Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[OUTLAW 09]

To all it is rather interesting to track Russian viewed news items on Interfax.com---------

Here is just a few interesting tidbits----

15:01 Moscow perplexed by OSCE/ODIHR's non-inclusion of its candidate in Afghanistan mission

Sometimes I am even surprised by what the Russians are thinking.

14:18 Russia against "higher ante" in Iran negotiations because of Ukraine events – diplomat

Again just what did they expect to happen?

13:23 Lukoil doubts domestic fuel delivery quota idea will be implemented

Sounds as if they are planning for actual sanctions and want to protect local fuel supplies.

12:51 RZD not much interested in Crimean ports - Yakunin

Now this goes to something Firm stated previously as well as did David.

[OUTLAW 09]

I have been interested in understanding just why China has been so quiet on the Russian violation of national boundaries as that is the key corner stone of Chinese foreign policy since the 80s.

Maybe it has to do with China receiving over 690M USD in weapons exports from the Ukraine last year and maybe in supporting very quietly Russia they want to ensure those weapons continue to flow.

Does anyone have a view on just what the Ukraine was supplying China with in the way of weapons?

There is some chatter that both countries are slowly nudging closer together politically/militarily as a combined superpower against the US/EU ie in general anything western.

So again did the US underestimate badly both China and Russia in its soft power thinking?

[AmericanPride]

So again did the US underestimate badly both China and Russia in its soft power thinking?

Absolutely. Even with the War on Terrorism, the last decade-plus has been spent idealizing "soft power" and "smart power" while second tier powers continued to build their military strength. When measured on military manpower, budget, and nuclear weapons, Russia is second only to the United States, and has about double the combined strength of France (#4), United Kingdom (#7), Germany (#19), Turkey (#23), and Poland (#29).Even while the Russian Armed Forces undergoes its transformation, it still maintains approximately 49% of the world's nuclear weapons to provide strategic cover for their military and political policies.

When the Yanukovych government collapsed, none of the NATO powers were in any position to unilaterally or collectively respond to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity. And I don't think it was even politically feasible, given the internal political dynamics of Ukraine as well as the hesistancy of NATO in the face of what would of course be a very strong Russian rebuke. Aside for "democracy promotion" in Kiev for many years, there were no other efforts to build a strong civil faction that could control the rest of the country or resist external threats. Ukraine is 25th in military strength on the account of its size, but not its quality, leaving it with about 3% of the military capabilities of Russia.

Given these facts, the outcome is a foregone conclusion and it was missed not because Putin is some evil mastermind but because we in the West failed to fully appreciate the entirity of the situation and to do basic long-term analysis.

[AmericanPride]

Still question why there was a disconnect between the military I&W and the decision makers---that was the purpose behind the creation of I&W---to have no disconnect--- and from your comment it seems to not have happened.

Because Washington policy-makers live in a bubble, and so do the political parties as well as the political appointees and media that fawn over them. Washington is still living in the "end of history" and can't possibly fathom that there are credible and serious challengers to American power abroad; much less formulate any kind of long-term policy to deal with it. And this is certainly reflected in everything from Congress, defense acquisition, and foreign policy. It's comforting to think that the American global position is unassailable, but when this assumption is made on the basis of ideological principles, we leave ourselves vulnerable to surprises by the decisive actions of others.

[Firn]

A slightly different take on the matter, but not entirely uneconomical...

Clauswitz, Book 1, Chapter 2:

In like manner the conquest of the enemy's provinces is quite a different measure if the object is not the destruction of the enemy's army. In the latter case, the destruction of the army is the real effectual action, and the taking of the provinces only a consequence of it; to take them before the army had been defeated would always be looked upon only as a necessary evil. On the other hand, if our views are not directed upon the complete destruction of the enemy's force, and if we are sure that the enemy does not seek but fears to bring matters to a bloody decision, the taking possession of a weak or defenceless province is an advantage in itself, and if this advantage is of sufficient importance to make the enemy apprehensive about the general result, then it may also be regarded as a shorter road to peace.

But now we come upon a peculiar means of influencing the probability of the result without destroying the enemy's army, namely, upon the expeditions which have a direct connection with political views. If there are any enterprises which are particularly likely to break up the enemy's alliances or make them inoperative, to gain new alliances for ourselves, to raise political powers in our own favour, etc., etc., then it is easy to conceive how much these may increase the probability of success, and become a shorter way towards our aim than the routing of the enemy's army.

That describes pretty much the current situation. Russia wants of course peace now and de-escalation after having annexed unopposed a weak and defenseless province because it's politicians, lacking power and military means, (rightly) feared a bloody decision and an even worse outcome.

But a measuring of strength may be effected in cases where the opposing sides are very unequal by a mere comparative estimate. In such cases no fighting will take place, and the weaker will immediately give way.

