Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[AmericanPride]

That the Ukrainian economy is in turmoil after all those events is all too natural.

Right, but it's too often ignored that the overthrow of Yanukovych triggered this crisis in its current state. For several years Yanukovych was looking for a way out of Ukraine's economic problems either through the EU or Moscow. And neither delivered. He would not have survived the 'reforms' the new government is implementing, which is why he abandoned the EU Association Agreement. And while it's agreeable that Yanukovych was corrupt, we only have the word of his militant successors describing the extent of it. This situation could have been avoided with the February agreement.

Never waste a bitter crisis, kicking off key reforms and slashing subventions like on the enemys gas is smart if they execute it well with direct transfers to avoid too big of an demand shock.

....

Lots of things to add but it will be key to not have a heavy depression before the long-needed necessary reforms and the aid kick off growth. The Ukrainian situation is of course totally different from the circumstances in practically all European countries who sufferd and are suffering a depression.

How many "[well executed]" "key reforms" (read: austerity measures) claimed to be "smart" before the fact were actually well executed? The problem with the pro-austerity crowd is that when their policies are demonstrated to be abject failures, they retort that it wasn't sufficiently stringent or pure in its application. There is no evidence that Ukraine's experience with austerity will be any different than that of the Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the US, UK, or even Russia. What is different in Ukraine is it's unstable political situation entering into a period of austerity.

This is from Forbes:

They like him because he’s pro Western,” says Vladimir Signorelli, president of boutique investment research firm Bretton Woods Research LLC in New Jersey. “Yatsenyuk is the the kind of technocrat you want if you want austerity, with the veneer of professionalism,” Signorelli said. “He’s the type of guy who can hobnob with the European elite. A Mario Monti type: unelected and willing to do the IMFs bidding,” he said.

This isn't about democracy. Or corruption. Yatsenyuk is unelected. He also has no interest in a future political career and is totally committed to the IMF's program. That's very useful for Washington. But being a banker and economist usually doesn't make a good politician. Would Americans find it acceptable if the Tea Party besieged the Congress and White House, installed Tea Cruz, and then went full sped ahead in slashing Medicare and Social Security before the next presidential election? Why not wait to implement any policies until after the election?

Perhaps it is the perfect time to tackle the big issues, with an enemy at the borders, strong financial support coming in and the iterim government taking most of the blame. There is no doubt that the IMF, EU and USA have to deliver, the strategy is mostly sound and it depends now on the hard task of executing it.

The "perfect time" for whom? The people of Ukraine are no longer in control of their country. An unelected Western-backed technocrat with elite allies leads the administration in Kiev while Russia occupies Crimea and has amassed 30,000 soldiers on the border. In any language, this is a disaster for Ukraine, one precipitated by a coup in lieu of negotiations, and it will not be made easier by a policy of austerity. Yatsenyuk has 2 months to deliver a stablized economy to his successor in the May elections - I doubt he'll pull it off.

What do elections look like in a demographically divided, partially occupied, economically bankrupt, radicalized country?

[Firn]

The "perfect time" for whom? The people of Ukraine are no longer in control of their country. An unelected Western-backed technocrat with elite allies leads the administration in Kiev while Russia occupies Crimea and has amassed 30,000 soldiers on the border. In any language, this is a disaster for Ukraine, one precipitated by a coup in lieu of negotiations, and it will not be made easier by a policy of austerity. Yatsenyuk has 2 months to deliver a stablized economy to his successor in the May elections - I doubt he'll pull it off.

What do elections look like in a demographically divided, partially occupied, economically bankrupt, radicalized country?

So what is your solution? No elections in May? No reforms until May? No government decisions until that date?

It is all good and well to criticise heavily, but the Ukrainian leadership, elected by the parliament whose president fled threatened by popular uprising, has not the luxury to do the same. In this time of historic crisis it has to act to avoid in those bad times worse.

P.S: The IMF has got it right and wrong in the past, it isn't the devil. It is proper to criticise guidelines and policies but in your post it almost sounds like it is some kind of dark force wanting to do evil.

