Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[davidbfpo]

I have quickly read the SWJ exchanges on the Crimea, plus today's interview, but the writing of Professor John Schindler IMHO is always worth reading:http://20committee.com/2014/03/07/un...crimea-crisis/

Leaving aside the diplomatic reaction, the reluctance in Europe, especially the UK, to respond with any economic / financial sanctions makes one wonder if NATO can move beyond the symbolic. John's column today:http://20committee.com/2014/03/08/de...-putin-part-i/

[jmm99]

The events in the next few weeks will evidence whether EU-NATO can be "reinvigorated" as Schindler suggests in today's blog, Deterring Putin, Part I. His article from yesterday, Understanding the Crimea Crisis, is more interesting for a number of reasons.

The first is:

As I write, the Ukrainian region of Crimea is being absorbed by Russia, more or less openly. This represents a blatant challenge to the post-1991 European order, make no mistake, and so far Vladimir Putin is winning. After a sudden increase in Russian military personnel on the sensitive peninsula, more than 6,000 troops, mostly Special Operations Forces (SOF), Moscow has pulled out all the stops in waging what I have termed Special War: provocations, espionage, black and white propaganda, and the use of deniable SOF, often under false flag. None of this is new to the Russians, indeed it’s second-nature to the Kremlin, and Crimea today can best be viewed as one huge operation by Moscow’s powerful military intelligence, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which controls not just defense espionage matters but SOF too, what the Russians term SPETSNAZ.

One should then read Schindler's, The Coming Age of Special War (September 20, 2013); and also his reference to Wiki's Active Measures, as one facet of the SW diamond. What he says is not new (he doesn't claim it is); and can be found in these samplings of the literature: Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare; Beaufre - e.g., Introduction to Strategy and Deterrence and Strategy; Liddell-Hart, Strategy: the indirect approach; and Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.

Schindler's conclusion is pessimistic on US capability to enter the SW lists:

Special war works when competently handled. It’s very cheap compared to any conventional military operations, and if executed properly it offers states a degree of plausible deniability while achieving state interests without fighting. The United States at present is not ready – organizationally, legally, politically, or culturally – to compete in special war. But getting proficient in special war will soon not be a choice, but a necessity. We’re already losing at it, whether we realize it or not, and the current trajectory is worrying. Over 2,500 years ago Sun Tzu, an early advocate of special war, argued that the acme of skill is not winning battles, rather subduing your enemy without actually fighting. It’s about time the Pentagon caught on.

--------------------------------

The second point is EU-NATO (laid out in more detail in today's article linked in the opening paragraph), whose direction (up or down) will be determined by its actions and/or inactions in the near future. Schindler may be right about what the US and EU nations will do to deter Putin; but I'll wait until the check is in the mailbox.

--------------------------------

The third point includes the USG foreign affairs mindset (which goes beyond this event, in matters large and small), which often stumbles over its own feet (links to two other Schindler articles, link1 and link2; the first being about my "buddy" Samantha Power); and, as proponents of more delicate matters:

... they have quite literally nothing to say when old-school conventional threats emerge and enemies – yes, enemies: not rivals or merely misunderstood would-be partners – emerge from the darkness with conquest and killing on their minds.

but also, the third point goes to the urbane Worldview held by many people in the US (people from EU states can judge whether it applies to their countries or not):

In the present-day West, it’s commonplace to have a laugh at Vladimir Putin’s weirdly macho (and more than a little homoerotic) posturings, and I’ve done it too – how not, among the panoply of martial arts, bears, and countless shirtless adventures before the cameras? Yet in Russia they love this stuff, without a laugh-track. They are not yet as post-modern as we are, and they find reassurance in an old-school leader who talks about – and more importantly demonstrates – strength in a dangerous world.

To these folks of refined delicacy, "Suvarov's" love of the infantry spade would be too remote to seriously contemplate:

The spade is not only a tool and a measure. It is also a guarantee of the steadfastness of the infantry in the most difficult situations. If the infantry have a few hours to dig themselves in, it could take years to get them out of their holes and trenches, whatever modern weapons are used against them.
...
This is a book about people who throw spades and about soldiers who work with spades more surely and more accurately than they do with spoons at a table. They do, of course, have other weapons besides their spades.

