Nice try but your FP article does not prove your contention. The fact that US SF teams trained to use SADMs in eastern Europe does not prove that EUCOM did not believe it could beat a Soviet /WP invasion of Western Europe. What do you know about MADMs and TADMs? Plans existed for their use as well. BTW, I believe the US stopped making/deploying SADMs in 1989.Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Come on wm---just where were you in 1989?---by the way officially yes the SADMs were negated out in 1989 but not everyone gave them up until 1991(remember US Army Berlin did not leave until 1994) and secondly was not the entire Cold War ended in 1989/90 so the further need was not a given. Having been on a specific team in a particular point in time in West Berlin I did in fact know what the USECOM wartime contingency planning was to be for us---slowdown, channeling, area denial deep in the GDR as well as in other Warsaw Pact countries---literally a one way mission to gain time.
If in fact channeling/slow down/area denial efforts were in fact part and parcel of the USECOM war planning ---slowdown until further troops arrived means just exactly what---slowdown until help arrives---help to arrive took on an average Reforger exercise over eight weeks to get everyone on the ground---do you really think without the nuclear piece in play US Army units could have hung on for eight full weeks until reinforcements arrived?---come on wm just how many Reforger exercises were you part and parcel of---you would not be saying this then.
There were some planners that felt in 1989 with the T72/80s in place in the numbers that were in the SGFG in the GDR the slowdown would have been at the Rhine---and that is defined as what by yourself---winning?
So wm exactly where were you in 1989 when the last Reforger actually exercised the USECOM war plan across all of Germany with all of NATO involved from Rotterdam to the inner German border and oh by the way with massive use of all US/NATO SOF units for the deep fight?
I know where I was---I lead the "Soviet" Anti SOF Response Company using Soviet TTPs against US/NATO SOF to verify if they would be effective---they were by the way--so again USECOM practiced seriously in 1989 the complete war plan and it foresaw a massive slog just to get back to the inner German border---far from a complete "win' we were a tad short --so I am not sure where you get your facts concerning a "win".
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-01-2014 at 09:26 AM.
wm---just a side note---some of us were especially far more in tune with what the actual war plans were for USECOM than even USECOM fully understood up to 1984 and then into the 1989 Reforger exercise as some of us spent literally hours dissecting them down to our operational/tactical levels as we were major players in the first critical initial hours and days until the rest of the US Army came over.
The unit that some of us worked for over the years has been finally allowed to have it's existence declassified 30 years (Jan 2014) after it's deactivation ---what we did, where we did it, and how we did it is still classified until 2044 as some of the techniques and procedures that we developed are still in use worldwide today by several elite units.
So there will be no books, no stories/rumors nor leaked articles on what we did---we will literally disappear as veterans into the world of silence having played major unsung roles for years during the Cold War and will take those successes to the grave with us.
So again some of us fully understood the USECOM war plans as well as the limitations of US/NATO Forces in Germany up to 1989 and a "win" it would not have been---better yet call it a "draw" if USEOM had been able to make it back to the inner German border.
http://www.fayobserver.com/news/loca...fe4c4a0bf.html
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-01-2014 at 01:16 PM.
I find it interesting that you claim to know the war plan better than the planners, but I doubt the veracity of that statement. More importantly, a plan is just a plan; it is axiomatic that no plan survives first contact. In fact, nearly every op plan I have seen executed was frago'ed before it was converted from a plan to an opord. At the lowest tactical level that may not be the case so much, but then units at , say, battalion and below do not normally write op plans, at least not in my experience. YMMV
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
wm---you still have not mentioned where you where during the very last 1989 Reforger exercise ---were you at least in an European based Army unit that participated---a yes or no will do and yes I do know the plans very well from 1989 as I was tasked to fulfill them both operationally as well as tactically and yourself? And then differently from you I had to exercise the Soviet doctrine against the opord.