[AmericanPride]

Here's one about Russia's red lines:

Krutikov devotes his article to where these lines are. According to him, they include any further expansion of NATO eastward, especially involving Georgia and Ukraine, designed to encircle Russia. Instead, Putin’s first “red line” is that Ukraine, Georgia, Sweden and Finland must retain their “neutral status as ‘buffer countries.’”

And a ninth is American support for “a ‘fifth column’” of opposition figures in the Russian Federation and especially any encouragement for demonstrations against the Putin regime.

Another one:

“In his speech, Putin basically made it clear that from now on, Russia will act just like the United States does. “Why are Albanians permitted to do something in Kosovo … that Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars are prevented from doing in Crimea?”

“Vladimir Putin has announced that existing borders in the former Soviet Union could be reexamined if a threat emerges to what the Russian president himself calls the ‘Russian world’,” says Russian political analyst Sergei Markedonov.

I suppose in the celebrations following the collapse of the Soviet Union, not much thought at the policy level was given to the consequences of dispersing ethnicies across many borders despite the world's collective experience in Europe and Africa since World War II. Some credit the post WW2 population transfers for Europe's stability (and some also argue the same for the success of the 'surge' during the second Iraq War). Are we entering a similar era for the Slavic world?

However, the U.S. is not yet ready to accept Russia’s new foreign policy course. “We should not expect the West to recognize Ukraine as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. This would be a step backward in terms of the past 20 years in which Ukraine has been integrated into the transatlantic space,” says Andrew Weiss.

However, this position is not constructive and is fraught with new challenges. “The West, of course, can continue to refuse to negotiate, but this would further destabilize the situation in Europe. We must put an end to the uncertainty and unspoken issues that have persisted since the Cold War,” says Dmitry Suslov.

Several commenters here seem convinced that economic sanctions on Russia will be sufficient punishment to keep Moscow in check. I have my doubts. The Kremlin is not occupied by lawyers, businessmen, or technocrats like in most Western capitals. The stock market ticker is not correlated with political success. The danger is not in how to define the status of Russian power, but that Russian power is not fully integrated into the Washington-led economic system and therefore very few levers exist to compel specific policy choices in Moscow.

[AmericanPride]

So what is your solution? No elections in May? No reforms until May? No government decisions until that date?

May elections are great. I've been sayings since the beginning that the way forward for Ukraine is to have early elections. Implementing unpopular economic policies by an unelected technocrat before those elections are not so great. Was the Kiev revolution about democracy or capitalism? Because only one of them is victorious with Yatsenyuk in office.

It is all good and well to criticise heavily, but the Ukrainian leadership, elected by the parliament whose president fled threatened by popular uprising, has not the luxury to do the same. In this time of historic crisis it has to act to avoid in those bad times worse.

This "historic crisis" was created by the "Ukrainian leadership" after they compelled Yanukoych to flew. The administration in power now in Kiev is not innocent in this matter - it was Yatsenyuk, et al, not Yanukovych, that abandoned the February agreement and triggered the chain of events since then. So, yes, I'm very critical of that government which now calls upon my government to assist them materially and financially.

P.S: The IMF has got it right and wrong in the past, it isn't the devil. It is proper to criticise guidelines and policies but in your post it almost sounds like it is some kind of dark force wanting to do evil.

I never said the IMF is "the devil". But the IMF is definitely not concerned with matters of social justice. And social justice, not unrestrained capital movement, is the greater contributor to stability, peace, and democratization.

[carl]

American Pride:

One of your agreements seems to be that Yanukovych placed the interests of Ukraine over those of himself and of Russia.

You're going to have to do a much better job before you convince me of that.

[wm]

Fuchs---5-7 divisions fully manned, equipped and critically having the necessary supplies in place for a quick charge to Moldavia and into the eastern portion is a breeze when the Ukrainians cannot get more than 20K together at any given time.