One should ask himself, Am I an Athenian or a Spartan in Thucydidean terms ?

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Mike:

I don't understand the Athenian vs Spartan reference.

[jmm99]

A good question. First, let me first answer it in my own terms. A long, long time ago (a bit more than 60 years), I had the opportunity to do a lot of reading - and a mother who was willing to supply the books and teach the kid.

Since my interest ran to military history, I soon got into Athenians, Spartans, Persians and Macedonians. I came to realize that art, academics, historians, philosophers, etc., were mostly on the Athenian side - and that they were not bad in a fight either. So, as I recall, the Athenians seemed my path at first.

The Spartans were not bad in a fight either (a rank understatement); but they were a remote, rural bunch far removed from the more refined Athenians, who were as likely to classify the Spartans not as "Greeks", but as "Barbarians". Moreover, one could not easily judge the Spartans on words alone; they certainly were not verbose, and so "laconic". They tended to be blunt; without lofty rhetoric about their philosophical virtues, which was so much a staple of Athenian rhetoric.

As time went on in their war, the Athenians found it necessary to "refine" their philosophical virtues (such as "justice") to apply to reality - especially as the Athenian military position worsened. The Melian Dialogue is a traditional example of what I came to consider Athenian doubletalk.

My end choice (way back when) was to vote for being a non-bull$hitting Spartan - and not an Athenian hypocrite; that choice being based on the high school and college level history texts I was reading then (Thucydides came much later).

Any number of academic references to what I consider Athenian hypocrisy could be cited. I rather like this short (7 pdf pages) 1998 paper by Seth Delong, The Price of Power: Honor and Self-Interest in Thucydidean Realism.

He sources and sums up the dichotomy between earlier Athenian lofty rhetoric and later Athenian actions:

..."In times of peace and prosperity cities and individuals alike follow higher standards, because they are not forced into a situation where they have to do what they do not want to do." ... (3.82)
...
"To fit in with the change of events words too had to change their meanings. What used to be described as thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find in a party member." ... (3.82)
...
"Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils. . . Here they were deterred neither by the claims of justice nor by the interests of the state; their one standard was the pleasure of their own party at that particular moment."[10] ... (3.82)
...
"... there was a general deterioration of character throughout the Greek world. The simple way of looking at things, which is so much the mark of a noble nature, war regarded as a ridiculous quality and soon ceased to exist." ... (3.83)

At this point honor, virtue (arete), and all the noble ideals of Athenian democracy evaporated from firm social institutions into thin air. This is exactly what happened and it was this loss Thucydides lamented more than anything else. As one scholar asserted, "The humane side of Thucydides is centered primarily around his notion of an ethical community as a high human achievement, and he deplores the outcome of Athenian realism as a destruction of this achievement." Forde, Steven. International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism. International Studies Quarterly, June 1995. pg. 154.

The dissolution of honor was reflected both on the individual and interstate levels. Early in The History, in the first book, the Athenian envoys to Sparta describe why the Athenians sought to maintain their hegemony, even though the Persians had ceased to pose any foreseeable threat to the Greek city-states. The envoys state on behalf of the Athenians that they would not appease Sparta by dismantling the empire since "security, honor and self-interest" prevented them from doing so. (1.76)

They still considered their empire to be honorable because they treated their colonies as a stern, albeit protective father would treat his sons. Though unnecessary, their paternalistic treatment was allegedly honorable and humane, since Athens was so powerful that it could easily rule with an iron fist instead. But it did not and this is precisely what spurs the envoys to declare "we are worthy of our power." (1.76)

They go on to boast:

"Those who really deserve praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nevertheless pay more attention to justice than they are compelled to do by their situation. . . No one bothers to inquire why this reproach is not made against other imperial Powers, who treat their subjects much more harshly than we do; the fact being, of course, that where force can be used there is no need to bring in the law." (1.77)

What is so significant about this passage is that the Athenians obviously prided themselves on their sense of honor and the imperial consequent of that sense, namely, treating the colonies more humanely and justly than they had to. Later, however, as the ominous eclipse of raw power covers the sun of the once noble empire, the Athenians completely change their motives for maintaining their imperial position. In contrast to the motives of the Athenians at Sparta the Athenian representatives at Melos openly and unflinchingly asserted that justice and honor have absolutely no place in the calculus of a foreign policy.