See when you mentioned every plan you have seen was frago'ed then you are way past the 1989 timeframe in active service and in those years all plans were submitted as opords in 1989 as they Army then adhered strictly to MDMP not as they do now and simply frago everything that walks and talks and acts like a plan---AFG in some units was up into the 300/400 series ranged frago numbers---come on wm--served there as well.
Quit sidestepping that every plan does not survive first contact---the wartime contingency planning for Europe was drilled at every Reforger exercise (in addition to surprises thrown in to mimic opord adaptions on the fly) if you had participated in them which you have not so I am not sure why you assume you are in fact correct and you challenge other's veracity who actually participated in them.
Come on wm you really do not believe units such as the 2/3ACR or 11ACR could have "won" against the Soviet Ground Forces Germany Tank Divisons who had already the T80s in 1985/86 in large numbers---even the Abrams in Europe initially had the 105mm gun not the 120mm which came into theater later in larger numbers. The ACRs only had the Bradley's and a bunch of 113s come on.
If you have participated in the last Reforger from 1989 then we can talk and exchange experiences on long the 141 rides over the Atlantic we both had just to get to Germany.
Again when you speak of SDAMs and the other related weapons--speak from experience as I have been trained on the darn thing and deployed with it out a C130 all based on an USEOM opord not a frago have you? Then we can converse and exchange experiences.
Until then continue thinking USECOM was "winning" as this conversation is going nowhere.
WM---by the way just to refresh your knowledge of Soviet Army units based in just the GDR as of 1989 not counting their back up units in Poland---in 1989 we had only a max of 270K and it was a lot of combat support mixed in. A majority of these units were deactivated after 1994 when they pulled out of the then GDR after reunification.
By the way count the number of actual Soviet Divisions (yes they are smaller than ours) inside the GDR and then tell me just how many Divisions we had along with NATO on the ground physically located inside Germany and you wonder why we worried every time there was a troop rotation on their side as the size actually doubled as units came in and units went out and often overlapped for several weeks increasing the actual number of Soviet troops on the ground by a factor of 2.
Soviet 1st Guards Tank Army (HQ Dresden) · 8th Guards Mechanised Corps, the 11th Guards Tank Corps
2nd Guards Tank Army (HQ Fürstenberg) · Soviet 1st Mechanized Corps, 9th Tank Corps, 12th Guard Tank Corps
4th Guards Tank Army (HQ Eberswalde) · 5th Guards Mechanised Corps, 6th Guards Mechanised Corps ; 10th Guards Tank Corps
2nd Shock Army (HQ Schwerin) · 109th Rifle Corps (46th, 90th, 372nd Rifle Divisions), 116th Rifle Corps (86th, 321st, 326th Rifle Division) 40th Guards Rifle Corps
3rd Shock Army (HQ Stendal) · 7th Rifle Corps (146th, 265th, 364th Rifle Divisions) ; 12th Guard Rifle Corps (23rd Guards, 52nd Guards, 33rd Rifle Divisions); 79th Rifle Corps (150th, 171st, 207th Rifle Divisions) 9th Tank Corps
5th Shock Army (HQ Berlin) · 9th Rifle Corps (248th, 301st Rifle Divisions); 26th Guard Rifle Corps (89th Guards, 94th Guards, 266th Rifle Divisions); 32nd Rifle Corps (60th Guards, 295th, 416th Rifle Divisions); 230th Rifle Division; three independent tank brigades
8th Guards Army (HQ Nohra) 4th Guards Rifle Corps (35th, 47th, 57th Guard Rifle Divisions) · 28th Guard Rifle Corps (39th, 79th, 88th Guard Rifle Division) · 29th Guard Rifle Corps (27th, 74th, 82nd Guard Rifle Divisions) · 11th Tank Corps
47th Army (HQ Halle) · 77th Rifle Corps (185th, 260th, 328th Rifle Division) · 125th Rifle Corps (60th, 76th, 175th Rifle Divisions) · 129th Rifle Corps (82nd, 132nd, 143rd Rifle Divisions) · 1st Guards Tank Corps and the 25th Tank Corps.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-01-2014 at 04:17 PM.
firn---an interesting aspect of the sanctions that is now hitting the Russian companies on the sanctions list---they are potentially losing their US software licenses as they have been initially informed of such a move by the leading US software companies such as MS, HP, IBM.
