Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[AmericanPride]

Carl and Firn,

The point is that with or without Russian intervention, Ukraine would still be facing this same economic dilemma. And the problem isn't is "West better than East?" Because that's a false dichtonomy. Ukraine's integration into the Washington Concensus will unleash a very painful program on the Ukrainian people that will benefit a few small class of investors and financiers. Whatever his motivations and faults, Yanukovych rejected this program. His government was in an impossible situation given the immense pressure from both Washington and Moscow. A considerable of the portion of the population is in favor of this course of action - another considerable portion is in favor of achieving the status of a Russian protectate. The narrative of a spontaneous freedom-thirsty pro-West Ukrainian revolution is a myth.

[carl]

Carl and Firn,

The point is that with or without Russian intervention, Ukraine would still be facing this same economic dilemma. And the problem isn't is "West better than East?" Because that's a false dichtonomy. Ukraine's integration into the Washington Concensus will unleash a very painful program on the Ukrainian people that will benefit a few small class of investors and financiers. Whatever his motivations and faults, Yanukovych rejected this program. His government was in an impossible situation given the immense pressure from both Washington and Moscow. A considerable of the portion of the population is in favor of this course of action - another considerable portion is in favor of achieving the status of a Russian protectate. The narrative of a spontaneous freedom-thirsty pro-West Ukrainian revolution is a myth.

Yanukovych who stole how many millions, billions, was trying to spare the Ukrainian people the pain of closer integration with the West despite the wishes of rather a lot of Ukrainians. Yanukovych the humanitarian philanthropist. You learn something new every day.

[AmericanPride]

Yanukovych who stole how many millions, billions, was trying to spare the Ukrainian people the pain of closer integration with the West despite the wishes of rather a lot of Ukrainians. Yanukovych the humanitarian philanthropist. You learn something new every day.

You have a superficial reading of the situation and at no point did I say Yanukovych was a "humanitarian philanthropist". Quote me. At best, he was corrupt. At worst, a murderer. But that wouldn't make him any different from most of heads of state nor does it have any bearing on the fact of his democratic legitimacy, certified by an election, or the expression of the popular will of the Ukrainian population. Nor does it change the fact that sometime this month the new government in Kiev will approve the same IMF-imposed austerity measures that have failed in Greece, Portugal, and elsewhere and that Yanukovych, whatever his motivations, rejected.

There is sufficient economic data that demonstrates the failure of austerity as a growth policy. Austerity is not about growth. Austerity is about ensuring the gains of a small class of investors and financiers in a dying economy, whatever the costs to the general population. Austerity will not save Ukaine. Austerity has not saved any country. But that's not the goal of austerity. The same pain that has gripped Russia, Greece, Chile, and even Detroit will come to Ukraine. Capitalism is not about democracy. It's about profit. And austerity brings that distinction to the forefront.

[AmericanPride]

This article describes the Latvian experience with austerity. This is the "democratic" future of Ukraine if Kiev elects the IMF program:

Latvia’s solid economic growth since its economy plunged by 25 per cent in 2008-10 is billed as a success. Its unemployment during the crisis soared above 20 per cent as the shutdown of foreign capital inflows (mainly Swedish mortgage loans to inflate its real estate bubble) left Latvia with deep current-account deficits.

That said, Latvians strongly protested austerity. On January 13, 2009, in the dead of winter, 10,000 in Riga protested against austerity and corruption. Teachers, nurses and farmers held demonstrations in the months following. The national police were called to suppress protests over the closure of a hospital in Bauska; fearing local police might not do what was “required.”

Demographers estimate that 200,000 have departed the past decade – roughly 10 per cent of the population – at an accelerating rate that reflects the austerity being inflicted. Latvian demographers estimate that at least 200,000 have left Latvia the past decade, Moreover, birth rates declined from already low numbers.

Right Sector and Fatherland will get theirs. So will Washington and Brussels. Moscow's presence in Crimea will also mean they get theirs as well. But those protestors in Kiev who risked their lives for a better vision of Ukraine will be left bankrupt and bitter. Resolving the Crimea situation will not solve Ukraine's fundamental economic problem.