Towards the end of the war the Athenians proposed to the inhabitants the island of Melos that they accept their role as a subject colony else they would be destroyed. The Melians appealed to the gods and abstract notions of justice and honor in order to protect themselves against the might of the Athenians. After the Melians finally declared they would not voluntarily succumb to Athenians domination the Athenians promptly killed the male citizens and sold the women and children into slavery. (Delong comment)

Power became so glorified as an end in itself that the Athenians could declare to the Melians:

"the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. You seem to forget that if one follows one's self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the path of justice and honour involves one in danger. Do not be led astray by a false sense of honour - a thing which often brings men to ruin..." (5.89, 5.107, 5.111)

How strikingly different from the Athenian assertion of their honour and "worthiness" as a noble empire just seventeen years ago at Sparta!

No doubt that the Spartans, besides conventional tactics and a willingness to die to the last man, would lie, cheat and steal in order to defeat an enemy. But, the enemy knew, or should have known that. The Spartans also were less than admirable in their treatment of the Helots (perhaps short-sighted when one compares the Romans' treatment of co-operative Italians).

What did the Spartans do in response to Athens' initial demand ? They went to war based on the logic of Sthenelaidas:

"The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double punishment for having ceased to be good and for having become bad.

We meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise, disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off till to-morrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer to-day.

Others have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words decide the matter, as it is anything but in word that we are harmed, but render instant and powerful help.

And let us not be told that it is fitting for us to deliberate under injustice; long deliberation is rather fitting for those who have injustice in contemplation.

Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance against the aggressors." (1.86)

After Sparta finally won the long war, it restored Melos to the Melian survivors - thus, as the Athenian said: "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."

Regards

Mike

PS: I classify the USGs of the "New World Order" (Bush I, Clinton, Bush II and Obama) as "Athenian" - the Beltway is "Athenian". Beware the "Athenians" and their "Sicilian Campaigns".

[Firn]

Voting fraud secured pro-Russian majority in Crimean parliament

I think this is a pretty interesting article as "Aftenposten’s correspondent interviewed a dozen members of the regional assembly, and talked to a number of central players and eyewitnesses. The conclusion is that the people’s will is far from deciding events in the Crimea. "

If one looks at how the events unfolded the Crimea (rump) parliament only called for Russian 'help' after Russian troops had already infiltrated and invaded. Under huge pressure, armed Russian gunmen only a minority was present when the voted.

Too few present

Rules require that at least 51 representatives be present in order to hold a qualified vote. The new goverment says 61 members of parliament took part. Aftenposten’s research shows, however, that only 36 were present.

- The system which registers who voted, and what we voted for or against, shows I did cast a vote. But I was not there. Neither were a large majority of my colleagues, says Sumulidi. Representative Irina Klyuyeva also participated in the vote, according to the official records, but she was not present either.

- I didn’t want to go, because I knew what was going to happen. Only pro-Russia representatives were present, and they numbered far below 50. In other words, a legal vote was not possible, she tells Aftenposten.

Those informations fill in some detail into the story of Russian aggression to make the processes and events of the invasions clearer. In at least another article I read how a Crimean parliamentarian considered pro-Urkainian was denied entry into the house. The big story does of course not change, but the case against the aggressor only becomes clearer.

This BBC article does also fit into the pictures on the streets, with pro-Soviet/Russia crowds being generally considerably older then the pro-Ukraine ones. It is of course difficult ot know the average age of the Russian 'tourists'.

@kaur: I will try to look at it if time permits.

[mirhond]

If one looks at how the events unfolded the Crimea (rump) parliament only called for Russian 'help' after Russian troops had already infiltrated and invaded. Under huge pressure, armed Russian gunmen only a minority was present when the voted.
Those informations fill in some detail into the story of Russian aggression to make the processes and events of the invasions clearer. In at least another article I read how a Crimean parliamentarian considered pro-Urkainian was denied entry into the house. The big story does of course not change, but the case against the aggressor only becomes clearer.

