswitian!

You'd always be looking to gain a positional and temporal advantage. I take that as read. Yes, I may want to infiltrate for the purposes of raiding, but again, I want to know where the enemy is, not where he is not.

I'm not trying to be a semantic pedant. The first core function is FIND, meaning find the enemy.