A quick charge to Moldavia????-
From where? Certainly not Western Russia-t'would require crossing at least 2 significant water obstacles. If you really view this as a possible option then I suggest you assess the status/concentration of Russian tank/tracked vehicle transport assets--wheeled HETs and rail flatcars--in the area of the exercise force buildup. Then consider the road/rail networks to see how easy your sprint to Moldova or Donets might be.

If your exercise forces all crossed over into Crimea, then we might have a different scenario to consider.

Perhaps a better alternative possibility for the force/supply buildup is to provide emergency relief to Crimea if Ukraine cuts the utility cords.

[AmericanPride]

American Pride:

One of your agreements seems to be that Yanukovych placed the interests of Ukraine over those of himself and of Russia.

You're going to have to do a much better job before you convince me of that.

Then let me dispel you of that perception. The idea of the "invisible hand" (that self-interest leads to better public outcomes) strikes both ways. Yanukoyvch refused the EU deal out of self interest - he would not have survived the political turmoil of slashing subsidies and ending public programs. Whatever his motivations, that's clearly beneficial to a public using such programs. Yanukovych negotiated with the EU before he struck a deal with Moscow - that should tell you how much control the Kremlin actually had over him. He turned down the EU agreement after he measured the full political costs to himself. Yanukovych was a self-interested pragmatist; what's good about them is that they're predictable. And predictability is desirable in politics and security.

Yatsenyuk is an ideologue and his ideology is capitalism. Ideologues are not predictable or rational. They're committed to abstract principles at the exclusion of material experience. That's why Yatsenyuk has clearly said he's on a "kamikize mission"; he knows he has a small window to implement his dreamy ideals of unrestrained capitalism before reality catches up with him and the public throws his government out of office. That's why he's not running for election - he knows he can't win. His agenda of unpopular policies relied upon the use of force to install him in office. So he's going to push as hard and fast as possible to secure his gains before the election - that'll shape the political field for his successor. He has admitted as much several times in public statements.

So what are the "interests of Ukraine"? Let's keep it broad: political sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic stability seem like good, general interests. The first was destroyed when Yanukovych, who was democratically elected, was thrown from office. There is no sovereignty while Yatsenyuk is in office - he was never elected by the public. That triggered the crisis in territorial integrity; not only the intervention by Russia to seize Crimea, but also the widespread agitation of ethnic Russians who are suspicious of Yatsenyuk's government and it's clear disregard that upwards of ~40% of Ukrainians do not want to join the EU. So despite Ukraine's close material ties with Russia, all of that is simply ignored and discarded, including billions of dollars in unconditional aid, which will no doubt contribute to Ukraine's economic instability.

So, Yanukovych is out and Yatsenyuk is in. That doesn't help the average Ukrainian. The way forward for Ukraine is a free and open election, not economic austerity.

[Fuchs]

They could... but they won't. Austerity is not a humanist program. It's not even intended to salvage sinking economies; the economic literature and recent experiences in Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, UK, and US all make this clear. It's meant to secure whatever remains in a dying economy for the creditors... at the expense of pensioners, the poor, the sick, workers, veterans, the unemployed, and so on. Even the IMF's own economists admit as much. Austerity will not save Ukraine.

Reality is much more complicated than that, and "austerity" is a poor description of many reforms.
The IMF's admission about the multiplier of government spending is not relevant to the Ukrainian situation, as it's about a specific set of economic conditions - many of which are not met.
It's complicated.

The Ukraine, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, United States - all of them have moved into economic traps from which it's very hard if not impossible to escape without major scars. Yes, I included the bubble in Turkey even though it did not burst yet.


A long period (5+ years) of bad economic policies can create such traps, and it's not helpful to point out that a particular recipe for leaving the trap is painful while all the other recipes don't work well either. It's a trap!

[Dayuhan]

It is of course true that the policies that created the situation have to change, the gas subsidy in particular standing out as something unsustainable. Whether it's wise to simply drop them all at once, rather than phasing them out over a period of time, is another question.