So, there is no evidence which could possibly change your belief into "pro-Ukranian Crimea" and any piece of infirmation you stumble upon would just reinforce it? Confirmation bias as it is.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias

[Firn]

So, there is no evidence which could possibly change your belief into "pro-Ukranian Crimea" and any piece of infirmation you stumble upon would just reinforce it? Confirmation bias as it is.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias

I'm very aware of that sort of bias, this is why I generally go first for the facts before I comment and use to cast a very wide net, from Moskva to Washington in four languages. But please, if you have anything intelligent and meaningful to add, make your case by good, even some arguments. So far I have waited in vain...

[carl]

So, there is no evidence which could possibly change your belief into "pro-Ukranian Crimea" and any piece of infirmation you stumble upon would just reinforce it? Confirmation bias as it is.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias

Mirhond:

If you guys are going to troll here as "Mirhond" work a little harder and have just one person do the trolling. When you switch off the quality of the written English and the sentence construction is wildly variable. Have a little respect for us and at least try to make it look good.

[kaur]

I'm just wondering why John Schindler didn't suggest in his post about Special war Mitrokhin's book "The World Was Going Our Way". He has mentioned this book before, but Ukraine topic is just like case from 21. century. This time you can follow influencing activites in internet and cable tv, that where missing back then. For example http://rt.com/politics/intelligence-...ng-social-619/

Book http://www.amazon.com/The-World-Was-.../dp/B0017HSXXQ

To continue topic " Deterring Putin, Part I" i'd like to suggest this paper.

http://www.ifri.org/downloads/pp40morgan.pd

Firn, this kind of voting is nothing new in Uraine

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=9o2j0WmxQvs

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kEIYjcjELdU

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=cG4VtDuBqBw

And in Russia too.

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XctKOIpYNCE

[JMA]

"the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."

Exactly, now we wait to see if Russia has misculculated (on the extent of her power) or not.

[jmm99]

with a much smaller US component than the EU-NATO states are used to. None of this should surprise anyone - and I'll posit that no one is too surprised.

From an American standpoint, the wall's been written for the last 2 years - of which, the following are typical:

US will pull two brigades from Europe by end-2014 (AFP; Jan 27, 2012):

WASHINGTON — The United States plans to complete the withdrawal of two of its four army brigades stationed in Europe in 2014, the Army chief of staff General Ray Odierno said Friday.

"We will decrease our European footprint by two heavy brigade combat teams, with the first one coming out of Europe in 2013" and the second in 2014, Odierno told reporters.

The two units are "heavy brigade combat teams" that will not be re-stationed in the United States, in line with plans announced this week to streamline the number of active duty forces, he said.
...
Each of the heavy brigade combat teams includes 3,800 troops, a spokesman for the army's European command told AFP. In addition to the 7,600 soldiers heading home, nearly 20,000 of their relatives will also be repatriated.

Moving ahead more than a year to Rapid Response Force Relies on Permanent U.S. Base in Europe (by Brian Slattery; October 17, 2013):

The U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (BCT) recently established an Army Contingency Response Force—a rapidly deployable company-size unit—to respond to crises in Europe and Northern Africa within a day.
...
The 173rd BCT is one of a dwindling number of permanently based U.S. brigades in Europe, which the Obama Administration and some in Congress have tried to remove, decrying them as wasteful Cold War relics. Two of the four BCTs have already been deactivated and removed from Europe. The justification given by the Obama Administration is that the BCTs will be replaced by a rotational battalion based in the U.S., a tiny force compared to one BCT, let alone two. This is not a legitimate substitute. ...

and finally from late last month, Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS, Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces; February 28, 2014):

Summary

On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review of potential future security challenges, current defense strategy, and budgetary constraints. ...

As part of the Administration’s original proposal, two armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) in Europe were to be eliminated out of a total of eight BCTs that would be cut from Active Army force structure. The Army had originally stated that it might cut more than eight BCTs from the Army’s current 44 Active BCTs. Army end-strength would go from 570,000 in 2010 to 490,000 by the end of 2017. As part of this reduction, the Army would no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, protracted stability operations but would continue to be a full-spectrum force capable of addressing a wide range of national security challenges. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves were not targeted for significant cuts. ...