[Firn]

I actually I agree with the bit about austerity and it would be economic stupidity to demand certain actions to be implemented in the short term. I have written against the bane of austerity during a depression enough in the thread about the European economy.

However it is absolutely wrong to see the integration into the broader European economy just through the prism of the Washington consensus. It is in fact even completely wrong to describe the WC in such a one-sided way. It is important to keep the simple facts in mind. An it is a fact that the reforms in the spirit of the WC did also great good and were one reason why we have graphs like that.





I think you should try to step back and lookd at the big picture and avoid to see it all the economy in the austerity light. It is very important to avoid a false balance. The world is not black and white but also not a shade of gray right in the middle...

[Firn]

On a different note, I noted for the first time that indeed a lot of the Eastern and Northern FM are quite active twitter users. The Polish one:

Radosław Sikorski ‏@sikorskiradek

In Narva, Estonia, for V4+Baltic+Nordic FMs meeting, a town with 97% Russians. Can fraternal assistance from Spetsnatz be avoided here now?

[AdamG]

On a different note, I noted for the first time that indeed a lot of the Eastern and Northern FM are quite active twitter users. The Polish one:

I would suggest that any staff planning officers of small-to-mid sized countries within range of Russian Air Force An-124s start Red Teaming how Putin and his Kremlin crew could Georgia/Crimea them within five days (which looks like the New Red Army standard), along with whatever the triggers would be and maskirovka indicators Russian forces would hide behind. That'd be a prudent exercise.

For that poor little O3/O4 in the G3 Section out there suddenly tasked with something like this, have a leg-up;

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j...62578216,d.dmQ

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...1a02p_0001.htm

http://books.google.com/books?id=lJ9Gfxo_bxMC&pg

Powodzenia.

Anybody care to guess when the first of those fraternal liberators are killed by Tatar bombs or bullets and what the fraternal liberators will then do?

Flanking actions, baby, flanking actions.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...127#post153127

BTW the OCSE* storms an Ukrainian shop:

Nice haircuts.

[Firn]

@jmm99: A member of maternal grandfathers family actually got in trouble because as teen he was listening to Radio Moskva in the 30s. I no longer know why (a price?) he wrote a cost-free letter back, but that one must have earned him a place on some list, as he could gather through an informal channel. Very low down of course, but it did hamper his career.

@AdamG: The article about the Soviet Deception makes for interesting reading, I will have to take my time on that one.

--------------

Quite early in this thread I questioned the wisdom of Putins invasion into the Crimea. Vladimir Putin is losing the battle for Ukraine by Alex Massie puts some of my ideas in far better words:

It is always tempting, in the field of foreign affairs, to suppose we are led by dupes and fools while our opponents enjoy – or endure – leaders of boundless cunning. We are over-matched; they are playing three-dimensional chess. We are weak, they are strong. We are easily distracted, they are single-minded. We compromise, they are implacable. It is easy to over-estimate the opposition while under-estimating our own capabilities.

This attitude and it's consequences were already picked up by Clausewitz as one of the reasons why wars often moved so slowly and carefully. The difficulties and the frictions are all too plain on your side while those of your opponent are hidden. But I disgress:

Moscow, assisted by the blundering Yanukovych, has over-reached itself and in so doing is losing the prize it coveted in the first place. No government in Kiev can submit to Moscow now. Putin has pushed his near abroad further abroad. Russia is forcing Ukraine to make a choice it might prefer not to make. Should Kiev look east or west? By invading the Crimea and threatening eastern Ukraine Putin makes that choice for Kiev. It cannot return to Moscow centre. It must instead, albeit with some trepidation, look west.

That is, Putin is losing hearts and souls. Ukraine may remain a divided country but Russia is helping legitimise the new Ukrainian government. Helping, too, Ukrainians make up their minds. If they were conflicted a few weeks ago they are a little less conflicted now.

Almost nothing is certain, but there is no doubt that Putin has so far undermined the support for Russia of 40+ million Ukrainians to secure so far a bit over a million Russian speakers and the Crimea. It will be highly interesting to see how it plays out.