I'm just recalling Manila in '86... when Marcos finally fled, the IMF came in and insisted that a Government that was barely functional had to drop a huge range of subsidies on basic goods (food, electricity, and fuel in particular) overnight. Prices soared, and the reaction on the street was not pretty. No question that the subsidies had to go, but there has to be some consideration for the need to avoid imposing massive political shocks on a government that is still trying to figure out which drawer the paper clips are in and where all the money went.

The Ukraine is of course a different place and a different situation, but I would think that the IMF might at least consider a phased reduction in subsidies rather than an outright cutoff.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan ---this goes a little to what JMA is alluding to even though I do not necessarily blame it only this WH

If Neptune invaded Uranus, JMA would find a way to blame the White House.

---it goes back to a large degree the Bush years "who looked Putin in the eyes"........

Bush may or may not have "looked Putin in the eyes", but whatever they saw didn't stop Putin from invading Georgia on Bush's watch.

There seems to be an assumption that if the US had done something different, or had different leadership, events in the Ukraine would have come out differently. Those assumptions seem to me rather tenuous at best: any "what if" scenario is inherently speculative. US reluctance to get involved in a military face-off with another nuclear power in the other guy's back yard is not something new and it is not a feature of any recent "soft power" strategy: it goes back to the beginning of the nuclear age. It is very unlikely that a Republican President or any other American leader would have responded any differently.

What worries me and it goes to this WH is a distinct lack of clarity in fully explaining the current Russia issue

What worries me is what seems like a reflexive Amercian-centric response assuming that the primary constraint on Russian action is and must be the actual or expected US response. I don't think that's consistent with reality. This is not the Cold War, Russia is not the Soviet Union, and Europe is not some frail fainting virgin that can only be rescued from inevitable ravishment at the hands of the bear by an aggressive US posture. That was another age.

If the White House, over the last few administrations, had tried to get the US public riled up over the threat Russia poses to Europe, what would have been the natural reaction? Don't you think Americans might have pointed out that Europe's combined GDP is 8 times that of Russia. Germany, France, and the UK each have a higher GDP than Russia. Combined EU defense spending is 3 times that of Russia... and the EU spends only 1.7% of GDP on defense, as opposed to well over 4% for the US and Russia, meaning that Europe can afford to spend a whole lot more if they choose to.

I don't think the American people are going to buy the notion that Russia is a direct threat to the US. To Europe, perhaps, but why should the US spend scarce resources to defend Europe when Europe is so clearly capable of defending itself? Trying to sell Americans on the idea that the US should keep troops in Europe at American expense to protect Europe from Russia is going to be a losing proposition unless Europe is willing to step up and invest in their own defense. Leadership does not mean doing everything for everyone. Sometimes it means encouraging and if necessary forcing those you lead to make use of their own capacities.

This image of mighty Russia setting up to roll over helpless Europe has got to stop. It's not real. If the Europeans want or need American assistance, we should certainly be willing to discuss that, if they ask nicely and offer to cover at least a substantial part of the cost. There is absolutely no need for the US to shove its way in and assume the role of protector of Europe.

None of this means that the US should neglect or ignore its allies, especially if those allies ask for help. It means that the US is in no economic position to provide defense for everyone, everywhere, all the time, and that allies with the capacity to provide for their own defense need to step up and do it, not expect the US taxpayer to protect them.

For way to long we as a country ignored Russian and Putin since 2000 as we literally chased the "bad guys" around the world and in the end it was a failure and a 4T USD loss.

Certainly the American habit of committing large scale military force to objectives that are neither attainable by military force nor essential to US interests has dissipated US military capacity and wasted a lot of money... but did that really affect Russian decision making in Crimea? I can't see a US administration dispatching military force to defend or retake Crimea under any circumstances.

For example--this WH dallied on calling out Russia for being in violation of the INF, for not being in compliance with the agreements they signed under the OCSE since 2001... that Russian activities in the southern hemisphere has drastically picked up to a point of matching them from 30 years ago and the list goes on.