The cuts in fact turned out larger, with three brigades scuppered on the Euro front (two down, one to go) says the Pentagon (CRS, pp.11-13):

On March 1, 2013, DOD announced a series of force structure changes for the U.S. Army in Europe from the period 2013 through 2016. The text of the news release is as follows:

DOD Announces U.S. Army in Europe Force Structure Changes

The Department of Defense announced today that Germany-based elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team will relocate within Germany and to Italy in summer 2013.

A total of four battalions will be relocated. Two battalions will relocate from Germany to Italy; the brigade’s headquarters and one infantry battalion will relocate from Caserma Ederle in Vicenza, Italy, to the Army’s new facility in Del Din (formerly known as Dal Molin) in Vicenza. The other two battalions will relocate from Schweinfurt and Bamberg, Germany, to Grafenwoehr, Germany.

In addition to the previously announced inactivation of V Corps Headquarters and the 170th and 172nd Infantry Brigades, the disposition of 2,500 enabling forces are provided as follows:

In 2012:

170th Infantry Brigade, Smith Barracks, Baumholder, Germany – Inactivated
...
In 2013:
...
172nd Infantry Brigade, Grafenwoehr, Germany – Inactivates
...
In 2014:

Headquarters, 18th Engineer Brigade, Conn Barracks, Schweinfurt, Germany – Inactivates ... [followed by a list of engineer, signals and military police units].

While part of this RIF belongs to budget deficits, it also belongs to a shift in US foreign policy which spans at least the four last presidencies (Bush I, Clinton, Bush II and Obama). That shift was popularized by the "Pacific Pivot"; but that pivot has been going on for at least a century. One must also take into account that the US has had four major campaigns since WWII (counting Gulf I and OIF as one) - all Asian ground wars. The lack of US success in those efforts suggests that we Yanks should limit our Pacific pivots to sea-air battles and island hopping.

Writing somewhat along these lines, we find Ondrejcsak, The United State´s Strategic Shift Towards the Pacific – Continuity and Change, (in Majer, M. – Ondrejcsak, R. – Tarasovic, V. (eds.): "Panorama of global security environment 2012", Bratislava: CENAA, pp. 25-41; 2012):

Abstract:

The goal of this paper is to analyze the global-scale trend of American strategic shift towards the Pacific and East Asia. This development will be one of crucial trends of international relations in the foreseeable future which will have a determining effect on the global security environment.

While immediately following the release of new U.S. Strategic Guidance in January 2012 it was referred to in the media and discussions as “something new,” in fact it is quite to the contrary. The most important driving forces and reason of this change started to emerge at least 2-3 decades ago.

The realization in the old continent came late due to “Eurocentric worldview” that was temporarily overwhelmed by events in her neighborhood and by the US engagement in Europe´s conflicts (wars in South-Eastern Europe as a most prominent example), but the rest of the globe realized it a long time ago.

Moreover, Obama administration´s steps toward Pacific and East Asia are to a large extent based on changes initiated or realized by previous administrations, particularly that of G.W. Bush. From that point of view Obama´s “Pacific shift” is a combination of both continuity and new elements based on long-term historical/strategic trends. On the whole, we are witnessing more of an evolution than revolution in US strategic positioning.
...
Historic and strategic trends

The United States possesses simultaneously both an Atlantic and a Pacific vector of its global strategy. The primacy of the Atlantic vector in foreign policy and strategy – with European allies as most important partners in world affairs – was based on “Europe first” tenet made during the WWII. That decision was based on strategic assessment that Germany represents a more serious strategic threat than Japan as well as on United Kingdom´s special relationship as the US most important ally. The emergence of the Soviet center of power, which decisively focused on Europe during the Cold War as well as in the post-War strategic environment, extended that strategic approach. Because of that primacy, the Atlantic vector secured its dominant position for half century in American foreign and security policy and strategies.

The collapse of the USSR and the diminished strategic rivalry in Europe, as well as the dramatic current self-demilitarization of European allies, compounded with American disappointment with them ‒ are among the most prominent sources of current trends. The financial austerity which has a decisive impact on the US military budget is also putting significant pressure on the prioritization of sources. We also have to take into consideration the non-existing multilateral regional security mechanisms in East Asia, and the inherited instability this causes.