[mirhond]

to carl

Your judgement is clouded by strong emotions against something I don't care, sorry for bothering you.

Carl and Firn,

The point is that with or without Russian intervention, Ukraine would still be facing this same economic dilemma. And the problem isn't is "West better than East?" Because that's a false dichtonomy. Ukraine's integration into the Washington Concensus will unleash a very painful program on the Ukrainian people that will benefit a few small class of investors and financiers. Whatever his motivations and faults, Yanukovych rejected this program. His government was in an impossible situation given the immense pressure from both Washington and Moscow. A considerable of the portion of the population is in favor of this course of action - another considerable portion is in favor of achieving the status of a Russian protectate. The narrative of a spontaneous freedom-thirsty pro-West Ukrainian revolution is a myth.

You just took the words from my mouth! (Anyway, it'd take me several hours to put the words and thoughts into the right shape, no thanks to my inferior English)

Mike, these Russian citizens living in Ukraine, are they Russian expats or Ukrainians of Russian origin?

I have heard that the Russians are dishing out passports to prove these people are Russian citizens? This to justify their invasion.

If this is so then you can't be a Russian or a Ukrainian at the same time... if dual citizenship is allowed then the national parliament can - quickly - push a new law through making it impossible for Russian citizens and passport holders to also be citizens of the Ukraine.

Russian citizens would then be required to apply for residence permits and work permits to live and work in the Ukraine. Pretty standard requirements for citizens of another country.

Well, I dare say the current international borders of the Ukraine is of Russian/Soviet origin origin, same rule applies to population. There are hundreds of thousands pensionaries in Ukraine who are not Ukranian, not Russian, but actually Soviet, some of them were smart enough to keep the Russian citisenship in order to have a larger pension.
Those who are still in the workforce may have dual identities and dual heritage but one passport - Ukrainean, because AFAIK, dual citizenship with Ukraine isn't allowed. They are often work seasonally in Russia on unskilled jobs, and I hardly can imagine a situation when Russian residents would seek jobs in Ukraine, usually it's directly opposite.
But we have dual citizenship with Tajikistan - the major source of slave labor. Russian capital just dont need that much Ukrainians running around, because they are Russian-speaking, culturally close and harder to exploit. I'd like to gun down all of this capitalists for greater justice, but my sentiment is irrelevant
ps. Is anyone here ever mentioned "Shrugging off the Soviet legacy for good?" If yes, this person must be happy - now Russia is doing it right away by reshaping Soviet borders and kicking ass of may be not too friendly but historically and culturally close nation.

[AdamG]

OSINT in action.

On Monday, a freelancer photographer called Steve Back snapped a photograph of a document being carried cavalierly in the open by British officials entering Downing Street. The document was a list of suggested countermoves by Westminster to play against the Kremlin for Russia’s recent invasion of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. Some of the items tracked with what other European and American counterparts were thinking. Let’s not fuel up the NATO jets quite just yet; let’s send a monitoring team from the UN and/or OSCE to Crimea (Robert Serry, a UN envoy was nearly kidnapped earlier this week by armed gunmen in Simferopol); let’s draw up financial and energy contingency plans to help the embryonic new government in Kiev. But one item stuck out above the rest: “Not support, for now, trade sanctions… or close London’s financial centre to Russians.”

http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...gar-daddy.html

[JMA]

Yes, it is known how the British and the Germans have been ethically, morally and financially compromised in their dealings Russia and the criminals who direct the affairs of that state. It is assumed that the story of France is much the same.

It is more interesting to learn how the US has been either caught asleep at the wheel or sucked into similar dealings as the Europeans have. All will no doubt be revealed in due course.

OSINT in action.



http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...gar-daddy.html

[JMA]

Is anyone here ever mentioned "Shrugging off the Soviet legacy for good?" If yes, this person must be happy - now Russia is doing it right away by reshaping Soviet borders and kicking ass of may be not too friendly but historically and culturally close nation.

Yes, though there were many warning signs after the collapse of communism Russia was allowed to evolve into a criminal state. We now see the result of appeasement as the criminals flex their nationalistic muscles.