If the US had made an issue of all these things, what would have changed? Not much, I expect. The US would still not be willing to go to war with Russia over Crimea, and there would still be a general reluctance to shove forces into Europe.

What "Russian activities in the southern hemisphere" are you referring to?

The same WH and the previous WH have failed to indicate to the American population that Russia is currently being managed by four separate organizations ie the Russian Security Services FSB/GRU/MoI, the oligarchs, the Army and especially the Russian Mob.

Are you suggesting that the White House should be positioning Russia as a threat to the US, and telling the American people ought to fear Russia? I don't see that internal balance (or imbalance) of power as something that should strike fear into the hearts of the US.

Certainly the US needs a coherent policy for dealing with Russia, and certainly (and more importantly) the US and Europe should be working together to develop joint policies. Fear and the unnecessary inflation of threat make a very poor basis for policy.

Take a map and draw in the Russian Federation then draw in the "Stans" that are under direct Russian influence

Russia has some influence in the "'Stans", but if they want to re-integrate them into a resurrected Soviet Union they will face a real challenge from another major power that is rapidly establishing itself as a dominant economic player in that region: China. The Chinese have moved into Central Asia in a big way, with lots of money to invest and long term deals to make. In the medium to long term I'd rate the likelihood of Russia and China facing off with each other over Central Asia as higher than the probability of either Russia or China facing off with the US. Both have extensive land borders with that region, and both consider it strategically critical, far more than it would be to the US.

One is looking at the former Soviet Union all over again and this in the 21st century when the Cold War was suppose to be over.

From the perspective of threat to the US, no. The Cold War was never just the Soviet Union vs the US. The Soviet Union represented an expanding ideology that the US perceived as an existential threat. That ideology took root far outside the Soviet sphere of influence and was perceived as raising the possibility of an ideologically coherent global bloc. That is simply not the case with today's Russia. The closest thing to an ideology behind Putin's moves is Russian nationalism. Ruissian nationalism is not Communism or an equicalent to Communism. We do not have to worry about Russian nationalism breaking out in Cuba or Nicaragua or Venezuela, or about Russian nationalist parties gaining a political foothold in western nations. It's a self-limiting ideology: it only appeals to Russians. Certainly it's a concern, especially in the immediate neighborhood and in countries with substantial Russian populations, but Russia is not the Soviet Union and this is not a new Cold War. That doesn't mean it's not a problem, but it needs to be placed in perspective.

So in formulating foreign policy just how does one go about it if in fact the American public is totally in the dark?

Not by trying to spread fear.

Do we have a strategy that reflects a clear end goal and what is to be achieved and or we just going to muddle through this over and over.

Putin does have a strategy and it is long term.

He probably does, but whether recent events in the Ukraine were part of that strategy is another question. I do not for a moment believe that the Ukrainian revolution was provoked by Moscow as a pretext for seizing the Crimea. I don't think that revolution was planned or expected by Russia, or that it was initially welcome. It did eventually provide an opportunity that Putin seized. That looks less piece of a long term strategy than an act of opportunism.

Realistically: Putin has Crimea, and he's not going to let it go. Not saying that's good or bad or right or wrong, it's just what is. Nobody's going to take it away from him, and given the emotional and ego factors it's not likely that sanctions will force him to release it. If sanctions can impose enough pain on Russia's economic elite, whose support Putin needs, it might (or might not) discourage any further Russian moves. In any event it's a regional crisis that involves primarily Europe with the US in a supporting role, not an existential threat to the US.

If all this convinces Europe that a threat exists, and persuades them to raise defense spending to a more credible level, this could actually be a long-term gain for the US. The idea that "leader of the free world" translates to "sole supplier of defense to the free world" is long overdue for retirement. Freedom ain't free, and all who enjoy it need to invest in maintaining it, not just Americans. If the Ukraine has to lose Crimea to deliver that message, that is not a critical loss to the US. The message is a good deal more critical.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---you did see the article written by a former internal Russian political type who in fact alluded to fact that long term plans existed, did exist and were just taken out and implemented.