If the object of a combat is not always the destruction of the enemy's forces therein engaged—and if its object can often be attained as well without the combat taking place at all, by merely making a resolve to fight, and by the circumstances to which that gives rise—then that explains how a whole campaign may be carried on with great activity without the actual combat playing any notable part in it.

That this may be so, military history proves by a hundred examples. How many of those cases had a bloodless decision which can be justified, that is, without involving a contradiction; and whether some of the celebrities who rose out of them would stand criticism we shall leave undecided, for all we have to do with the matter is to show the possibility of such a course of events in war.

We have only one means in war—the battle; but this means, by the infinite variety of ways in which it may be applied, leads us into all the different ways which the multiplicity of objects allows of, so that we seem to have gained nothing; but that is not the case, for from this unity of means proceeds a thread which assists the study of the subject, as it runs through the whole web of military activity, and holds it together.

I think this underlines that with a focus on the great conflicts in our history we tend to miss those 'bloodless' decisions* which military history (back then) 'proves by a hundred examples'. This does of course take nothing away from the fact that:

The combat is the single activity in war; in the combat the destruction of the enemy opposed to us is the means to the end; it is so even when the combat does not actually take place, because in that case there lies at the root of the decision the supposition at all events that this destruction is to be regarded as beyond doubt. It follows, therefore, that the destruction of the enemy's military force is the foundation-stone of all action in war, the great support of all combinations, which rest upon it like the arch on its abutments. All action, therefore, takes place on the supposition that if the solution by force of arms which lies at its foundation should be realised, it will be a favourable one. The decision by arms is, for all operations in war, great and small, what cash payment is in bill transactions. However remote from each other these relations, however seldom the realisation may take place, still it can never entirely fail to occur.

*Not all of them Small Wars, I would say.

[AmericanPride]

I'm currently working on a quantitative assessment of national power (political, economic, and military) with an optional extended scale of science and social (soft power) dimensions. The intent is to capture the full breadth of a state's power. I've only included United Nations members. The methodology enables me to see what percentage of the global power pie that each state owns. These are the top five:

National Power
1. United States (16.23%)
2. China (7.47%)
3. Russian Federation (6.20%)
4. Japan (4.23%)
5. France (2.98%)
...
41. Ukraine (0.44%)

However, when looking at economics, the USA drops to #2 while Russia drops to #10. And when looking at military power, the USA and Russia occupy #1 and #2 respectively. Whereas the United States has 34.14% of the 'military pie', Russia has 15.27%. NATO military strength is 46.17% while CIS/CSTO is 15.75%.

So, a couple of insights bearing on this situation:

1) Russia is a 'great power' in the traditional realist sense. It is capable of exercising hard power on its neighbors. I suspect when I complete the extended scale, it's rank will decline on account of its underdeveloped 'soft power'.

2) Ukraine has no hope of defending itself alone against Russia.

3) NATO deterrence is only effective when the alliance operates in unison - the split positions diminishes NATO power. The combined military strength of NATO countries bordering Russia or Ukraine (Norway, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) amount to 0.706%. That's hardly a credible threat to Russia. France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and the UK have 10.02% military strength compared to Russia's 15.27%. In other words, an effective military option is dependent on the United States, but as we know, the importance of Crimea and Ukraine varies between Washington, Berlin, and Warsaw.

[OUTLAW 09]

For a country that claims it can resist the sanctions being levied against it this came up today on CNBC. Looks like the US understands the Russian economy (who has influence as an oligarch) better than Putin does. Maybe the NSA was right after all in pursuing their surveillance concepts overseas.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is calling on billionaires to pay taxes amid fears that a new wave of Western sanctions against the country over the annexation of Crimea may hit businessmen.

At a meeting Thursday with Russia's richest men in Moscow, Putin said businesses "ought to register on Russian territory and pay taxes in our motherland."

[carl]

American Pride:

That is an interesting concept. I think it is useful only in a like vs like sense. What I mean is if you compared Pakistan to the US the US beats Pakistan on every measure, yet the Pak Army/ISI beat us in Afghanistan (or will have barring a miracle). If Ivan went into the rest of Ukraine and the US and frontline NATO states embarked upon an Unconventional Warfare campaign I don't think the Russian economy could handle that, especially combined with economic sanctions over a period of years.

[wm]

I'm currently working on a quantitative assessment of national power (political, economic, and military) with an optional extended scale of science and social (soft power) dimensions. The intent is to capture the full breadth of a state's power.

I'd be interested to see what you use for assessing power and how you integrate the various elements to get an overall ranking.

I find interesting that you do not use the same factors of national power that the US uses --DIME vs. your PEM(SS).

I'd also like to point out that "power" rankings are often of little predictive value, as Ohio State and Cincinnati found out today in their NCAA Men's Hoops tourney games with Dayton and Harvard.