They are some serious worries about being penalized if caught using turned off licenses plus the loss of technical support will hurt as well as well as the loss of security updates as well.
Outlaw, I think the statement of the RCB does actually reflect to a good extent the difficult position Russia is in. I wouldn't overestimate the impact of the software sector, but it is of course one aspect among many.
I think the RCB statement shows gives in it's condensed form a good quick snapshot of the difficult phase the Russian economy is in, especially if you have done first your in-depth homework.
From an economic point of view Russia suffers so far clearly much more as it was predictable and predicted. Stil it is important to remind oneself that it looks like a long conflict, with lots of unknowns.
Last edited by Firn; 05-01-2014 at 06:26 PM.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Outlaw,
Do you have some special link that the rest of us are unaware of regarding the last REFORGER? I have 1993, regardless of how effective or level of troop participation was. The date is either 89, 90, 91, 92 or 93.
If you insist on copying and pasting, at least provide the link and give the real author credit.
Such as...
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
The Group of Soviet Occupation Forces, Germany, was formed after the end of the Second World War from formations of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. On its creation on 9 July 1945 it included:
If you want to blend in, take the bus
That marvelously dependable source Wikipedia lists the last REFORGER as 1993. Interestingly, it does not list 1989.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Outlaw,
This is my last post to try to correct your distortions. Where I was in 1989 is no more germane than having Mirhond show you an identity card ( BTW, Don't bother asking for one from me.)
Had you really read the Wikipedia article from which you plagiarized the GSFG OB list, you would have noticed your list was the 1945 organization. Scrolling a little further in that article you would have seen the later (1980s). Your first tip that something was amiss in the list you posted was the inclusion of corps HQS in your posted OB.
Can we stop cluttering this thread with fantasies about how WW III in 20th Century Europe might have played out? I, for one, am done doing so.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
wm---giving the impression of actually understanding Germany/USECOM War Plan/Soviet forces and claiming "winning" is in fact playing the WW3 card.
That is unless you were actually physically in Europe and on the ground in 1989 which you were not so any comments on what was being exercised in 1989 from you are what correct or wrong?
By the way for your professional development search SWJ for an article on the critique of the Army's use of FRAGOs' vs OPORDs---it is enlightening as some of us have been complaining about this since 2006 as it especially applies to Bde Staff operations.
Check my comments on it---that might enlighten you as well.
Some of us know our subject matter and debating tidits here or there that are off or wrong or not correctly footnoted and or referenced is what 11th grade?
Maybe that is the reason JMA checked out of this conversation days ago.
Actually the thread could have closed down with the advent of the KGB/GSB mis/disinformation blogger who is online and providing his/her work back to the KGB/FSB for pay as well as profiles on every writer on this thread as well as individual email addresses which then leads onto FaceBook account holders and Twitter accounts.
And by the way the individual who did not provide his/her ID regardless of what you think is in fact a known entity working several other sites as well. The individual has helped in understanding the TTPs currently in use.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-02-2014 at 12:30 PM.
In 1989, I was not a member of POW Camp Berlin. Not that it matters, but I was preparing for an assignment to SOUTHCOM J2 where planning was ongoing for a little live fire exercise called Operation Just Cause.. But, like many people outside POW Camp Berlin, I was also happy to find that the Wall was coming down and GSFG would soon be out of the former DDR. I suspect that REFORGER 89 went forward as it did because its planning had been going on for at least a year. For most units involved in REFORGER, the exercise was the capstone event of an annual training cycle. And not uncommonly in training exercises, enemy forces' worst case scenarios are used; exercises are usually designed to stress the system. BTW, this last point goes quite some way toward explaining the array of Russian forces across the border from the Ukraine.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
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