Come on Dayuhan---you write like mirhond did---what is actually your own personal uninhibited opinion?---taking apart anyone's comments is actually easy---writing and defending one's opinion is actually tougher.

So what do you think Putin is doing , will do and what his future is to be?

Two points stand out over the last three weeks;

1. he wants to rebuild the greater Soviet Union---that is a given
2. in a Interfax PR released last night he definitely as I alluded to a couple of times fears the "street" breaking into the Russian population---and that is definitely a given

[OUTLAW 09]

wm---even the NATO Senior Commander an American used the same word---charge across to Moldavia---would run along the southern border after merging with the Crimea forces which by the way are still being increased.

Question would be if the Crimea is secure then why the increase in armored forces being photographed really near the border when the Ukrainian forces are just using personnel carries minus tanks?

If the Russian ground forces have the airborne capability that was exercised and they are still by the way on alert status then bridges and major rod intersections are never an issue for the Russian Army.

The Daily Beast article would be a good place to read about the open window they have due to the weather---they no longer need roads.

[OUTLAW 09]

American Pride---just curious so in all your comments I hear you saying that a democratically elected president who together with his cronies stole over 70B then fled ---even his dentist son went to billionaire status in under three years---how is that possible---is far better than the street tossing out the former crook and installing an interim individual who seems to have some support from somewhere.

And the 42kilos of gold bars and $5M in cash left behind was what the average earned Ukrainian blue collar working class individual salary for say one week?

How can that be good?---if in fact the Maidan was not an outburst against the rule of law and good goveranance what was it? ---the neo Nazi nationalist takeover that Putin and Co. claim it was or was it an undercover Western land grab to takeover the raw resources of the country?

Come on AP you are sliding back into the political debate I went through on the FU Berlin in the 60/70s between world communist dominance and the evils of capitalism---the world has moved on and it is now all about the rule of law and good governance and along the way if a country can get an economy moving along that is accepted by the population regardless of how it looks then so be it.

The Maidan regardless of what one thinks was an expression of the population and we at a distance should accept that simple fact and provide them any support in getting their economy and country moving again all the while an invasion army sits on their borders, the Russian special forces and GRU are in the country and the Russian backed President raped the country.

Remember even in some of the Arab countries that have had a color revolution they have at least moved further along than some of the former Soviet Union empire countries since 1994.

One can say this is a "colored" view of the current Russian military situation but it is probably as close as one will get without reading the classified reports.

http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukra...ar-341161.html

[JMA]

I'm not fully through, but it is a great read. He also warned of the nationalistic tendencies in Russia partly rooted in the 'tragedy' of the lost empire. Interestingly the commodity exports back then were also increasingly used to fund imperial ambitions and to keep the inefficient system going. Time will tell what will happen to Putin's Russia.

Nationalistic tendencies among the Russias were obvious all along.

What happened was in the years after the Soviet collapse the US and western Europe took their eye off the ball thinking they could build 'normal' relations with Russia. Not smart.

The problem with Russia's dreams of empire are that to be achieved it means that numerous nations and ethnic peoples need to be absorbed, dominated and controlled most likely against the wishes for self determination of the peoples concerned.

The world is now reaping the results of the strategic incompetence of the US and Europe. G_d help us all.

[JMA]

I note with some interest that where you have been a loud and vocal champion of International Law when it came to US / NATO involvement on Libya, Syria etc you are quiet on the Russian invasion of Crimea.

Also of course what comes to mind is your earlier defence of the German strategic decision to accept energy reliance on Russian oil/gas.

Have you changed your position on these issues?

Reality is much more complicated than that, and "austerity" is a poor description of many reforms.
The IMF's admission about the multiplier of government spending is not relevant to the Ukrainian situation, as it's about a specific set of economic conditions - many of which are not met.
It's complicated.