[kaur]

Former EU COM delegation head Michael Emerson has published couple interesting papers about Ukraine. Maybe Firn can comment the economical aspects of those association agreements and DCFTA. Emerson says that it all started as trade war and for deescalation all sides must solve that issue.

http://www.ceps.be/ceps/dld/8820/pdf

http://www.ceps.be/ceps/dld/8973/pdf

Ukraine is really devided country as those graphics in previous pages have showed. Here is surevey about EU AA/DCFTA and Customs union.

http://www.dw.de/ukrainian-support-f...nes/a-17189085

Next "interesting" place will be Moldova (where Russia has same kind of levers like in Ukraine) and their EU AA agreement.

http://www.cepolicy.org/news/eu-acce...mong-moldovans

One more interesting poll.

Integration with Russia into a single state is supported by 12% of respondents in Ukraine, and during recent years this number has decreased from 20% to 9%, but after Maidan – increased by 3%. The main part of supporters of this idea of unification with Russia is in the East (26%) and South (19%), while the smallest part is in the Center (5%) and West (1%) of Ukraine. By regions majority of integration with Russia in one state is in Crimea (41%), Donetsk district (33%), Lugansk district (24%), Odessa district (24%), Zaporizhzhya (17%) and Kharkiv (15%) districts, but even there support to the current status of relations with Russia - as two independent and friendly states – prevails

http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=news&id=237&page=1

[davidbfpo]

I have quickly read the SWJ exchanges on the Crimea, plus today's interview, but the writing of Professor John Schindler IMHO is always worth reading:http://20committee.com/2014/03/07/un...crimea-crisis/

Leaving aside the diplomatic reaction, the reluctance in Europe, especially the UK, to respond with any economic / financial sanctions makes one wonder if NATO can move beyond the symbolic. John's column today:http://20committee.com/2014/03/08/de...-putin-part-i/

[jmm99]

The events in the next few weeks will evidence whether EU-NATO can be "reinvigorated" as Schindler suggests in today's blog, Deterring Putin, Part I. His article from yesterday, Understanding the Crimea Crisis, is more interesting for a number of reasons.

The first is:

As I write, the Ukrainian region of Crimea is being absorbed by Russia, more or less openly. This represents a blatant challenge to the post-1991 European order, make no mistake, and so far Vladimir Putin is winning. After a sudden increase in Russian military personnel on the sensitive peninsula, more than 6,000 troops, mostly Special Operations Forces (SOF), Moscow has pulled out all the stops in waging what I have termed Special War: provocations, espionage, black and white propaganda, and the use of deniable SOF, often under false flag. None of this is new to the Russians, indeed it’s second-nature to the Kremlin, and Crimea today can best be viewed as one huge operation by Moscow’s powerful military intelligence, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which controls not just defense espionage matters but SOF too, what the Russians term SPETSNAZ.

One should then read Schindler's, The Coming Age of Special War (September 20, 2013); and also his reference to Wiki's Active Measures, as one facet of the SW diamond. What he says is not new (he doesn't claim it is); and can be found in these samplings of the literature: Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare; Beaufre - e.g., Introduction to Strategy and Deterrence and Strategy; Liddell-Hart, Strategy: the indirect approach; and Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.

Schindler's conclusion is pessimistic on US capability to enter the SW lists:

Special war works when competently handled. It’s very cheap compared to any conventional military operations, and if executed properly it offers states a degree of plausible deniability while achieving state interests without fighting. The United States at present is not ready – organizationally, legally, politically, or culturally – to compete in special war. But getting proficient in special war will soon not be a choice, but a necessity. We’re already losing at it, whether we realize it or not, and the current trajectory is worrying. Over 2,500 years ago Sun Tzu, an early advocate of special war, argued that the acme of skill is not winning battles, rather subduing your enemy without actually fighting. It’s about time the Pentagon caught on.

--------------------------------

The second point is EU-NATO (laid out in more detail in today's article linked in the opening paragraph), whose direction (up or down) will be determined by its actions and/or inactions in the near future. Schindler may be right about what the US and EU nations will do to deter Putin; but I'll wait until the check is in the mailbox.