As the central player of current world order, the United States has to react to the ongoing trends if wants to maintain its position. While the relative power of other-than-Western centers is rising, the United States still possesses sufficient capabilities as well as the will of its leaders to remain the main centre of power for decades to come. ... The US will not share the “destiny of the Netherlands” (by Paul Kennedy) – that once was the world´s leading power, and now is a small European state without decisive influence on global affairs – despite the rise of other centers of power.

Once upon a time (when the Pentagon confidently spoke of fighting 2-1/2 major wars), the US could be confidently expected by the EU-NATO states to back up its NATO "obligations" - regardless of its engagements elsewhere (e.g., in Vietnam). Such expectations today are delusional - or perhaps, the mental state could be called "excessive hopefulness".

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

I am trying not to pull this thread off target, but I have to scream out loud sometimes...

As part of this reduction, the Army would no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, protracted stability operations but would continue to be a full-spectrum force capable of addressing a wide range of national security challenges. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves were not targeted for significant cuts

Prior to our entanglements in Southeast Asia, the Army managed to conduct a moderate scale, protracted stability operations in the Balkans without dipping deeply into the Active forces. They turned the mission over the Guard. This was the ideal mission for the guard since, being a protracted operation over a static territory, it lent itself to the type of long term planning of rotational units that Reserve forces are ideal for. I laugh evertime I see that statement in bold above because the Active Army was never reorganized to conduct large-scale protracted stability operations. It just adjusted the FEBA to the edge of the wire and conducted search and destroy missions.


On the other hand, Active forces, which need to be called up on a moment’s notice, should be forward stationed IF your intent is to be a worldwide power (as opposed to only concerning yourself with homeland defense). This is particularly true of the Army since it is slow to move if not placed somewhere that is close to the fight. For example, you would never keep the forces needed to defend Korea at Fort Lewis. Since we are moving to regionally aligned forces, maybe they should be regionally placed as well.

[TheCurmudgeon]

One should then read Schindler's, The Coming Age of Special War (September 20, 2013); and also his reference to Wiki's Active Measures, as one facet of the SW diamond. What he says is not new (he doesn't claim it is); and can be found in these samplings of the literature: Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare; Beaufre - e.g., Introduction to Strategy and Deterrence and Strategy; Liddell-Hart, Strategy: the indirect approach; and Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.

I read this and, again, did not see anything new. We conducted Special War all over South America in the 70's and 80's. So I don't think that what Schindler discusses is anything new (and you clearly state that he does not claim that).

First, I must say that what is going on the the Crimea is not Special War as defined by Schindler. A key component seems to be deny-ability, something I don't think the Russian's care about. They are playing a different card (or cards). Domestically, this is a mission to protect ethnic Russians with a not so subtle subtext of restoring Russia to its former imperial glory. That card also plays to the Chinese, who did much the same in Tibet. To Westerners, who have a different perspective on legitimacy in international action, they will play the R2P and the "will of the people".

There are two ways to respond. The first the "instant gratification" option - fight fire with fire. Move everything the US has into the area and threaten to start blowing things up unless they withdraw and allow in a UN Peacekeeping Force based on the numerous violations of international law (I always have to giggle when I use that term "international law"). We could probably do that except that, the reality is that we cannot support it logistically without diverting resources from Afghanistan. Luckily, bunch of that supply line is already in place. Politically, we must have the will and the funding to do this. Reality here is that, it would bankrupt us to begin another large scale military operation when when we have yet to pay for the last two and no one is in the mode to raise taxes. Plus, it won't be us who feels the pinch immediately. It will be the EU who will have its Natural Gas cut off. At least we are headed into spring.

The second option is the "slow as steady" option of economic sanctions. They do work, but only over the long haul and only if you are willing to stick to them. They also have to be universal, something we were able to do with Iran but are unlikely to be able to do with Russia.

Where does that leave us ... heck, I don't know. I am thinking it is going to have to be a little of both. Rebuild NATO along with sanctions. I don't think we are going remove the Russians from the Crimea. I do think we can establish the conditions to deal with Putin the next time he acts.

I do agree with Schindler that the US has created an expensive military of limited utility. We can do a big war better than anyone else, but that is of little use when our enemy know that so they avoid big wars. So we end up paying way too much for a military that is not flexible enough to provide what we need.

OK, I have ranted enough. I will return this string back to the professionals.