The Ukraine, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, United States - all of them have moved into economic traps from which it's very hard if not impossible to escape without major scars. Yes, I included the bubble in Turkey even though it did not burst yet.


A long period (5+ years) of bad economic policies can create such traps, and it's not helpful to point out that a particular recipe for leaving the trap is painful while all the other recipes don't work well either. It's a trap!

[JMA]

Ok you have finally seen through Dayuhan.

I warned you.

You really expect a comprehensive response?

Dayuhan---you did see the article written by a former internal Russian political type who in fact alluded to fact that long term plans existed, did exist and were just taken out and implemented.

Come on Dayuhan---you write like mirhond did---what is actually your own personal uninhibited opinion?---taking apart anyone's comments is actually easy---writing and defending one's opinion is actually tougher.

So what do you think Putin is doing , will do and what his future is to be?

Two points stand out over the last three weeks;

1. he wants to rebuild the greater Soviet Union---that is a given
2. in a Interfax PR released last night he definitely as I alluded to a couple of times fears the "street" breaking into the Russian population---and that is definitely a given

[JMA]

So what do you think, big guy?

A quick charge to Moldavia????-
From where? Certainly not Western Russia-t'would require crossing at least 2 significant water obstacles. If you really view this as a possible option then I suggest you assess the status/concentration of Russian tank/tracked vehicle transport assets--wheeled HETs and rail flatcars--in the area of the exercise force buildup. Then consider the road/rail networks to see how easy your sprint to Moldova or Donets might be.

If your exercise forces all crossed over into Crimea, then we might have a different scenario to consider.

Perhaps a better alternative possibility for the force/supply buildup is to provide emergency relief to Crimea if Ukraine cuts the utility cords.

[Fuchs]

Cited in part:

My recollection was that these two items were cancelled sometime ago, much to the annoyance of the Czech and Polish governments who had fought hard to persuade their public.

I may have missed some U.S. logistics troops in Romania as well.

[JMA]

I've been rather quiet on SWC for months actually.

There was a recent text on my blog equating the Western and Russian violations of IL and pointing out the recent hypocrisy. Legally the Russians have a pretty good case when they compare Western behaviour against Yugoslavia with their behaviour against Ukraine, except the violated guarantees. But treaties were violated by Western countries as well, so they can construct equivalent Western evilness by adding a few violations.
The West clearly was lacking self-discipline, and now it sees what happens when other great powers lose respect for rules, too.

That was no answer... unless you are OK with the Russian action on the grounds of previous US actions elsewhere.

Are you OK ... without reservation... with the Russian action?

The gas supply thing is still the same; Russians are even more dependent than Germans on the pipeline, and we've had natural gas trade with them since well into the Cold War. It's largely a non-issue. Even a complete cut-off would merely be a nuisance when compared to historical embargoes.
The "energy reliance" on natural gas makes up only 22.5% Germany's energy 'consumption' and the minority of its natural gas consumption is from Russia: 38%

8.5%: Anybody who thinks Germany - the people whose parents and grandparents waged two world wars under total naval blockade - couldn't cope with a loss of this is a fool.
It would be painful, but more like a paper cut pain than like the pain of a submission technique.

Yes... Germany can cope with an abrupt termination of supply... but are they prepared to expose themselves to the disruption... as a reaction to the Russian invasion of Crimea?

My guess is no. The Germans are too fat and comfortable to act in support of international Law and the self determination of a fellow European people if they have to take some 'pain' in the process.

But the original strategic decision to place themselves in a position of dependency for energy from Russia was clearly an error and damaging to the German ability to act according to - what one would believe is - their conscience.

This decision must rank along with the decision to invade Russia in June 1941. It seems when the Germans screw up they screw up big.

[wm]

So what do you think, big guy?

I gave you an hypothesis in the third paragraph. Another option is Russia is that conveying a threat so Ukraine thinks long and hard about pulling the utilies plug on the Crimea.