--------------------------------

The third point includes the USG foreign affairs mindset (which goes beyond this event, in matters large and small), which often stumbles over its own feet (links to two other Schindler articles, link1 and link2; the first being about my "buddy" Samantha Power); and, as proponents of more delicate matters:

... they have quite literally nothing to say when old-school conventional threats emerge and enemies – yes, enemies: not rivals or merely misunderstood would-be partners – emerge from the darkness with conquest and killing on their minds.

but also, the third point goes to the urbane Worldview held by many people in the US (people from EU states can judge whether it applies to their countries or not):

In the present-day West, it’s commonplace to have a laugh at Vladimir Putin’s weirdly macho (and more than a little homoerotic) posturings, and I’ve done it too – how not, among the panoply of martial arts, bears, and countless shirtless adventures before the cameras? Yet in Russia they love this stuff, without a laugh-track. They are not yet as post-modern as we are, and they find reassurance in an old-school leader who talks about – and more importantly demonstrates – strength in a dangerous world.

To these folks of refined delicacy, "Suvarov's" love of the infantry spade would be too remote to seriously contemplate:

The spade is not only a tool and a measure. It is also a guarantee of the steadfastness of the infantry in the most difficult situations. If the infantry have a few hours to dig themselves in, it could take years to get them out of their holes and trenches, whatever modern weapons are used against them.
...
This is a book about people who throw spades and about soldiers who work with spades more surely and more accurately than they do with spoons at a table. They do, of course, have other weapons besides their spades.

One should ask himself, Am I an Athenian or a Spartan in Thucydidean terms ?

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Mike:

I don't understand the Athenian vs Spartan reference.

[TheCurmudgeon]

One should then read Schindler's, The Coming Age of Special War (September 20, 2013); and also his reference to Wiki's Active Measures, as one facet of the SW diamond. What he says is not new (he doesn't claim it is); and can be found in these samplings of the literature: Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare; Beaufre - e.g., Introduction to Strategy and Deterrence and Strategy; Liddell-Hart, Strategy: the indirect approach; and Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.

I read this and, again, did not see anything new. We conducted Special War all over South America in the 70's and 80's. So I don't think that what Schindler discusses is anything new (and you clearly state that he does not claim that).

First, I must say that what is going on the the Crimea is not Special War as defined by Schindler. A key component seems to be deny-ability, something I don't think the Russian's care about. They are playing a different card (or cards). Domestically, this is a mission to protect ethnic Russians with a not so subtle subtext of restoring Russia to its former imperial glory. That card also plays to the Chinese, who did much the same in Tibet. To Westerners, who have a different perspective on legitimacy in international action, they will play the R2P and the "will of the people".

There are two ways to respond. The first the "instant gratification" option - fight fire with fire. Move everything the US has into the area and threaten to start blowing things up unless they withdraw and allow in a UN Peacekeeping Force based on the numerous violations of international law (I always have to giggle when I use that term "international law"). We could probably do that except that, the reality is that we cannot support it logistically without diverting resources from Afghanistan. Luckily, bunch of that supply line is already in place. Politically, we must have the will and the funding to do this. Reality here is that, it would bankrupt us to begin another large scale military operation when when we have yet to pay for the last two and no one is in the mode to raise taxes. Plus, it won't be us who feels the pinch immediately. It will be the EU who will have its Natural Gas cut off. At least we are headed into spring.

The second option is the "slow as steady" option of economic sanctions. They do work, but only over the long haul and only if you are willing to stick to them. They also have to be universal, something we were able to do with Iran but are unlikely to be able to do with Russia.

Where does that leave us ... heck, I don't know. I am thinking it is going to have to be a little of both. Rebuild NATO along with sanctions. I don't think we are going remove the Russians from the Crimea. I do think we can establish the conditions to deal with Putin the next time he acts.

I do agree with Schindler that the US has created an expensive military of limited utility. We can do a big war better than anyone else, but that is of little use when our enemy know that so they avoid big wars. So we end up paying way too much for a military that is not flexible enough to provide what we need.

OK, I have ranted enough. I will return this string back to the professionals.